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Abstract 
Contemporary terrorism is linked to Islam, and thus the focus of counter terrorism work is on 
Muslim communities especially as far as the UK is concerned following the events of July 2005. 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse how, if at all terrorism and counter terrorism has 
affected British Muslims both according to law and according to their perceptions. 
The study focuses on a sample of British Kashmiri Muslims and seeks their perceptions of 
terrorism and the British counter terrorism policies and legislation. The study employs 
qualitative fieldwork techniques, alongside scholarly research on legislation and socio-legal 
literature. The findings contribute original analysis and fieldwork data to the academic literature 
and discussions on counter terrorism in general, and on the British Kashmiri Muslim community 
in particular. 
The thesis analyses the tensions between the government's counter terrorism agenda and the 
community's perception ofthos~. This thesis highlights that some counter terrorism policies such 
as Prevent are effective in encouraging community co-operation, whilst other areas of active 
policing create anxiety and thus hinder community co-operation. In addition there is a clash of 
perceptions about what constitutes terrorism, especially regarding activities abroad, and it is this 
'clash' that has to be addressed by those working with these communities. The research further 
identifies the potential vulnerability within this group and their social status within the society 
they live in. The findings emphasise that despite the anxieties related to the counter terrorism 
legislation, the interviewees accept national security requirements at home, but struggle to accept 
that foreign policy affairs in Kashmir should be affected by the United Kingdom's security laws. 
ii 
Contents. 
Page 
Acknowledgements 
Abstract 11 
Contents III 
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction. The Law against Terrorism and Islam 
1.1 Background 
1.2 Summary of the Problem 2 
1.3 Objectives of the Research 3 
1.4 Overview of the Thesis 3 
CHAPTER TWO: Overview of the British Kashmiri Community 7 
2.1 Introduction 7 
2.2 Background to the Dispute in Kashmir 8 
2.2.1 Historical Dispute 8 
2.2.2 Political Dispute 10 
2.3 Kashmir and the concept of self-determination 14 
2.4 Human Rights violations 16 
2.4.1 Human Rights violations on individuals 16 
2.4.2 Human Rights violations on the 'collective' community 17 
2.5 Terrorist Groups in Kashmir 21 
iii 
Page 
2.6 Summary 25 
2.7.1 A Profile of Kashmiris in Britain 26 
2.7.2 British Kashmiris - Ethnography 28 
2.7.3 Migration 29 
2.7.4 Identity 30 
2.7.5 Religion 33 
2.8 Conclusion 35 
CHAPTER THREE: Methodology and Fieldwork 38 
3.1 Introduction 38 
3.2 Aims and Objectives of the Research 39 
3.3 Methodology 40 
3.3.1 Qualitative and Quantative Research 40 
3.3.2 Qualitative Research Method 41 
3.4 Researcher Bias 42 
3.5 Access and Sample Selection 44 
3.6.1 In depth Interviewing 47 
3.6.2 Questions 49 
3.6.3 Interview Guide or Schedule 49 
3.6.4 Recording 50 
3.6.5 Participants 51 
iv 
Page 
3.6.6 Overview of the Participants 51 
Table la: Gender and Age 51 
Tablelb: Education of the Participants 52 
3.7 Data Analysis 52 
3.8.1 Ethical Issues 53 
3.8.2 Confidentiality 53 
3.9 Strengths and Limitations 56 
3.10 Conclusion 56 
CHAPTER FOUR: Terrorism 58 
4.1 Introduction 58 
4.2 What is the definition of Terrorism? 59 
4.2.1 United Kingdom's definition of Terrorism 60 
4.2.2 Europe's definition of terrorism 64 
4.2.3 International law definitions of terrorism 65 
4.2.4 Scholarly / philosophical attempts to define terrorism 71 
4.2.5 The subjective definition of terrorism 75 
4.2.6 Summary 80 
4.3.1 Categories of Terrorism 82 
4.3.2 State-Sponsored Terrorism 82 
4.3.3 State's manipulation of Non-State terror? 85 
4.3.4 Nationalist Terrorism 85 
4.3.4.1 Self DeterminationINational Liberation 86 
v 
Page 
4.3.4.2 Nationalist Groups 88 
4.3.5 Ideological Terrorism 89 
4.3.6 The International Network of AI-Qaeda 89 
4.3.6.1 'Islamic Fascists?' 89 
4.3.6.2 AI-Qaeda 90 
4.3.7 Summary 92 
4.4 Terrorism and Religion - New generation of ideological terror? 92 
4.5 Fieldwork analysis on the concept of 'terrorism' 92 
4.5.1 Research Findings 93 
4.5.2 Summary of the Fieldwork findings 97 
4.6 Conclusion 97 
CHAPTER FIVE: Terrorism in the name of Islam 101 
5.1 Introduction 101 
5.2 Terrorism and Religion 102 
5.2.1 Religion as the Motivator of Terrorism 102 
5.2.2 Religion as a tool for political opposition 103 
5.2.3 AI-Qaeda and Religious Terrorism 105 
5.3 Overview of the teachings of Islam 106 
5.3.1 Islamic law 106 
5.3.2 Compulsory duties that derive from the sources 107 
5.3.3 Discourse in the belief of 'one Islam' 108 
5.4 Does Islam legitimise terrorism 110 
vi 
Page 
5.5 Islam and the role of war 113 
5.6 Use of the term 'Jihad' 115 
5.7 The concept of suicide in Islamic law 119 
5.8 What motivates Islamic terrorists? 122 
5.9 The 'Clash' 130 
5.10.1 Islamaphobia 134 
5.10.2 Global lslamaphobia 138 
5.11 Conclusions 141 
CHAPTER SIX: Terrorism Policing laws and the British Kashmiri Muslim 
Community 144 
6.1 Introduction 144 
6.2 CONTEST 145 
6.3 Counter Terrorism Legislation and PURSUE 146 
6.3.1 Police Discretion and Stop and Search 147 
6.3.2 Stop and Search under the Terrorism Act 2000 149 
6.3.3 The Pre-Crime Justification 158 
6.3.4 The Arrest Power under Anti Terrorism Legislation 160 
6.3.5 Section 41 and Detention 161 
6.3.6 Summary of the participants views on sections 44 and 41 165 
6.3.7 Airport Policing 165 
6.4.1 Prevent 168 
6.4.2 How effective is the Prevent strategy? 171 
vii 
Page 
6.4.3 Prevent and Neighbourhood Policing 178 
6.5 Wider Consequences of Terrorism Policing on the 
British Kashmiri Muslim Community 186 
6.5.1 Suspect Community? 186 
6.5.2 British Kashmiri Muslim community's views on 
'suspect community.' 191 
6.5.3 Fear 195 
6.6 Conclusions 197 
CHAPTER SEVEN: Terrorism Activity Laws and the British Kashmiri 
Muslim community 199 
7.1 Introduction 199 
7.2 Proscription powers: Membership of an organisation 199 
7.2.1 Overview 199 
7.2.2 Factors determining proscription 200 
7.2.3 British Kashmiri Muslim participants views on Kashmir 203 
7.2.4 Analysis 206 
7.2.5 Proscribed Organisation Appeals Commission (POAC) 208 
7.2.6 Application and Effectiveness of Proscription 209 
7.2.7 Further Analysis 211 
7.3 Glorifying Terrorism 212 
7.3.1 Background 212 
7.3.2 United Kingdom's response 214 
viii 
Page 
7.3.3 Critique of the Glorification and Dissemination legislation 
under Terrorism Act 2006 218 
7.4 The Offence of Withholding Information 225 
7.5 Financing of Terrorist Organisations 227 
7.5.1 Overview of the Counter Terrorism Financing Legislation 228 
7.5.2 Effectiveness of the Counter Terrorism Financial Crimes 230 
7.6 Conclusion 234 
CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusions 237 
8.1 The Rhetoric and Real ity 237 
8.2 Analysis of the Reality 238 
8.3 Themes and Typologies 239 
8.3.1 The Dismissive 239 
8.3.2 Advocates of Kashmir 240 
8.3.3 The British Patriots 242 
8.3.4 The Advocates of Ummah 244 
8.3.5 The Seekers 245 
8.3.6 The Guardians 246 
8.4 Further Analysis 246 
8.5 Overview of the Research Process 248 
8.6 Future Trends 249 
APPENDIX One Interview Schedule / Guide 251 
ix 
APPENDIX Two Interview Consent Form 
APPENDIX Three Critical Self Reflection 
APPENDIX Four Characteristic Analysis of the Participants 
Bibliography 
List of Cases 
x 
Page 
254 
255 
256 
259 
301 
Chapter One Introduction 
The Law against Terrorism and Islam 
1.1 Background 
Terrorism has become a major focus of, and is viewed as a major threat to, contemporary 
democratic societies. The events of 11 September 200 I not only shocked the nations. but created 
a global 'war on terror' according to some world leaders. This in turn created an upheaval in 
'political systems' which prioritized national security and thus allowed counter terrorism agendas 
to prevail. I In conjunction with the new counter terrorism policies is the strong focus as potential 
risks or even suspects on Islam and Muslim communities that reside in the UK and other 
Western nations. The nature of attacks undertaken by those professing the Islamic faith on 
September 200 I, and July 2005 has intensified the perception in the United Kingdom that the 
'war on terror' is being fought at home as well as abroad. 
The focus in this thesis on British Kashmiri Muslims is fitting because of their connection \\ ith 
the turbulent situation in Kashmir itself, and the allegation that Kashmiri militants receive some 
of their financial contributions from the British Muslims of Kashmiri origin. This situation 
perpetuated anxiety tollowing the events of September I I 200 I, and deepened the concerns that 
Kashmir is contributing towards the creation of global terrorism. Moreover, Tanweer, one or the 
July 2005 bombers had 'spent time at a training camp near the Kashmir border run by Harkat ul-
Mujahedin ("Movement for Holy Warriors")'.2 Thus, it is also fitting that the nature of terrorism, 
indeed the terrorist's self proclaimed agenda in the name of Islam, will inevitably find Islam and 
those practicing it under scrutiny. However. the imperative issue as described by Leigh, should 
be that of 'balanced targeting.') Hence, in discllssing 'the credentials of Islam in the context of 
I Moran J. (2008) 'Politics, Security, Intelligence and Liberty after 9/11' in Moran J. & Phythian M. (eds.) 
Intelligence. Security and Policing Post - 9/11.' Hampshire. Palgrave MacMillan at p.15. 
2 Phythian M. (2008) 'In the Shadow of9/11 Security, Intelligence and Terrorism in the UK', in Moran J. &Phythian 
M. (editors) op cit at p.39. 
3 Leigh I. (2008) 'National Security, Religious Liberty and Counter terrorism', in Moran J. & Phythian M. (eds.) op 
cit at p.l 16. 
terrorism',4 there has to be the balance between the recognition that there exists violent discourse 
in the interpretation of Islam, and that the majority of British Muslims are opposed to terrorism. 
In this way, 'the most effective responses to acts of terror, in short. arc thoughtful. measured 
ones, not reactions driven by fear and emotion.'5 These 'thoughtful. measured' responses 
recognize 'the sophisticated, secretive and committed nature of terrorist groups/' that requires 
counter terrorism policies that are dependant not only on counter terrorism legislation but on the 
'elevated imp0l1ance' of community co-operation.7 Consequently, an understanding of the 
community dynamics specifically in relation to counter-terrorism legislation is a vital step 
towards achieving the ultimate goal of co-operation and thereby counter-terrorism. These ideas 
will be applied in this thesis to selected Kashmiri communities in the UK. 
1.2 Summary of the Problem 
As suggested by the preceding discussion, the threat from terrorism is a perpetual concern, and 
those implementing their agenda in the name of Islam have brought Muslim communities \vithin 
the core focus of counter-terrorism. Indeed it was the radicalization of 'home - grown' young 
Muslim men that led to the atrocities of July 2005. The present government's counter terrorism 
policies aim to eliminate terrorism by various strategies including community involvement. 
However. the problem lies in the fact that there is insufficient research on the views, attitudes 
and behaviour of the Muslim communities in relation to terrorism and counter terrorism 
legislation. Therefore, it is unclear whether the government's policy is viable. It is proposed that 
this thesis will attempt to redress this void to some extent in relation to selected Kashmiri 
communities, whose co- operation is deemed vital for the elimination of the terrorist threat. 
4 Rehman J. (2005) Islamic State Practices, International Law and the Threatfrom Terrorism. A Critique of the 
'Clash of Civilisations' in the New World Order. Oxford: Hart Publishing at p.221. 
5 Forst B. (2009) Terrorism. Crime and Public Policy. Cambridge: CUP at p.297. 
6 Walker C. (2011) Terrorism and the Law. Oxford: OUP at p.55. 
7 Walker C. (2011) op cit at 55. 
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1.3 Objectives of the Research 
The purpose of the thesis is to question whether the legal conception of terrorism and thc 
implementation of key aspects of counter-terrorism laws, as applied in the UK, are necessarily in 
conflict with the culture of British based Kashmiri communities or whether the apparent clashes 
between the two arise more from the manner of implementation of British law or the embedded 
culture combined with Islamic beliefs. In addition, research will be undertaken as to whether the 
perceptions of contemporary terrorism are affected by the historical and political violence in 
their ancestral land, of Kashmir. To test these questions, the research will examine the 
substantive counter-terrorism policies and laws and will, in addition, conduct qualitative 
fieldwork to provide an insight into the views of a sample of the Muslim community (of 
Kashmiri origin) in the UK in relation to terrorism and the policies and law on terrorism. The 
study will explore to what extent the UK's anti-terrorism laws are viewed as 'acceptable' and 
adequate. or as giving rise to perverse outcomes such as creating sympathy and even support for 
terrorism, or at least negative outcomes in terms of non-cooperation. This study is particularly 
important since it has been held that 'excessive,8 legislation can 'inflame rather than dcter 
extremism.'9 It is also original for no such survey of British Kashmiris has previously been 
undertaken. 
1.4 Overview of the Thesis 
Part One of the thesis will include three chapters. Chapter One will provide the background to 
the thesis, the summary of the problem, and an overview of the thesis and Chapter Two will 
provide an overview of the selected sample, namely the British Kashmiri community. Both 
chapters are necessary for clarification, and understanding of the subject matter. In addition, 
Chapter Two provides a 'background' for the fieldwork. It emphasizes an analysis of the history 
of Kashmir, the current political situation, and the British Kashmiri Muslim's role in Kashmir 
and the UK. It allows insight as to how this important selected group perceive the 'terrorists' 
groups in Kashmir, and how this background belief affects their views about the British 
8 Walker C. (2009) Blackstone's Guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation. Oxford University Press: Oxford at 206. 
9 Rahman. R v Mohammed [2008] EWCA Crim 1465 at para 8. 
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government's counter-terrorism policies within the UK. Chapter Three will discuss the 
methodology and the execution of fieldwork. It will offer an analysis of the research process. 
Part Two of the thesis will analyze and discuss the concepts of, terrorism and Islamic 
jurisprudence. Chapter Four will consider the definition of terrorism; categories of terrorism; 
contested perceptions of terrorism; the role that politics and religion fulfill in terrorism. This 
study is imperative because terrorism is a defining issue at the present time. It raises political, 
legal, ethical and other issues of great difficulty. ID Chapter Four will provide a background to the 
proposed primary research. Hence, it will explore what is the definition of terrorism in the 
opinions of the selected sample of British Muslims? 
It is argued that one of the primary reasons why terrorism is difficult to define is that the 
meaning changes within social and historical contexts. Like crime, it is socially defined, but it is 
also influenced by political, cultural, historical and social factors much more than cri me. I I This 
hypothesis can be applied to the situation in Kashmir, where the social and historical contexts 
have affected the meaning of 'terrorism'. This thesis will not reach a conclusion about the moral 
justifications of terrorism. However, the perceived justifications will be discussed in the context 
of the Kashmir situation. Jenkinsl2 calls terrorism the use of threatened force designed to bring 
about a political change, and many western commentators and governments would argue this 
description applies Kashmir. Do British Kashmiris share this ascription? Hence their views on 
the meaning of 'terrorism' will be presented in this chapter. 
Chapter Five provides an explanation of Islamic jurisprudence, specifically in relation to 
terrorism. It is argued that Kashmiri culture is affected by Islamic beliefs; its influence on 
Kashmiri perceptions and attitude to terrorism highlights the need for the in depth discussion on 
Islam. Therefore, consideration is given to the basic teachings of Islam; Islam and 'Jihad'; and 
Islamic views on 'war'. The views of the selected sample on Islam and terrorism will be 
considered alongside the secondary literature. 
10 Arden M. (2005) "Human Rights in the Age of Terrorism" L.Q.R 2005, 121 (Oct), 604-627, at p.604. 
11 White 1.R. (2003) Terrorism 2002 Update. 4111 edition. Thomson Wordsworth., at p.4. 
12 lenkins B. (1984) The Who, What, Where, How & Why a/Terrorism. Paper presented at Detroit Police 
Department Conference on "Urban Terrorism: Planning or Chaos": Detroit. 
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Part Three of the thesis will discuss aspects of anti-terrorism law and its application, as 
understood and identified by the interviewees - limited to selected features of the policing of 
terrorism. Chapter Six will consider stop and search powers. In addition CONTEST's Pursue and 
Prevent policies I 3 will be considered. Chapter Seven will discuss anti-terrorism laws on political 
expression and association, namely, membership, financing and glorification. Both chapters will 
consider the findings from the fieldwork. 
The selected aspects in Chapters Six and Seven are chosen because these elements of the law 
may affect 'ordinary' British Kashmiris. Literature has highlighted that the selected sample are 
vulnerable to recruitment; some have assisted in the financing of terrorist activities in Kashmir, 
and some have encouraged others to do so. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider all 
potential impacts of the anti-terrorism legislation. 
Chapter Eight will offer conclusions. It will provide some recommendations for further research 
and for intervention with the said community on aspects of counter terrorism. Whilst the 
participants' specific views will be discussed in Chapters Four to Seven, the concluding chapter 
will identify the broad typologies obtained from the data analysis. These typologies are not 
developed fully until Chapter Eight because the individual views of the participants are 
necessary to evaluate the concepts, and the counter terrorism policies and law. Hence, the 
typologies are reserved for final Chapter since they form and are part of the conclusion. These 
typologies are an overview of the participants' attitudes as identified by the fieldwork analysis. 
The typologies include six groups, which are: 'The Dismissive', who have no interest in Kashmir; 
'The Advocates of Kashmir', who not only have increased knowledge on the situation in 
Kashmir, but also feel compelled to advocate on their perception of the Kashmir situation; 'The 
British Patriots' view their loyalty to Britain as a priority over any other issue; 'The Advocates of 
Ummah' believe that the international Muslim perspective is a priority; 'The Seekers' search for 
knowledge on Islam; 'The Guardians' are keen to protect their neighbourhood, and thus, for them 
the 'problems' in their neighbourhood take precedent over any counter terrorism work. 
13 H.M.Government (March 2009) Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare The UK's Strategy for Countering International 
Terrorism. London: Crown copyright. Cm. 7541. 
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In summary, this thesis will enable the reader to understand factually and within a legal policy 
context the views of a sample of British Muslims of Kashmiri origin concerning terrorism, and 
policies and laws around counter-terrorism. It will contribute to the current literature and 
discussion surrounding the counter terrorism policies and legislation alongside the British 
Kashmiri Muslim community. This is important especially following the bombings of July t h 
2005 in London - understanding of the perceptions of minorities can enable society to work on 
suitable designs for effective legislation or at least to avoid designs in legislation which make the 
matter worse. 14 
The law and the events in this thesis are up to date as of I June 2012. 
14 HMSO (2008) The National Security Strategy a/the United Kingdom. Cm 7291. March 2008, at p.8. 
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Chapter Two Overview of the British Kashmiri Community 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter One provided the objectives of the thesis. This chapter will aim to identify the group 
selected for the fieldwork, and their origins. This is imperative for the foundation of the thesis. 
Kashmir has been described as 'the intractable bone of contention,' I that has prolonged for over 
sixty years between India and Pakistan. It has attracted attention and concern from the 
international community including the UK.2 However, the British Kashmiri Muslim community 
was selected not simply because of the ongoing dispute in Kashmir, although that has 
considerable significance particularly in relation to their views on terrorism; their selection is 
also because of the focus on this group prior to and following the events of July 2005. The 
British Kashmiri Muslims form 70 per cent of the British Pakistani population, and are of Mirpur 
origin. They are a Muslim community that is 'marginalised',3 and has become the focus of the 
government's CONTEST agenda.4 This focus is essentially justified by the knowledge that 'the 
families of the three Leeds - based bombers were originally, in all likelihood from Mirpur, part 
of Pakistani Kashmir.'5 It is proposed that this thesis will contribute to the understanding of the 
counter terrorism legislation specifically in relation to the British Kashmiri Muslims, and also 
contribute to the existing literature on this subculture. 
In summary, the first purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the Kashmiri 
dispute, historically and politically in order that background perceptions of the British Kashmiri 
Muslims can be fully understood. The discussion will give consider alleged human rights 
violations against individuals and the collective community. Terrorist groups in Kashmir will be 
discussed, and their link if any to the British Muslims of Kashmiri origin. The final part of the 
chapter will consider the ethnography of the British Kashmiri Muslims. 
I Dixit J. N. (2002) India-Pakistan in War and Peace. London: Routledge, at p.307. 
2 Hilali A.Z. (2005) 'Confidence and Security - Building Measures for India and Pakistan' Alternatives; Global, 
Local, Political 30:2, p.191. 
3 Bolognani M. (2006) A 'Community Criminology' Perceptions of Crime and Social Control amongst Braqford 
Pakistanis. (PhD Thesis) School of Sociology and Social Policy. University of Leeds. November 2006. 
4 H.M.Govemment (March 2009) Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare The UK's Strategy for Countering International 
Terrorism. London: Crown copyright. Cm. 7541. 
5 Bunting M. (2005) 'Orphans oflslam'. The Guardian. Monday 18 July 2005. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk!ukl200S/jul/18/july7.religion. (last visited November 2011). 
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2.2 Background to the Dispute in Kashmir 
The international community including the United Kingdom, has to date unsuccessfully tried to 
'persuade that parties that any resolution of the dispute over Kashmir should not come from the 
barrel of a gun but from negotiation and dialogue.'6 Nevertheless, Pakistan continues to believe 
that Kashmir is a prime adverse factor in its relations with India, a view that is reciprocated by 
India, which views Kashmir as an essential symbol of its secularism, and indeed its very 
'existence'.? 
2.2.1 Historical Dispute 
The consequence of independence from the colonial power of Britain created division in India -
namely, India and Pakistan.s The process of granting independence from the British rule required 
that the 'princely states', had to choose whether they would integrate with Pakistan, or remain as 
India. 9 The state of Jammu and Kashmir was the fourth most populace,1O of the 562 principalities 
which had encompassed the map ofIndia prior to the partition of 1947." As a result, 'integration 
of Jammu and Kashmir with India was not a smooth affair' 12 and Kashmir has been a subject of 
dispute since 1947. 13 Consequently, Pakistan and India have had three wars over Kashmir, in 
1948-1949, 1965, and 1971, as well as a battle in 1999 in KargiJ, in the Indian controlled 
Kashmir.14 Kashmir is India's only Muslim majority state'S and has become 'one of the largest 
running and the most intractable problem challenging the United Nations."6 
The Kashmir region has been described as an historical 'chessboard,' that has acquired differing 
victors. In 1819 the Indian Sikhs with British assistance 'invaded' Kashmir then under the 
6 Hilali A. Z. (2005) op cit at p.307. 
7 Dixit J. N. (2002) op cit at 309. 
8 Trehan J. (2002) 'Terrorism and the funding of terrorism in Kashmir'. Journal of Financial Crime Feb 2002,9:3 
at 201. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Cayland, Sir, R. (1945) "India: A Restatement" Oxford University Press. p. 30 I. 
11 Crecher, M. (1953) "The struggle for Kashmir". Ryerson Press, p. 1. 
12 Trehan J. op cit at 201. 
13 House of Commons (2002) Hansard Debates, co1.596. Jack Straw (The then Foreign Secretary). 10 June 2002. 
See also International Crisis Group (2003a) Kashmir: The View from Islamabad. 4 December 2003. ICG Asia 
Report No.68. Islamabad / Brussels. 
14 House of Commons (2002), op cit at col. 596. Jack Straw. 
15 Evans, G. (1995) "Kashmir the Intractable Conflict" Comtemporary Review Vol 267: 1157. Oct 1995. p. 178. 
16 Evans G. (1995), ibid at 178. . 
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traditional rule of the Muslim Moguls. In 1847, Kashmir was sold by the British with 'land and 
people'to Gulab Singh, the Hindu Maharajah for approximately seventy five million dollars. 17 
Despite the British 'sovereignty' the maharajah ruled over Kashmir until 1947. 18 Under the 
command of Lord Louis Mountbatten, Sir Cyril Radcliffe was given 36 days to redraw 'the map 
of India', described as 'a procrustean task that was completed hastily and haphazardly.' 19 Thus, 
under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, Kashmir now had to choose between joining 
Pakistan or India.2o The basis for deciding whether a State would join India or Pakistan was 
determined by its religious composition. Historians assert that the Maharajah Singh did not wish 
to join either State, he wanted independence.21 However, the Hindu ruler, alarmed by the threat 
of tribal invasion acceded to India, understanding that 'naturally they cannot send help asked by 
me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India' .22 It seemed an 'unusual choice' 
because of Kashmir's large Muslim majority.23 Consequently, Muslims attempted to capture it. 
The invasion was halted oy the India army, however Pakistan had seized a third of the State. 
named Azad (Free) Kashmir.24 A United Nations resolution25 for a 'plebiscite' was then accepted 
by India and Pakistan. However, it was never held. It is now opposed by India, which considers 
Kashmir to be an integral part of the India Union. 
The Inspector General of the Indian Police Service observes that it was India's confidence in the 
United Nations that resulted in the idea of a plebiscite. India was of the firm opinion that the 
United Nations would resolve the Kashmir discourse in its favour, but now believe that the 
matter cannot be resolved because 'to date, Pakistan has not vacated what is today called 
'Pakistani occupied Kashmir". So, this 'boundary' discourse continues with India, though 
17 Tkacik J.H. (2002) 'Kashmir: A 50 Year Controversy - Hindu and Muslim Hatreds Run Too Deep to be Resolved 
by Governments either in New Delhi or Islamabad.' World and I May 2002, 17:5 at 20. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Tkacik J.H. ibid at 20. 
20 Evans G. (1995), op cit at 178. 
21 Hewitt, T. (1997) "Kashmir the Unanswered Question". History Today Vol 47, Issue 9, September 1997. p. 607. 
22 Korbel, J. (I 956) "The Danger in Kashmir". Princeton University Press. pp. 80-83. 
23 Significantly, Kashmir was Nehrus' homeland, he was responsible for it accession, who considered it 'land of 
enchantment and beauty' Nehrus' determination to encompass Kashmir within India is emphasized by Percival 
Spear 'his heart, can almost literally be said more then the lovely and fatal vale of Kashmir'. Spear T. (1955) A 
History of India. Penguin Books, Baltimore, p.253. 
24 Evans G. (1995), op cit at 178. 
25 UNSC Resolution 47 (1948) Resolution of21 April 1948 [sI726]. It was held: 'Noting with satisfaction that both 
India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be 
decided through the democratic method ofa free and impartial plebiscite, .. .' In addition UNSC Resolution 80 
(1950) Resolution of 14 March 1950 [slI469], commends both countries for resolving the crisis via peaceful means. 
9 
Pakistan 'gave away' some of the Kashmiri territory it occupied to China in ) 962. Thus 'the 
situation, as of today, is that 45.7 per cent of the 222,336 square kilometer area of Jammu and 
Kashmir is with India, 35.1 per cent is with Pakistan and 19.2 per cent is with China. ,26 
2.2.2 Political Dispute 
The underlying dispute about sovereignty continues to cause the political unrest in Kashmir. 
Since the late 1980's, there has been serious outbreaks of political unrest within Indian 
administered Kashmir.27 The immediate cause is said to be the suspicion that Indian State 
elections have been rigged.28 India's response to the violence has been to increase military and 
political pressure, and thus direct rule was imposed. There has been since then an increased 
military and Indian security presence within Kashmir.29 
The Indian Government had steadfastly held that Kashmir is undisputedly an integral part of 
India. 3o The Indians view Kashmir as a smaller Pakistan. With Kashmir, India adds credence to 
its belief in secularism, and continuously seeks to convince Muslim communities in the rest of 
India that Hindu Government adheres to 'fair administration' .31 However, Kashmir was and is of 
vital importance to Pakistan, economically, politically, and socially. One justification offered to 
its citizens by the Pakistani government is that all the five rivers of the Punjab, flowing from the 
valley of Kashmir, are the lifeline of Pakistan for the entire network of its irrigational systems.32 
The Pakistani case for claiming Kashmir is based on the 'two nation theory'. It is argued that 
Muslims require their own State because they are not represented within Indian National 
Congress and are culturally different from the Hindu traditions.33 Pakistan's historical stance was 
and continues to remain that Kashmir is its integral part especially since it has a Muslim majority 
26 Trehan J. (2002) op cit at 201. 
27 Hewitt, T. (1997), op cit at 607. 
28 Evans 0.(1995), op cit at 178. 
29 Evans O. (1995), op cit at 178. 
30 Shatt, S. (2003) "State Terrorism versus Jihad in Kashmir" Journal of Contemporary Asia. Vol 33, Issue 2. p. 
215. 
3\ Bhatt, S.(2003), ibid at 215. 
32 Ahmad, S. S. (2004) History of Pakistan and Role of the Army. Karachi, Royal Book Company. p. 72. See also: 
International Crisis Oroup (2003) Kashmir: The View from Islamabad. Brussels Islamabad: ICG Asia Report No. 68 
at p.11 and Malik I (2002) Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict. International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University Press at 
E·208. 
3 Hewitt T. (1997), op cit at 607. 
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population.34 Indeed, it has been held by those justifying the partition that lead to the creation of 
Pakistan that the religious differences between the Muslims and the Hindus were paramount in 
the creation of the two states,3S and they have continuously used this basis of religious 
differences to acquire support. 
However, the 'scholars have argued that partition was a product of the differential impact of 
religious institutions and new opportunities for economic mobility.'36 It is asserted that the 
economic disadvantage that the Muslims experienced under the British rule led to the 'creation of 
Pakistan.,37 
It has also been submitted that 'Islam was not the basis of elite mobilization is illustrated by the 
eventual secession of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh ... .'38 It was insufficient for the Bengali to 
have senior positions with limited power, since the actual power for the civil service and military 
rested with the central federal government. 39 The secession of Bangladesh in 1971 emphasises 
that the concept of the two nation theory was used by the creators of Pakistan and those 
perpetuating the Kashmir conflict, as a political tool rather than a factual claim.40 
The next Pakistan claim is that the Instrument of Accession of Kashmir to India is not legitimate. 
They assert the Hindu leader was not representative of the majority Muslim State, and there was 
an indigenous rebellion in Poonch District against the Maharajah. The Poonch rebellion is used 
34 House of Commons (2006/07) South Asia Foreign Affairs Select Committee. 4th Report with proceedings, 
evidence and appendices. at para 109: p.40. 
35 Muhammad AIi Jinnah, the first leader of Pakistan states in 1940 that, 'Islam and Hinduism ... are not religions 
in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact different and distinct social orders .... They neither inter-marry, nor 
inter-dine together and. indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting 
ideas and conceptions ... derive their inspirations from different sources of history. They have different epics, their 
heroes are different. ... Very often, the Hero of one is a foe of the other and likewise their victories and defeats 
overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a 
majority, must lead to a growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up from the 
government of such a state. Cited in Choudhry S. (2009) 'Managing linguistic nationalism through constitutional 
design: lessons from South Asia.' ICJL 2009, 7(4). 577-618 at 600; see also Brass P. (1974) Language, Religion and 
Politics in North India Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
36 Choudhry S. (2009), op cit at 60 I. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Choudhry S.(2009) op cit at 612-613; see also: Quddus M.A. (1981) Pakistan: A case study of a Plural Society'. 
Minerva Associates: Pakistan at 110-120. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Choudhry S.(2009) op cit; Chenoy K. (2006) 'Contending Nationalisms: Kashmir and the Prospects for Peace.' 
Harvard International Review 2006,28(3) at 24; Trehan J. (2002), op cit. 
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as evidence by Pakistan that it did not orchestrate an invasion of Kashmir, but that fellow tribal 
Muslims spontaneously went in aid of their 'Muslim Brothers' .41 It has been suggested that 'the 
Indian army were already in Kashmir before the signature of the instrument of accession. This 
adds weight to the allegations that it was Indians that acted illegally, and that their intervention 
into Kashmir was planned and executed before it was legitimized by the Maharajah signature.'42 
Following the partition in 1947, Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, incorporated by India in 
1949, initially enabled Kashmir to govern under its own constitution. But this ceased four years 
later. Hence since 1953, it is administered exclusively by the Indian federal government. 
Similarly in Pakistani administered Kashmir the Northern areas of Baltistan and Gilgit have 
'scarce' political representation. Furthermore Pakistan dictates to the Pakistani administered 
Kashmir as to who is the Premier, often contrary to the wishes of the public.43 
The European Union44 has considered the dispute because of Baroness Emma Nicholson's report 
on Kashmir. Baroness Nicholson pointed to Pakistan's unwillingness to consider a democratic 
electoral system in Pakistani administered Kashmir. They were critical of Pakistan assigning its 
own people for all official roles in the region, and stated that it 'disapproves of the provision in 
the 1974 Interim Constitution which forbids any political activity that is not in accordance with 
the accordance with the doctrine of Jammu and Kashmir as part of Pakistan and obliges any 
candidate for a parliamentary seat in AJK to sign a declaration of loyalty to that effect. ,45 
The European Union elaborates to state that it '[v]ery much regrets the continuing ambivalence 
of the current Government of Pakistan with regard to the ethnic identity of Gilgit and 
Baltistan. ,46 It was recognized that 'the people of Gilgit and Baltistan are under the direct rule of 
the military. ,47 Thus, Baroness Emma Nicholson emphasized the urgent and imperative 'need' to 
41 Hewitt T. (1997). op cit at 67. 
42 Hewitt T. (1997). op cit at 67. 
43 Chenoy K. (2006) 'Contending Nationalisms: Kashmir and the Prospects for Peace.' Harvard International 
Review, 28(3),24. 
44 Official Journal o/the EU: 'Kashmir: present situation and/uture prospects . . (24/04/2008); European Parliament 
resolution of May 24. 2007 on Kashmir. (200512242 (1Nl) CI02E/473. 
45 Ibid: C/I02E/473-474. 
46 Ibid. 
4? Ibid. 
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'secure an independent justice system to address the situation of the people of AJK and Gilgit 
and Baltistan. ,48 
It is significant that prior to the debate on Baroness Emma Nicholson's report on Kashmir, at the 
European Parliament, she responded to a letter she had received from Ambassador Saeed Khalid, 
Pakistan's Ambassador to the European Union. Ambassador Khalid asserted that the 'Northern 
areas of Pakistan were never a part of Jammu and Kashmir.' In response, Baroness Nicholson 
stated 'that she had rigorously revisited her earlier research on the geography and history of the 
region, including checking of maps, treaties, historic documents and speeches from 1846 till 
date' when providing her submissions and asserting her case.49 Baroness Nicholson, provided 
supporting evidence to her preceding claims, and included 'an official map of the region as it 
existed in 1909,' which showed Gilgit and Baltistan as part of Kashmir. 50 
The evidence clearly emphasizes that both India and Pakistan have failed to provide a 
'democratic process' that is equitable for the Kashmiri people, leading Kamal Chenoy to 
conclude that 'both Pakistanis and Indians must realize that no country that oppresses others can 
itselfbe free.'51 
It has been highlighted via 'anthropological examinations' for 'ethnographic research' in the 
Indian administered Kashmir and observed that 'Kashmiris today to use the language of self 
determination as a way of demanding an opportunity to express their collective will in relation to 
48 Quoted in Big News Network.com; May 24, 2007 last visited: 13/12/2009. 
49 The Report concluded: 'All the evidence points to the fact that Gilgit and Baltistan region were consistent parts of 
Jammu and Kashmir by 1877; They were under the sovereignty of Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir and remained 
in this princely domain till the date of accession on October 26, 1947; The assertion that the Northern Areas were 
independent of Jammu and Kashmir in August 1947 was incorrect, as the British had only leased a small part of the 
territory from the Maharajah (Hari Singh) on March 29, 1935, to provide a strong defense and security provision 
against persistent Russian invasion of the State; The lease did not take away the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir. 
Ownership remained fairly and squarely with the ruler. The lease came to an end on August I, 1947 in preparation 
for partition on August IS, 1947, thus giving the ruler full powers to decide which two emerging nations would this 
state join.' 
50 Also provided "an extract of the leasehold agreement of 1935, an extract of the Instrument of Accession of 
October 26, 1947 and a letter from Maharaja Hari Singh giving reasons for his decision to accede the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir to the Dominion of India.' Big News Network. corn, May24, 2007, last visited 13/12/2009. 
51 Chenoy K. (2006) 'Contending Nationalisms: Kashmir and the Prospects for Peace', Harvard International 
Review, 28(3) at 24. 
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their own political future.'52 One solution provided by a commentator on Kashmir is for both 
India and Pakistan to uphold the international human rights and humanitarian law. Others 
elaborate to acknowledge that this does not create a democratic autonomous Kashmir, but it 
meets some of the 'demands' for 'azaadi.' Consequently such a 'peace process' may create a 
climate for the region that is presently unforeseeable.53 It is conceded that 'these ideas seem to be 
no more than a wish list.' However, 'the same was true for the Indian struggle for independence 
against Britain and again during the struggle for Pakistan. ,54 
2.3 Kashmir and the concept of Self determination 
To understand the Kashmiri predicament, it is important to address the issue of self 
determination and whether it is a legitimate argument or whether it is used to advance the foreign 
policy of Pakistan, in its proxy war with India. 55 Indeed, 'the argument has been put forward that 
Pakistan's army and its Inter Service Intelligence agency (lSI) do not want progress on [any] 
peace process because Kashmir bolsters their position within Pakistan. ,56 The International Crisis 
Group found that the military in Pakistan had a perpetual 'self-indoctrination process' which 
provided that foregoing Kashmir would threaten Pakistan's identity and its 'existence,.57 They 
observed that the 'Kashmir issue' is used to justify the 'high' economic expenditure of the army 
and the Inter Services Intelligence.58 Nevertheless, there is the alleged propaganda that Kashmir 
seeks independence, and thus campaigns for self determination. 
The campaign for self determination is referred to as 'tehreek', an Arabic word utilising the Urdu 
and Kashmiri linguists, with the aim of'azaadi' - independence. The ultimate aim is identified by 
the yearning to eliminate 'ghulami; (servitude) such as has occurred through successive 
occupations, such as the Moghuls, Sikhs, Dogras and Afghans. 59 
52 Duschinski H. (2009) 'Destiny Effects: Militarization, State Power, and Punitive Containment in Kashmir 
Valley,' Anthropological Quarterly 2009,82(3); 691. 
53 Chenoy K. (2006), op cit at 24. 
54 Chenoy K. (2006), ibid. 
S5 As emphasized in House of Commons (2006/07) HC SS, South Asia. Foreign Affairs Select Committee 4th 
Report, op cit at p.SO. 
56 Ibid at 46. 
57 International Crisis Group (2003) Kashmir: The View From Islamabad. Brusselsllslamabad. ICG Asia Report 
No.68. 4 December 2003, at p.12. 
58 Ibid at p.11. 
59 Duschinski H. (2009) op cit at 691. 
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It has been successfully asserted that self determination 'has numerous layers of meaning. This 
includes a right to democratic participation for individuals which can be derived from the 
doctrine of self determination, group rights and certain additional human rights entitlements for 
minorities, and for indigenous peoples. ,60 The power and implementation of law lies with the 
governments. In order to maintain their status quo, governments, whilst portraying the 'myth of 
statehood' ensure that succession against their state should not occur.61 Such is the position of 
India, whose primary aim for Kashmir is 'absorption' .62 In addition, Ramanathan analyses 
India's rationale in abstaining from the Statute for an International Criminal Court in July 1998 
as being 'explained, in part, by anxieties about how investigation [about Kashmir], prosecution 
and justice in the Indian system may be judged by the international court .... [In addition t]he 
inclusion of armed conflict not of an international character in defining 'war crimes' in Article 8 
of the Statute for an ICC has met with resistance from the Indian establishment. ... The situation 
of conflict that persists in Kashmir, ... explains the reasons for the state's anxiety that this 
manner of violence could be referred to the ICC.'63 Hence the allegations of human rights 
violations may be represented to the ICC and thus create a predicament for India and its rule in 
Kashmir.64 
India's absence from the ICC and its 'goal of absorption' for Kashmir strengthens the hypothesis 
advocated by Weller that 'the right to self determination can be exercised only within the 
boundaries established by the colonial power .... As soon as a colony has gained independence, 
it will itself start defending its own territorial integrity with utmost vigor. There is no secession 
from secession. ,65 
To summarize, the concept of self determination is confused by all the issues discussed here. 
Kashmir was always part of India in a pre-1947 sense. Kashmir consists not only of the Muslim 
majority in the Valley, but also has the Hindu dominated Jammu and the Buddhist dominated 
60 WeBer M. (2009) 'Settling self-determination conflicts: recent developments.' EJ1L 2009, 20(1), 111-165 at 112. 
61 Well er M. (2009). ibid at 112. 
62 Ratner S.R. (2005) 'Foreign occupation and international territorial administration: the challenges of 
convergence.' EJlL, 695 at 698. 
63 Ramanathan U. (2005) 'India and the ICe.' J.J. C.) 2005, 3(3), 627-634. 
64 Ibid. 
6S Weller M. (2009) op cit at 113. 
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Ladakah,66 and thus it is argued should receive the same status as Hyderabad province which 
also has a vast Muslim population, and is an integral part of India. One solution might lie in 
integrating what remains of Kashmir with India, and treating its citizens humanely, but any such 
solution would lack international legitimacy and fails to take account of the equal aspirations of 
Pakistan. 
2.4 Human Rights Violation 
Human rights violations are reported to be at such a level in Kashmir that their occurrence has 
become 'anomalistic,.67 The people of Kashmir have found themselves in the middle of the 
ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan. Thousands have lost their lives, with many people 
displaced.68 Indeed, under the 'rubic' of the fight against militancy and terrorism, there is 
evidence that suggests that the federal government in India has subjected the Kashmiri people to 
perpetual human rights abuse.69 
2.4.1 Human rights violations on individuals 
It is alleged that the civilians in Kashmir are inevitable victims. Hundreds have been incarcerated 
'on the slightest doubt of suspicion, and then tortured and killed', with dead bodies thrown 
outside the victims homes.7o Custodial deaths further highlight the unjust administrative system 
of India. In an interview, Dr. Ashok Bhan, head of police in Srinagar, in 2003, talked of the 
numerable cases of rape, 'you have to understand the psychology of the soldiers. He has been 
away from the home for two to three years. Ifhe sees a young woman in a house he might try to 
have a chance with her. ,71 Interestingly, Bhatt found that the militants 'rarely ever indulged in 
rape against their own women'. 72 Others document that such violations often are met with a 
'charter of impunity' for the offenders.73 
66 International Crisis Group (2003b) Kashmir: The View From New Delhi. BrusselslNew Delhi: ICG Asia Report 
No. 69 at p.12. 
67 Bhatt S. (2003), op cit at 215. 
68 House of Commons (2002) Hansard Debates. Jack Straw. Col. 596-604. 
69 Haque S. (2003b), The_Amnesty International, Rights at Risk. Amnesty's International Concerns Regarding the 
Security Legislation and Law Enforcement Measures. London, Amnesty International, 2002, at p. 5. 
70 Bhatt S. (2003), op cit at 215. 
71 Quoted in Bhatt S.(2003), op cit at 215. 
72 Bhatt S. (2003), op cit at 215. 
73 Beer L. (1995) 'Human Rights - The forgotten fight - the human rights defenders who have themselves been 
victims of violence and discrimination.' LS Gaz, 24 May 1995, 92 (22); see also: Geelani S.A.R. (2009) Committee 
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The alleged human rights abuses are said to 'occur with regularity.'74 The International Crisis 
Group recognised that the reality of the conflict for the civilians is blurred by official (Indian) 
reports. 75 They observed that the 'enforced or involuntary disappearances' were formally 
acknowledged by the then Chief Minister, who stated that '3,744 are missing between 2000 and 
2002, 1533 persons got (sic) disappeared in 2000. 1586 went missing in 200 I and 605 in 2002.'76 
2.4.2 Human Rights violations on the 'collective' community 
Examples of collective human rights violations include operations whereby a group of the 
military border security force seals off an area at night and at daybreak all the able-bodied men 
are apprehended. Targets are identified by 'Cats' (concealed apprehension techniques) agents 
whose faces are hidden, each man who is identified by the 'cats' is taken away and many do not 
return alive.77 The United Nations Special Rapporteur observed that 'torture, killings and 
custodial deaths' are undertaken by the police and the paramilitary organisations.78 This 
corroborated earlier findings in 1995 when the international commission for Jurists, found that 
'the Indian troops, the Pakistani Government, and local militant groups' all violated human 
rights. Indians were found to have committed rape, arson, routine torture, extra judicial 
executions. Pakistan equally had no consideration for rights in Azad Kashmir and supported the 
militant groups.79 
From the Indian viewpoint, the situation in Kashmir is a consequence of Pakistan's interference. 
In a press release to the Washington Times the Indian embassy wrote in 1999 that 'problems that 
have occurred in Kashmir in the last decade have been chiefly sponsored by Pakistan .... If the 
human rights of the people of Kashmir have been violated, then the blame for these violations 
for the Release of Political Prisoners at http://bkaf.org.uklarticle3.htmlvisited on 11112/2009; Das OK (2005) 
'From the Editor - in - Chief Police Practice and Research (An International Journal), May 2005, 6(2), 95-97. 
74 International Crisis Group (2003b) op cit at p.2. 
7S Ibid. 
76 The statement was made in the State Legislative Assembly on 25 February 2003; cited in International Crisis 
Group (2003b) op cit at p.2; see also Showkat A. & Motta H.A. (2003) "Declare 'em Dead: Families of disappeared 
men appeal [to] PM." Srinagar Times, 18 April 2003. 
77 Evans G. (1995), op cit at 178. 
78 United Nations (2012) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders. Margaret 
Sekaggyg. Mission to India (10-12 January 2011). AlHRC/I 91551Add. I. 6 February 2012, at p.ll, para 57. 
79 Evans G.( 1 995) op cit at 178. 
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rests squarely on the terrorist elements .... ,80 This is also emphasized by others who observe that 
the Indian government regularly overlooks its responsibility or role in any of the abuse, and 
project the blame solely on Pakistan. Such 'demonization' enables both Pakistani and Indian 
public to accept the agenda offered by their governing bodies. 81 The Indian case is further aided 
by the fact that there are around '350 000 Kashmiri Hindus (Pandits) who have been internally 
displaced by violence since 1989.,82 
Another aggravating factor is that there are 'rigged' elections, and 'that twice a democratically 
elected government was dismissed by the central government, [so] there is no evidence to 
suggest that democratic institutions are functioning in Kashmir. The lack of any democratic 
process makes the government's abuses all the more disastrous because there is no legal recourse 
through which victims can advance their grievances and receive redress. ,83 In addition the 'non 
responsiveness of the 'state' is perpetuated by the knowledge that the Indian and the Western 
media have little interest in the Kashmiri plight. 84 On her mission in January 20 I I, the United 
Nation's Special Rapporteur reported that in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, media is often 
censored, and 'at least ten journalists have been killed since 1990, allegedly by the armed 
forces.,8s 
Similarly, it was reported that human rights activitists, including six lawyers, were killed whilst 
representing those alleging human rights violations.86 Other foreign dignitaries visiting India, 
such as FCO Minister Peter Hain in 1999, and Robin Cook (the then Foreign Secretary) in April 
2000, had also expressed concern about human rights violations. 87 Concern was also expressed 
by the UK government in 2007, when it stated, 'the human rights situation in the Kashmir region 
on both sides of the line of control remains of concern, with reported abuses by militants and the 
80 Hindu Times, October 31, 1999, p. 5. 
81 Chenoy K. (2006) op cit at 24. 
82 International Crisis Group (2003b) op cit at p.ll. 
83 Kumar M. (2005) 'The Hidden Conflict: False Optimism and Silent Strategy in Kashmir'. Harvard International 
Review, 2005, 26(4) at 36. 
84 Kumar M. (2005), ibid. 
85 United Nations (2012) op cit at p.15, para 99. 
86 United Nations (2012) op cit at p.14, para 86-90i. 
87 House of Commons (1999/2000) Cm 4774 'Human Rights Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual report 
2000' - House a/Commons Parliamentary Papers Online, down loaded 16/11/2009. 
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Indian security forces.'88 Furthermore, the European Parliament has condemned the human rights 
violations, which led to the 'hundreds of unidentified graves hav[ing] been discovered since 
2006 in Jammu and Kashmir and whereas at least 940 bodies have reportedly been found in 
eighteen villages in the Uri district alone.'89 The European Parliament announced that it 
'[s]trongly condemns the unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, torture, rape and other 
human rights abuses which have occurred in Jammu and Kashmir since the beginning of the 
armed conflict in 1989; insists that the families of the victims be granted full reparation.'9o 
Just as the Indian government has been urged to adhere to human rights, the Pakistani 
government is asked 'to ensure that the people of Azad Jammu Kashmir can exercise their 
fundamental civil and political rights in an environment free from coercion and fear', the 
European Parliament has simultaneously urged 'Pakistan to revisit its concepts of democratic 
accountability and minority and women's rights in Azad Jammu Kashmir.'9\ Thus the European 
Parliament urged both India and Pakistan to allow independent human rights observers, such as 
Amnesty International, to assess and observe the situation in Kashmir.92 
The individual and collective violations, such as over policing, and lack of democratic elections, 
have been latterly justified by India as related to the 'war on terror' which has necessitated 
enhanced security and legislation in Kashmir.93 Duckinski writes, 'As Kashmir Valley has been 
redefined as a frontier in the global war on terror, Kashmiris have been caught up in new 
ideological schematizations that posit a secret worldwide illegal network of enemies -
infiltrators, jihadis, sleepers, and fanatics - engaged in a common plot to threaten the welfare and 
integrity of the nation. . . .'94 Thus, according to some commentators the 'indefinite' and 
subjectively defined terrorism, (discussed in detail in Chapter Four), has ensured that India 
88 House of Commons (2007/2008) Cm 7340 'Human Rights Annual Report 2007' at 33. House of Commons 
Parliamenta'l Papers Online: downloaded 16/11/2009; 2006:07 HC SS, South Asia Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee 4' Report with proceedings, evidence and appendices, at SO. HMSO: London. 
89 2009/C294 E/17 'European Parliament resolution of2008 July lOon allegations of mass graves in Indian-
administered Kashmir' at C294E /76, Official Journal o/the European Union. 3/12/2009. 
90 Ibid at 77. 
9) European Parliament resolution of24 May 2007 on Kashmir: present situation andfuture prospects. (2005/2242 
(1Nl) ) at C102E 1 474. Official Journal of the EU. 24/412008. 
92 Ibid. 
9) International Crisis Group (2003b) op cit at p.19-20. 
94 Duschinski H. (2009) 'Destiny Effects: Militarization. State Power, and Punitive Containment in Kashmir 
Valley.' Anthropological Quarterly 2009, 82(3); 691. 
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continues its current political governance in Kashmir.95 Indeed the International Crisis Group 
found that the major political parties used Kashmir as a 'major electoral plank', and that the 
domestic opinion is that there should be no soft policy for 'terrorism' in Kashmir. 96 
Consequently, India justifies its 'high ratio of troops to civilians [making] Kashmir one of the 
most heavily militarized areas in the entire world. ,97 Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act 1979 
is exclusive to Jammu and Kashmir. It enables the 'administrative detention' of any person or 
persons without judicial redress or intervention up to two years.98 The Jammu and Kashmir 
Disturbed Areas Act J 992, confers powers to the State Government, under Section 3, to declare 
via notification in the official gazette 'whole or part' of the area as 'disturbed,.99 In addition the 
'The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Power Act, 1990,100 bestows 'special powers' 
to the armed forces working in Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, under section 3 of the Act, the 
Governor of the State or the federal government can 'declare' the area as 'disturbed' to enlist the 
aid of the armed forces. It basis includes any activity 'disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of India.' Section 4 allows the armed forces to 'fire upon or 
otherwise use force, even to the causing of death' for the 'maintenance of public order.' It also 
states that in such circumstances a warrant is not required for an arrest, or even for entering and 
searching a home or vehicle. Section 7 offers 'protection of persons acting in good faith under 
this Act.' 101 
Therefore it has been argued that the military personnel have the freedom to indiscriminately 
exercise their powers, irrespective of whether those powers violate human rights, and the 
Kashmiri people have no redress. This has led observers to conclude that because of 'this war 
against the people, Kashmiris by virtue of their existence are transformed into terrorists, enemies 
of the state excluded from the political arena .... populations stripped of basic human rights 
9S Ibid. 
96 International Crisis Group (2003b) op cit at 19. 
97 Duschinski H. (2009), op cit at 691. 
98 United Nations (2012) op cit at p.5. para 18. 
99 See: http://www.vakilnol.comlbereactsILawsllammu-And-Kashmir-Disturbed-Areas-Act-\992.htm. 
100 At: 
http://www.satp.orglsatporgtp/countries/indialstates/jandkldocument/actsandordinances/J&KSpecialpoweract.htm. 
last visited: April 2012. 
101 Ibid. 
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because of their collective identity as Kashmiris.' 102 Indeed the Special Rapporteur to the United 
Nations recognized that 'the broad and vague definitions of terrorism contained in [the] security 
laws' provided legal justification for the alleged human rights violations. 103 Human rights 
violations are said to be one justification for the continued presence of terrorist groups in 
Kashmir, as discussed in the subsequent section of this Chapter. 
2.5 Terrorist Groups in Kashmir 
The 'Kashmir conflict', in its widest sense 'finds its OrIgm in the 1947 partition of the 
subcontinent,' as already described. 104 Academic assessment of the insurgency prior to 
September 200 I, is that the situation became more mi Iitant from 31 Ju Iy 1988, with the 
establishment of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front. 105 Although this group ceased to exist by 
1994, it laid the foundations for other groups that continue to exist. 106 However, others claim that 
the core issue of the insurgency in Kashmir, is the consequence of 'rigged elections', which 
created a 'separatist insurgency' in 1989. 107 A survey of militant groups will now be given. 
Lashkar-E-Toiba (Soldiers of the Pure) is said to be one of the most feared groups fighting 
against Indian control in Kashmir. It emerged in 1994, (but its founding organization, a Pakistani 
Punjabi group known as Markaz Dawa-ul-Irshad was established in 1987), and earned its 
reputation following the introduction of 'Fedayaeen Fighters' who carried out attacks on Indian 
troops. It has been held responsible by the Indian Government for undertaking armed attacks in 
India and Kashmir. This organization acknowledged in 2000 that it was responsible for attacking 
the armed barracks at the Red Fort in Delhi, in which three people died. India has alleged that 
Lashkar-E-Toiba is also responsible for the raid on the Indian parliament in December 200 I. It is 
further accused of being responsible for the explosions in 2003 in the city of Mumbai, which 
killed 55 people and injured hundreds, and subsequently in 2005 in Delhi when 60 people died. 
102 Duschinski H. (2009), op cit at 691. 
103 United Nations (2012) op cit at p.6, para 29. 
104 Kumar M. (2005) 'The Hidden Conflict: False Optimism and Silent Strategy in Kashmir'. Harvard International 
ReView, 2005, 26(4) at 36. 
105 Evans A. (2000) "The Kashmir Insurgency: As Bad As It Gets." Small Wars and Insurgencies 11: I, Spring 
2000, pp69-81. 
106 Ibid at p.69. 
107 Kumar M. (2005) op cit at 36. 
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However, they deny killing civilians stating that the tactic was against the organization's 
principles. They further deny attacks in 2005 on the Delhi parliament. 
Following the September I I, 200 I attacks, the group was banned in Pakistan in 2002. However, 
until then, it openly raised funds and recruited support inside Pakistan. Subsequent to the ban, it 
has named itself Jamaat Ud Dawa (Party of the Calling) and continues its activities in Pakistani 
controlled Kashmir. 108 Significantly, 'Lashkar-E-Toiba has many international linkages 
including in the United Kingdom. On Friday 17 March 2006, Mohammed Ajmal Khan, from 
Coventry, was jailed for nine years in the UK after admitting directing a terrorist organization, 
including providing weapons and funds to Lashkar-E-Toiba.' 109 
Harkat-UI-Mujamideen, is also alleged to receive its financial support from Muslims worldwide; 
namely the Middle East, Europe and Palestine. It is also said to be involved in other conflict 
regions such as Afghanistan, Takikistan and Chechnya." O The group was established in 1985 in 
opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The group moved to Kashmir following the 
end of Soviet-Afghan war in 1989. In 1993 the group merged with Harkat-UI-Jehad-al-Islami to 
form Harkat-UI-Ansar. To avoid the label of terrorist organization by the USA, the name of the 
organization was changed in 1997 to Harkat-UI-Mujahieen. In 1999 they hijacked the Indian 
Airlines Flight 8 14, and successfully obtained freedom of some of its leaders in Indian custody. 
Although high profiled incidents have occurred since, III its agenda is to unite Muslims in South 
Asia and worldwide. I 12 
Hizbul Mujahideen, 'with a pro-Pakistan agenda', 113 is the most widely supported and 
indigenous. It has been asserted that the 'balance of fire power among the rebels shifted to 
Hizbul Mujahideen.'"4 Hizbul Mujahideen is said to have 'emerged' from Afghanistan, and 'is a 
108 BBC News http://news.bbbb.code.uklgo/pr/fr/-2Ihilsouthasial3181925.stm. published 17th of March 2006. 
109House of Commons (2006/07) HC SS 'South Asia Foreign Affairs Select Committee' op cit at 153. 
110 Evans A. (2000) op cit at 7l. 
I11 Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki.harkat-ul-muiahideen. 11th of July 2006. 
112 Evans A. (2000) op cit at 71. 
113 Duschinski H. (2009) op cit at 69l. 
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subsidiary of Jamaat - e - Islam in Pakistan.' 115 It was established in 1989, and is described as 
. 'one of the oldest militant groups.' Its aim is to unite the whole of the Jammu and Kashmir 
Valley within Pakistan. Its financial funding is said to be from Pakistan and Jamaat-i-Islam, 
which works in the entire region of South Asia. 116 It has been observed that' in addition to its 
regular attacks on Indian security forces, Hizbul Mujahideen is implicated in excesses against the 
civilian population of Kashmir and the destruction of the [Sufi Muslim] shrine of the patron saint 
of Kashmir at Chorar Sharif. [Despite the aforementioned funding from Pakistan, officially] in 
2002 the Pakistan government reversed its policy of promoting militancy in Indian-administered 
Kashmir.' 117 It openly opposes any diplomatic relationship between India and Pakistan, and via 
Jamaat, its parent organization and Pakistan's current opposition party, Hizbul Mujahideen 
openly supports 'more mujahideen attacks' as the Kashmiri conflict remains unresolved. I 18 
Jaish E-Muhammad (The Army of Muhammad) was established in 2000 by Mulana Masood 
Hzhar, a Pakistani cleric, released from Indian prison in exchange for the hostages on an Indian 
Airline. It supports a Pakistani controlled Kashmir. It is active in carrying out armed attacks on 
Indian armies in the Indian controlled Kashmir. It is alleged to receive some funding from 
Pakistani supporters in Birmingham. 119 Indeed in 2002, the Sunday Telegraph reported that 
Lashkar E-Toiba and Jaish E-Muhammad received £5,000,000 a year from British Muslims. 120 
A common aspect of all these groups is a nationalistic/religious ideology which political aims. 
They are alleged to be supported by some Kashmiri people, as well as the Pakistani Government 
in its proxy war against India. The Laskhar E Tayyaba, Jaish E Muhammad and Harkat UI-
Mujahideen are proscribed by the Terrorism Act 2000, and are said to be 'at the forefront of 
violent activity within the [Kashmiri] region.'121 
I IS Mustafa D. (2005) '(Anti) Social Capital in the Production of an (un) Civil Society in Pakistan.' The 
116 Geographical Review. 2005. 95(3) at 328 (American Geographical Society). 
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In addition commentators have questioned whether AI-Qaida fleeing from Afghanistan might 
have found sanctuary in Kashmir albeit in Azad Kashmir.122 Kai Leather l23 identifies two 
ideological thoughts on the separatist groups in Indian controlled Kashmir, namely the 
nationalists, who want to liberate Kashmir from Pakistan and India, and a second view, that 
Kashmir has Muslim majority that should not be under the control of India. Zutshi suggests that 
the latter viewpoint want Kashmir to be a part of Pakistan. 124 
One analysis of the terrorism in Kashmir is that while 'Pakistan trained and armed the young 
Kashmiris who have crossed over to garner support for their 'freedom struggle', the provocation 
arose primarily from India, not Pakistan.'125 Thus, it is argued that what commenced as targeted 
insurgency - aggression towards the constitution and security forces, progressed to terrorism 
with indiscriminate killings of civilians. In addition to the lack of a democratic system, it is 
asserted that the human rights violations have perpetuated insurgency in Kashmir. This violent 
activity by terrorists and counter-terrorism has led to the deaths of thousands of Kashmiri's and 
security forces. 126 
The governing executive of the Indian military view the Kashmir situation and the insurgency as 
'a zero sum game between India and Pakistan', though they view Pakistan as being responsible 
for the militants in Kashmir. 127 The Pakistani Government has continuously denied assisting pro-
Pakistani and pro-Islamic Kashmiri militants. Nevertheless, Pakistan has stated that it has an 
obligation to bring to international attention Indian's violation of human rights and treatment of 
Muslims in Indian occupied of Kashmir. 128 There is international evidence which suggests that 
the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Bureau has undertaken covert operations in Kashmir. 129 
Although, there is there is continuous denial of any support of terrorism in Kashmir, the then 
122 Ollapally, D. (2003) "America's War on Terrorism on South Asia: Political and Military Dilemmas". White 
t!~use Studies. Vo13. Issue 4. p. 445. 
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Conflict. New York: Novinka Books. 
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126 Chenoy K. (2006). op cit at 24. 
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self-proclaimed President of Pakistan publicly stated 'Pakistan will continue to extend full moral, 
political and diplomatic support to the Kashmiri people in their judicial goal.' 130 However, 
security operations continue to affect economic growth. 131 
Liaquat AIi, the Head of Counter-Insurgency Operation in Srinagar, Kashmir, recalls 'when I 
went to Pakistan for my training, I realized that we were being used as pawns in Pakistan's game 
plan ... The training camps in Pakistan convert the secular-minded Kashmiri's into communal, 
blood-thirsty terrorists. I realized that Kashmir is much better off, socially, economically, as well 
as politically without Pakistan's help.' 132 
In their research, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, found that the 
Kashmiri people want independence but simultaneously realize that 'it is a fantasy.' According 
to the Committee's findings, 'The Kashmiris themselves, once they began to get going and learnt 
more about their own history, said - I heard this frequently when I was in the Valley - 'why 
should we swap one set of masters for another? Ifwe are to be free, let's be free.' This was very 
much in the spirit of the collapse of the Soviet Union ... and so on .... however, independence is 
an idealistic idea that people are not sure they will ever see realized .... The Kashmiri 
independence movement is very factionalized and demoralized .... It is uneven support, but it's 
very much there .. .' 133 Evidence of such support is advocated by the Jammu Kashmir Liberation 
Front, who ran 'a mass signature campaign' during 2004 and 2005 in the Indian administered 
Kashmir. They obtained '1.5 million signatures', which represented twenty five percent of the 
population. 134 
2.6 Summary 
Part one of this chapter has provided a historical and political perspective of the ongoing dispute 
in Kashmir. It has highlighted the human rights violations and the insurgency that have 
encouraged terrorism. The next part of this chapter will utilize this discussion to provide a profile 
130 Press Trust of India "Mushraff wants to meet Hurriyat Leaders". Indian Express, July 5, 2001, p. I. 
131 Paris J. (2010) Prospects/or Pakistan. London: Legatum Institute. 
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of communities that have their origins in Kashmir but live in the United Kingdom. Although, as 
the subsequent discussion will highlight, there are no official figures for the population of British 
Kashmiri origin, the aim is to provide an ethnography of the participants being interviewed and 
to begin to understand how, if at all, the dispute in Kashmir affects the outlook of this subculture 
- community. 
2.7.1 A Profile of Kashmiris in Britain 
It has been officially stated the dispute in Kashmir 'has also had an impact on community 
relations in British cities where conflicts originating in the subcontinent can be a factor in local 
politics. In addition, .... in the past terrorist training camps might have trained British Kashmiris 
.... through such experience that some had ended up 'as the new generation of recruits for al-
Qaida and the global jihad movement.,135 
It is further claimed that 'Britons have gone to Pakistan where they have joined terrorist groups 
launching attacks in Kashmir.' An example of this is Bilal Mohammed, the 24 year old, who on 
25 December 2000, 'took part in a fidayeen mission and blew himself up outside an Indian army 
headquarters in Srinagar, killing ten people. Bilal was a Briton of Pakistani origin, from 
Birmingham, a youth [who] frequented nightclubs until he reportedly had become very religious. 
Bilal's notoriety will be that he was the first British suicide bomber.' 136 lt was emphasised in the 
introduction of this chapter that three of the London bombers had ancestry and links to Pakistani 
administered Kashmir. 
Britain has received criticism as being responsible for the Kashmiri dispute because it 
mismanaged the issue in 1947. When Douglas Hurd, as a Foreign Secretary in 1995 asked India 
to consider human rights in Kashmir, India responded that Britain had not felt it 'necessary to 
ascertain the wishes of the colonies to which it transferred power, including India itself - and it 
had countenanced continued violence in Ireland rather than permit the breakup of the UK.' 137 
135 House of Commons (2006/07) HC 55: South Asia Foreign Affairs Select Committee 4'h Report, op cit at 37. 
136 Ibid, EV.152 at 258. 
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It is further submitted that the political activity in Kashmir has affected the 'ethnic politics' in the 
contemporary UK.138 It is argued that since the 1980's the Kashmir issue has reemerged as an 
issue which engages the Parliament. Its interest coincides with the growth of emotion and 
associated activities amongst British Kashmiris. 139 The 1997 general election significantly 
highlighted the importance of Kashmir issue in British politics. This was evident by the 
continuous lobbying of the British Kashmiris,14o particularly in West Midlands, West Yorkshire, 
Great Manchester, and Buckinghamshire. 
A Kashmir Human Rights Committee was formed in the House of Commons in 1990 by Max 
Madden, then MP for Bradford West and chaired by Roger Godsiff, then MP for Birmingham 
Small Heath. 141 Membership of the Kashmir group comprised 67 MPs, 47 Labour; 12 
Conservative and 8 Liberal, in 1995. In written evidence provided to the South Asia Foreign 
Affairs Select Committee, Mohammed Ghalib of the All Parties International Kashmir Co-
ordinating Committee, highlighted the importance of addressing the Kashmir dispute in British 
politics. In considering their political party's welfare, he argued that in light of the hal fa mi lIion 
British Kashmiris, 'The Labour Party has [a] Kashmir policy in its party manifesto l42 as well as 
on human rights issues but unfortunately that policy had never been reflected in the government 
policies. Similarly the party has failed to raise voice in favour of Kashmiri people's right to self 
determination or against the flagrant violation of their rights in Kashmir since it formally adopted 
the policy in 1995 .... they can decide their future political action if Labour Government 
continue to ignore the Kashmir conflict.' 143 
It has been recommended that Britain 'could get involved in the peace process since the United 
Kingdom was 'still well thought of in the region', but only to 'facilitate and encourage dialogue.' 
This was emphasized by Margaret Beckett, the then Foreign Secretary, who claimed that the 
British government was 'encouraging and have always encouraged negotiation,' however 'it is 
for the parties to see what is the best ground on which they can reach agreement and find the best 
138 Ellis P. and Khan Z. (1998), "Diasporic Mobilization on the Kashmiri Issue in British Politics". Journal of Ethnic 
and Migration Studies. Vol 24, Issue 3. p. 471. 
139 Ellis P. and Khan Z. (1998), ibid. 
140 Ellis P. and Khan Z. (1998), ibid. 
141 Ellis P. and Khan Z. (1998), ibid at 471. 
142 House of Commons (2006/2007) Report submitted on 1 January 2007, at 294. 
143 House of Commons (2006/07) Submitted on I January 2007, He 55, op cit at p.294 (Ev.188). 
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way forward. It might be the kiss of death for us to express a preference one way or the other.' 144 
This sentiment has been endorsed by others who have advocated that Kashmir 'is a dispute 
between two sovereign nations, it can only be resolved through direct dialogue between those 
two sovereign nations.' 145 
2.7.2 British Kashmiris - Ethnography. 
'British Kashmiris' are those who emigrated from Kashmir or they have ancestral origins there. 
The majority are from the Pakistani administered Kashmir.146 By contrast, 'Or Majid Siraj, a 
leading surgeon from [the] Indian controlled Kashmir, now based in Leeds, notes that 'it was 
very difficult for working class people to obtain passports in Indian held Kashmir. The whole 
process could take up to two years with numerous visits by police to check on the applicants.' He 
is of the opinion that the Indian government created circumstances that make it difficult for those 
in Indian administered Kashmir to migrate. He elaborates that there in UK only one hundred and 
fifty families from that area, twenty of whom are Hindu Pandits. 147 This is corroborated by other 
writers on Kashmir who state that there are only around two hundred families from the Indian 
administered Kashmir. 148 Looking at the overall picture, it is continuously reiterated by writers 
that there is 'no official recognition of Kashmiris residing in Britain.' 149 The BBC reports that 75 
per cent of the 750,000 Pakistanis in England are of Kashmiri origin. ISO It has also been reported 
that they mainly reside in British cities such as Glasgow, Bradford, Birmingham, Luton, Derby, 
Buckinghamshire, in particular High Wycombe, with large pockets in Lancashire, Leeds, 
Nottingham and London. lsl 
144 House of Commons (2006/07) HC 55, op cit at 52. 
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11/12/2009. 
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2.7.3 Migration 
According to Shams Rehman, the 'first Kashmiri' came to Britain in the 1830s.1 52 The majority 
of the people migrated from the Pakistani administered Kashmir, are from Mirpur and Kotli, 
(Kotli 'was a sub district' of Mirpur 'until the early 1970s' 153). The demographics and history of 
Mirpur has been compiled by the research undertaken by Dr Roger Ballard at the University of 
Manchester, Centre of Applied South Asian Studies. 154 Although Mirpur is situated north of 
Punjab, its residents rarely obtained employment in the British Punjab. Thus there is 'a tradition 
of Mirpuri men travelling throughout the Indian sub-continent for paid work.' 155 They are 
compared to 'the Filipino domestic women workers, [whereby] one male member of the family 
volunteers for this sacrifice.' 156 
The end of the nineteenth century saw the men from Mirpur working as 'stokers on the British 
coal fired steamships plying out of Bombay.' 157 These Kashmiris also served in the armed forces 
of the British Indian army, and fought alongside the Allies. 158 Following the Second World War, 
they were employed on British merchant ships. Some of these 'seamen found themselves on 
shore in Britain. These stranded Kashmiris were soon in demand, first in the labour-starved 
munitions' factories of Birmingham and later, as a post-war boom got under way, in the mills 
and furnaces of the North.'159 These are said to be the 'pioneers,' 160 'who laid the foundations,161 
for the subsequent migrations from Pakistani administered Kashmir. 
Following de-colonisation, a further factor was that water sources were scarce for the 'new' 
Pakistan, and so the Mangla Dam was constructed. This resulted in the old town of Mirpur, with 
its fertile land disappearing under water. 'The construction of the dam resulted in the 
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155 Doe B. (2006), ibid. 
156 Ali D. (2007) Recognising the Kashmiri Community in the UK: Implications/or Education Attainment. Race 
Equality Teaching Trentham Books: London at 27. 
157 Doe B. (2006) op cit. 
158 Khan Z. (2000), op cit. 
I 59Doe B. (2006), op cit. 
160 Anwar M. (1979) Myth of Return: Pakistanis in Britain. Heinemann: London. 
161 Doe B. (2006), op cit. 
29 
displacement of at least twenty thousand families.' 162 This combined with the culture of working 
away from their ancestral territories, led to new migration to UK.163 This coincided with 
Britain's need for labour force in the 1950s and the I 960s. 164 Thus those emigrating to Britain 
'are not usually English-speaking, skilled or well educated .... [and once in Britain are] 
concentrated in the poorest housing and lowest paid jobs.' 165 The indigenous British community 
views them 'as resistant to integration or assimilation, clinging to their own language, customs 
and religious identity.'166 
2.7.4 Identity 
It is argued that for integration and assimilation, identity is crucial. This hypothesis is based on 
the notion that, unlike other South Asian communities in Britain, Kashmiris have 'had to 
forcefully assert their identity,' and thus reflecting the ambiguity of their identity from their 
place of origin. 167 At present, South Asian background usually identifies' Indian, Pakistani, and 
Bangladeshi', and thus cuts out the Kashmiris. Consequently, Kashmiris residents in UK usually 
opt for the Indian or Pakistani designation when completing forms or surveys. 168 Over two-thirds 
of Pakistanis are actually Kashmiris. 169 But apart from the anecdotal observation on a strong 
Kashmiri presence, it is difficult to ascertain the national picture with any accuracy, especially as 
many studies have been somewhat 'lax' in their use of terminology. 170 
It is observed that the language difficulties perpetuated to allowing the Kashmiri identity to be 
'c1eansed,.17I It has been established that 'Pahari is the name of their language, which is a 
language of the Indo-Aryan family of languages.' 172 Thus when presented with South Asian 
languages in the British services, namely: 'Urdu, Hindi, Bengali, Punjabi or Gujarati', the British 
162 Khan Z. (2000), op cit. 
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Kashmiris opt for the Pakistani languages of Urdu or Punjabi, some struggling to understand 
either. 173 Other researchers have provided similar findings. 174 
As for the position of Kashmiri immigrants in the UK, it is said that they have been 'excluded 
and marginalized' since the outset. Hence, it may not be a surprise that difficulties in 
assimilation are further perpetuated by 'the high levels of underachievement' in the education 
system. 175 This high level of underachievement in the education system has led to low, socio -
economic status in the UK, despite the lack of official data, there is the continuous emphasize on, 
'in our view the problems of Kashmiri children are even worse than those of true Pakistanis." 76 
Ballard177 identifies several contributing factors for the low socio-economic position and the 
poor educational achievement of the 'Mirpuris'. The first is their poor and low educational 
origins; second, is their close ties to their places of origin with 'chain migration' that is 
perpetuated by arranged marriages of their children in the parents' place of origin. These issues, 
it has been held, are given priority over the educational achievement in the UK. He observes, 'as 
a result Mirpuris routinely find themselves driven to engage in even more byzantine counter 
manoeuvres in an effort to contain and subvert the efforts of their closest kin to advance their 
own interests.' 178 In summary, it is argued that the British Kashmiri Muslims commenced 'the 
race with substantially greater handicaps than their peers drawn from elsewhere in South Asia, 
but they also chose to follow a significantly different course whilst running it.' 179 
Hence, the Kashmiri community in Britain, themselves 'quite wrongly proscribe to Punjabi 
identity.' 180 Significantly, Rehman argues that the British Kashmiris are referred to as 'Mirpuris' 
by those who either did not know about Kashmir or chose to overlook the wider Kashmiri 
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identity.' 181 It is further submitted that other Pakistanis, whether they are from Karachi, or 
Islamabad, use 'Mirpuri' as 'pejoratively' and 'on line dating sites often stipulate 'No Mirpuris,.t182 
The wrong identity is perpetuated by the fact that the majority of Kashmiris 'were illiterate, only 
concerned with work and sending money back home. , . , it gave a free hand to Pakistani 
academics to construct Pakistani or Muslim identities and completely ignore and erase Kashmiri 
ethnicity and identity.' 183 Accordingly, the assertion that 'most of the Kashmiris are Muslims and 
come from Pakistani colonial area therefore they are Pakistanis and have no need for their 
language, culture and heritage to be distinguished,' is incorrect. It is further observed that 'they 
have no nation state, however, neither have Kurds, Palestinians, nor many more ethnic groups 
which are recognized and included.' 184 
Research indicates Kashmiri identity is that of the Kashmir State and not of divisions of people 
or places,I85 It has been observed that descents of Pakistani administered Kashmir commenced 
calling themselves Kashmiris instead of Pakistani or Punjabis. This move is related to increased 
educational knowledge of Kashmir and its history which has led to the disillusionment and 
awareness of the ill-treatment of those in the 'Azad Kashmir' by the Pakistani dominated Punjabi 
administration, and indeed increasing political assertiveness. 186 Ellis and Khan found evidence in 
Luton of Kashmiri attending meetings in Britain 'to advance aspirations for the unification (on 
independence) of Kashmir'. Children of the original Kashmiri immigrants share the aspirations 
of their forefathers, and condemn the human rights violations, although they may have never 
lived in Kashmir,l87 
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In recognizing the said frustrations and difficulties, the House of Commons accepted the motion 
on 16 December 2008, that 'this House recognizes there is a considerable Kashmir community in 
the UK ... calls on the Government to give recognition to the six hundred thousand Kashmiri 
people estimated to be living in the UK by ensuring that the 20 II census has a separate section 
for Kashmiri people to identify themselves and looks forward to Kashmiri people living in the 
UK being able to register their identity as the many other ethnic groups that live in the UK are 
able to do so.' 188 The figures for the 'Kashmiri people' are as yet not available. 189 
2.7.5 Religion 
SUfism 
The circumstances in Kashmir have led to what Margolis refers to as the new 'Jihad'. 190 Bhatt 
observes that it is new because Kashmiri's are 'Sufis, the most pacifists and mystical branch of 
Islam based on the precept of peace and complete devotion to Allah.' 191 The Foreign Affairs 
Committee acknowledged, Kashmir 'does not have the extremism and radicalism that we see in 
other Islamic movements. That was never part of Kashmir's make-up. It had a more Sufistic, 
softer face of Islam.' 192 The 'softer face' of Sufism is reiterated by John Glover,193 who 
emphasizes that based on 'both Quranic and Sufi education' there was the 'emphasis on 
diplomacy and co-operation ... religious principles could not be compromised, but armed jihad 
was explicitly rejected as counter-productive'. 194 
However, it is argued that the face of Islam changed in the mid twentieth century when Islamic 
teachings in Kashmir became more dependent on Pakistani scholars. 195 It is perhaps significant 
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to note that the majority of the first generation British Muslims practice Sufism, as it, had existed 
in Kashmir since the 1300S.1 96 
The British Kashmiris generally belong 'to the branch of Islam called Barelwi [Sufism), a sect 
disdained by many other British Muslims and somewhat isolated.' 197 They are the followers of 
the Mawlana Ahmad Raza Khan Barelvi (1856-1921), who revived Sufism in the Indian 
subcontinent. 198 Their differences from other Muslims are based on the Barelvi - Sufi 
doctrine,199 the Sufi teaching revolves 'around the centrality of mediation: the Prophet mediated 
with God, the shaykh - and the saints - with the Prophet ... three channels of mediation and 
intercession: the individual pir or shayky, the founding saint of a Sufi order ... and the 
Prophet.,2oo There is also the emphasis on 'shrine-based Islam. ,201 The British Kashmiri Muslims 
are viewed as practicing 'customary,202 Islam and accordingly marginalized within the wider 
British Muslim community. 
Furthermore, the British Barelvi mosques have 'Urdu-speaking imams', as Ann Cryer, the then 
Member of Parliament for Keighley in West Yorkshire, with many British Kashmiri constituents 
stated, 'many of imams who have been brought in don't speak a word of English and have little 
knowledge of what life in Britain is all about, particularly for their young members. We have to 
help our communities to integrate, to live in cohesion. ,203 She was particularly critical of those 
from Mirpur, and described them as part of the problem rather than the solution. 
It has been observed that such imams hinder the British born and inadvertently make them 
vulnerable to exploitation from extremist groups of Islam. 'Madeline Bunting wrote about this in 
The Guardian after the London bombings ... She cited one Barelvi journalist's claim that 
196 Ibid. see also: lohns A.H. (1995) 'Sufism in Southeast Asia: Reflections and Reconsiderations'. Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 1995,26(1), 169 and Naeem F.S. (2009) 'Sufism and Revivalism in South Asia: Mawlana 
Ashraf AIi Thanvi of Deoband and Mawlana Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareilly and Their Paradigms of Islamic 
~;viva(jsm: The Mus~im World 2009, 99(3), 435. 
Doe B. (2006) op elt. 
197 
Doe B. (2006) op eit. 
198 
Naeem S.F. (2009) op eit. 
199 
Naeem S.F. (2009) op eit. 
200 Ibid. 
201 
Naeem S.F. (2009) op eit. 
202 D' . Iseussed In Chapter 5. 
203 Quoted in Doe B. (2006) at http://www.tes.eo.uklarticle.aspx?storyeode=2261962 last visited May2012. 
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unnamed Arab movements have a name for young UK Barelvis let down by their elders. They 
call them orphans of Islam and target them for recruitment. ,204 
2.8 Conclusion 
There is no denying that the 'instability between India and Pakistan [is] one of the greatest threats 
that the world might face in the future.,20s Consequently it has emerged that the events in 
Kashmir have had and continue to have an impact in the United Kingdom. British Kashmiri 
Muslims' 'detachment, indeed, isolation from [all] groups,206 may on occasions make them 
vulnerable to exploitation from deviant and extremists personnel. In analysing the events of 7 
JUly 2005, Hayman concluded that 'many of these terrorists supported extreme Kashmiri groups, 
their first links with terrorism in Pakistan, which led them to al Qaeda.'207 
The Kashmiri situation offers little hope of optimism, leading some to comment that 'in this 
conflict, the people who are being used as table tennis balls in a game of power politics are the 
Kashmjri people.'208 Analysis of India's special powers conferred on its military, and its blatant 
human rights violations has led to the conclusion by one ethnographic researcher in Indian 
administered Kashmir, that 'militarization and penalization work hand in hand to produce 
patterns of captivity in which a particular society's 'rubbish people' - those not fully human and 
better off dead - are subjected to the waste disposal strategies of control and surveillance ... .'209 
Kashmir is viewed as 'continuation or resurrection of colonial power in contemporary form', and 
Kashmiris 'probably had more freedom under the British crown' than at present.21O 
However, no peace compromise is anywhere nearer today than it was nearly sixty years ago. 
Injustice and inhumane treatment can become a breeding ground for home-grown terrorism, as is 
the case in Kashmir. The simple solution lies in the task of getting 'people to look forward rather 
204 
205 Doe B. (2006), op cit, emphasis added. 
House of Commons (2002) Hansard Debates, Mr Richard Spring. 10 June 2002, co1.598. 
206 Tilman R. (2002) 'Durkheim and Veblen on the Social Nature of Individualism.' Journal of Economic Issues, 
2002, 36(4) : 1104 
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Hayman A .(2009) The Terrorist Hunters Bantam Press: London at p.285. See also: Durkheim E (1965) The 
Division of Labour, translated by George Simpson. The Free Press: New York, p.129-130; see also: Turner P.S. 
~J8993) Emi/e Durkheim: Sociologist and Moralist. Routledge: New York. 
2 House Commons (2002) Hansard Debates Mr Khalid Mahmood. 10 June 2002, Col. 602. 
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than looking back,'211 without this the Kashmiri people will continue to be 'used as table tennis 
balls in a game of power politics.'212 The International Crisis Group concluded that although 
India has 'exploited' global 'concerns by linking Kashmiri militancy with the global war against 
terrorism',213 India continues to remain willing to accept 'a dialogue, ... with Pakistan.'214 
However any long term 'solutions' require that all the Kashmiri 'grievances' highlighted in this 
chapter and elsewhere be addressed.2I5 
In conclusion, the dispute over Kashmir is an ethnic, religious and territorial issue with potential 
for economic and strategic gains to India and Pakistan, which is in desperate need of 
diplomacy.216 The Kashmiri situation is analyzed by Duschinski who writes, 'of how deeply -
entrenched patterns of militarization produce real social suffering for particular local 
communities while simultaneously being obscured and rendered invisible through popular 
rhetoric of protecting national security, promoting national interests, and maintaining law and 
order.'217 
It has been asserted these background conditions have led some British Kashmiris to sympathize 
with and support terrorist groups in Kashmir. It was reported that 'stabilising Kashmir is also 
important for United Kingdom domestic security reasons.'218 Christopher Hope identifies that 
British Muslims are sending their 'problem children' to Islamic institutions in Kashmir. These 
children are deemed to be at risk of exploitation from Islamic 'radicalisation.'219 Hence, the 
importance of this chapter, to the analysis of the present Kashmiri viewpoint on terrorist groups 
in Kashmir. 
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In brief it has been established that the diminished and confused identity of Kashmiris in Britain, 
and religious beliefs contrary to mainstream Islam have created conditions to be targeted by 
extremists as being susceptible to recruitment as 'Islam's orphans', as was the unfortunate case of 
the London bombers on July 2005. The following chapters 4 to 7 will address some of the issues 
identified h~re when interviewing the participants of a British Kashmiri Muslim community. 
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Chapter Three Methodology and Fieldwork 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will consider the rationale, development and implementation of the fieldwork 
undertaken for this thesis. It will consider the issues of achieving access, sampling, data 
collection and data analysis, as well as issues of confidentiality, risk management, research ethics 
and the pragmatic constrains of the research process. The fieldwork consisted of face-to-face, 
semi-structured interviews with British Kashmiri Muslims in one area of the North of England. 
The focus ofthis chapter is, first, to provide an outline of methodology, and the suitability of the 
research design. Then the issues that arose from the fieldwork, such as ethical issues, and issues 
emerging from the interview situation itself, before going on to explain the data analysis. The 
findings in relation to conceptual developments will be identified in Chapters Four and Five. The 
findings on specific areas of law will be reserved for the subsequent Chapters Six and Seven. 
The writer had commenced the research with the idea that it would be sequential: the data 
collection would lead to directly to the data analysis; however, it soon became apparent that this 
would not be the case. On occasions the writer was at the mercy of the participants in terms of 
timing, and departure from the pre arranged plans and timetabling was necessary. The researcher 
was compelled to re-think preconceived ideas specifically in relation to access. Analysis was 
formulated on the basis of 'information' provided by the participants.' 
The aims did not entirely represent the reality of the fieldwork, as human beings cannot be 
modified to fit in an ideal laboratory, nor can their views. This became clearer as the fieldwork 
progressed. It also became apparent that social science research requires modification to the 
settings, rather than the participants modifying to the researcher. The researcher has to be 
flexible, and interact in a manner (within the boundaries of the research), to suit the participants. 
The pragmatic necessities of the fieldwork led to the informative process requiring analysis and 
reflection. Via such a reflective process, the problems experienced in the fieldwork and the 
counter-strategies utilised will be highlighted. This will be in conjunction with the discussion of 
the strengths and limitations of the methodology. 
1 Creswell J. W. (2007) Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design Second Edition. London: Sage Publications at 
p.63. 
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3.2 Aims and Objectives of the Research 
The aim of this research was to ascertain the views of a minority religious group, namely, the 
British Kashmiri Muslims, on the issue of terrorism, and the British counter-terrorist legislation 
and policies. This was to be furthered by contacting community centres. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with the aim of obtaining a sample of fourteen men and fourteen 
women. The time and resource constraints of a self-funded PhD project would only allow for that 
number of interviews. Nonetheless, the participants were chosen with care in accordance with a 
purposive sampling approach suitable for small-scale qualitative research projects where the aim 
is to gather rich sources of data, depth of insight and generate new hypotheses, rather than to test 
existing concepts or to generalize to a large population. 
From the two groups there was to be an equal number of first generation and second/third 
generation Kashmiri Muslims. This is crucial since the second / third generation of Kashmiri 
Muslims will be British born and educated, whose culture may differ from the Kashmiri born 
first generation. Due to the limitations of a PhD thesis, this research will not cover the views of 
any other Muslim group in the UK. However, the research is original by not treating all Muslims 
as one 'community' but seeking to penetrate in detail and for the first time one important 
category within the many communities of predominately Muslim people resident in the UK. As 
the impending discussion will highlight, British Kashmiris have been selected because of their 
historical conflict in Kashmir, and links to the British Empire - and the transfer of this conflict to 
contemporary British society. In addition, nearly a quarter of British Muslims are of Kashmiri 
origin.2 This research is valuable in offering some unique insight into the selected British 
subgroup/culture, and its minority religious beliefs,3 which is presently under-researched.4 
2 BBC, 11 July 2005 Kashmiri Anxiety over UK Attacks. http://www.jammu-
kashmir.comlarchivesiarchives200Slkashmir200S0711a.html. 
3 It is difficult at this stage to distinguish between religion and culture, as chapter 2 will highlight religion is 
interlinked to the selected group's culture. 
4 Rehman S. (2009) British Kashmiris. Challenges and Opportunities. http://bkaf.org.uk/articlel.hlml, last visited 
January 2010; Ali D. (2007) Recognising the Kashmiri Community in the United Kingdom: Implications/or 
Education Attainment. Race Equality Teaching Trentham Books: London. 
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3.3. Methodology 
In exploring the selected group's views and perceptions of and towards terrorism, careful 
consideration has been given to the research strategy. Consideration was given to the fact that a 
methodology 'translates' the principles of a paradigm in a research language, and shows how the 
world can be explained, handled, approached and studied;5 highlighting 'what is important, what 
is legitimate, what is reasonable' to the researcher.6 
3.3.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Research 
Brief consideration will now be given to the two main approaches to research. It is argued that 
the qualitative approach is the most useful for this thesis. When faced with the question, 'Which 
is better?' the better paradigm (qualitative or quantitative) is the one that serves to answer the 
specific research question. 7 The approach best suited to the present research is qualitative. It 
enabled the researcher to utilize techniques that the British Kashmiri Muslim participants are 
'comfortable' with, and is suitable for both the researcher and the participants.s The researcher 
can therefore 'make the most efficient use,9 of all available resources to understand the 
participants views. lo It is noteworthy that due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, and issues 
of confidentiality, on-line or telephone-based survey research would not be as effective, or 
indeed provide the in-depth data required. Moreover, response rates would likely be low and 
responses of poor quality. Surveys and questionnaires would only be completed by those 
proficient in the English language, though there exists as discussed below, a substantial sample 
that are illiterate, but whose views are vital. 
: Sarantakos S. (1993) Social Research Hampshire. Macmillan Press Ltd .(34-45). 
Patton M. (1990) Qualitative Evaluation &Research Methods Newbury Park: Sage, at 1'.37. 
7 Benz & Newman (1998) Qualitative - Quantitative Research Methodology: Exploring the Interactive Continuum. 
Carbondale, IL; Southern Illinois University Press at 1'.11. 
8 Creswell I.W. (2007) 01' cit at 23. See also: Rorty R. (1990) 'Pragmatism as anti-representationalism' in Murphy 
l.P. (editor) Pragmatism: From Pierce to Davidson. Westview Press: Boulder, CO; Patton M.Q. (1990) Qualitative 
education and research methods Sage: London; Cherryholmes C.H. (1992) 'Notes on Pragmatism and Scientific 
Realism: Educational Researcher, 14: 13-17; Tashakkari A. & Teddie C. (2003) (editors) Handbook of mixed 
methods in the social and behavioural sciences. Sage: London. 
9 Onwuegbuzie A. l. (2002) 'Why Can't We All Get Along? Towards a Framework for Unifying Research 
Paradigms.' Education, 122 (3): 518 
10 Giorgi A. (2002) 'The Question of Validity in Qualitative Research.' Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 
33(1): I. 
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3.3.2 Qualitative Research Methodll 
Qualitative research is generally interpretive. It is the most appropriate for this thesis because the 
researcher is well-placed by reason of her personal background to access, understand, analyze 
and explain the research topic. Interpretive 'positions' are described as being the most effective 
with underrepresented or minority groups such as that of the British Kashmiri Muslims, as they 
'provide a pervasive lens or perspective on all aspects of' 12 the research in 'natural settings,.13 In 
addition, it is an appropriate approach because 'terrorism' is an emotive subject. Therefore, to 
assess the strength of feelings around the subject, qualitative approach would be the most 
effective. The research is not just about what is officially pronounced but what is genuinely felt. 
Interviews were selected as the main data collection instrument. For effective results and indeed 
participation in this 'sensitive' area of research 'empathy' is imperative, and the researcher can 
only achieve this using the qualitative research method. 
The research involved analyzing and exploring the way in which individuals (British- Kashmiri 
Muslims) viewed UK society, specifically the laws on terrorism, and how these perceptions were 
expressed and perceived by this groUp.14 Thus in order to understand this perspective, any valid 
interpretive study would have to 'conceptualize reality' from the selected community's point of 
view. ls As a British born Muslim, the writer was able to demonstrate empathy with the dynamics 
involved in the subject group's religion, and as a person of Kashmiri ancestry, she was also able 
to demonstrate a unique level of insight in particular in relation to the second and third 
generation participants. 
Qualitative inquiry can generate theory and findings from the perspective of its participants, 16 
which are vital for the thesis. It helps the researcher to address values,17 and capture social 
)) The researcher has used qualitative methods whilst undertaking research as a undergraduate and postgraduate at 
Masters level, however the experience is limited to interviews. 
12 Creswell I.W. (2007) Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design Choosing Among Five Approaches Sage 
Publications: London at 24 )3 • 
Creswell I.W. (2007) ibid at 38. 
14 Daymon C. & Holloway I. (2002) Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and Marketing 
Communications. RoutJedge. at p.4. 
:: Sarantakos, (1993). op cit at p.34-S; Daymon & Holloway (2002). ibid at p.S. 
Goodson L. & Philimore I. (2004) Qualitative Research in Tourism: Ont%gies, Epistemologies & Methodology. 
Routledge, at p.4. 
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meanings. IS In addressing values, the researcher acknowledges the culture of the participants, 
which is vital when working with perceived minority groups such as British Kashmiri Muslims. 
Qualitative data 'humanize' research,I9 and enable guidance on a personalized level, thereby 
allowing the researcher to explore perceptions and attitudes on terrorism in depth. Full 
understanding of participants necessitates interviews followed by detailed transcription analysis. 
This provides data to produce 'descriptive writing that is the hallmark of qualitative research,.20 
Shortcomings of the chosen methodology are discussed in the concluding part of this chapter. 
3.4 Researcher Bias 
It is important to acknowledge the researcher'S standpoint, as objectivity is regarded by many as 
a virtue that every researcher should aspire to.21 The goal of objectivity or value neutrality is in 
order to minimize bias, and present social reality as it is, rather than as influenced by the 
personal prejudices of the researcher.22 However, Mills argues that the most admirable scholars 
do not split their work from their lives. They take both too seriously to allow such dissociation, 
and they use each for the enrichment of the other?3 It is further submitted that separating 
research from other aspects of one's life can cut off a major source of insight, hypotheses and 
validity checks.24 Indeed feminist researchers' have found that trust is enhanced when the 
researcher's identity is acknowledged in the field. 25 
Disclosing one's inevitable bias or personal beliefs is less dangerous than pretending to be value 
free26• The writer is a British born Muslim with Kashmiri ancestry, and acknowledges her biases, 
namely that the British law on terrorism is necessary, and that majority of the Muslim 
17 Ebbs C.A. (1996) "Qualitative Research Inquiry: Issues of Power and Ethics" Education Vo1.117, Issue 2, 1996, 
~.2I7. 
8 Jupp V. (1989) Methods ojCriminological Research. London: Unwin Hyman, p.28. 
19 Fitzgerald M. & Muncie J. (1981) 'Humanising the deviant' in Fitzgerald M., et al (editors) Crime & Society: 
Readings in History and Theory. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
20 Pugach C.M. (2001) "The Stories Choose to Tell: Fulfilling the Promise of Qualitative Research for Special 
~ducation", Education. VoJ.67, Issue 4; p.439. 
I Sarantakos, op cit at p.18. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Mills C.W. (1959) 'On intellectual craftsmanship' in Mills C.W (editor) The sociological imaginations pp.195-
226. London. Oxford University Press, p.195. 
24 Maxwell (1996), op cit at p.27; see also Hammersley M .( 1998) Reading Ethnographic Research Second Edition. 
London: Longman (Social Research Series). 
25 Warren C. (1988) Gender Issues in Field Research. London: Sage Publications. 
26 S k . aranta os, op Clt at p.l 9. 
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Community in Britain are agreeable to such laws. However, the writer is of the opinion that these 
views may not be shared by all second and third generation Muslims. This is in line with the 
literature research conducted by the researcher, which categorically states that the said 
population is vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, was highlighted by the London bombings in 
JUly 2005. 
It is important to distinguish between two different purposes for research: practical purposes, and 
scholarly purposes. The writer's practical purpose is to explore the needs of the community for 
legislature, the aim of which is to 'protect'; and the research purpose is to enhance academic 
understanding and insight into the views of the participants.27 The understanding and insight will 
be scholarly in the sense that it will be fully and openly argued and interpreted in light of existing 
scholarly literature. The analysis may then be of use to decision makers involved in the 
development of the legislation and other forms of public policy. 
There is the inevitable concern over whether the researcher, as a member of the British Kashmiri 
Muslim, 'can be a valid and reliable interpreter of the research;,28 the argument that being an 
'inside' member of a group creates bias rather than empathy. This view has been challenged by 
some researchers in the feminist and emancipatory fields,29 who accept that all researchers 
possess 'values and perceptions' - thus acknowledging limitations and bias at the outset is 
inevitable. In addition, it has been argued that 'detached researchers need to recognize their 
assumption of privilege, the potential inability to establish rapport, and the possibility of 
inaccurate interpretation.'30 Successful research requires acknowledgement of the 'diversity' of 
the participants, and to ignore that 'would be the greatest travesty.'31 It has to be assumed for the 
purposes of the present research that the participants in the research have valuable views that the 
researcher can obtain knowledge about. To control the potential 'bias' of the researcher, Burke 
Johnson suggests that the 'researcher actively engage in critical self reflection about his / her 
27 
Maxwell, op cit at p. 15.16. 
28 Henderson K. A. (1998) • Researching Diverse Populations.' Journal of Leisure Research, 30(1): 157. 
29 Stanley L. (editor) (1990) Feminist Praxis. Routledge: London; Denzin N.K. (1994) 'The Art and Politics of 
Interpretation.' in Denzin N.K. & Guba V.S. (eds.) Handbook of Qualitative Research. pp.500-515. Sage: London; 
~eason P. & Rowan J. (eds.) (1981) A source book of new paradigm research. London: John Wiley & Sons. 
3) Henderson K.A. (1998) op cit at 157. 
Ibid. 
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potential biases and predispositions,.32 The writer asserts that the objectivity or value neutrality 
is unattainable, unnecessary and undesirable. In order to control any bias, the researcher created 
a 'diary,33 alongside the 'field notes'. The diary was used following each interview, and this 
enabled the writer to reflect on the processes that occurred during the interviews. 
3.5 Access and Sample Selection 
Access was gained via community centres, initially by telephone, with face to face meetings 
where deemed necessary. 'Purposive' and 'snowball' sampling34 was used to obtain further 
contact. Participants would be first and subsequent generation of British Kashmiri Muslims, as 
well as male and female. Beyond this, sampling was based on accessibility and their cooperation 
or willingness to undertake the interviews.35 The initial group of participants were those 
attending selected youth centres and adult drop-in centres, which includes women's centres. 
There are potential risks to the researcher working alone; such as, anger and abuse. The 
researcher proposed to address these by exiting the situation. In addition, arrangements were 
made for the researcher to be contacted via telephone or pager, and the participants were 
informed accordingly that should the interview exceed an hour, there would be an interruption at 
that stage. 
The females were all personally contacted; the aim was to have five first generation and five 
second or third generation females. Qualitative research, as it is continuously reiterated, is indeed 
time consuming, however, this research had the additional inherent difficulties related to the 
subject matter. Eight women withdrew consent once it became apparent as to what we would be 
discussing. Two British born women said that they were 'too far from Kashmir', and 'know 
nothing about it'. One asserted, 'I have nothing worthwhile to say about terrorism.' Others 
expressed that they were 'extremely uncomfortable talking about terrorist stuff, I'm not like 
32 Burke Johnson R. (1997) 'Examining the Validity Structure of Qualitative Research.' Education. 118 (2): 282. 
33 S d' ee appen IX 3. 
34 Etienne M. (2005) 'The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as 
Cause Lawyers' Journal o/Criminal Law & Criminology, Vol. 95, Issue 4, p.1195. 
3) Wong-Wylie G. (2007) 'Barriers and Facilitators of Reflective Practice in Counsellor Education: Critical 
Incidents from Doctoral Graduates.' Canadian Journal o/Counselling 2007, 41(2): 59; and Molleda J-C. & Maeno 
A. (2008) 'Balancing Public Relations with Socio-economic and political environments in transition: comparative, 
contextualized research in Columbia, Mexico and Venzuela.' Journalism & Communication Monographs 2008, 
10(2): 115. 
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them. I can't believe you're doing this, they're all gonna think that you're one of them. You 
shouldn't be doing this. Leave it [to] the white folk.' Several said, 'I'm not educated, what do I 
know?' In addition to the eight, one withdrew because of sudden illness in the family. The 
researcher had anticipated that access would be easier with the female British Kashmiri Muslims, 
but the opposite was the case. Following much negotiation, reassurances of confidentiality and 
anonymity, seven females were interviewed. 
All twenty males were interviewed. Snowballing chains were employed with the men, whereby 
one participant provides access to another individual. This process was essential for this research 
as an introduction from an existing member ensured that confidence and trust was established in 
the researcher. 36 Three initial contacts were established with the first generation men, one of 
whom was informally appointed 'leader', since he knew the community well and was trusted by 
the majority of the community. His approval signaled to the others that the researcher was 
ethical, and having him as a 'sponsor,3? also reduced any potential risks to the researcher, who 
had initially encountered some hostility from individuals on discussing the issue of terrorism and 
Kashmir. In addition, it was fortuitous that the interviews were conducted at a time of local and 
national British elections; since the community was divided into Conservative and Labour 
camps, many of the men had taken leave off work to campaign for their individual parties. Thus 
the men appeared keen to be interviewed, and those that were selected would establish the 
researcher's credentials, and on satisfaction of that point they would proceed enthusiastically 
with the interview. Of the second and third generation males, five were personally contacted, and 
then several different chains of snowballing were initiated with students and government and 
public sector employees. 
As with all research, there were limitations to the snowballing process. The existing participant 
may knowingly or unknowingly discuss his interview with the potential participants, therefore 
creating bias. It has to be accepted that anonymity and complete confidentiality of which 
participants were being interviewed was not exclusive to the researcher.38 These issues were 
addressed with the participants, namely that confidentiality was of fundamental importance, and 
36 
J Jones I. & Gatton C. (2003) Research Methods/or Sport Studies. Routledge: London at p.184. 
7 Denscombe M. (2003) The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Prqjects. Open University 
fsress: Maidenhead at p.16. 
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the content of his interview or anyone else's views were not to be discussed. The researcher 
invested considerable time discussing these issues to protect confidentiality, and to eliminate and 
minimise bias. 
The snowballing process of the data accumulation proved essential for the research, as it yielded 
a sample of participants that the researcher would not have had access to via any other means. In 
addition, to illustrate an example of direct contact and the difficulties: one of the wives prevented 
the researcher from interviewing her husband. For sixty to ninety minutes alone with a 'strange 
man', she said firmly, 'is against Islam.' Yet the researcher was never permitted to be 'alone' with 
any male participants; this was done out of respect for the researcher, and to ensure that her 
reputation remained intact. 
The interviews were conducted in participants' homes, and for some of the men in a house that 
belonged to one of the informally appointed 'leaders' that had instigated the snowballing process. 
The researcher had anticipated that they would take place in community centres, but the 
participants adamantly refused to be interviewed in such locations for reasons of confidentiality. 
But this caused some practical difficulties. There were interruptions for cups of tea and food. On 
occasions there were interruptions by crying children. The initial contact would sit mute, as a 
chaperon whilst the researcher interviewed each individual male. It was reassuring that he never 
interrupted, but he assured the 'new' participant of his confidentiality too. With regards to the 
second generation males, they were interviewed with the door ajar. Again as with the first 
generation males, there were similar interruptions. The females were all interviewed alone with 
no interruptions. However, as these were conducted in their homes, there were only certain times 
in the day that they could be interviewed, because they had prior commitments and other chores 
to undertake. These prior commitments lead to several visits to their homes, as some would 
forget that they had 'double booked'. 
It was imperative that the researcher was flexible in her approach and methods. Reflection and 
assessment of the situation made access to the participants slightly easier but not without 
hindrances. As a person fluent in the languages of Pahiri and Urdu, the writer hoped that she 
possessed the necessary cultural awareness and understanding. However, the fluency in the 
languages alone was not sufficient, the researcher had to adapt a consistent manner when 
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translating the words from English to Pahiri, the exact same words were used for each 
interviewee. The challenge was to ensure that each participant was asked the same question in 
Pahiri, since one word may be translated in several different ways, and convey a completely 
different meaning. In addition, the writer's dress code, (casual jeans and blouse), perturbed some 
of the first generation women. One commented that it saddened her to see someone wearing an 
Islamic headscarf and western clothing, and that it was a 'contradiction'. Another said, 'What is 
the point of the hijab [headscarf] when you wear jeans.' This example highlights the importance 
of understanding not just the religious aspects, but also the cultural aspects of the community 
being researched. 
3.6.1 In-depth interviewing39 
Qualitative research interviews are typically referred to as depth or in-depth interviews.40 In-
depth interviewing is the most commonly used data collection approach in qualitative research.41 
The in-depth interview enables researchers to understand the meaning people make of their lives 
from their own perspective. This was necessary for this thesis as it allowed the participants to 
relay their perspective on the issue of terrorism, and whether their religion, origin or other factors 
contributed to their views. In-depth interviewing takes seriously the notion that people are 
experts on their own experience and so best able to report how they experienced a particular 
event or phenomenon. If we interview different people (even though those individuals have a 
connection in common, namely religion and place of origin), about the same event or 
phenomenon, we shall inevitably gain a range ofperspectives.42 
Like any method of data collection, in-depth interviews have their relative strengths and 
weaknesses.43 However the choice to use interviewing in this thesis was informed by the view 
that they would generate the most valid and appropriate forms of data. Firstly, they share the 
general advantages of all face-to-face interviewing. They offer flexibility but still allow a 
39 It is proposed that the interviews will be analysed immediately following, this is imperative as the material will be 
contemporaneous. 
40 Maykut P. & Morehouse R. (1994) Beginning Qualitative Research: A Philosophic and A Practical Gllide. 
y>ndon: Falmer Press, at p.81. 
4 Darlington Y. & Scott D. (2002) Qualitative Research in Practice: Stories from the Field. Alien & Unwin 
~ublishers, at pAS. 
43 Darl~ngton Y. & Scott D. (2002) op cit, at p.48. 
Darhngton Y. & Scott D. (2002) op cit, at pA8. 
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direction to the discussion and a deep exploration of the subject matter.44 Probably the central 
value of the interview as a research procedure is that it allows both parties to clarify the 
questions and answers, and this is necessary as there may be English language difficulties. There 
is an implicit, or explicit sharing and / or negotiation of understanding which is unique to the 
interview setting, and usually not present in other procedures such as questionnaires.45 In 
addition the overriding advantage of a 'friendly chat' in the interview process enables the 
interviewee to disclose information that would not be obtained in questionnaires.46 Thus 
interviews are an excellent means of finding out how people think or feel in relation to sensitive 
and emotive topics such as 'terrorism'. 47 
The interview process adopted for this thesis involved a semi-structured method. Semi-structured 
interviews are designed to address 'the pivotal information needed' for the research.'48 It is an 
effective method for the present research whereby 'standardized set of questions' are designed as 
'semi structured' in that they 'allow interviewers, at their discretion, to use follow-up questions' 
When the participant's answer is 'unclear or incomplete.'49 
The semi structured nature of the interview allowed the researcher to focus on the issues at hand, 
especially since the interviewees struggled to elaborate on the topic. Nonetheless, it did appear 
like a 'test' to some, who required assurances that the researcher was not interested in a 'correct' 
answer. There was very little rambling or any superfluous information, some of the participants 
appeared apprehensive but were keen to answer the questions. The men were certainly more 
open and talkative than the females. In order for the participants to elaborate, 'para-phrasing' 
was utilised, where the researcher selects and repeats something that the interviewee has said. It 
is noteworthy that the researcher resiled from offering any personal opinions. 
The researcher was acutely aware of non verbal communication: personal and the participants'. 
Conservative western dress code (perhaps not sufficiently adhered to, as noted earlier) and 
44 D I· 
45 ar ~ngton Y. & Scott D. (2002) op cit at pp.48-49. 
46 Darhngton Y. & Scott D. (2002) op cit at p.49. 
47 Leed~ P.D. & Omrod J.E. (2010) Practical Research 9th edition. New Jersey: Pearson Publications at p.1 88. 
48 Darhngton Y. & Scott D. (2002) op cit, at p.50. 
Joffe W.S. (2001) 'Investigating the Acquisition of Pedagogical Knowledge: Interviews with a Beginning Teacher 
~fthe Gifted.' Roeper Review, 2001, 23(4): 219. 
Long C. & Stansbury K. (1994) 'Perfonnance Assessments for Beginning Teachers: Options & Lessons.' Phi 
Delta Kappan 1994, 76(4) at 318. 
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personal mannerisms were reserved to reassure the participants that their views were of 
imperative significance. 
3.6.2 Questions 
Question-asking is an 'art,50, and at the heart of research design for semi-structured interviews. 51 
In this project the female gender of the researcher was found to be a hindrance to engagement 
with some of the first generation males, but simultaneously an advantage as it allowed access to 
the 'first generation' females as they would not be as forthcoming with their responses to a male 
researcher. 
The sensitive nature of the subject matter was reflected in the questions. The primary 
consideration for this qualitative research is that the questions be open-ended, inviting the 
interviewee to participate in a conversation.52 However, interviews can be derailed if the 
interviewees begin to see the session as a grilling on topics for which they cannot supply the 
necessary information.53 In addition, it was imperative to avoid unclear or vague questions, as 
well as complex questions. It was anticipated that the participants would appreciate simplicity,54 
especially when English may not be their first language. 
3.6.3 Interview GuideS!! or Schedule 
The interview guide is an essential tool that consists of a series of topics and questions or 
prompts that the research encompasses. 56 It enabled the interviewer to ascertain the participants' 
views and seek clarification or elaboration where necessary. Every interview requires some kind 
of structure, especially in broad subjects such as terrorism. This structure was particularly 
necessary because the subject was sensitive and therefore prevented potentially emotional 
outbursts from diverting the focus of the subject matter. Prestructuring also reduced the amount 
of data that the researcher had to deal with. Indeed it offered both the interviewer and the 
50 M SI aykut & Morehouse (1994) op cit at p.88. 
~axwell J.A. (I 996) Qualitative Research Design An Interactive Approach. Applied Social Research Method ~enes. Vol.41. London: Sage Publications, p.49-51. 
53 M~Ykut & Morehouse (1994) op cit. 
54 Ibld, at p.91. 
5S Ibid, at p.93. 
56 See Appendix One for the Interview Guide. 
Maykut & Morehouse (1994), op cit at p.83. 
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interviewee guidance. In most cases an interview guide is recommended.57 Therefore the present 
research utilized a single interview guide that was used with all participants; this 'direction' 
further promoted consistency. As discussed in the preceding section, the majority of questions 
were open-ended. 58 
3.6.4 Recording 
Initial data analysis conducted immediately following each interview. The notes would be 
transcribed following the interviews, and the information would be utilized in the thesis. This 
aIJowed the immediate recognition of emerging concepts, and simultaneously ensured, the 
participant's confidentiality; the only information recorded was that which was necessary for the 
thesis. 59 To reduce the risk of individual recognition, the data were organised in a manner that 
represented the interviewees' response to different questions and with the identification of issues 
under theme - based headings,60 rather than in the form of a narrative. 
There are several computer aided methods of analysis such as CAQDAS (Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software) and Nvivo. However the researcher elected to employ a 
'manual' method of data analysis, (an example of the manual method is that for each question, 
the answers from each interviewee are recorded on the same thematic section). It has been 
successfully established that 'computer programs are most helpful with large databases,,61 but 
since the data generated from this research were relatively small, the manual method was 
deemed most suitable. In addition, the fieldwork consisted of non-English language; a computer 
programme may distort findings in the Kashmiri language. 
In consequence, the twenty-seven interviews were all manually recorded. These notes were 
transcribed immediately after the interviews. There are limitations to this method. However, for 
the purposes of confidentiality, and placing the participants at ease, manual note taking, albeit 
time consuming, was essential. 
S7 Dar ss r mgton Y. & Scott D. (2002) op cit at p.56-57. 
S9 See appendix one. 
60 Mu~ay S.A., et aI., (2009) 'Research Methods and Reporting' BMJ 24 October 2009; 339: 958-960 at 959. 
61 Darhngton Y. & Scott D. (2002) op cit at p.29. 
Creswell J. (2007) op cit at 165. 
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3.6.5 Participants62 
As noted above, in order to ascertain the views of the British Kashmiri Muslims specifically on 
terrorism and the British counter terrorism legislation, the writer undertook to interview male and 
female; first and second or third generation British Kashmiri Muslims. The aim was to interview 
fourteen men and fourteen women, but it was eventually agreed that due to the qualitative nature 
of the research, thirty participants would be interviewed. of which twenty would be male and ten 
female. The higher number of male gender was reflective of the statistics presented by the Home 
Office, where those arrested for terrorism consisted of 94% male, and of those charged with the 
terrorism offence, 96% are male.63 In addition, to establish in-depth, exhaustive data, the writer 
would conduct the research in one area of the country, rather than considering two or three areas 
simultaneously. Although the interviews are not representative of the general population. they 
offer a unique perspective on the views of one selected British Muslim community. 
3.6.6 Overview of the Participants. 
Table la: Gender and Age. 
Number of Males Age in Years 18-24 25-35 36-45 45-54 55-65 65-70 70+ 
20 (Total) 4 6 1 1 3 2 3 
Number of Females \8-24 25-35 36-45 45-54 55-65 65-70 70+ 
7 (Total) \ 4 2 0 0 0 0 
62 F d . 
63 or etalled characteristic analysis of the participants. see Appendix 4. 
Home Office (2009) Home Office Statistical Bulletin; Operation o/police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 
and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stops and searches. Great Britain 2008109. 26 November 2009. 
London: HMSO. at p.19. 
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Table Ib: Education of the Participants 
Males NO 'A' Undergraduate Bachelors' Masters' 
Qualifications/Education Level Graduate Graduate 
Total 8 1 0 8 3 
Females 
Total 2 0 I 2 I 
(Appendix 4 outlines further characteristics of the participants). 
3.7 Data Analysis 
In qualitative research such as the present exercise, data analysis is a continuous and somewhat 
serendipitous process from the onset of the fieldwork. It is asserted that 'data collection and data 
analysis go hand in hand. ,64 Although subjective selection is inevitable, the aim of the researcher 
is to be faithful to the data collected, and accounts represented will adhere to empirical validity 
representing the full range of views. Indeed, from the initial interview as the data were collected, 
analysis took the form of the review of its contents; analysis then affected how to proceed with 
subsequent interviews. Reflective note-taking following each interview was fruitful in 
recognising 'emerging themes. ,65 In addition to the note-taking, the reflective diary enabled the 
researcher to acknowledge and reflect on personal reactions, including emotions during the 
fieldwork. 
The writer had initially considered typing up all the notes, and commenced the process, but due 
to confidentiality and anxiety in relation to the subject matter,66 manually wrote each interview, 
and manually identified the themes. Once the transcripts were checked for accuracy, the 
researcher utilised the process of 'coding'. 'Coding is the process of creating categories and 
assigning them to selected data ... involving sifting through the data, making sense of it in 
64 
Daymon C. & Holloway I. (2002) Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and Marketing 
~om.munications. London: Routledge, at p.120. 
66 Ibld at 121. 
~e. computer 'crashed' half way through the typing process, the writer had the (irrational) anxiety that the 
techlclan operating on the computer may be able to access information from the hardware, yet the data was never 
saved on the computer's hard drive. 
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various ways. ,67 Coding was achieved by systematically going through each interview; reading 
and re-reading of the data then led to links where interviewees expressed similar or divergent 
views about a particular topic, these slices of data were coded with numbers and symbols 
whenever encountered. The code terms were in relation to the concepts of terrorism, for 
example, definition of 'terrorism', ~ihad', and similarity of opinion expressed, and views on the 
law. The data were subsequently used to make comparisons and contrasts, thus reduced into 
themes and typologies.68 
3.8.1 Ethical Issues 
There are a variety of ethical issues that need consideration.69 The Code of Ethics for 
Researchers issued by the British Society of Criminology was utilized and emphasized 
throughout the research. 70 In accordance with this Code individual participants must to this study 
have been treated as autonomous, as, and accordingly informed consent was obtained from the 
individual's at the commencement of the interview. The researcher offered clear explanations of 
the research and the participants' role, and information on s.38A Terrorism Act 2000 and s. 1 
Terrorism Act 2006,71 especially since there exists no 'scholar's privilege,.n This opt out was 
continuously reiterated; at the commencement and during the interview. The potential conflict 
between the 'obligation to extend knowledge versus respect the rights of others' must and was 
always considered.73 
3.8.2 Confidentiality 
The development of ttust between researcher and participant is an essential part of the research 
process.74 At first sight confidentiality seems a fairly straightforward ethical issue, and in the 
research literature is almost exclusively dealt in terms of developing data collection and storage 
67 
Scott D. (2002) Qualitative Research in Practice: Stories/rom the Field. Crows Nest, N.S.W: Alien & Unwin at 
p.14S. 
68 
69 Creswell J. (2007) op cit at 148-149. 
70 Daymon C. & Holloway I. (2002) op cit at p.71. 
The researcher will carry a copy of it for the participants should they wish to refer to it. See: 
~lttP://www.britsoccrim.OTlil/ethical.htm last visited 20 March 2010. 
Namely, that if an interviewee discloses information about their or anyone else's involvement or any illegal 
~;tivity in terrorism, the researcher is compelled by law to disclose this information to the relevant authorities. . 
Van Den Hoonaard W.C (2001) 'Is Research-Ethics Review a Moral Panic?' The Canadian Review o/Sociology ~ Anthropology. VoI.38:1, p.19. 
74 Day~on C. & Holloway I. (2002) op cit at 71. 
Darlington Y. & Scott D. op cit at p.53-S4. 
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systems in which it is not possible to identify the research sUbjects. Accordingly, research 
participants were routinely given assurances of confidentiality. 75 
As emphasised earlier terrorism is a 'sensitive' issue and views on this area may not be openly 
disclosed without complete assurances of confidentiality, (the researcher offered each participant 
the option of a written confidentiality agreement, this was refused by all the participants).76 It has 
been argued elsewhere that 'the use of consent forms signed by interviewees becomes 
Particularly problematic when one is engaged on sensitive topics.'77 It has been suggested that 
interviewees sign the form 'with a code', or the researcher sign the consent on their behalf, the 
latter may be employed in circumstances where the interviewee is illiterate.78 It is important to 
emphasise that while no research is without risks, the risks must be, and were, balanced against 
the possible gains from conducting such research. It is a powerful tool and one to be used with 
care.
79 Thus it was emphasized to the interviewees (at the commencement of the interview) that 
while their personal experiences and attitudes were relevant to the research, details of criminal 
activity by themselves or others was not, and that the interview would be terminated should that 
arise. The notes taken during the interview would be shredded and the information relevant to the 
thesis will be transcribed. The researcher informed the participants that she would be using 
pseudonyms for participants and places, for example, 'Southern England', 'Midlands', and so 
forth. The data were secured in a locked cabinet that contained numerous research articles, and 
hidden amongst those articles. The transcribed data is to be shredded on completion of the thesis 
and examination process. 
The researcher had had to address some of the potential predicaments and difficulties that the 
fieldwork may entail, some of which were discussed earlier in this chapter. However this had not 
prepared her for the level of fear and anxiety in the selected community even around the use of 
the word 'terrorism'. Trustworthiness and gaining the confidence of the community became a 
great issue, as was the struggle to present a fair and balanced perspective. Thus, it became 
7S 0 I' 
76 ar mgton Y. & Scott D. op cit at p.29. 
77 Although two of the participants initially asked for it, and when presented to them, they said it was not necessary. 
Van Der Hoonard w.e. (2001) 'Is Research Ethics Review a Moral Panic?' The Canadian Review o/Sociology & 
~nthropology. 38(1); 19. 
79 Van Der Hoonard (2001), ibid. 
Darlington Y. & Scott D. op cit at p,49. 
54 
apparent that for any progress to be made, a pilot study would be necessary. It gradually 
introduced the researcher into the community - the field environment. It was revealed for 
instance that instead of using the definition of 'terrorism' in Section I of the Terrorism Act 2000, 
it was necessary to paraphrase it because as one participant put it 'the legal language is too 
difficult to understand.' It enabled the writer to reflect on some of the potential difficulties in the 
research. The pilot study was also instrumental in addressing the practical limitations of the 
research: the researcher's appearance, namely dress code was an issue, and the use of a digital 
Dictaphone was a hindrance. The Dictaphone deterred people from participation since they had 
enormous and perpetual concerns about confidentiality. 
Thus, the fear in the community was not the fear of crime, but the fear of talking about terrorism, 
the issue of policing and security services will be addressed in the subsequent chapters. 
Nonetheless, there was anxiety expressed for the researcher's safety and well-being, 'It is not safe 
for you to be doing this, asking all these questions on this, they can arrest you.' [nt.6. 'I seriously 
hope that you don't get sent to Guantanamo for writing this stuff.' Int.5. 'Why are you doing this, 
they are arresting Muslim students that are writing on terrorism.' Int.25. One interviewee 
checked the researcher's bag to ensure that there was no recording device, despite the verbal 
assurances that information would only be manually recording, and requested that the mobile 
phone be switched off. He was apologetic and said, 'talking about terrorism stuff is scary these 
days, especially since one the London bombers was from around here. You better be careful you 
know, they [the police and security services] can get you any time. It's getting worse, they have 
spies everywhere.' Int. 17. 
The foregoing examples of fear demonstrate the need 'for the researcher to display empathy and 
flexibility in order to proceed with the fieldwork. Thus, as stated earlier, continuous reassurances 
of confidentiality were necessary on introduction and during the interview. The approach 
therefore, by necessity, departed from what might be seen as a model approach to data collection. 
The approach adopted was, however, pragmatic and necessary in the context of researching a 
hard-to-reach group concerning a subject of great sensitivity. 
Transparency is imperative for the recognition of research and for its use in academia. Thus 
validity is necessary for credibility and to enable other researchers to elaborate on the findings. 
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Self reflection80 and critical self awareness was employed by the writer in the interpretation of 
data. Interviews conducted in English were written word for word, and attempt was made to 
ensure that those conducted in the Kashmiri language were translated word for word. Where 
permissible the participants' narratives were read back to them to ensure the accuracy of 
transcription. As discussed in this chapter, the writer kept a reflective diary to understand the 
psychological - emotional states that may have occurred during the research experience. The 
writer accepts accountability for the presentation of the data; however, the contents of these 
views are solely the participants. 
3.9 Strengths and Limitations 
In brief, the purpose of the fieldwork was to ascertain the views of a Muslim community in the 
UK on terrorism and imperatively their views on the counter-terrorism law. The researcher 
embarked on the fieldwork with the belief that she was in a unique position of achieving the 
results and succeeding in the proposed fieldwork. It is acknowledged that the researcher is a 
female of privileged background, but the overriding factor was that the researcher is a practicing 
British Muslim from an 'ethnic' background similar to that of the interviewees. 
As the preceding discussion has highlighted the limitations to qualitative research are that it is 
labour intensive,81 and time consuming, from data collection through to analysis, so there may be 
practical constraints on the number of people who can be interviewed, and were not 
representative of the general Muslim population. Nevertheless it is proposed that the sample will 
represent the views of varied age groups, male and female gender, and length of time in the UK. 
It is proposed that the subsequent analysis has thoroughly and originally explored and enhanced 
understanding of the views, values and beliefs of first, second and third generation of British 
Kashmiris. 
3.10 Conclusion 
In conducting the fieldwork the researcher experienced many emotions ranging from frustration, 
to excitement and enjoyment. The research process inspired both innovative thinking and 
80 Creswell J. (2007) Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design. Sage Publications: London at 206. 
81 D I' ar mgton Y. & Scott D. op cit, at p.53. 
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meticulous attention to the detail of data gathering and analysis. The researcher's views were 
revised, or even completely discarded in light of the data accumulated. This became more 
pronounced as the female participants continuously refused to be interviewed, yet the researcher 
had commenced with the preconception that access and the data from this group would be 
relatively easy to obtain. It has been an important experience for the researcher to learn the 
importance of research not being simply an esoteric enterprise reserved exclusively for outside 
experts, but rather one which aims to represent, respect and understand the view ofparticipants.82 
Throughout this research process, limitations of the study were acknowledged and pragmatic 
solutions sought, participants' prompt withdrawal of consent to participate was respected, as 
were their views. It was learned and recognised that such research could only be undertaken on 
the participant's terms and in other circumstances could not have been conducted at all. This 
chapter has sought to reflect on aspects of the fieldwork and to make the research process more 
transparent to the reader in order for assessments of validity to be drawn. Detailed analysis of the 
data will be represented in subsequent chapters and this can be cross-referenced to the 
methodology in relation to the prominence of fear as an issue for this population, and the 
participants view of being a 'suspect community' in the context of the UK government's counter 
terrorism policies. The data secured were on the issues that affected the participants. Despite the 
semi-structured nature of the interviews, the participants talked only about areas that they 
themselves considered relevant, and not what the researcher may have considered relevant. In the 
chapters which follow, issues and concerns of the researched community regarding prominent 
concepts such as: 'terrorism', Jihad'; areas of the law, policing, 'glorification' and aspects of 
terrorist financing are discussed in depth. 
82 See also: McVicar A., Munn-Giddings C. & Abu-Helil C. (2012) Exploring the develpment of action research in 
nursing and social care in the UK: A comparative bibliometric review of action research designs in social work 
(2000-2010). Sage Publications. 
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Chapter Four Terrorism 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the conception of terrorism, and 
terrorism's contested perceptions. This chapter is imperative for the delivery of the thesis. It 
highlights the malleability of the term 'terrorism'. It is easily contested, and the political and 
social conditions of a society affect its delineation. Conditions shaping official discourses may 
not be those shared by discrete communities. Due to its complex nature there is not one 
monolithic or objective discourse about terrorism. Thus, there are inevitable disagreements 
which can lead to resentment and alienation when the ascription of a label is felt to be unjust or 
inaccurate. Indeed both issues can arise with terrorism: inaccurate, because the group does not 
actually commit wrongs of a kind associated with terrorism, as may be the case with financing or 
glorification, where the categories are broad; unjust, in a case where the group is military and 
commits attacks as part of a widely shared aim of self determination or struggle against 
occupation. 
This chapter identifies the core issue of what constitutes terrorism, and how its elements may be 
justified. This is crucial for the thesis, specifically in relation to how the term 'terrorism' is 
perceived and sometimes justified by its sympathizers. It is contended that the discourse 
surrounding the definition of terrorism has enabled contemporary Islamist terrorists to recruit 
individuals by arguing that it is a colonial, imperialist and a hegemonic concept created by the 
West. Indeed the fieldwork analysis revealed that the differing perceptions of terrorism 
determined how the situation in Kashmir was perceived by the participants interviewed. 
Consideration will be given to the definition of terrorism and its possible antecedent causes, be 
they religious, social and / or political, and how terrorism is perceived. The latter will be 
discussed in conjunction with the research findings from the interviewees. Perception of 
terrorism leads to 'counter-terrorism' legislation, and it is argued that for counter-terrorism 
measures to be effective they require community support. Special legislation can in itself lead to 
conditions for terrorism and / or support for terrorism and its cause. An example of this is the 
young Kashmiris becoming 'increasingly available to the militants' following India's 
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deployment of increased national security and legislation, I consequently 'alienating' the 
community in Kashmir that the Indian Parliament sought to protect.2 
It is argued by the media and key politicians since the events of September 2001 that we live in a 
time of terror. 3 Yet terrorism has occurred throughout human history and around the globe. 4 It's 
sudden dramatic nature and unusually unexpected occurrence attracts widespread attention. 5 It 
has also been argued that 'terrorism challenges liberal democratic values,6 on the one hand, and, 
on the other hand, the reaction to terrorism has on occasions provoked a response that threatens 
the 'essence' of the democracy. 7 Indeed, few problems can compete with the capacity of an act of 
. 
terror to encapture and sustain the attention of an aUdience. 8 Although the terrorists' 
communication occurs in many ways,9 one commentator refers to it as the 'socio-political 
message' .10 This message is said to justify the cause and simultaneously sustain and increase the 
support for the terrorist agenda. However, as a public event, terrorism is a performance with an 
involuntary audience, an unscripted and unpredictable event that can go badly wrong, and often 
does. I I Terrorism, in short, is calculated for a specific political agenda or aims. 12 It is submitted 
that those political ends are contested, so the definition tends to be ascribed or avoided through 
political influences with law simply acting as a tool rather than having an immutable meaning. 
4.2 What is the definition of 'Terrorism' ? 
One of the fundamental, though tacit, assumptions made in the understanding of terrorism is that 
terrorism is an unequivocal problem 13. Yet, as Livingston advocates, the 'salient feature' of 
I Kadian R. (1993) The Kashmir Tangle: Issues and Options. Westview Press at p.13. 
2 Dixit J.N. (2002) India - Pakistan in War and Peace. Routledge. 
3 Walker C. (2011) Terrorism and the law. Oxford University Press: Oxford at p.47. 
4 Leeman R. W. (1991) in Johnpoll B. K (editor) (1991) The Rhetoric of Terrorism and Counlerte,.rorism. New 
'[ ork: Greenwood Press. p.4S. 
Lacquer W. (1999) The New Terrorism Fananticism. and the Arms of Mass Destruction. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. p.3. 
6 Lodge J. (editor) (1988) The Threat of Terrorism. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. p.\. 
7 Lodge J. (editor) (1988) The Threat of Terrorism. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. p.\. 
8 Greenberg M.H. & Norton A.R. (1980) international Terrorism: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide. 
~estview Press, Boulder, CO. p.2. 
Leeman R. (1991), op cit at 45. 
10 Bassiouni , Cherif M. (1983) in Freedman L.H. & Alexander Y. (editors) Perspectives on Terrorism. Wilmington. 
Del: Scholarly Resources.p.180-181. 
11 Klaic D. & Orr J. (editors) (1990) Terrorism and Modern Drama. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. p.3. 
12 Livingston S. (1994) The Terrorism Spectacle. Boulder Co: Westview Press. p.2. 
13 Livingston S.(1994), ibid, at p.4. 
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terrorism is the absence of a unified definition.14 This view exists irrespective of attempts by the 
international law via the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 15 and 
1566 16. Thus consideration will be given to the various definitions of terrorism, and then views 
from the participants interviewed will be analysed. 
4.2.1 United Kingdom's definition of Terrorism 
Section 1 of the Terrorism Act (TA) 2000 provides a definition of what 'terrorism' means; 
'( 1) In this Act 'terrorism' means the use or threat of action where - -
(a) the action falls within subsection (2), 
b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a 
section of the public, and 
c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause. 
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it - -
a) involves serious violence against a person, 
b) involves serious damage to property, 
c) endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, 
d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, 
or 
e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.' 
It has been submitted that the above definition of terrorism in the Terrorism Act 2000 is too 
broad and vague. It is too broad because it covers as targets any foreign government including 
those that have no regard for their citizens' civil liberties, and encompasses the flexibility to 
include all groups. It lacks the criteria to facilitate the self determination groups that are opposing 
autocratic regimes that govern irrespective of their inhumane records. The absence of legal 
guidelines blurs the boundaries and thus does not distinguish between those exclusively focusing 
on military targets. Crucially, it is also contended that this definition broadens the State's powers 
14 Ibid. 
'5 (2001) 28 September. 
16 (2004) 8 October; this reaffirmed 1267 (1999) and 1373 (200 I). and urged states to comply with international law 
obligations. 
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to ascribe the label of terrorism according to its political will. Further, it is not only that the 
description is broad, but it also appears to lack specific context, namely, the refcrcnce to a 
conflict or to geographical context. 17 
For their part, the courts have recognised the government's necessity for a broad definition of 
terrorism. R v F,18 held that section I is indeed broad and flexible enough to encompass the 
government's political agenda for any given situation. This case made 'explicit that the scope of 
the definition includes action' outside the UK against foreign governments.oI9 It has lead to the 
conclusion that via section I that the UK government can preserve its 'friendship with oil _ 
owning despots more highly than the political freedoms of refugee underdogs.'20 Walker further 
argues that there is 'degree of flexibility which escalates with some of the ideas expressed behind 
the legislative intention.'21 More recently in R v Gut, 22 the appellant, Gul, had been charged with 
dissemination of terrorist materials. He had up loaded onto the internet images of Iraqi and 
Afghanistani militants attacking the coalition personnel. The materials included praise and 
encouragement of such attacks. The Crown Prosecution Service argued that the videos 
containing such images encouraged 'terrorism' as defined by section I of the Terrorism Act 2000. 
The question before the Courts was whether it was indeed terrorism as stipulated in Section I. 
Gul's defence was that the militants were resisting the occupation of their countries, and that he 
was merely encouraging 'self defence'. However, it was held that under. section I those who 
attacked the legitimate military personnel of the coalition were indeed terrorists for domestic law 
purposes. It was further held that there was no other national or international statute that 
provided exemption to such actions. This case expanded the remit of Section I to apply in 
international settings when it was argued that 'there was nothing in international law to exempt 
those engaged in attacks on the military during the course of an insurgency from the definition of 
17 Brandon, B. (2004) "Terrorism, Human Rights and The Rule of Law: 120 Years of the UK's legal response to 
Terrorism". Crim.L.R. 2004. December. 981-997. See also: Feldman, D. (2006) "Human Rights, Terrorism Risks: 
The Roles ofPolitian's and Judges". P. L. 2006, SUM 364-384: Shah, S. (2005) "The UK's Anti-Terror Legislation 
and House of Lords: The First Skirmish" 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV.403 2005. Barnum, D. (2006) "Indirect Incitement 
and Freedom of Speech in Anglo-American Law" E.H.R. LR.2006, 3,258-280; Carlile, Lord (2007) 'The defintion of 
~~rrorism.' Cm. 7052. London: HMSO. 
[2007] EWCA Crim 243. 
19 Walker C. (2009) Blackstone's Guide to The Anti Terrorism Legislation. 2nd edition. Oxford:OUP at 12-13. 
20 
Walker C. (2009) op cit at 201. 
21 Walker, C. P. (2005), CLR "Terrorist Offences: Terrorism Act 2006 Section 11(1). Belonging to Proscribed 
Organization". . 
22 Rv Gul (Mohammed) [2012] EWCA Crim 280; [2012]1 Cr. App. R 37; Times, April 9, 2012. 
61 
terrorism, and the wide and clear definition in section 1 included such acts, when done with the 
requisite intent.'23 
Contrary to the criticisms of the 'wide and clear' definition, the government defended section 1 
Of the Terrorism Act 2000, as 'effective and comprehensive.'24 Thus, no amendment was made 
by the Terrorism Act 2006 to the definition of Terrorism Act 2000. During the long discourse 
that took place in passing this new legislation, there was dispute about the definition. 25 The 
dilemma posed during the extensive Parliamentary debate clearly highlighted that no consensus 
could be reached by definition and its political nature was apparent. As Mr. John Denham26 
stated 'if the Bill has the limited objective of stopping indirect incitement. .. people living in this 
country who take part in terrorist action, here and abroad, that involve the deliberate targeting 
and indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians, I would have no problem with it. .. UN Security 
resolution 156627 locates terrorism primarily in terms of actions against civilians it also refers to 
criminal acts in a way that I suspect excludes genuine liberation movements and genuine 
violence against oppression.' 
Later, Lord Carlile's Inquiry28 into the definition of terrorism did 'not offer major new statutory 
language',29 and in fact considered the definition outlined by section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 
as of 'real practical importance.'30 Lord Carlile concurred with Lord Lloyd, whom he quotes as 
saying, 'We must obviously do our best with the definition. However, having spent many hours 
looking at many different definitions, I can only agree with what was said by both the noble 
Lord, Lord Goodhart, and the noble Lord, Lord Cope; namely that there are great difficulties in 
finding a satisfactory definition. Indeed I was unable to do so and I suspect that none of us will 
succeed. As I say, we must do our best but I hope we will not spend too much time on the 
23 Archbold Review (20 12) "Case Comment. Terrorism offences - defintion of "terrorism" in Terrorism Act 2000 -
international law." Arch Rev. 20 J 2, 3, at 2-3. see also: C. L. & J. 2012, 176( 11) 158. 
24 
HMSO (2007) 'Government Reply' Cm. 7058, London, at p.5. 
2S Barnum, D. (2006) "Indirect Incitement and Freedom of Speech in Anglo-American Law" E.H.R.LR.2006.3,258-
280. 
26 H 
27 ansard, H. C. Vol. 438, Cols 371-372, October 26, 2005. 
October 8, 2004, paragraph 3. 
28 Lord Carlile (2007) 'The defintion of terrorism.' London: HMSO Cm. 7052. 
29 [bid at pA. 
30 [bid at p.6. 
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definition.,31 Lord Carlile urged objective readers to accept this statement, but it is disappointing 
to some and encouraging to others that Lord Carlile advocates the importance of having a legal 
definition to prevent 'violent and lethal jihad.'32 It is encouraging that Lord Carlile's Report 
recognised33 that the definition is broad enough to encompass non terrorist activities. His 
solution to such predicaments is to rely on the police and the prosecution's discretion,34 however 
as the discussion in Chapters Six and Seven wiIl highlight such discretion has limits. 
Nevertheless Lord Carlile is optimistic that mistakes can be prevented in defining actions as 
terrorism by the ~ewel' of the criminal justice system, namely the jury. 35 
In line with Lord Carlile, David Anderson (his successor as Independent Reviewer of the 
Terrorism Legislation) recognised that the broad definition of terrorism provides a depth of 
discretion to the police and prosecution, and that the Gut case further highlighted the actual 
broad nature of the definition under section 1.36 Whilst acknowledging that 'it is undesirable' to 
have such a broad definition, he categoricaIly stated that 'it is not easy however to see a 
principled basis upon which the scope of the United Kingdom's definition of terrorism could or 
should be reduced.'3? He elaborated that he did not feel compelled to indulge in 'deep legal 
waters' and offer any recommendations.38 
Lord Carlile's and David Anderson's defences of United Kingdom's definition of terrorism were 
based on their comparisons with international definitions. Thus it is fitting to proceed in the 
subsequent section by discussing Europe's perspective, and then, the international law's 
perspective on terrorism. 
11 Q d' 'b'd uote In I I at pA. 
12 Ibid at p.24. 
J3 Ibid at para 34. 
:: Ibid at p.35 (para 60). 
Ibid at p.36. 
16 Anderson D. (QC) (2012) The Terrorism Acts in 2011 Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of 
the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part I of the Terrorism Act 2006. London: The Stationery Office. June 2012, at p.34-
36. 
17 Anderson D. (QC) (2011) 'Report on the Operation in 2010 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part I of the Terrorism 
Act 2006.' London: The Stationery Office. July 2011. Para 3.6-3.7 at p.29. 
n . Anderson D. (2012) op Clt at para 3.13, p.38. 
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4.2.2 Europe's definition of terrorism 
The 1977 Council of Europe's Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism39, has been described 
as an 'ambitious regional response ... , which aimed to facilitate the extradition of persons 
suspected of terrorist offences. ,40 Article I dictates that the offences in the three international 
anti-terrorism treaties, namely 1970 Hague Convention, 1971 Montreal Convention and the 1973 
Protected Persons Convention, should be used for extradition as well as 'offence involving the 
use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers 
persons.'41 A Ithough the 1977 Convention elaborated on the offences (committed by terrorists) 
covered by previous treaties, 'it does not use or define the term terrorism,.42 Nevertheless in 
200343, as a response to 11 September 2001, Council of Europe 'revitalized' the 1977 
Convention in its Protocol.44 Despite the 'revitalization' there were no major changes to the 
scheduled offences. 
In 2005, the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism more radically 
elaborated the concept of terrorism to include 'public provocation to commit a terrorist offence', 
training and recruitment for terrorism.45 The preamble states: ' ... acts of terrorism have the 
purpose by their nature and context to seriously intimidate a population or unduly compel a 
government or an international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act or to 
seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
structures of a country or an international organization .... ,46 
.It is observed that the 'Council of Europe now has divergent definitions of terrorist-type activity 
between its 1977 and 2005 Conventions and the position is complicated further by the preamble 
39 1977 Counci I of Europe Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism & Explanatory Memorandum; see also: 
Baker M (1987) 'The Western European Legal Response to Terrorism' 13 Brookings JIL I; Lowe V. & Young J. 
(1978) 'Suppressing Terrorism under the European Convention' 1978,25 Netherlands ILR 305. 
40 
Saul B. (2006) Defining Terrorism in International Law OUP: Oxford at 147. 
41 • 
1977 European Convention .. Art. I (d). 42 
Saul B. t2006) Defining Terrorism in International Law OUP: Oxford at 148. 
43 2003 Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ETS No. 190, Strasbourg, 15 
May 2003). 
44 
Saul B.(2006) op cit at 148. 
45 Saul B. (2006) op cit at 149; Articles 5-7 respectively. Articles 8 & 9 establish offences of complicity, organising 
~6directing and conspiracy. Article 11 is used to show the nature and penalties. 
Preamble; see also Article I, cited in Saul (2006) op cit at 149. 
64 
to European Union's different definition.'47 Such a complication relays an ambiguous and 
contradictory message, and epitomizes the lack of consensus within its own European borders, 
consequently 'allowing governments to unilaterally and subjectively define the scope of criminal 
liability' .48 It is noteworthy that the 1977 and the 2005 Conventions served different purposes, so 
different approaches were to be expected, nevertheless, they are both complicit in empowering 
individual States to define terrorism as they wish to choose. 
Spurred by September 11, the European Union's 2002 Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism had the aim of creating a 'European' definition of terrorism.49 Article I states: 
'terrorist offences include the following list of intentional acts which, given their nature or their 
context, may seriously damage a country or international organization where committed with the 
aim of: i. seriously intimidating a population, or ii. unduly compelling a Government or 
international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or iii. seriously 
destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social 
structures of a country or international organisation,.50 Scrutiny of the definition has provided 
with the analysis that it is 'complex and uncertain,.51 It is considered 'far wider' than previous 
Conventions, specifically in relation to acts (or threats) of personal injury and murder; criminal 
damage and its methodology. It also considers biological and chemical warfare. 52 On the basis of 
this far wider definition, the States were urged to incorporate terrorism into their domestic 
legislation, the United Kingdom did not have to do anything because it already complied with the 
criteria with its comprehensive counter terrorism legislation. 
4.2.3 International law definitions of Terrorism 
It is contended that the definition of terrorism has to work within the context of international 
process but, to do so, must involve a legitimate formulation that cannot be moulded by anyone 
47 
Saul B. (2006), op cit at 149. 
48 • Saul B. (2006) op Clt at 152. 
49 See Commission Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 19 September 2001, 
COM (2001) 521 final; DuffY H. (2005) The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of international Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, at 28. 
so Article 1, Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, 13 June 2002 (2002/475/JHA). 
SI Guillaume G. (2003) 'Terrorism and International Law,' Grotius Lecture, British Institute of International and 
fomparative Law, London, 13 November 2003 at 4. 
2 Peers.S. (2003) 'EU Reponses to Terrorism', 2003, 521CLQ 227 at 232. 
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member State. It must enable consistency and transparency that is presently not always 
forthcoming. s3 In pursuit of this goal, the international community has valued the importance of 
having a 'generic definition' of terrorism since the 1920s, but has not been able to attain it. 54 
Attempts made to formulate a universal definition have always been unsuccessful. Consequently, 
the international community's work on terrorism has often been 'to avoid confronting the 
contentious question of a general definition.'55 
In 1926 Romania unsuccessfully proposed to the League of Nations 'a convention to render 
terrorism universally punishable' .56 It was not until 1934 that the League of Nations responded to 
international political pressure5? to consider terrorism, and although the final draft was not 
forthcoming until 193758 at 'the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism' -
but did not define the term 'terrorist activity'; but it offered optimism that discussion on 
terrorism is significant.59 In addition it dealt only with international terrorism. Saul in analyzing 
the League of Nations response to 'terrorism' observes that the definition of terrorism 
encompassed a broad scope that led to varied interpretations and misinterpretations.60 However, 
it was accepted that terrorism had to be distinguished from 'ordinary' crime because it 'deserves 
special condemnation'. 61 
Although the treaty never entered into force, the Convention is a significant landmark in its 
attempt to 'define' terrorism. It was considered in the 1994 General Assembly Declaration62 and 
5] AlIott P. (1999) 'The concept oflnternational Law' 199910 EJIL 31 at 32; Jessup P (1964) 'Diversity and 
Uniformity' cited in Saul B (2006) op cit at 17. . 
54 Saul 8. (2005a) "Attempts to define 'Terrorism' in International Law" NILR 2005 Lf 157-83. 
5lSaul 8. (2006) op cit at 133. 
56 League of Nations, Committee of Experts for the Codification oflntemational Criminal Law, Replies of 
Governments 1927, League of Nations Doe. C. 196. M. 70. 1927. V, p.221; quoted in Saul 8. (2005), op cit at p.S9. 
57 Following assassination of Yugoslavian King, and French foreign minister by ethnic seperatists. 
58 First session, April-May 1935; second s~ssion, January 1936; third session April 1937; League of Nations, 
International Conference Proceedings on the Regression of Terrorism, Geneva, 1-16 November 1937, League of 
Nations Doe. C.94 M.47. 1938. V.annex I, p.183; League of Nations (LoN) (CIRT), Reports to Council, Geneva: 1'1 
Session (8 May 1935, LoN Doe. C. 184. M. 102. 1935. V); 2nd session (10 February 1936, LoN Doe. A.7. 1936. V); 
3'd session (26 April 1937, LoN Doe. V. Legal 1937. V.I); see also LoN Assembly (171h ordinary session). Records 
- Committee Meetings (I" Committee: Constitutional and Legal Questions), Geneva, LoN OJ (1936) (Special 
Supplement) p.156. 
59 Saul B. (2006b) "The Legal Response of the League of Nations to Terrorism". Journal of Internalional Criminal 
{ollsIice 2006,4 (I): 78-102. 
61 Saul 8. (2005a) op cit at 57-83. 
Saul B. (2006b) op cit at 78- 102. 
62 UNGA Res. 49/60 (1994), annexed Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, para 3. 
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In the 1954 International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Code,63 which was suspended and 
reconsidered in 1991 ILC Draft Code Article 24.64 The final ILC Draft Code (Part 11), whilst not 
a treaty was endorsed in 1996.65 Similarly, in the Draft Rome Statute in 1998, 'no generally 
acceptable definition [of terrorism] could be agreed upon.,66 Thus, the repeated attempts by the 
international community highlight the importance of having a generic definition of terrorism. 
This importance is perpetuated by the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General 
Assembly's on-going work on 'terrorism'. 
Significantly the League of Nations is reflected in the Security Council Resolution 1566's 
definition of terrorism, (October 8, 2004), para 3: 
' ... that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with intent to cause death or serious 
bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general 
public or in a group of persons or in a particular persons, intimidate a popUlation or compel a 
movement or an international organization to do or obtain from doing any act, which constitutes 
offences within the scope of as defined in the international conventions of protocol relating to 
terrorism, there are in no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical 
, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other similar feature.' 
This definition empowers and enables the individual States to uphold and implement their 
unilateral definitions, thereby perpetuating subjectivity.67 Likewise, the United Nation Security 
Council Resolution 1373 deliberately avoided the definition of terrorism in order to obtain 
consensus from its members.68 Without a definition, 'universal jurisdiction over terrorism', may 
prove difficult. Instead, each individual nation's domestic laws will ultimately determine the 
effectiveness of this resolution.69 
63 1954 ILC Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Part I) in [LC 6'h Session Report (3 
Lune- 28 July 1954). 
"Undertaking, organizing, assisting, financing, encouraging or tolerating acts against another State directed at 
persons or property and of such a nature as to create a state of terror in the minds of public figures, groups of 
fsersons or the general public"; Draft Article 16(1) of 1990 is similar: ILC Yearbook (1990) p.336, 
ILC, Report on 48'h session (6May - 26 July 1996) UN Dec Al51/1 0, ch 11 (2), paras 46-48. 
66 Res E, annexed to the Final Act of the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on an ICC, 17 July 1998, 
!{N Doc. AlConf.183/1 0; Saul (2005a) op cit at p.72. 
Saul B. (2005b) "Definition of 'Terrorism' in the UN Security Council 1985-2004", Chinese Joul'I1al of 
:~ternational Law 2005 4(1) 141-166. 
69 Saul B. (2005b), ibid at 141-166. 
Saul B. (2005b), ibid 141-166. 
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Since the definition of terrorism is limited in scope in international law,7o most effective work 
arises within treaties which focus on specific areas, such as air transportation,7) and weapons.72 
In addition the financing of terrorism has become pivotal,73 and some treaties have included 
definitions of acts deemed to exceed the conventional treaty offences.74 What is significant is 
that the actual acts of terrorism are considered to affect the international arena,75 but do little to 
actually 'establish criminal offences,.76 Perhaps there is justification to the assertion that such an 
approach ensures the 'broad multilateral support for many of the treaties. since it evades the 
political and prodigious technical difficulties of a generic, analytic. deductive. or comprehensive 
definition' .77 
In summary it is contended that such an evasion of a precise definition has led to 'widely 
differing approaches to jurisdiction,;78 as has been the case with the United States. which have 
avoided the 'traditional systems of criminal or military justice' which are not seen to be 
applicable in terrorist cases. 79 The differences in the definition of terrorism in the international 
70 See McWhinney E. (1987) Aerial Piracy and International Terrorism Martinus Nijhoff, Dardrecht; Alexander Y. 
& Sacher E. (editors) (1990) Aerial Piracy & Aviation Security Martinus Nijhoff, Dordecht; Plant G. (1990) 'The 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation' 1990, 39 ICLQ 27; 
Falvey A. (1986) 'Legislative Responses to International Terrorism: International and National Efforts to Deter and 
Punish Terrorists' 1986, 9 BC ICLR 323, 326-343; Murphy J. (1987) 'The Future of Multilateralism and Efforts to 
Combat International Terrorism' 1987; 25 Col JTL 35, 41 -49; Cassesse A. (1989) 'The International Community's 
'Legal' Response to Terrorism' 1989,38 ICLQ 589,591-596; Higgins R. & Flory M. (editors) (1997) Terrorism 
and International Law. Routledge: London. 
71 See, e.g. 1970 Hague Convention; 1971 Montreal Convention & 1988 Montreal Protocol; 1973 Protected Persons 
Convention; 1994 UN Personnel Convention; 1988 Rome Convention; 1988 Rome Protocol. See also: 1970 Hague 
Convention; 1971 Montreal Convention; 1979 Hostages Convention. 
72 See e.g. 1980 Vienna Convention; 1991 Montreal convention; 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention; 2005 
Nuclear Terrorism Convention .. 
73 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention. 
74 Such as attempt, threats complicity, abetting, organizing or directing, or intentionally contributing to the 
commission of an offence by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; see e.g. 1970 Hague Convention, 
~rt., I; I ~71 ~ontreal Convention, Art., I. " 
) 972 Biological Weapons Convention; ) 982 UNCLOS, Arts) 00-) 07; 1944 Chicago Convention, Art 4; 1993 
Chemical Weapons Convention; 1992 Biological Weapons Convention; UPU Resolution CA )/200 I on Combating 
Terrorism; lCAO Resolutions A 17.1 to A 17·24 (1970); ICAO (Council) Resolution 1970, lCAO Doc 8923-C/998; 
Joint Statements of Heads of State and Government on International Terrorism, Bonn Summit Meeting, 17 July 
1978, (1978) 78 State Department Bulletin No.20 18, 5 (Bonn Declaration); Guidelines for the Application of the 
Bonn Declaration, London, 9 May 1979; NAM, XIII Confrence of Heads of State or Government, final document, 
~uala Lumpur, 25 February 2003. 
6 1963 Tokyo Convention; 1991 Plastic Explosives Convention. see: Saul (2006) op cit at 132-133. 77 
78 Saul B. (2006) op cit at 132-133. 
Peers S. (2003) 'EU Responses to Terrorism' 2003, 52 ICLQ 227 at 233. 
79 US Secretary of State, C. Rice, quoted in Saul B. (2006), op cit at 140-141. see also Allorney General of Israel v 
Eichmann (1961) 36 ILR 5 (District Court Jerusalem); US v Alvarez-Machain (1992) 31 lLM 902; Thrush B. (1994) 
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treaties has led to 'so much uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and discrepancy 
... that it is not possible to discern in all this any constant and uniform usage, accepted as law.'80 
In order to avoid deadlock, the perpetual approach adapted by the international community is to 
focus 'on terrorist acts rather than the definition ofterrorism',81 thus perpetuating the subjectivity 
- to suit individual sovereignty and local politics. For example, the Draft Rome Statute, 1998, 
reflected on the need to address terrorism when thirty four States82 advocated the need to include 
terrorism 83• However the States differed in their views on definition and 'criminalization'. Whilst 
some States wanted terrorism to incorporate all offences 'against humanity,84 others such as 
Russia, advocated to limit terrorism to 'the most serious' offences; 'Turkey believed systematic 
and prolonged terrorism against a civilian population should be covered; and Albania argued that 
institutionalized State terrorism should be included.,85 Egypt did not want to include nationalists 
movements, contrary to many other Islamic States that wanted to use the Arab League 
Convention's definition of terrorism.86 Thus, the commonality of the international community 
stops at the condemnation of terrorism.87 It has been observed that the consequent absence of a 
terrorism definition from the Rome Statute is normatively significant, since the Statute represents 
the most recent and 'authoritative expression of the legal views of a great number of States on 
international criminal law. ,88 
'US Sanctioned Kidnappings Abroad' 1994. 11 Ariz lleL 181; Bush J. (1993) 'How Did We Get Here? Foreign 
Abduction after Alvarez-Machain' 1995, 45 Stanford Law Review 939; Halberstam M (1992) 'International 
Kidnapping' 86 AJIL 736; Glennon M. (1992) 'State Sponsored Abduction' 86 AlIL 746; Whitlock C. (2005) 
~folice retrace CIA's expensive Italian job', Sydney Morning Herald, 27 June 2005. 
81 Asylum case (Columbia v Peru) (1950) ICJ Reports 266, 276-277 at 277. 
, Saul B. (2006) op cit at 147. 
8_ Draft Rome Statute (1998) vol. 11, in Official Records of the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on an 
ICC, Rome, 15 June - 17 July 1998, UN Doc AI CONF. 183/13, vol. 11; 34 States: Albania, 82; Algeria 73, 148, 
177,283; Armenia 78; Barbados 248, 354; Benin 286; Bolivia 347; Burundi 118; Cameraon 181; Camoros 287; 
Congo 117; Costa Rico 175; Cuba 181; Dominica 248,354; Egypt 281; Ethiopia 288; India 87, 177-178,323; 
Jamaica, 328; Kuwait 289; Kyrgyzstan 77; Libya 102; Macedonia 86; New Zealand 178; Nigeria Ill; Pakist!ln 173; 
Russia 115, 117, 289; Saudi Arabia 179,293; Sri Lanka 123, 176,288, 339; Tajikistan 92; Thailand 332; Trinidad & 
Tobago 248, 354; Tunisia, 174,292; Turkey 106, 124, 179,276,330; UAE 177; Yemen 178. see also: Sliverman C 
(1998) 'An appeal to the UN: Terrorism must come within the Jurisdiction of an International Criminal Court' 4 
~ew England & Comparative Law Annual: www.nesl.edu/intljournaIIVOL4/CS.HTM. 
Saul 8.(2006) op cit at 180. 
84 AI . 
85 gena, Camoras, India, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey. 
Saul B. (2006) op cit at 181. 
86 
87 Saul B. (2006) op cit at 181. 
Resolution E, annexed to the Final Act of the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on an ICC, 17 July 
~8998, UN Doc A I Conf. 183/10. 
Saul B. (2006) op cit at 182-183. 
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In the absence of consensus, 'a number of conflicting definitions of terrorism have emerged in 
the practice of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council.,89 Resolutions are legally 
non-binding, however the importance of United Nations General Assembly practice is paramount 
to the global community.90 Resolutions play an imperative role in promoting and relaying 
imperative decisions undertaken by the international States. They are significant because they are 
used to clarify any ambiguity caused in domestic settings. In addition, when 'formed' as 
declarations they 'may have direct legal effect as authoritative interpretations of the Charter,.91 
Resolution 137392 has been described as 'the boldest resolution,93 to be passed by the Security 
Council. Not only does the United Nations Security Council direct its Member States to 
implement into their domestic legislation counter terrorist law, but has also set into action 'a 
body of legal norms' that the Member States were compelled to implement.94 It is mooted that it 
is a reformulation of the United States Patriot Act~5 and has been described as the 'international 
version' of the said Act. The political bias in the definition of terrorism is fuelled by the United 
State's hegemonic dominance in ensuring that Resolution 1373 was adapted and accepted by the 
Member States. Thus, the international community responded with its own 'broad' definitions of 
terrorism, leading one commentator to conclude that the international definitions of terrorism are 
indeed 'too vaguely defined, and potentially abusively enforced as a result of being vaguely 
defined.'96 
In brief, it is perhaps justified to observe that by not having a generic definition the' international 
community reacted pragmatically to terrorism', as there are inevitable 'chronic' differences over 
'freedom fighters' and those seeking legal 'self determination,.97 Significantly, what is 
89 Saul B. (2006) op cit at 191. 
90 UNGA issues non-binding recommendations under Arts. 10-11 of the Charter, cited in Saul B (2006: 191). ibid. 
91 
92 Saul B. (2006) op cit at 192-193. 
9) UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). .. . 
Scheppele K. L. (2011) 'Global security law and the challenge to constJIutlOnahsm after 9/11.' P.L. 2011, April, 
353-377 at 360. 
94 Ibid at 360. 
9S Ibid at 362. 
% Ibid at 369. 
97 
Saul B. (2006), op cit at 248. 
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universally accepted is that 'terrorism is a crime of special characteristics' .98 It is also argued that 
the absence of a universal definition of terrorism can create practical difficulties in prosecuting 
terrorism in an international setting.99 The lack of a universally accepted definition has 
perpetuated the academic discussion on terrorism, and thus the discussion on the definition of 
terrorism is not complete without due consideration to scholars and philosophers. 
4.2.4 Scholarly / philosophical attempts to define terrorism 
As the foregoing discussion has highlighted it has indeed been established that terrorism has 
insidiously worked its way into our contemporary, everyday vocabulary. lOO It cannot be denied 
that defining terrorism does indeed vary from country to countr.x, and is often based on emotive 
social factors, economic and political ideology.lOl 
It is argued that a definition of terrorism lacks concrete and value-free language. It is therefore 
readily applied to a ruler-rebel dichotomy,102 for instance those fighting a ruling government as 
in Syria, are automatically labeled terrorist. It is significant that earlier works such as that of 
Brian Crozier, 103 attempted to differentiate and identify terror as that employed by insurgents and 
rebels, and counter terror as the state's response against this insurgency.l04 However, despite its 
common application, such a dichotomy is held to be 'overly simplistic' as Thomas Perry 
Thornton noted of Crozier's early work, 'it is by no means inevitable that the insurgents will 
initiate terrorism; in some instances, they may be reacting to the terror of the incumbent's.'105 His 
solution was to att~mpt to differentiate between 'enforcement terror' and 'agitational terror' .106 
Similarly, W.F.May referred to 'regime of terror' versus 'siege of terror'; Edward Herman 
referred to 'wholesale terror' versus 'retail terror'; and Richard Falk referred to 'functionary' 
98 [bid 
99Bellemare D. (2012) "Bringing terrorists before internal justice: a view from the front lines: notes for an address.' 
Crim L.F. 20i 2. 23(4) 425-435. 
100 Hoffman B. (1998) Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press, New York. p.13. 
101 Lauderdale P. & Oliverio A. (2005) "Terrorism as Deviance or Social Control: Suggestions for Future Research" 
International Journal o/Comparative Sociology. Vol. 46; 1-2; p.1 53. 
102 L' . IVIngston (1994), op cit at p.5. 
103 Crozier B. (1960) The Rebels: A Study 0/ Post-war Insurrections. Boston: Beacon Press. 
104 L' . Ivmgston (1994), op cit at p.5. 
10S Thornton T.P. (1964) "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation", in Eckstein H. (editor) (1964) internal War: 
Problems & Approaches. Ne~ York: Free Press of Glencoe. p.71. 
106 L' . IVIngston (1994), op cit at p.5. 
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terror and 'revolutionary' terror. ID7 These works were criticised by subsequent scholars as 
deficient l08 of detailed analysis. 109 
In seeking greater precision in terms Wilkinson 110 recognised that terrorism is used incorrectly to 
mask political violence, and counter terrorism is employed in instances when the insurgents 
initiate as agenda that is not approved by the ruling government. Hence the term terrorism could 
be applied to a democratic revolution III as it was by the Ghadaffi government in Libya, when his 
regime referred to the uprising in the country as 'terrorism'. Thus Wilkinson's thesis encompasses 
the political nature of terrorism (discussed in detail in the subsequent section). 
However, it has been accepted that terrorism differs from other forms of rebellion or violence 
because of its psychological impact and its indiscriminate nature which perpetuates fear. This is 
increased by the belief that anyone may be a victim of it, and hence no one is protected. I 12 It is 
different from 'normal' crime, and this is reflected in the special laws against terrorism which 
involve different treatment within policing, the criminal justice system and the penal system. 
On reflection, it is contended that the concept of terrorism used in the contemporary academic 
literature is essentially reflective of political values. 113 The underlying goal of terrorism it is 
argued is first and foremost political, whether this is in the form of an Islamist aiming to 
eradicate the ruling governments and replace them with their selected leaders, their political 
motive is prevalent. 114 Despite 'the worrying trend whereby powerful criminal groups such as the 
Italian Mafia l15and the Latin American nacro-barons I16, have adopted some of the tactics and 
107 May W.F. (1974) "Terrorism as strategy and Ecstasy" Social Research 41. 1974. pp.277-98; Falk R. (1988) 
Revolutionaries & Functionaries: The Dual Face of Terrorism. New York: E.P.Dutton; 
~~vi~g~ton (1994), op cit at p.5. 
109 Llvmgston op cit at 5. 
110 Wardlaw G. (1982), op cit at p.12. 
Wilkinson P. (2003) "Implications of the attacks of 9/11 for the future of terrorism", in Buckley M. & Fawn R. 
(editors) (2003) Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11. Afghanistan and beyond. New York: Routledge Publication. 
111 W'lk' 112 ~ ~nson P. (2003), ibid, at p.27. 
Wllkmson P. op cit, at p.28. 
III W'lk' I IOson P. op cit at 28. 
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weapons of terrorist groups,' but it differs from 'contemporary terrorism that is intertwined with 
politics. 117 
In turn, whether a terrorist organisation is good or bad involves a subjective analysis based on 
the political outlook at any given time. I IS Academic commentary continually reinforces the 
'political end' of terrorism. Whether it is indeed a bargaining tool employed by the weaker 
adversary, is not as relevant here as its persistent political nature." 9 Terrorism thus forces the 
government to respond. Accordingly, it is submitted that the approach by the government mirrors 
Richard Posner's theory of 'economic logic'. Terrorism, as has been exemplified by the London 
bombings is painfully expensive for a society, not just because of the loss of human lives. The 
economic loss to any given society is thus considered in the structure of counter terrorism 
policies and legislation. 12o 
Hence, a 'pragmatic' approach to the definition should be favoured to a 'philosophical' 
approach l21 , in that 'the winning parties actually compensate the losing parties',122 although in 
terrorism there are no winning parties, but the public are compensated via counter terrorism 
legislation and policies. The risks taken by the government's judicial and legislative decisions 
are justified. 123 Posner argues that under the theory of 'wealth maximisation', 124 the judiciary 
rules on the definition of terrorism according to the principles which will maximize society'S 
total wealth. 125 Brix views this as 'law's attempt to construct a more practical version of 
117 W'lk' 
1 IOson P. (2003), op cit at p.28. 
118 Rathbone A. & Rowley C.K. (2002) "Terrorism" Public Choice 111,2002, cited in Ousman A. (2003) "Religious 
Violence and Absolute Solutions" Queen's Quarterly Vol.llO: Issue 3. Fall 2003. p.347. (Queen's Quarterly; Gale 
Group). 
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(editor) (1988) Inside Terrorist Organizations. Columbia University Press. New York at p.l3 and Schelling T.C. 
(1966) Arms & Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, especially "The Diplomacy of Violence" pp.l-
34. 
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~:fo~d University Press at p.80. . 
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utilitarianism' . 126 Therefore, government decisions or actions on the definition of terrorism are 
allowed on behalf of its citizens without their actual consent on the basis that the government's 
decision maximizes 'social wealth' and it leaves everyone (or almost everyone) better off. A key 
aspect of maximizing their' investments', is the legislator's ability to 'signal credible long - term 
commitments to certain policy preferences,.127 They argue that national security takes precedent 
over any potential conflict. Thus, Posner argues that if asked, everyone (or almost everyone) 
would have given consent to the government's decision. m In analyzing Posner's work 
Rubenfield offers examples of Posner's views (that can also be applied to UK legislation 129): 
'Government may prohibit dissenting political opinions when the country 'feels' (the word is 
Posner's) that such opinions are dangerous' .130 In such circumstances, the definition of terrorism 
can be very broad to cover every eventuality, which maximise's society'S wealth by preventing 
terrorism that is costly to the citizens and the government. The government if seen to be doing 
very little may even have to forfeit their elected offices. 
In line with this 'pragmatic' argument that the government is justified to act via its counter 
terrorism Walker l31 argues that, irrespective of the difficulties, it is justifiable to make an attempt 
and include a legal definition of terrorism. Walker's justifications of counter terrorism legislation 
recognise the State's power to protect its citizens. \32 Walker elaborates that 'State responsibility' 
takes precedent, and thus compels the State to act and take action against terrorism to protect its 
citizens. The rights ofthe citizen are essentially the State's priority under Articles 1 and 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 133 Moreover, irrespective of whether the 'political 
cause' is 'deemed legitimate' it has to be treated in line with war crimes. 134 Furthermore it is 
argued that since terrorism as a crime differs from other forms of crime, it therefore requires 
126 B . 
nx B. (1996) op cit at p.I72. 
127 Hirschi R. (2005) "Preserving Hegemony? Assessing the Political Origins of the EU constitution" 3 Inl'/ J. 
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III Walker C.(2002) ibid, at p.!2. 
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'special' counter terrorism laws emphasizing the gravity of the offence, and the lengthy 
investigation it requires. I 35 
Interestingly, the Joint Committee on Human Rights l36 'considered the definition of terrorism 
[and] expressed concerns about the width of the definition, and that it needed to be changed'. But 
they found that 'a narrower definition of terrorism' would hinder the prosecution, whilst 
recognising that increased discretion had the potential to hinder community relations. 137 Thus, 
the Committee epitomized the trends that political convenience around national security is, the 
underlying consideration when defining terrorism. 
The difficulty of defining terrorism is perpetuated by the endless subjectivity of the concept. 
Hence it is necessary to turn next to the academic commentary on terrorism's subjective nature. 
4.2.5 The subjective definition of terrorism 
The foregoing discussion about the definition of terrorism and its potential difficulties is 
imperative for the thesis. It will ultimately provide a link to the proposed sample's views on 
terrorism, and whether the 'varied' nature of the definition alienates the community or attracts 
support for the counter-terrorist legislation. 
The preceding discussion has also highlighted that for some, terrorism is a process comprising 
several phases. 138 For others, it is a military strategy; for others still, a f.arm of political 
V• I 139 •• • • b 11' h I't' I 140 10 ence approxlmatmg to inSUrrectIOn, re e IOn, anarc y or po I Ica protest or 
revolution. 141 There is the ongoing discourse around the idea that one man's terrorist is another 
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man's freedom fighter,142 and this idea reflects the basic subjectivity. Some authors have tried to 
isolate precisely those characteristics of political violence in given societies that may be said to 
describe terrorism. Attention is afforded to the antecedents and consequences, psychology of 
terrorists, their ideologies, their political position, and the terrorist's actual goals. 143 
It is also argued that the language of terrorism automatically creates 'moral judgment'; terrorism 
is always viewed as criminal, and counter terrorism (irrespective of its methods) is righteous and 
correct. 144 This is simply saying that the ascription of the label 'terrorist' is pejorative, which 
indeed it is. Hence, law seeks to cement that label by using its own inherent legitimacy as a 
persuasive factor. It has been asserted that 'in its modern form, therefore, the language of 
terrorism has become the rhetorical servant of the established order, wherever it might be, and 
however heinous its own activities. Talking of 'terrorism' in this way flattens the world of 
international relations.' 145 Indeed, many authors point out that terrorism is a moral problem,146 
and highlight the fact that because terrorism is not the exclusive presence of the politically 
motivated but may be used by deviants and socio-paths, the problem of defining and identifying 
terrorism becomes more complex. 147 
However, 'moral judgment' aside, when war, rebellions and dangers erupt, most constitutional 
governments step outside their usual procedures to deal with national preservation and national 
security agendas. 148 Therefore, there is the ongoing danger l49 as emphasised in earlier discussion, 
142 
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that the governments may act impulsively to events and thus 'contingencies' have to be placed in 
advance to avoid legal injustices. 15o 
That said, the political concept of terrorism is clearly shaped by the state's emphasis on 
terrorism, and it has changed over history. Terrorism is clearly viewed through a political process 
not in line with 'normal' crime. It is a continuous process that distinguishes itself from 'normal' 
political crime such as 'one ofr riots. In addition, violence defined in terrorism is described as 
'exceptional'. An example of political process can be obtained from USA. President Bush's 'War 
on Terror' has led to global interest in terrorism. 
Terrorism's challenge to the ruling governments and therefore creates inevitable instability,151 
and due to its underlining political nature, terrorism is perceived sUbjectively. There are 
countless examples, such as Nelson Mandela, and that of George Washington who was viewed 
as a hero in USA, and while Gerry Adams was viewed as a terrorist. Yet it would be fair to state 
that all had a similar purpose. 
Next, it is argued that a states terror is viewed as a legitimate use of force and therefore normal. 
Terrorism is the illegitimate use of force by non-state actors and therefore deviant. 152 However, 
this is polemical, as not all state terror is viewed as legitimate as emphasized by the Nuremberg 
judgment,153 which provides precedent for holding individuals subject to sanctions for the use of 
terror, irrespective of their rank, such as Saddam Hussein. 154 Helen Duffy argues that 'in 
exceptional circumstances [it is] the responsibility of other states to take measures to end the 
wrong in question,.155 It is further submitted that wrongful acts that breach any international 
ISO Walker C. (2002) The Anti-Terrorism Legislation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, at p.16. 
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obligations of the state trigger the international responsibility of the state. 156 In addition, Duffy 
argues that 'where the state does not exercise the necessary control at the time of the conduct in 
question, it may nonetheless assume responsibility for the wrong ex post facto, where it 
subsequently 'acknowledges or accepts' the conduct as its own.' 157 The legitimacy of 
intervention is questioned in the absence of a universal definition, and actions however 
meaningful, appear politically motivated. 158 
The political motivation in the definition of terrorism makes the state responsibility for acts of 
terrorism difficult to assess, and the 'critical issue is often not whether a wrong has occurred but 
whether the test for attribution has been satisfied, such that the state is responsible for the 
w~ong' .159 Importantly, 'state responsibility may result from wrongs committed through 
terrorism or counter-terrorism. The challenge to the injured parties is to ensure that international 
law is upheld and enforced against states involved in 'terrorism', or in unlawful responses 
thereto'. 160 
It is further submitted that a state response to terrorism, even if not state terrorism itself, can 
create a 'breeding ground for terrorism and their causes when the Bush, Blair and other 
Governments respond with violence.' Such a response can compromise political legitimacy.161 
The constitutional nation's 'institutionalized double standards' in defending their cause and their 
response can lead to violence, and perpetuate the sympathy for the terrorist cause. 162 The 
'breeding ground' and sympathy for the terrorist cause was acknowledged following the events 
of 7 July 2005: 'extremists could be created at any time through a very quick process'. 163 It is 
156 Article 2 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International 
Law Commission in 200 I; Report o/the International Law Commission, on the work of its 53,d session, UN Doc. 
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further acknowledged that 'their motivation appears to be typical of similar cases [and involved 
flierce antagonism to perceived injustices by the West against Muslims' .164 The video statement 
of Khan,165 one of the four alleged 7 July 2005 bombers is evidence of the 'sympathy for the 
terrorist cause', Khan states: 'Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate 
atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly 
responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, 
you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of 
my people we will not stop this fight ... ' 
The Bush's and the Blair's hegemonic attitudes are seen to act in the same manner as those 
whose actions they abhor and condemn. In essence, their attitudes created 'new pacts with 
violence,,166 by 'playing politics with the war on terror.'167 Consequently, the lack of defintion 
perpetuates the subjectivity of terrorism, which in turn, perpetuates the 'political propaganda' of 
the terrorist's cause l68 an example of this is highlighted by the preceding statement by Khan. 
We live in an era where the 'ethics of revenge' legitimatize 'massive displays of military power 
and de-legitimatize' those that challenge the Bush/Blair regimes. 169 Thus, following 11th 
September 200 I, 'an emergency was declared, an enemy was defined, violent was unleashed; 
democracy was once again subordinated to the claimed necessities of state', albeit, that the state 
itself may be viewed and defined as a terrorist, especially by those who are subjected to the fury 
of the Superpowers. 170 
In conclusion because of the politicized concept of terrorism, there is no agreement of a single 
definition of terrorism, (although there is agreement on many of its elements l71 and some moves 
164 
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towards a universal concept in UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1566). Practically, a 
person can be known as 'terrorist; freedom fighter and then leader of a state; a contemporary 
example is Nelson Mandela.'172 The definition of terrorism as it stands, enables the ascription or 
relegation of opponents as 'terrorists' and, as the tragedy of II th September 200 I has 
demonstrated, it has had a sudden a profound effect on the perception of terrorism. l73 It is now 
on the agenda of every state. 174 
4.2.6 Summary 
Terrorism continues to remain an enigmatic and elusive phenomena. 175 There is no unity in its 
definition, historically the definition has changed over the time, and its subjective nature is 
inevitable. 176 Hence in the words of Livingston, terrorism is summed up as the, 
'the good faith effort to bridge the gap between language and violent practices account for the 
volume and range of definitions of terrorism formulated over the years. Yet greater specificity 
alone will not overcome the difficulties surrounding terrorism definition. The fundamental 
problem is found in the relationship between political language and values. Use of the term 
implies a moral judgment. If one party can successfully attach the label 'terrorist' to its 
opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adapt its moral viewpoint. Terrorism is, 
after all, what the bad guys do. More precise definitions alone cannot distinguish 'terrorism', 
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on the one hand, from the 'heroic struggle of freedom fighters' on the other. Nor can a more 
refined definition distinguish between 'enforcement terrorism' and the legitimate exercise of 
police power to insure public safety and law enforcement'. 177 
To a large extent, the passing years, have reinvented and redefined terrorism; but 'political' is a 
word that further broadens the spectrum of terrorism. 178 Perhaps the only characteristic generally 
agreed upon is that terrorism always involves violence or the threat of violence. l79 The 
psychological impact of the terrorist threat is equally ifnot more important to the public than the 
terrorist act itself. 180 Commentators suggest that when analysing terrorism, it should incorporate 
all possibilities of 'violence and motivation' from sexual assault to the evasion of inheritance tax. 
Still others have insisted that unless leaders such as Hitler, and Pol Pot be considered terrorists, 
and feudalism, colonialism, imperialism, oppression viewed as antecedents the true analysis of 
terrorism is meaningless and empty.ISI Perhaps it is fruitless to attempt to formulate a truly 
comprehensive definition. As Schmid l82 admits, 'are we to conclude that terrorism is impervious 
to precise, much less accurate definition? Not entirely, if we cannot define terrorism, then we can 
at least usefully distinguish it from other types of violence and identify the characteristics that 
make terrorism the distinct phenomenon of political violence that it is'.183 This message of 
political violence was reinforced by the same commentator twenty three years later. 184 
Unlike the international community, academics have formulated many definitions of terrorism. 
Predictably, they are comprehensive, encompassing all the categories discussed in the preceding 
discussions. They effectively distinguish between those targeting only the military personnel and 
those targeting civilians indiscriminately. The definitions recognize state and non-state terrorism. 
Furthermore, the scholarly community distinguishes terrorism from organised crime and war 
crimes by recognising that terrorism is 'predominately political.' Aside from the array of 
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motivations listed, it is concluded that the underlying aim of terrorism is to 'form part of a 
campaign of violence which alone can, due to the serial character of acts of violence and threats 
of mOI:'e to come, create a pervasive climate of fear that enables the terrorists to manipulate the 
political process.'185 The comprehensive nature of terrorism can be reflected further by 
categorizing terrorism. 
4.3.1 Categories of Terrorism 
It is useful to explain categories of terrorism based on their cause and/or political motivation for 
this thesis since it also demonstrates the broad nature of what encompasses terrorism. As stated 
earlier, Pakistan justifies the militancy in Kashmir as the work of 'freedom fighters', while India 
views the same situation as 'terrorism'. Thus, this detailed analysis is imperative as it 
demonstrates that important distinctions can be made between international and domestic 
terrorism: the for~er is terrorist violence involving the citizens of more than one country, while 
the latter is confined within a particular locality in the country. Furthermore, distinction is useful 
for analytical and statistical purposes. Pragmatically, it is accepted that it is difficult to ascertain 
a terrorist organization that has a sole 'domestic' agenda; they usually require political and 
financial and practical support that is often obtained overseas. 186 In addition, at the present time 
almost all of the attention is focused on Islamic terrorism, 'but it is useful to remember from time 
to time that this was not always the case' .187 
4.3.2 State-Sponsored Terrorism 
State terrorism it is argued has become the major justification for modern war. IS8 State terrorism 
relates to the perceptions of terrorism and for the purpose of this thesis is of imperative 
significance. States use this type of terrorism both as a tool for domestic and foreign policy. 
Examples provided by commentators are those of Iran, who in order to promote domestic 
coerciveness, proposed to eliminate its opponents - including those overseas. Similarly when 
North Korea aimed to eradicate the South Korean government leaders in Rangoon, they did so to 
promote the interests of North Korea. However, it is recognized that state sponsorship of 
185 Ibid. 
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terrorism's aim is to hide their participation and to 'sustain plausible denial,.189 Such is the case 
in Kashmir, namely that India and Pakistan are at a continuous 'war' - with Pakistan's 
undeclared support for the militants in Kashmir. 
During the Cold War, it became almost impossible to distinguish between conventional warfare 
and terrorism. It has been observed that to avoid the risk of nuclear warfare, the Soviet Union 
and the USA sponsored guerilla '90 organizations around differing parts of the world. Indeed, it 
was the United State's funding of Taliban in Afghanistan, to fight the Soviet invasion, which 
appeared economical at the time at the cost of three billion dollars, that eventually turned against 
them. '91 
In addition, the United States financed anti-government armed force in Nicaragua, known as the 
'contras'. Nicaragua took the US to the International Court of Justice,'92 although the United 
States did not accept the ruling of the Court,193 important legal issues were provided in their 
decision. 194 The Court held that the United States had breached international law by aiding the 
contras. 195 The United States was complicit in the civil war by 'organising or encouraging the 
organization of irregular forces or armed bands ... for incursion into the territory of another 
State' and by 'participating in acts of civil strife .. , in another State' .196 The Court rejected 
United States claim of 'self- defence', 'force used in self defense must be necessary, immediate 
and proportional to the seriousness of the armed attack' .197 It was further held that interventions 
involving the use of force could not be justified by a third state such as the US; namely that 'one 
189 W'lk' I IOson, (2003), op cit at p.30. 
190 It is important to note that not all guerilla groups use 'terrorist' activity. 
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state may not defend another state unless that other state claims to be (and is) the victim of an 
armed attack and asks the first state to defend it' .198 The decision echoes that of the United 
Nations General Assembly. 199 
Security Council Resolution 748 (1992)200 acknowledged international terrorism in which a State 
(Libya), is directly or indirectly involved in acts of terrorism. 201 At the International Court of 
Justice, Libya202 issued a suit against the UK and the US. A Security Council decision imposing 
economic sanctions on Libya because of its refusal to surrender accused terrorists was 
challenged by Libya as invalid. The Court denied Libya's request for interim measures to stay 
the Security Council's action,203 (thereby reiterating that state-sponsored terrorism is not 
justified). In essence, this signaled to the international community that while state terrorism 
exists, it should not be tolerated. 
The blurred boundaries between terrorism and conventional warfare have created an effective 
environment for proxy wars,204 such as the alleged backing by Iran of Hamas against Israel, and 
the alleged backing of Pakistan in Kashmir against India. The situation is further escalated by the 
knowledge that terrorism does not accept laws and rules of warfare, whereas legitimate 
governments are bound by them.205 
Thus, perhaps in response to the internationalization of terrorism, the sovereign states,206 also 
became involved in the planning, financing and. execution of many acts of international 
terrorism. 207 Just what is defined as international terrorism, state sponsorship has also become 
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the theme of 'acrimonious debate' .208 State sponsorship is viewed to be a major consequence of 
having no 'universally accepted definition of terrorism.' It is accordingly manipulated by 
powerful governments to justify actions mimicking 'propaganda weapon.' And indeed used 'as a 
foreign policy tool itself .209 Tam observes that 'the fight against terror may have effectively 
been abandoned if different factions within the international community again revert to the 
rhetoric of 'our' versus 'your' terrorists, the former fighting for legitimate causes, the latter 
engaging in criminal activities'.2IO 
4.3.3 State's manipulation of Non-state terror? 
It is further argued that Western governments, especially the USA, (referred to earlier), have 
manipulated the public by exaggerating the threat from terrorism.211 It is imperative to consider 
that history has shown that 'over reaction' to 'a phantom enemy,'212 can be as dangerous as the 
terrorist attacks themselves. Although there are allegations of exaggeration of the extent of the 
terrorist problem, it cannot be disputed that terrorism is a real problem that continues to plague 
the United Kingdom and the international community, and this is highlighted by the subsequent 
discussion on the varied groups that are recognised terrorist organisations. 
4.3.4 Nationalist Terrorism 
Nationalist or ethnic terrorists have a readymade, in built support system. 'Unlike ideological 
terrorists, they tend to be long-lasting. They can build logistical structures much easier than 
ideological terrorists and they can hide in a ready-made population',213 and they draw support 
from a distinct constituency. 
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4.3.4.1 Self Determination / National Liberation 
Self determination is an issue that affects the definition of terrorism. Indeed as Saul observes, the 
problem of definition has 'haunted countries for decades, not least because of the difficulties 
posed by 'freedom fighters and State sponsored terrorism,.2l4 Self determination and national 
liberation have caused a 'lacuna in present international legislation and international 
conventions, in order to develop a fundamental tool for international co-operation against 
terrorisni.'215 It is this lacuna that has led some to argue that the violence in Kashmir is not 
'terrorism' as perceived by India, but a legitimate instance of self determination or national 
liberation. 
It is accepted that terrorism is I)ot generally endorsed by the international community, however, 
irrespective of the condemnation of terrorism, some States have mooted that violence in the 
name of self determination is not terrorism.216 This is particularly important since the Arab 
League; the OIC Conventions and the OAU Convention have excluded national liberation - self 
determination from the definition ofterrorism.217 
Following the disastrous events at the Munich Olympics in 1972, in its inquiry, the Security 
Council considered the antecedents of terrorism.218 It proceeded to recognize' ... the inalienable 
right to self determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes and 
other forms of alien domination and upholds the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the 
struggle of national liberation movements in accordance with the principles and purposes of the 
Charter and the relevant resolutions of the organs of the United Nations ... ,219 Resolution 3034 
214 
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(XXVII) is viewed as 'a victory for those who supported the right to use all available measures 
to advance ends of self - determination and was of national liberation. ,220 
The significance of the underlying causes to terrorism was reaffirmed by the establishment of the 
Ad Hoc Committee.22l The consequences of the committee discussions resulted in Protocol I 
which provided further advancement to the self determination justification, 'armed conflicts in 
which people are fighting against racist regimes in the exercise of their right and self 
determination',222 and thus 'legally distinguishing such movements from terrorist groupS.,223 It 
was further recognized that self determination or national liberation was a fundamental cause and 
nothing '... could in any way prejudice the right to self determination, freedom and 
independence, as derived from the Charter of the United Nations, of peoples forcibly deprived of 
that right ... particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes and foreign occupation or 
other forms of colonial domination, nor, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in 
conformity with the above mentioned [1970] Declaration, the right of these peoples to struggle to 
this end and to seek and receive support ... ,224 A provision that has been viewed as an exception 
on terrorism by its 'national liberation' justification.225 
It is argued that justifications based on self determination or national liberation have to be given 
due consideration for there to be due process in the international or national criminal justice 
arena. In addition such an arena has to be seen as just for it to be taken seriously and prevent the 
perpetuation of further violence. This was observed by Habermas who states, 'The spiral of 
violence begins as a spiral of distorted communication that leads through the spiral of 
uncontrolled reciprocal mistrust to the breakdown of communication'. 226 
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4.3.4.2 Nationalist Groups 
Kashmiri nationalist groups have been discussed in Chapter Two. Natio,nalist groups include the 
ETA in Spain, the PKK in Turkey, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, and the 
Irish Republicanism. 
It is beyond the scope of the thesis to provide a detailed analysis of the Irish Republicanism, 
however a brief outline is necessary as this governed the British counter terrorism procedures, 
and it is this experience that is said to assist the security services in combating the 'Islamic 
terrori sts' .227 
In brief, UK's response to Northern Ireland is also used as an important comparison to the UK's 
response to the present 'War on Terror'. It is essential to note that the British referred to the 
Northern Ireland conflict as 'an internal matter' which was successfully accepted by the Security 
Council and the General Assembly.m In addition, the British government viewed the situation 
'criminal' rather than an 'armed conflict'. Northern Ireland effectively portrays that UK utilized 
'shielding devices' against international humanitarian law and defined terms in the international 
legal field that were in their interest.229 It is further argued that the activities of the IRA in Britain 
(for example in Manchester 1996) have enabled the UK legislative body to draw on its extensive 
experience on counter-terrorism legislation thereby able 'to extend its control so easily',230 
following the events of II September 2001. The 'emergency legislation' of 1974 following the 
Birmingham public house bombings: Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, 
has been compared to the 7 July 2005 London bombings and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005, and the Terrorism Act 2006.231 
m See: Maillot A. (2004) The New Sinn Faein: Irish Republicanism in the Twenty-First Century Routledge: New 
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Fighting/or Ireland. The Military Strategy o/the Irish Republican Movement. RoutJedge: New York, at p.8. 
228 Campbell, C. (2005) "Wars on Terror and Vicarious Hegemons: UK, International Law and the Northern Ireland 
Conflict" International and Comparative Law Quarterty. April 2005. 
229 Campbell, ibid. 
230 Walklate S. & Mythen G. (2006) "Criminlogy & Terrorism which Thesis? Risk Society or Goverrnentality?" 
46BRITJ 379. May 2006. 
231 Bonner D. (2006) "Responding to Crisis: Legislating Against Terrorism" L. Q.R. 2006. J 22 (Oct). 602-63 J 
Analysis oflegislation will be considered in detail in the succeeding chapters. 
88 
4.3.5 Ideological Terrorism 
It is asserted ideology is more effective than nationalistic issues in terrorism recruitment because 
ideology is a powerful mobile method that automatically travels from country to country, it has 
no demographic boundaries.m Before the fall of Communism, Raymond Canado and Rebecca 
Evans233 examined Western European terrorism, and concluded it has developed into a variety of 
forms with few common threads. Modern indigenous terrorism, however, developed from two 
bases: left-wing and right-wing ideology and nationalism.234 Canado and Evans argued that 
fundamental difference between ideological and nationalist terrorists can be found in their aims. 
For instance, the ideological terrorists in Europe aim to dismantle the capitalist structure, and 
create a 'new' state and constitution. Interestingly, despite their differences, both left and the right 
wing aim for this goal of new order. Nationalists, however, aim for self determination and often 
have no desire to change the capitalist order.235 Examples of ideological groups include 
Germany's Red Army Faction, Italy's Red Brigades, The Japanese Red Army and Neofascism. 
It is argued that ideology is no longer about 'left / right' issues, but rather about issues of 
globilisation, and not focused to a particular country. These are protracted and globalised issues 
that have a magnetic appeal in a way which national based leftist group could not achieve. And 
perhaps the ultimate ideology is based on globalization and religion. 
4.3.6 The International Network of AI-Qaeda 
Although the international network of AI-Qaeda is ideological, it remains predominantly 
political. This view is reiterated by the recent rhetoric about the 'war on terror'. 
4.3.6.1 'Islamic Fascists?' 
The Bush administration's 'war on terror' is becoming the 'war on Islamic fascism', reinforcing 
the stereotype that a 'Muslim fundamentalist' is now 'an internationally accepted definition of 
terrorism.'236 In August 2006, President Bush referred to the British based suicide attempt on 
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Transatlantic airlines, 'a stark reminder that this nation is at war with Islamic fascists,.237 This 
statement was condemned by the Muslim Association of Britain. Indeed even within its own 
senate, the Bush's 'Islamic fascism' statement received criticism, 'Fascist ideology doesn't have 
anything to do with the overwhelming majority of Muslims around the world who practice the 
peaceful teachings of Islam'.238 Thus, leading commentary from the national newspapers 
concludes that the concept of Islamic fascists created ambiguity by labeling all Muslims as 'the 
enemy.' The link to religion, it was argued, failed to recognise the salient cause namely 
'resistance to transcendence. ,239 
4.3.6.2 AI-Qaeda 
Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda (the Base) network have become very prominent actors 
worldwide.240 This is discussed further in Chapter Five. However for the purposes of the present 
discussion, its ideology can be adapted universally.241 
In addition to 'its central leadership' that facilitates military, legal and publicity issues, al-Qaeda 
is said to have a 'worldwide network of operational and preparative cells and affiliated 
organizations capable of being activated at any time and carrying out terrorist attacks on their 
own initiative,.242 The advantage that this particular group has is its loose organization and the 
movement of people. It effectively utilizes the modern transport, finance and communications 
facilities (such as the internet). Via 'periodic prouncements, speeches and writings', that are 
issued by its leaders, the organization perpetuates the support and its indoctrination.243 The loss 
of one cell does not hinder the wider network.244 It has the robust capacity to regenerate 
extensive membership that has no limits of ethnicity, class or nationalit/45 It is because of this, 
despite the major setback of losing its safe haven in Afghanistan, and the loss of its leaders 
including Bin Laden, that the global network is still capable of continuing the terrorist campaign. 
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II September 2001, and subsequent attacks around the world, including London, highlight that 
the al - Qaeda ideology is a new form of terrorism that has meticulous engineering that is able to 
employ catastrophic consequences, and bring a superpower to a standstill?46 Thus, it is evident 
that AI-Qaida utilizes the highly competent network that even the sophisticated intelligent 
services of the Superpowers are struggling to eradicate. 
Its practical weaknesses do not affect its ideology or its magnetic recruitment of young 
Muslims247 Gunaratna argues that Al Qaeda has 'inherited' a good foundation, namely the 
extensive and elaborate military funded by the governments248 who wanted to 'oust' the Russian 
forces from Afghanistan. Its strengths and skills went unchallenged by the world' for about five 
years, unti I 1993' ?49 
Its covert financial network is maintained via the· auspicious of charities and 'wealthy Arab 
benefactors in the Middle East'; businesses in that region are used as 'fronts' to Al Qaeda 
business.250 Gunaratna observes that' Al Qaeda's financial network in the West has proved 
durable.'251 Moreover, Gunaratna's interview with New Scotland Yard revealed that in Europe 
Al Qaeda receives funding from 'credit card fraud' known as 'Algerians'. In 1997, within six 
months, it received almost 200000GBP from a single cell in Britain.m 
It is argued that Al Qaeda's attacks on the West are designed with the purpose of bringing about 
change in the respective countries foreign policies, and equally to dismantle the House of Saud in 
Saudi Arabia.253 Traditionally, terrorists wanted the attention, not the fatalities,254 but al-Qaeda 
aims for maximum causalities that create worldwide media spectacle. 255 
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4.3.7 Summary 
To summarise, contemporary international terrorism, enjoys the power created by the media 
when it broadcasts to the worldwide audience; the availability of armour that can be easily 
purchased, and imperatively the vulnerability of governing nations, via their transportations such 
as airplanes. 256 Moreover, the international networking of terrorist cells has extended its 
boundaries and blurred the traditional categories thereby creating a greater challenge to those in 
the counter terrorism field. 257 
Furthermore it has been highlighted that the range of categories in terrorism perpetuate the 
difficulties in 'one' internationally recognised definition. Terrorism's political nature is reiterated 
via State and non State involvement, and the evolving global phenomena. Recognising the 
categories fuels the debate that terrorism is as subjective as it is dangerous. 
4.4 Terrorism and Religion - New generation of ideological terror? 
There can be no doubt that religion is dominant in the II September 200 I and 7 July 2005 
attacks, it provides legitimation of the terrorist's cause or does it? Indeed, it is submitted that it is 
intertwined with political ideology. 
Consideration is given to religion as a motivator for terrorism, and a tool for political opposition. 
The salient and imperative point of religion as a 'legitimate' tool for terrorism will be considered 
in Chapter Five, as this is an aspect that requires detailed analysis and discussion of Islamic 
jurisprudence; namely the area of suicide attacks; Jihad and 'Ummah'. 
4.5 Fieldwork analysis on the concept of 'terrorism' 
It is interesting to see how the participants interviewed view the legal definition. For counter 
terrorism to be effective it is of paramount importance that it does not alienate the community it 
seeks to protect. The fear is that any legal condemnation of terrorism may have less authority 
than with other areas of deviance. So, to call a person a terrorist may not be readily accepted as 
calling them a murderer or a thief. It was proposed that the research will establish the views and 
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perceptions of British Kashmiris on terrorism especially when it is applied to Kashmiri affairs. 
The imperative question is whether they are persuaded that persons or groups linked to political 
violence in Kashmir, including sympathizers in the United Kingdom, are legitimately called 
'terrorists' . 
4.5.1 Research Findings 
What the term 'terrorism' means to each individual was explored and discussed in the fieldwork. 
Just as there are inevitable disagreements amongst the scholars, there was divergence amongst 
the participants interviewed. 
The meanings the term terrorism relayed by the participants was based on their personal 
perceptions or experiences. It is a term that evoked passionate responses from some and apathy 
. from others, combined with disgust as to how 'one of us' would be 'researching such a topic' 
Int.25. Nevertheless it evoked above all responses that emphasise that the perception of terrorism 
is interlinked to the effectiveness of the counter terrorism legislation. 
Analysis of the fieldwork data emphasises the range of responses to the 'meaning' of the term 
terrorism. Some deliberated on the causes and solutions of terrorism: 
There are three elements to terrorism, First, terrorism is created by the USA. Osama Bin 
Laden is trained and equipped by USA against Russia. As soon as he evicted Russia, he 
wanted USA out of Saudi, he wanted to defeat the Royal Family there. When USA stayed in 
Saudi, he retaliated against USA. He did wrong. Second, Taliban, given money by those anti 
USA and anti Pakistan, brainwashing those youngsters to commit suicide. Third, those 
innocent lives taken, whether it is a daughter, sister, mother, wife, family members join out of 
revenge, [against the injustice done to them]. To end terrorism, [we have to] listen [sit] at the 
table. For example, Pakistan spends ten billion fighting terrorism yet they do give help there, 
they (their Western partners) need to strengthen Pakistan to fight terrorism and 
simultaneously 'table-talk' to end it.' Int 19. 
Others offered brief explanations of what terrorism means: Terrorism means one person's 
destruction or rage of war against group of people over religious or political beliefs.' [nt.2. 
93 
'Terrorism is simply a guerrilla army, not recognised by the international community as a 
country's defence force;' Int.20 'terrorism is indiscriminate killing of innocent human beings.' 
Int. 27. 
Some participants elaborated to support terrorism in some situations such as Afghanistan or Iraq: 
'they are freedom-fighters trying to get their rights back. They want Americans out. These 
Americans they pay people to become terrorists and blame other governments.' Int.l O. They 
appeared to have justifications, 'a person gets so fed up and to revenge this, he becomes a 
terrorist. They only become terrorists because they have been wronged, not in normal 
circumstances.' Int. 24. 'Media showed Belgrade jail; I saw today on T.V. the US army killing 
journalists in Iraq. We only see one incident, they may have killed millions this way. NATO bus 
in Afghanistan with children and women. So that's why people take arms and go against. 
Terrorism is just a name for Muslims. Palestine they have issued identity cards, it's all cruel and 
inhumane, when treated so badly whether Muslim or Jew, they will take arms. Palestinians 
without identity cards will get seven years imprisonment. A person slave of UK or US is ok, and 
one that is not is a terrorist, if not doing as UK or US ask they are seen as terrorism.' Int. I 1 
But for some, terrorism is not acceptable in given circumstances: 'terrorism is wrong when 
killing indiscriminately innocent, but if war then mujahideen. In Kashmir, is fighting for its land, 
so not terrorism.' Int. 9. The common opinion was that: 'In Kashmir [its] not terrorism. In 
Afghanistan elected by the people there. Yet Mugabe does things we don't agree with, yet we 
don't attack Zimbabwe. No evidence about Afghanistan yet targeted Taliban, whom I don't 
agree with, but they are not terrorists, only fought for their rights. Not insurgents, always been 
there. American terrorists in Iraq, they go round in their apache helicopters shooting people, so 
they go round to get a high score. Russian terrorists because of what they did in Chechnya and 
then they wonder why Muslim world is reacting the way it is.' Int.13. The theme of state 
terrorism was echoed by several interviewees, 'terrorism means killing innocent people for a 
political gain. But it is also terrorism to go over with carpet bombs and phosphate. I don't see a 
distinction between state and individual terrorism - it's difficult.' Int.17. The subjective nature of 
what terrorism is was highlighted by one participant's response, 'people call killing in secret, it's 
a western term [terrorism] - they call it.' In1.4. 
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It was proposed that the fieldwork would attempt to establish 'the reality' of how terrorism is 
understood by the selected participants. The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that whilst 
terrorism on the one hand 'means indiscriminate killing. It's very bad - we do not like them," 
Int.3, on the other hand it means to, "terrorize a population, to make them live in fear - all the 
stuff going on in Pakistan - the Taliban situation - Israelis doing in Palestine - as terrorism and 
Hamas rockets, terrorism, can understand it. If I was occupied I would resist by all means 
possible.' Int.S. Thus 'the reality' is rife with discourse and ambivalence, 'the killing of innocent 
people - 9111 a perfect example of that, majority of the people that died in it, oblivious to USA, 
Taliban and AI-Qaeda. Another aspect is the initiating and provoking of a war in another country 
- also terrorism. Sometimes people misinterpret defending one's own country as terrorism - I 
don't think its terrorism, its war isn't it really.' Int.22 
Some participants believed that terrorism was incorrectly linked to Islam. As one articulated, 
'terrorism, not very clear term at the moment; international media has put the term in a carton. 
No classification of terrorism, whoever is doing any movement, whether its freedom - they class 
everyone as terrorism. They join them all in one group. No one knows the origin of terrorism-
international media is trying to show that Islamic countries are creating terrorism. They are 
unconsciously brainwashing people that it is in danger oflslam - of these groups.' Int. 16. 
Interestingly, irrespective of what the participants believed as to what terrorism means, there is 
overwhelming support, for section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. It is important to assert that this 
was not reflective of their opinion of other aspects of the British counter terrorist policy and 
legislation. The unwavering endorsement is reflected by the participant's responses: 'it's a fair 
definition;' Int. 5; 'yes it needs to be broad because terrorism is so. As long as intention to protect 
the UK, it's a good thing, as long as they have done the research.' Int.1. 'It sounds like a good 
idea' Int.7, with 'yes I accept it, we live here so must accept the law.' Int.9. 'I do agree with it, 
there are other ways of getting the point across without harming people.' Int.22. 
The underlying reasoning for the approval was 'because I should abide by the law.' Int.! 0, and 'I 
agree with it because they [terrorists] are doing wrong,' Int.2!; 'meaning is good, when done 
wrong, they are wrong.' Int.24. This theme was repeated, 'we need definition to'keep peace. Law 
should be obeyed, we are tied by the law.' Int.1!; 'It's a fair definition shouldn't do it at all - not 
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to disturb the law.' Int.14; 'I agree because any taking of lives we are against it, ideology we are 
against it.' Int.18. There was also the opinion that the Terrorism Act 2000 was not sufficient, 'I 
don't think it's extreme enough for terrorism, terrorism is at a larger scale,' Int.23 and 'if done 
deliberately should be punished severely.' Int.19. Some participants held reservations but were 
fuelled by the necessity of section I of the Terrorism Act 2000, 'I accept most of it, Muslims 
have wonderful victimhood, but now people killing people, I don't know why; the definition is 
difficult because used as a blanket policy to apply to Muslims who disagree with it. But I 
understand it, it's used for the unseen enemy;' Int.17 and 'It needs to be broad I understand that 
but it can be open to abuse. However, I trust our judiciary - they have to date always upheld the 
law and protected us - even spoke against Guantanamo Bay, so I accept the definition because 
the judiciary will challenge any of its shortcomings.' Int.27. 
Nevertheless, this confidence in the judiciary was not shared by some dissenters,258 'it is not 
acceptable when suspicious circumstances make one terrorist, for example, Pakistani students in 
Manchester, they were wrongly arrested, gave all a bad reputation, they, the Labour Government 
apologised to the students. When I met John Prescott the Deputy Prime Minister, he said so, but 
the damage was already done.' Int.12. Others expressed concern that section I is 'too broad, it 
scares me, it opens it up. What if someone stayed in my house the night before the bombing, and 
I did not know anything about it.' Int.13 
This anxiety was elaborated: 'any problem is how you perceive it, obviously we live in this 
country, if we are attacked they will kill everyone, no class or religion. If harmful to country or 
society, it's perceived as terrorism, how its defined, it's a bad term, it's hard to class who is bad 
or not. Recently Pakistani students here in Manchester, some in lock up; the same in 
Buckinghamshire, British born are arrested, we don't know what happens to them, even if 
innocent, one person's terrorist for others it's not.' Int. 16. Some disagreed with the definition not 
because of personal anxieties but because they perceived it as 'unfair': 'No I don't agree with it. If 
bombing an empty building they are not hurting anyone, I can understand what the IRA are 
doing, why they are doing it, because the British in Ireland were just as bad, they were 
terrorizing the Catholics.' Int.26. 'I feel it's unfair because there are countries without army, for 
258 • • 
These responses are all to the same question on sectIOn I of the TA 2000. 
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example Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, fighters for their defence considered terrorist, it's unfair.' 
Int.20. 
Although there was the perhaps inevitable indifference, those who expressed, 'no real opinion,' 
Int. 2 and 'there's a definition? I suppose I'm indifferent.' Int. 25, Section I of the Terrorism Act 
2000 evoked spontaneous response from other participants. 
4.5.2 Summary of the Fieldwork findings 
It has to be acknowledged that the participants whilst they overwhelmingly accepted the legal 
definition of the Terrorism Act 2000, but they also struggled with the application of the term 
'terrorism'. As the foregoing discussion has highlighted, some of the participants found it difficult 
to understand how the situation in Kashmir could be perceived as terrorism, thereby, highlighting 
the difficulty of separating the law from the political decision making. It has to be conceded 
based on the said findings, that the views on the concept of terrorism are affected by deeds and 
practices of the State rather than by laws, and for counter terrorism to work effectively this has to 
be taken into consideration. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This thesis proposes to establish the 'reality' of how the definition of terrorism is understood. 
The British Kashmir population was perceived as an ideal sample. They are not only aware of 
the political and national issues that address contemporary Kashmir, but also the religious issues 
that govern all Muslims. Thus they echo the disparity of opinion shared by academics and 
political scientists. Indeed it has been highlighted that people turn to terrorism for various 
reasons. Many terrorists act from political, ideological and religious convictions. The writer 
submits that the law should ensure safeguards in order to curtail further injustices that may be 
created by 'public panic and 'scare-mongering,.259 Indeed, the coverage of the attack on the 
World Trade Centre on September 11, 200 I, and its aftermath, (more recently 7 July 2005) has 
been unprecedented as a propaganda war that is conducted alongside more conventional 
warfare.26o It is such propaganda that leads one to conclude that terrorism is a loaded term that is 
219 
260 See: House of Lords Constitution Committee (2008-09) Fast Track Legislation (2008-09 HL 116). 
Spence D. (2002) "Shocking News" Ent L.R. 2002, 13(2), 27-30. 
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intertwined with politics. It is important to emphasise that however we choose to define 
terrorism, the imperative and inevitable element and indeed driving force are politics - and the 
law should be an anchor for safeguards in order to prevent politics from exploiting or even 
creating a situation - that can lead to catastrophic consequences - worse than the acts of 
terrorism that will haunt us for generations. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an understanding between private and public discourses 
about 'terrorism'. In ascertaining the views of the British Kashmiri Muslims, the writer ai ms to 
take a 'step' towards understanding what 'terrorism' actually means, and subsequently consider 
the effectiveness of the law. 'It is regrettable that decisive improvements are yet to come, 
especially at universal level. ,261 Granted that the' legal developments related to terrorism have 
not been paralysed by the impasse in achieving a global definition,'262 nevertheless, the lack of a 
universal definition has revealed a disparity of opinion in the interviewee responses, especially in 
relation to the situation in Kashmir, whom they describe not as terrorists but as freedom fighters. 
Based on the fieldwork findings, it can be tentatively argued although the participants of the 
British Kashmiri Muslim community commonly accepted the legal definition as identified by 
section I of the Terrorism Act 2000, they simultaneously struggled with what constitutes 
terrorism. A bombing on British territory was unanimously deemed to be an act of terrorism, but 
the events in Kashmir (and some of the other overseas Muslim territories) were described as an 
act of independence or self determination. In line with these findings, the perception of what 
constitutes terrorism is diverse and complex. But it reflects opinions and views that can be used 
to turn individuals against the government, as was the case of the July 2005 bombers. Thus in 
order to address such complexities, the international community has to adapt via the United 
Nations, a thoughtful and detailed definition of terrorism that also condemns state terrorism. 263 In 
261 Filippo M.D. (2008) 'Terrorism crimes and international cooperation: critical remarks on the definition and 
inclusion of terrorism in the category of international crimes'. E.1./.L 2008, /9(3), 533-570. 262 
263 Duffy (2005) op cit at p.18. 
Aust H.P. (2012) 'Publication Review. State Responsibility for International Terrorism. Problems and Prospects. 
Kimberly N. Trapp.' E. 1. I. L. 2012, 23(/), 275-278. 
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addition, effective 'cross-border co-operation' in counter terrorism requires a definition of 
terrorism that is internationally accepted and adhered to.264 
It has been established that terrorism has changing definitions and notions, and that there is now 
an 'ideological shift from more political to more religious motives, at least in the explicit 
ideology of the group.'265 The lack of a universally accepted definition coupled with this 
ideological shift has the danger of creating 'even stiffer measures in a crisis.'266 This does little to 
appease the anxiety of critics that maintain that the term terrorism is very broad and thus open to 
manipulation and state control. 
Analysis of terrorism - its conception and its contested perceptions and whether they are shaped 
by the state, or by the individual or communal ideology - are vital for the foundation of this 
thesis. The results provide a 'guide' and perhaps enable comparison of the view of the 
'interviewed' community and that of academia. As the foregoing discussion has highlighted, for 
effective safeguards and indeed community cooperation towards a 'terror safe' world - there has 
to be some element of discussion with the very community that is being protected, and that can 
simultaneously create potential terror. 
It is important that political rhetoric is not confused with the rule of law.267 Indeed there is 
concern 'that across the whole of the counter-terrorism community the development of the 
home-grown threat and the radicalization of British citizens were not fully understood or applied 
to strategic thinking' .268 Thus it is acknowledged that 'we must work in partnership with 
communities to identify and respond to the risk that extremism poses. The potential factor to 
extremism is a sense of personal alienation'. 269 It is submitted that in order to 'work in 
partnership with communities,27o it is of paramount importance that the views of those 
264 Sovndal V., De Kerchove G. & Emmerson B. (2012) 'Remembering the victims of terrorism: a collective 
~~mmitment to respect for human rights.' E.H.R.L.R 2012.3,247-248. 
Bergesen A.J. & Han Y. (2005) "New Directions for Terrorism Research" International JOllrnal of Comparative 
~~Ciology Vo1.46. Issue 1-2. Page 133. 
Walker C. & Horne A. (2012) 'Legislative Comment. The Terrorism Prevention and Investigations Measures Act 
t6~11.: one thing but not much the other.' Crim. L. R 2012,6,421-438 at 426-427. 
268 Flss O. (2006) "The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law" Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Summer 2006 
2005-06 HC 1087 op cit U9 ,. 
270 H~ July 2006, Cm 6888, op cit. 
Discussed in subsequent chapters 6 and 7. 
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communities be acknowledged to evaluate the current concepts of terrorism and indeed counter-
terrorism legislation. The next chapter will elaborate on some of the issues identified in this 
discussion, specifically those related to religion and ideology when discussing terrorism and 
Islam. 
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Chapter 5 
Terrorism in the name of Islam 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter considered the concept of terrorism and the issues related to it. This chapter 
will provide discussion about Islam and its teachings on terrorism. Islam is a religion that is often 
now associated with 'threatening images of theocracy and terrorism'; I and 'as news of a 
particularly unpleasant sort,.2 Hence, the issue of Islam and Muslims dominates the attention of 
both UK and international audiences,3 via images of 'war on terror' and the 'clash of 
civilizations,.4 Consequently, 'Islam has never been of greater interest to the people of Britain 
than it is today', 5 and this' interest' continues to perpetuate. The visible, permanent presence of 
'politically active Muslim population in Britain,6 has caused considerable anxiety in some parts 
of the country especially after the events of July 2005.7 
The purpose of this chapter is not to state what is right or wrong about Islamic teachings, but 
rather the focus in this chapter is to enable the reader to understand the differences within Islam 
and how these differences have the potential to be misinterpretated and exploited to create and 
perpetuate terrorism. The issues addressed in this chapter will reflect some of the concerns 
expressed by the participants in the fieldwork analysis. The British Kashmiri Muslims, as 
discussed in Chapter Two have not traditionally followed the Islam advocated by AI Qaeda, but 
British born Muslims have been recruited into terrorism as demonstrated by the London 
bombings. This chapter will attempt to address some of the conditions and issues within the 
Muslim communities that perhaps make this recruitment process possible. 
I Kurzman C. (Editor) (1998) Liberal Islam: A Source Book OUP: Oxford, at p.3. 
; Fluehr-Lobban C. (1994) Islamic Society in Practice University press of Florida: Florida, at p.l. 
Rehman J. (2000) 'Accommodating religious identities in an Islamic state: International law, freedom of religion 
and the rights of religious minorities' International Journal on minority and Group Rights 7, 139-165; Rehman J. 
(2003/4) 'Islamaphobia after 9/11: International terrorism, Sharia and Muslim minorities in Europe: The case of the 
UK', 3 European Yearbook o/Minority Issues 217-35; Rehman J. (2007) 'The Sharia, Islamic Family Laws and 
!nternational Human Rights Law: Examining the Theory and Practice of Polygamy and Talaq' 211NT JLPF 108. 
5 Rehman J. (2007), ibid at 108. 
6 Sear L.H. (200 I) in The News International. Nov.21 200 I, p. \0. 
Vertovec S. (2002) in Haddad Y. (editor) Muslillls in the West: From So/alllers to citi:ens Oxford: Oxford 
~niversity Press at p.19. 
White op cit at p.153. 
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It is imperative for the purposes of this thesis, namely to provide insight into one British Muslim 
community's views on terrorism and counter terrorism, that a chapter be dedicated to the brief 
overview of Islam, specifically in relation to terrorism. The chapter will commence with the 
issue of religion in general, and subsequently to consider terrorism specifically in relation to 
Islam. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider a comprehensive overview of Islamic 
jurisprudence. However, to understand the teachings of Islam, a basic overview of Islamic law is 
necessary. Subsequent to this, a discussion of whether Islam legitimizes terrorism; Islam's role 
on war, jihad and suicide attacks will be held. Fieldwork analysis of the meanings of ~ ihad' and 
how Islam relates to terrorism will be submitted. Consideration will also be given to what 
motivates the so-called 'Islamic' terrorists. The final part of the chapter will benefit from a 
discussion on Islamaphobia, to assess whether prejudice affecting the Muslim communities 
affects their vieW's on counter terrorism. 
S.2 Terrorism and Religion 
Many historical and contemporary terrorist groups have demonstrated a strong religious 
affiliation. These comprise examples such as the Jewish organizations in the pre - independence 
Israel era; the Catholic IRA; the Islamic FLN in Algeria; and the Islamic PLO. However these 
groups are dominated by their political aspirations, rather than their religion; thus their aim for 
nationalistic - self determination prevails.s Similarly, it is argued that the religious militant 
groups operating from Kashmir also possess primarily political agendas. 
5.2.1 Religion as the Motivator of Terrorism 
Religion has been used and usurped to enhance the terrorist's political agenda in other situations. 
It is argued that 'the religious imperative for terrorism is the most impOltant defining 
characteristic of terrorist activity today,.9 In relation to the events that occurred on September 11 
2001, Juergensmeyer argues that the al Qaeda ideology utilized by Bin Laden, exploits the 
'estranged and disaffected' as may be the case for British subjects of Kashmiri origin, for its 
specific political agenda. \0 
8 
9 Hoffman B. (1998), Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press, New York, at p.87. 
Hoffman, ibid at 87. I~ Juergensmeyer M. (2001) quoted in Dart J. (2001) "Bin Laden's Strategy: War and the Religious Imagination" 
The Christian Centllre, Vo1.l18; Issue: 30. Nov.7 2001 at p.4. 
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In a similar vein it is argued that terrorism and religion have been intertwined over the centuries 
with the sixteenth and seventeenth century wars in Western Europe, 1 1 and modern examples 
comprise of the attack on the Twin Towers in 2001, and Aum Shrinikyo's attack on the Tokyo 
underground in 1995. They all have the shared ideology that their actions are permitted and 
sanctioned by God. This belief exists irrespective of their differences. Thus religion is used to 
motivate and retain support for the sacred mission advocating terrorism. 12 The present Islamist 
religious terrorism is said to derive from an ideology perpetuated in the Arab Penninsula by 
increased poverty and political instability. It was even encouraged by the Western nations to 
counter the Soviet Union's communist ideology in regions such as Sudan, Iraq, Yemen. 
Interestingly it was an objective shared by the USA and Saudi Arabia. 13 
Nevertheless the motivation for religious ideology is combined with politics, thus creating 
difficulty in differentiating between the religious and political aspirations of such groupS.14 An 
example often highlighted is that of Hamas and Hizb'allah, who despite their Islamic affiliations, 
operate in the political spheres of Palestine and Lebanon. This complexity is perpetuated by the 
element of 'state sponsorship"5 discussed in the previous chapter. This also applies to the 
Kashmiri situation where it is submitted that the militants knowingly or unknowingly advance 
Pakistan's foreign policy agenda against India, whilst simultaneously proposing to liberate their 
homeland from the non-believers of Islam. Hence, religion is used to justify political violence. 16 
5.2.2 Religion a tool for political opposition 
It is argued that 'other than a few strictly millenarian or messianic groups (such as Aum 
Shirinkyo or some Christian white supremacist movements), almost all the contemporary 
terrorist groups with a distinct religious imperative are either offshoots or on the fringe of 
11 Jakab A. (2011) 'Breaching constitutional law on moral grounds in the fight against terrorism: implied 
presuppositions and proposed solutions in the discourse on 'the rule of law versus terrorism'.' I. J. C. L. 2011, 9( I), 
58-78. 
12 Keene S. D. (2011) 'Terrorism and the Internet: a double - edged sword.' J. M L. C. 2011, 14(4),359-370. I] 
Jabara A. (2002) "Introduction" Arab Studies Quarterly. 2002; p.l. 
14 Berko A., Erez E. & Globoker J.L. (2010) 'Gender, crime and terrorism: the case of Arab / Palestinian women in 
l~rael.' Brit. 1. Criminol. 2010,50(4),670-689. 
Ranstorp M. (1996) "Terrorism in the Name of Religion", Journal of International Ajfairs. Vol.50, Issue I p.4l. 
16 Amigo B.A. (20 I 0) 'Identity, international terrorism and negotiating peace: Hamas and ethics based 
considerations from critical restorative justice.' Brit. 1. Criminol. 2010,50(4),772-790 at 780. 
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broader political movements.' 17 Consequently, even where the extremists 'break away' from 
particular organizations, they are usually governed by their political aspirations. It is argued that 
their objectives are formed by their differing agendas and their opposition to the secular 
ideology, which is perceived and portrayed as a major hindrance to their ultimate goal. Where 
the secularization is supported or encouraged by Western societies, the threat is further 
magnified, and their feelings of isolation are further perpetuated. 'Thus, religious terrorism serves 
as the only effective vehicle for political opposition,.18 In essence, the ruling government feels 
compelled to respond to such opposition in a manner when left 'unchecked' mirrors the 
'repressive action,'19 thereby perpetuating the sympathy for terrorism. 
This view is also advocated by others,2o who provide examples of religious communities living 
in peace in one area of the globe, and the same communities are in a state of conflict in another 
part of the world - - such as the Sinhalese Buddhists and Tamil Hindus in Sri Lanka and India. 
Though Hindus and Muslims are involved in constant conflicts in the Indian subcontinent, they 
are at peace in Indonesia. Oommen's point is that there is nothing in the religious affiliation that 
encourages or creates violence, it is only when they seek political power that they 'become 
sources ofviolence.'21 
Religion has been described as an effective base for legitimizing political violence. Hoffman 
refers to the Jewish terrorist movements in Israel. According to Hoffman, these movements 
receive their ideology from the late Rabbi Meir Kahane and exist under Kach ('Thus'). Hoffman 
elaborates that the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in 1995 was the result of 'extremist 
rabbis' uncompromising blend of religious fervour coupled with the intense enmity towards 
Israel's secular government.' The Rabbis had viewed Rabin as the 'enemy' of both Israel and the 
Jewish people.22 Ironically, it is held that 'there is a great degree of similarity between the stands 
of the Jewish Kach and Islamic Hamas organization.'23 Both possess a revulsion for Western 
17 
18 Jabara A. (2002) op cit at I. 
Ranstorp, (1996), op cit at 41. See also: Amigo B A (20 I 0) op cit at 772-790. 
19 Londras F. and Davis F. (2010) 'Controlling the executive in times of terrorism: competing perspectives on 
~[fective oversight mechanism.' o.J.L.S (2010), 30( I), 19 - 47 at 47. 
2 Oommen T.K. (200 I) "Religion as Source of Violence" The Ecumenical Review. Vo1.53, 200 I. p.168. 2~ Oommen, ibid. 
23 HofTman, (1998), op cit p.1 02. 
Ranstorp (1996), op cit at 41. 
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ideology, and aim to create a State that is obscure of anything 'alien or secular.' The individuals 
are attracted to the groups by their unity in the beliefs and struggles, and the endorsement and 
reinforcement of these beliefs by their religious leaders.24 The religious terrorists justify their 
violent actions as the 'war' against those that are their 'enemies'. For example, this is reinforced 
perpetually by the literature distributed 'by the terrorists, as exemplified by Yigal Amir's 
justification for assassinating Rabin,'2s or by Hamas' path to heaven via 'death for the sake of 
Allah.'26 
S.2.3 AI- Qaeda & Religious Terrorism 
It is widely believed, 'at present, that the Muslim terrorists, in general and specifically, Osama 
bin Laden and al-Qaida are a threat worldwide. Indeed the nature and scale of the attacks on 
September 11, 2001 by al-Qaida suggested that terrorism had developed a 'Third Millennium,27 
format that lacks the traditional nationalist or political ideology, and it is now flexible with ideas 
deeply rooted in religion. Walker argues that al-Qaeda's threat was foreseen by United Kingdom 
prior to September 2001, as it was legally proscribed seven months earlier in February 200 I. 
'Nevertheless, the apprehension remains that al-Qaida activities has been occurring within UK 
for some years. Out of the nineteen hijackers, eleven had links with the UK,.28 Importantly, it is 
worth noting that the majority of the proscribed organizations under the 200 I Proscribed 
Organisations Order29 are of Islamic origin.3o It has become a common place among analysts to 
talk about Islamic terrorists.31 
AI-Qaeda is the most famous recent example of an older phenomenon: 'religious terrorism'. 32 
Sedgwick asserts that religion governs the salient features of al Qaeda's constitution: it's primary 
goal for a Islamic nation or nations, and its aim to recruit individuals from the Muslim 
24 Ibid at 41. 
25 Ibid. 
26 A . 
'7 mlgo B.A. (2010) op cit at 772-790. 
- Walker C. (2004) "Terrorism & Criminal Justice: Past, Present & Future". Crim. L.R 2004 May, 311-327. 
28 
Walker C. (2004), ibid. 
29 Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Orders 200 I-I 0, S 1200 1/1261. Proscription of 
~roups is discussed further in Chapter Seven. 
3° Walker C. (2011) Terrorism and the Law. Oxford University Press: Oxford at p.346 - 348. 
I Cooper B. (2004) New Political Religions. Or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism University of Missouri Press. 
folumbia, MO at p.2 . 
. 2 Sedgwick M. (2004) "AI-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism" Terrorism & Political Violence, Vo!. 16, 
No.4 (Winter 2004) pp.795-814. Publishers: Taylor & Francis. Inc., at p.795. 
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communities. However, irrespective of its religious objectives, it is submitted that it shares 
political33 'objectives' similar to any other terrorist organisation.34 
AI Qaeda is an 'infrastructural organisation' that has allocated roles and duties for its continuous 
governance. Its hierarchy reflects its formality. It functions effectively as a religious organisation 
because it has no 'fixed' base, and via its global ideology it easily replaces and fulfils the role of 
its lost leaders. As discussed in Chapter Four, despite the death of its prominent leader, Osama 
Bin Laden, it continues to flourish. It is its Islamic (Wahabbi) religious ideology that enables it to 
exist as a global group, and indeed as a powerful, influential, and a dangerous 'guerilla and 
terrorist organisation.'35 (Thus the organisation of AI Qaeda is often seen as post modern, 
although traditionally Islam, similar to other religions, was heavily formalised with Ayatollahs, 
Muftis and so on, AI Qaeda has instead opted for its networks). 
Indeed, it has been highlighted that the religion of a 'terrorist' is a political choice. Indeed, 
religion as religion cannot in and of itself be an independent source of violence, 36 since it has an 
inevitable link with politics. Although religion is the chosen rhetoric for any given society, 
political imperative is the underlying ideology governing the current aspects of religious terror. 
Nevertheless Islam is perceived to be interlinked with politics, hence it is imperative that due 
consideration be given to Islamic teachings and 'terrorism' so as to disentangle the two. 
5.3 Overview of the teachings of Islam 
5.3.1 Islamic law 
Islamic law or Shari'a completely incorporates the rules and regulations, and the jurisprudence of 
the religion. 37 Islam means 'submission', 'submission to God (Allah) the one and only deity in 
the uncompromising monotheistic faith,.38 It is argued that irrespective of their demographic 
33 Croft S. & Moore C. (2010) 'The evolution ofthreat narratives in the age of terror: understanding threats in 
~ritain.' International Affairs 86:4; 2010, 821-835 at 823. 
35 Sedgwick, op cit at p. 795-796. 
Gunaratna R. & Oreg A. (2010) 'AI Qaeda's Organizational Structure and its Evolution.' Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 33: 1043-1078 2010 at 1043 - 1044. 
36 ' 
37 Oommen, (200 I), op cit at 168. 
Badar M.E. (2011) 'Islamic law (Sharia) and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.' L. J. I. L. 2011, 
24(2) 411-433 at 414. see also: Nyazee l.A.K. (2000) Islamic Jl/rispl1ldence (Usul al - Fiqh). Islamabad: Islamic 
~esearch Institute Press, at p.17. 
Fleuehr-Lobben (1994) op cit at 18. 
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situation, Muslims worldwide believe in one Islam.39 In short, Islam is the 'complete way of life' 
for its followers, and Shari'a 'the pathway.'4o Thus, the law of Islam is viewed as the 'all 
embracing body of religious duties' .41 
According to the common understanding, the teachings of Islam have 'four fundamental 'roots'; 
the Quran (the word of Allah), the Sunnah (hadith- Hadith as having developed from the 
Prophetic Sunna the latter as its basis);42 the consensus of Muslim jurists: ijma, it is argued that 
ijma forms the bulk of Islamic jurisprudence;43 and analogical reasoning (usu/ al-fiqh},44 also 
referred to as the 'product of human reason',45 which can be employed, 'if no guidance is 
available on the point under discussion in any of the other three sources of law'. 46 
The Quran states issues of belief and practice for the individual Muslim and for the Islamic 
society, collectively known as 'the Umma ,.47 Subsequent to the Quran is the 'Sunna' of the 
Prophet, believed to be 'the words and practice of Prophet Muhammad during his lifetime'. 
These two sources are authoritative, but subject to 'interpretation' .48 
5.3.2 Compulsory duties that derive from the sources 
Irrespective of the differing schools of Islamic legal interpretation, they unanimously recognise 
and accept the five pillars of Islamic faith that form the foundation for the Islamic practices. 
In brief, Shahada, the first pillar oflslam, represents the 'uncompromising monotheism of Islam' 
and Prophet Muhammad as the Messenger of God. Sa/at the second pillar of Islam, is the 
39 Ramadan T. (2004) Western Muslims and the Future of Islam Oxford University Press: Oxford, p.9. 
40 Lahlou M.S. &Tanega J. (2007) 'Islamic Securitisation: Part II - A proposal for International Standards, legal 
~uidelines and structures'. J.I.B.L.R 2007, 22 (7), 359-372 at 359. 
Pease R. (2005) 'Estate Planning for Middle East clients'. P.C.B 2005, 3, J.l3-/54. 
42 Fazlur Rahman (1965) 'Islamic Methodology in History' p.76, cited in Motzki H. (2002) The Origins of Islamic 
Jurisprudence. Meccan Fiqh before the Classic Schools' Brill: Boston at p.38. 
43 Hassan F. (1982) 'The Sources of Islamic Law', 1982,76 Proceedings of the American Society of International 
Law 67; AIi S.S. & Rehman J. (2005) 'The Concept of Jihad in International Law' C&S Law, 2005 /0(321). 
:: Weiss B.G. (2002) (editor) Studies in Islamic Legal Theory Publisher: Brill, Boston at xvii. 
Badar M.E. (2011) op cit at 414. :~ Ali & Rehman (2005), op cit at 321. 
48 FI~uhr-Lobban (1994) op cit at 20. 
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obligatory pray that occurs five times daily; 'communal pray in the mosque is considered higher 
of prayer,49, as its participation involves the community. Friday prayers are significant as they 
are obligatory, and are usually followed by a sermon, be it 'social, political or religious,.5o The 
third pillar of Islam is called the Zakat, which means 'purification,.51 It is an obligatory 
contribution of 2.5 per cent of the individual's wealth and assets, and functions as a welfare 
system in the Muslim community. It is not a charity, but demonstration of thanksgiving that God 
has placed the individuals' in a position where they can assist others that are in 'need'. Sawn, is 
fasting in the month of Ramadan, is the fourth pillar that is obligatory for healthy adult Muslims, 
when they abstain from food and drink from sunrise to sunset. It 'is intended to stimulate 
reflection on human frailty and dependence upon God, focus on spiritual values, and 
identification with and response to the less fortunate' .52 The final pillar is Ha}} - it is a 
pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.53 It is performed once in the lifetime and by those that have 
the financial and physical means. 
5.3.3 Discourse in the belief of 'one Islam' 
The 'sources' and the essential principles that form the basis of Islam are 'unanimously 
recognised'. 54 In addition, there remains an element of the Muslim community that interpret the 
texts in such a manner that prohibits any development in interpretation. Such communities are 
said to be present in Britain among Indo-Pakistani groups (including those of Kashmiri origin), 
and 'are concerned mostly with religious practice that does not envisage social, civil or political 
involvement' in the society that they live in.55 Hence, assimilation or participation in the 
'western social milieu' is rejected, and they are often isolated in 'the prism of their traditional 
reading,.56 It has led some to conclude that inclusion of the Muslim community in the British and 
European society is difficult and 'diffusion' impossible.57 The discourse within Islam enables 
some Islamic preachers specifically in the West to 'propagate hate,' via their rigid and selective 
49 
50 FI~uhr-Lobban( 1994) op cit at 26. . 
5 Ibid. (these sennons can in their extreme form lead to VIOlence). 
1 Esposito J.L. (2002) What Evelyone needs 10 Know abollt Islam Oxford: Oxford University Press at p.20. 
52 Esposito, ibid. 
53 In Saudi Arabia 
54 • 
ss Ramadhan T. (2004) op cit at 24. 
56 Ramadhan, (2004) op cit at 25. 
57 Ramadhan (2004) op cit at 25. 
Gould M. (2008) 'Islam, the Law and the sovereignty of God' Polic)' Review 0: 149; p.3. 
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application of Islamic law, such as Abu Hamza, Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and Ayman al-
Zawahiri. 58 
Part of the reasoning for controversial interpretations that may lead to social alienation and 
perpetuate antagonism where Muslims are in the minority, can be identified via the terms, 
'customary Islam' and 'revivalist Islam'. In 'customary Islam', practices are based on the 
combination of regional traditions and Islamic beliefs that are universally shared. These regional 
traditions include 'reverence for saintly figures' in Morocco; 'displays of spirituality and power' 
that are Indonesian traditions; Iranians celebrate 'holy dates and pre-Islamic New Year'; whereas 
'caste-like social hierarchies' and 'locality pilgrimage to sacred stones is regarded as an 
acceptable substitute for the hajj' in South Asia.59 In contrast, 'revivalist Islam', abhorred and 
openly criticised the customary interpretation as being contradictory 'to the letter of Islamic 
doctrine,.6o Tayyib Uqbi of Algeria61 is quoted to have said, 'I have never performed the 
circumambulation [of a saint's shrine] ... nor propitiatory sacrifices ... I do not invoke the dead 
... Invoke them you will, I shall never surrender to your idolatory' .62 
The 'relegation,63 of the Islamic law to customary law highlights that the Islamic law can be 
misconstrued efficiently and effectively. Islamic law can be re-formulated to suit the agenda of a 
particular regime, particularly in parts of the world where the Muslim population are illiterate, 
for example in some parts of Kashmir, and thus accepting of what they are told by the governing 
administration. Similarly Islamic law can be presented to a naiVe teenager, seeking the 'righteous 
path' in the United Kingdom, in a manner that contradicts the actual teachings of Islam. This 
view was accepted by some of the participants interviewed: 'Our problem is not that we don't 
believe in Allah's creation, but because we don't properly understand the teachings [Islamic], and 
we start believing in the wrong kind of Islam, not knowing how incorrect it actually is.' Int. 15. 
The fact that there exists a problem was acknowledged by the first generation British Kashmiri 
S8 Rehman J. (2007b) 'Islam, 'War on Terror' and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the UK: Dilemmas of 
~ulticulturism.' Human Rights QI/arterly, 29(4), 2007, 831-878 at 838. 
60 Kurzman C. (editor) (1998) Liberal/slam: A SOl/rce Book OUP: Oxford and New York at p.5. 
Kurzman, 1998:5, ibid. 
61 Died 1960. 
6' 6~ Quoted in Gelher E. (I 981) MI/slim Society Cambridge: CUP, p.1 56; see also Kurzman C. 1998:6, ibid. 
Oba A.A. (2002) "Islamic law as customary law: the changing perspective in Nigeria" /CLQ 8/7. 
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Muslims also, 'Our young when they stop believing in the true Islam [Sufism], then they are 
taken on the wrong path.' Int. 11. The question on the discourse of Islam was never posed to the 
participants, they spontaneously talked about this, 'It is very sad that my parents find my 
interpretation of Islam embarrassing. My father even criticises his best friend whose son a 
practising Muslim does not practice Sufism. My mother is more accepting of my non-practising 
sisters, than of me, a practising Muslim. And I am not able to relate to Sufism. I often get treated 
as though I am so wrong, and ignored. Why is that I wonder.' Int. 27. It is perhaps the conflicts 
within Islam that have perpetuated the discussion on Islam and terrorism. 
5.4 Does Islam legitimize terrorism? 
It is accepted that the impact of 11 September 2001 has had a dramatic influence on Islamic 
thoughts and practices. Extremism and 'radical Islamist discourse' is evident throughout the 
world, with Osama Bin Laden featuring as a main 'reference,.64 In addition the events of 11 
September 2001 have provided 'ammunition ... to those suspicious' of the Islamic societies.65 
Thus in an era when 'Islamic themes and terminology dominate political discourse', politics and 
religion become intertwined, irrespective of whether they are viewed by those inside the Muslim 
societies or extemaIly.66 It is further submitted that the events following II September 2001, 
have resulted in Islam being placed under the magnifying glass - with some struggling to 
distinguish between terrorism and Islam.67 
As already discussed, it is not a new concept to link terrorism with religion.68 However, Hoffman 
argues that in contemporary terrorism religion is used as a 'means of communication.' It is 
observed that despite Bin Laden's lack of theological credentials, his fatwas are accepted by 
people in a manner described as 'truly is a perversion of religion'. 69 The data analysis of the 
fieldwork reveals the common view that 'You should know, our religion does not guide us to 
64 Nathan K. S. & Kamal M.H. (200S) (editors) Islam in SOlltheast Asia: Political, Sodal & Strategic Challenges 
for the 1\i'enty-jirst century. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore at p. xxii. 
6S Rehman J. (2005) Islamic State Practices. International Law and the Threat from Terrorism. Hart Publishing: 
Oxford. 
66 Mayer A.E. (1991) Islam and Hllman Rights: Tradition and Politics. Westview Press: Boulder, CO at p.xii. 
:7 Malika A. in Yahya H. (2002) Islam Denollnces Terrorism Amal Press: Bristol, at p.7. 
8 Osho (2006) in http://www.oshoworld.com/newsletter/POF/aug06/religion and terrorism.pdf last visited July 
;Q009; see also earlier discussion related to 'religion and terrorism'. 
Hoffman B. (2002) 'Religion and Terrorism Interview with Or Bruce Hoffman' 
h!t!):llwlVw.religioscope.com/info/articles/003 Hoffman terrorism.htm 22/2/2002, last visited July 2009. 
110 
terrorism. Islam meaning is love and share with everyone, and live happily.' Int. 14. Another 
participant believed that Islam was being deliberately tarnished but not from within Islam itself, 
'Islam is against innocent killings of life. If one kills one innocent person then kill a nation - but 
system is pre-planning of the Jews and Christians.' Int. 11. Thus consideration will be given to 
how terrorism is legitimised in the name Islam. 
In considering whether the teachings of Islam legitimize terrorism, Rehman argues that 'the 
modern Islamic State practices are broadly in agreement with international laws prohibiting acts 
of terrorism,.7o However 'Islam, as all religious civilizations, represents a complex system of 
values and ritual, theology and folklore, law and faith. Like all religions, it contains within it 
both the deep and the simple, the sublime and the cruel, the exulted and the ignoble,.71 There are 
indeed differences and 'splits' within the Muslim communities.72 Nevertheless, the fact that 
terrorist acts are 'perpetrated in the name of IsIam,73 has led some to question the 'religious 
culture in which this phenomenon is rooted and nurtured'. 74 The apparent threat from this 
religious culture is further perpetuated by the knowledge that it embraces 'more than one-fifth of 
the world's population,.7s In addition, it is argued that there continues to exist a presence in the 
Muslim communities that support terrorism, and this is attributed to the basic perception and 
beliefthat it is Islam itself that is violent.76 
Muslims are instructed by the Quran and the Hadith- Sunna to find a 'middle way' and to avoid 
extremism; 'to act with justice, perseverance and patience,.77 Islam is viewed as a religion of 
peace, and terrorism is seen as an attack against religion itself.78 This view was continuously 
70 
71 R.ehman J. (2005) op cit. 
Firestone R. (\999) Jihad: The Origin 0/ Holy War in Islam. Oxford; OUP at p. 13. 
72 Ibid. 
73 
7 Bar S. (2004) 'The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism' Policy Rel'iell' No. 125,2004. 
4 Bar S. (2004), ibid; see also; Mazarr MJ (2004) ;The Psychological Sources of Islamic Terrorism; Alienation and 
~~entity !n the Arab World.' Policy Review 125:39. 
76 Esp~slto J. (1992) The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? OUP;Oxford at p.2. 
Carrmgton CJ. (2001) 'What is the Truth about Islamic Terrorism', http;llwww.onthruth.com/islamwtc.html. last 
visited July 2009, and http;llwww.islamreligion.com/articlesl238/Ill0dified on 24 April 2008. See also; Huntington 
S.P. (1996) The Clash o/Civilizations and the Remaking o/World Order Silllon & Schuster; London, at p.263; see 
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reiterated by the participants interviewed, 'It is haraam - it should not occur. Muslims are anti 
terrorism especially in the UK. We condemn July 2005 - we don't want to kill any innocent 
people of any nation.' Int. 18. Others whilst sharing this common perspective, also believed that 
they were incorrectly portrayed, 'Islam is against terrorism, clear ruling that cannot kill innocent 
people - only kill in war, at the moment what the media shows goes against that. Not following 
religion when killing people.' lnt. 16. Thus Muslims are said to be responsible for preventing 
terror, in essence perpetuating justice and peace to society. 'Islamic terror' is seen as an 
erroneous concept which contradicts Islam's message.79 Indeed it is further argued that Islam 
itself does not legitimise terrorism: 'God does not forbid you from showing kindness and dealing 
justly with those who have not fought you about religion and have not driven you out of your 
homes. God loves just dealers'.so The Prophet Muhammad (PBH) prohibited the killing of 
Women and children by the soldiers,sl and stated 'Do not betray, do not be excessive, do not kill 
a newborn child',82 and elaborated, 'whoever has killed a person having a treaty with the 
Muslims shall not smell the fragrance of Paradise'. 83 
The fact that Islam does not permit terrorism through its respect for human rights was an 
argument relayed by one participant interviewed, 'We respect the human rights of all people, 
whether they are Christians or Hindus, so we as Muslims should not and cannot kill anyone 
except in war, but London bombing was not war, and neither was September 11, all this stuff is 
not war. You write this: we respect human rights, it is in our Islam. If I was a scholar I would 
give you quotes, but you write this ok.' lnt. 3 The assertion that Islamic law dictates the 
preservation and practice of human rights is conceded by the Organisation oflslamic Conference 
in 1990,84 when it accepted the 'Declaration on Human Rights in Islam'. Thus human rights are 
viewed as a crucial tenet of Islam and thus cannot be violated or ignored. The preservation of 
these rights is deemed to be the duty of all Muslims.85 It is accepted that the inhumane methods 
of some of the contemporary Islamic States makes an oxymoron of the concept of 'human rights 
19 
80 Yahya,( 2002) op cit at 14; see also Rehman J (2005). op cit. 
81 Quran: 60:8 cited in hUp:llwww.islamreligion.com/articles/2381 . 
82 Narrated in Saheeh Muslim, #1744, & Saheeh AI-Bukhari # 3015. 
83 Narrated in Saheeh Muslim #1731, & AI Tirmizi #1408. 
Narrated in Saheeh AI-Bukhan; #3166, & 1bn Majah, #2686. 
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and Islam'. Nevertheless there is clear evidence that these inhumane practices are not governed 
by the Islamic law. States responsibility in ensuring the practice of human rights is dictated in the 
doctrine of Islamic law.86 Hence even the Archbishop of England to comment that '[t]he 
principles ofIslamic law ... are principles that lay heavy stress on dignity and respect ... ,87. 
5.5 Islam and the role of war 
It has been observed that 'western prejudice toward Islam is as old as Islam itself.' Despite 
Islam's progression in the scientific and other intellectual areas, the West has always 'epitomized 
Islam as cruel, evil and uncivilized.'88 Thus war is viewed as an integral part of Islam89 and the 
hypothesis that 'it is the principal process by which Islam spread throughout the world' .90 As the 
foregoing discussion has briefly highlighted the question that is often posed in the contemporary 
world is about Islam's views on war, especially since al-Qaeda has equated their terrorist 
activities with 'just war'. Thus they justify their actions under the umbrella of Islamic law. 
It is asserted that the justification of the 'holy war' in Islam can be found in some teachings in 
the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Religion and politics are often intertwined in Saudi Arabia, and it 
is from this basis that a Islamic theologian, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab created 'a 
movement, Wahhabism,.91 Wahhabism continues to flourish in contemporary Saudi Arabia. 'It is 
a strict, puritanical faith that emphasizes literal interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah ... thus 
holy war is required' to unite the ummah. 92 Bin laden uses his Saudi Arabian heritage of 
Wahhabism to justify his actions and deeds, and this ideology lead to the creation of al-Qaeda 
(the base).93 
86 
Coulson N.J, (1957) 'The State and the Individual in Islamic Law' 61CLQ /95749 at 5 I. see: Qllran at 17:70 and 
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89 Firestone R, (I 999) op cit at 13, 
90 Cavanaugh K. (2012) 'Speaking law to war.' J,c.& S,L 2012, 17(1),3-24, 
91 Nafziger O.F. & Watton M.W. (2003) Islam at war: A HistOI)', Praeger Publishers: West port at p.vii. 
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However, there is the school of thought that asserts that the accurate interpretation of the Islamic 
teachings contradicts the ideology of al-Qaeda and other similar groupS.94 It is further submitted 
that Bin Laden whilst not wholly ignorant of the Islamic teachings and law, is selective in its 
interpretation to aid his 'cause' .95 Hence, 'some Western readers find the Islamic rulings on war 
to be contradictory'. 96 To understand the teachings, scholars argue that the Quran must be 
analyzed as a 'whole' and not in selective pieces,97 'And those who are firmly grounded in 
knowledge say: "We believe in the Books; the whole of it is from our Lord": and none will grasp 
the Message except men of understanding'. 98 Thus, it is observed that the concept of war in 
Islam has gradually 'evolved carrying layers of corrective interpretation,.99 Armstrong concludes 
that the Quran does not sanctify warfare. It develops the notion of a just war, of self defence, to 
protect decent values, but condemns the killing and aggression. 100 
Moreover, indiscriminate killing is prohibited in the Quran as evidenced by Surah al-Maida, 
verse 32. Thus attacks on civilians violate Islamic law. 'It has been narrated on the authority of 
Abu Haraira that the Messenger of God said: 'Do not desire an encounter with the enemy; but 
When you encounter them be firm'. 101 It is further narrated on the authority of Abdullah that a 
woman was found killed in one of the battles fought by the Messenger of God. He disapproved 
of the killing of women and children. 102 It is narrated by Ibn Umar that a woman was found 
killed in one of these battles; the Messenger of Allah forbade the killing of women and 
children. IO) In the hadith narrated by Abdullah ibn Amr ibn aI-As, Prophet Muhammad said: 
'You are neither hard-hearted nor fierce character, nor one who shouts in the markets. You do 
not return evil for evil, but excuse and forgive' .104 
94 Lovelace D. (2004) in Aboul-Enein Y.H. & Zuhur S. (2004) Islamic Rulings on Wm:fare. Strategic Studies 
Institute: Carlisle Barricks. 
95 Aboul-Enein Y.H. & Zuhur S. (2004) Islamic Rulings 011 WO/fare. Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle Barricks, 
at p.1. 
96 Ibid at p.2. 
97 
98 Bader M.E. (2011) op cit at 415. 
99 Quran: Surah3, al-Imran, verse 7. 
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101 M I' 
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5.6 Use of the term 'Jihad' 
There exists an unceasing and detailed assertion that Islamic law condones and perpetuates 
terrorism. This debate centres around what Harris refers to as the 'peculiar institution of 
Islam',105 namely Jihad. Rehman observes that 'the terminology of jihad is often erroneously 
applied as being synonymous with terrorism or violence'. 106 Perhaps this should not be surprise 
when Osama Bin Laden declared in 1998 that, ' ... jihad is an individual duty if the enemy 
destroys the Muslim countries ... as for the fighting to repulse, it is armed at defending sanctity 
and religion, it is a duty .. .'I07 Thus jihad is often associated with the theory that 'it is a 
religiously sanctioned violence.108 Islamic law is thereby seen to advocate terror in the form of 
jihad, Mushkat advocates thatjlhad is an obligation imposed on Muslims to increase the Muslim 
community, and join forces against the non-believers of Islam. 109 Similarly, Busuttil elaborates 
on Mushkat's views, and argues, that the sole purpose of Islam is to convert the non - believers 
by the 'sword,.11O Anxiety about such an 'aggressive and violent' faith is further fuelled by 
leading Muslim jurist, such as Majid Khadduri,111 who advocated that Islam's purpose is to usurp 
the world, and no-one outside of Islam had 'equal status' .112 
Jihad is viewed simply as dividing Dar ai-Islam (Muslim controlled territory), and Dar a/-harb 
(al1 areas not under the Islamic rule).113 Aboul-Enein and Zuhr assert that aggression that is 
conducted as 'jihad', has clear evidence that it is contrary to what is provided in the teachings of 
Islam. For a person to declare a jihad, he has to be the 'Commander of the faithful', and the 
contemporary Muslim world has no 'allegiance' to one 'Caliph'. 114 Nevertheless, such acts of 
jihad perpetuate the thesis that Islam is indeed 'a religion of the sword ... and a concept of non-
violence is absent from Muslim doctrine and practice'. 11 5 
105 H . L 
10 arns . (2006) 'Jihad Then and Now' Policy Review 2006. 139:71. 
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11 usuttl J. (1991) 'Humanitarian Law in Islam' The Milital)' Lmv & Lml' of War Review 1991.30, 113. 
I" Khadduri M. (1955) 'War & Peace in the Law of Islam' 51-54 cited in Ali & Rehman. 2005, op cit. 2 Ibid. 
113 
114 Knapp M.G. (2003), op cit at 82. 
liS Abo~I-Enein E.H. & Zuhr S. (2004) op cit at 5. 
Huntll1gton S.P. (1996) 'The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order' 263 cited in Ali & Rehman 
(2005) op cit. 
115 
In contrast to the above ideology, Jihad is more often viewed as a 'non-violent' concept. It is 
incorrectly linked to war, since the word in Arabic for war or fighting is 'harb,.116 Jihad al saghir 
(lesser jihad) orjihad bin saif(jihad of the sword), is viewed in Islam as lesser struggle than the 
large, inner struggle referred to as jihad alkabir. 1I7 For the purposes of the present discussion, 
and certainly to those justifying warfare in Islam,jihad al saghir is projected to the forefront. I IS 
Professor Rehman elaborates on the definition of jihad when he writes, '[t]he term jihad is 
adopted from the Arabic verb jahada, which connotes exerting oneself, labour or toil. In essence 
jihad is an expression of endeavour and struggle in the cause of Allah' . 119 
Jihad is in this sense conducted in non-violent manner 'with persuasion' as the key element. 120 
This is based on evidence from Islamic law, where it is argued that jihad is used in the Quran to 
guide the individual closer to Allah.121 On jihad the Quran states, '0 Ye who believe! Shall I 
guide you to a commerce that will save you from painful chastisement? Is that you believe in 
Allah and His Messenger, and strive in the cause of Allah with your belongings and your 
persons. That is better for you. If ye have knowledge, He will forgive your sins, and will admit 
you to Gardens beneath which river flow, and to pure and pleasant dwellings in Gardens of 
Eternity. That is the supreme triumph' .122 In short, jihad is equated to 'striving with one's person 
and one's wealth for the sake of God.'123 
116 Burki S. K. (2011) 'Haraam or Halal? Islamists' Use of Suicide Attacks as ~ihad'.' Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 23: 582-601 at 584. 
117 Burki (201 I) ibid at 585. Jihad al kabir (the greater jihad) also calledjihad bi! nafs (the struggle of the conscience 
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MawahhidunlWahhabi/salafi teachings of Islam, who as discussed in Chapter Two view the customs of Sufism as 
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It has been argued that the 'concept of 'just war' permeates the jihad ideology and has been 
invoked, contemporaneously to legitimize struggles in Kashmir.'124 Indeed this was reflected in 
some of the data obtained from the fieldwork: 'bombing people is not j ihad. It's a great league of 
Muslims. Let me give you an example - Jammu Kashmir, fighting for freedom isjihad.' Int. 14. 
However not everyone is certain of what it entails, but its abuse was acknowledged, 'I don't 
actually know whatjihad is, but a lot of terrorists use it as an excuse to carry out attacks.' Int. 20. 
The reality that the jihad propaganda is continuously used to recruit 'home grown' terrorists is 
reflected in the /qba/ case. 125 In brief, /qba/ was arrested with co-accused at Manchester Airport, 
they intended to go to Finland. On arrest, he had in his possession material promoting terrorism. 
A later search of their home revealed material on jihad and video images of Iqbal mimicking 
jihadi acts - such as holding a boy by the throat, with two swords and saying, 'This is what I am 
going to do to somebody, God willing, when I find a kuffar, this is how I am going to take his 
head off.' Further videos showed celebration of beheadings. The defence argued that the 
defendants were 'dreamers obsessed with weapons and action films.' Whether they were 
'dreamers' or those 'fascinated' with jihad, this case highlights the many dangers that encompass 
the distorted version of jihad to young British Muslims. As the trial judge concluded, they were 
'more taken with the vanity than reality.' But the case reflects the serious need to educate the 
British Muslims that audio files such as those identified in this case entitled 'Come on let's do 
jihad', contradict Islam. And this education can only come from within the community, by those 
that these potential terrorists respect. One participant's solution was to work with the national 
security services, 'they have to be educated that what they are doing is wrong by someone they 
can relate to.' Int. 7 
In Islamic law, it is emphasised that the ideal option should be of peace. The Quran emphasises, 
'And, if they incline to peace, incline thou also to it and trust in God, Lo! He is the Hearer, the 
Knower',126 Furthermore, 'if two parties among the believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace 
between them'.127 Thus the fieldwork data generated responses which reflected a peaceful 
outlook. 'Jihad is a struggle, whether it's personal to be a better human being. It is misconstrued 
by those who exploit Islam and has been wrongly linked with terrorism. Jihad can be a 'just 
1:!4 
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war', which terrorism clearly is not, the whole purpose of jihad is to struggle for the righteous 
path - terrorism is the opposite to that. Does that make sense?' Int.27. There was the common 
acknowledgement that the terrorists' abuse of Islam, has distorted the image of jihad and that the 
concept of jihad is sometimes blurred: 'Jihad is the fight for your own country, for freedom and 
rights. Maybe related to terrorism because that's how they recruit.' Int. 21. Jihad's links with 
terrorism had an uncomfortable impact on some of the participants interviewed: 'Jihad in the 
time of our Prophet peace be upon him, was different, it was part of the Islamic law like a sixth 
pillar. Now jihad is not of killing innocent people. Ummah is against it and says it is haraam l28 
not jihad, (make sure you write this), we condemn it all, all of us in the UK, this is our second 
home.' Int.I 8. 
The participants were keen to distant their religion from terrorism thus despite being unfamiliar 
with the Islamic teachings. The common theme was that 'Islam is against terrorism' reflected 
even amongst those 'not well read about Islam, but contrary to the preaching's of Islam.' Int. 15; 
'Not really studied Islam yet. Can't make a judgement, shouldn't kill innocent, don't believe in 
persecution; whether it relates to Islam or not - but from a moral perspective it's wrong.' Int.8; 
'Islam does not allow terrorism, I don't think so.' Int.26. 'Not sure. Not looked at it enough. Not 
an expert. Innocent people should not be harmed.' Int.7. 
The notion that jihad should be used 'to convert the entire world' into Muslim Ummah is 
challenged. 129 The Quran clearly states 'There is no compulsion in religion .. .' 130 Although it is 
argued that 'apostasy' is comparable to the 'modern laws [of] treason',131 forced conversion to 
Islam is clearly not sanctioned by Islamic law. This is further emphasised by the verses of the 
Quran, 'Invite all to the way of your Lord with wisdom, reason and clear intentions. Truly your 
Lord knows best who has gone astray from His Path, and He is the best aware of those who are 
guided' .132 
128 Prohibited. 
129 • 
130 Aboul-Enem V.H. & Zuhur S. (2004) op cit at 7). 
131 The Quran, 2:256;(al-Baqarah, verse 256). 
132 AIi & Rehman, (2005) op cit at 321. 
The QUl'an, Surah AI-Nahl, verse 125. 
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The use ofjihad to forcibly convert into Islam is evidently contradicted by the Islamic law, this is 
emphasised in the above verses of the Quran. Thus, it is argued that since the essential elements 
of dar al Islam and dar al harb have evolved over the centuries, the definition of dar al Islam as 
'any territory whose inhabitants observe Muslim law', applies to Western nations such as the 
United Kingdom. The analogy used for this is that of British India, referred to by Islamic 
scholars as a dar allslam, because it fulfills the criteria of holding Friday and Eid Prays.133 
On a similar vein, the fieldwork data reiterated the participants' common views on terrorism and 
its links to jihad, 'Jihad is meant to be a struggle, these days only hear about it when people 
fight.' Int. 8; 'Jihad is just about taking the religion forward, personal goal, not necessarily 
violent. The term is hijacked by terrorism and seen as a fight against Islamic forces -
misinterpretation of what is in the Quran - but precisely their views.' Int.7. Some viewed jihad as 
'dying for one's country and religion - not for Islam to be insulted.' Int. 10, and Jihad is different 
from terrorism. Jihad is about holy war, Muslims have to follow strict rules - very different from 
terrorism - no links.' Int.24. Others applied jihad to their surroundings, as one participant 
explained, 'In Sufism, jihad is about nafs - pursuing yourself. The legal definition is the just war 
theory adapted by St. Augustine, it's based on Islamic teachings, allowed and accepted even by 
the Geneva Convention. People are now taking it out of context and saying you can kill, like 
terrorism. In my area people are dealing drugs, this takes priority, can't conquer the world when 
neighbourhood is not sorted out. That is my jihad.' Int.17. Some participants appeared to view it 
as an opportunity to correct a misconception, others expressed some annoyance that the 
researcher as a Muslim was also linking it to terrorism, 'I am surprised that you of all people 
need to ask such a question.' Int. 11 Having considered some of the views from the fieldwork, 
further discussion is warranted on what justifications if any are offered by those undertaking and 
advocating terrorism in the name of Islam. 
5.7 The concept of suicide in Islamic law 
Suicide is viewed as the paradigmatic spectacle of Islamist terrorism; 'a favoured method of AI 
Qaeda type terrorism'. 134 Via suicide there is the portrayal of the terrorist as 'noble, terrible, 
133 AI' 
134 1 & Rehman,( 2005) op cit. 
Greer S. (2008) 'Human rights and struggle against terrorism in the UK' EHRLR 2008,2, 163-172 at 166. 
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irresistibly fascinating, for he combines in himself the two sublimities of human grandeur: the 
martyr and the hero'. 135 When Wafar Idris, one of the first Muslim female committed suicide, in 
2003, she was described in emotive language that perpetuated the 'spectacle'; as 'illuminating 
spirit and purity', with 'spirit raging, her heart filled with anger' .136 'Her sacrifice was [described 
as] a supreme act of beauty,.137 Such concepts of suicide overlook the reality that suicide 
bombing is a 'frightening' weapon that has 'catastrophic effect[s]' .138 
Yet, suicide is not sanctioned within the Islamic law. It is submitted that throughout the history 
of Islam suicide has been held to be prohibited. This is based on the belief that only Allah has the 
power to give and take life, and thus suicide is considered 'sacrilegious,.139 Burki observes that 
suicide missions are also referred to by those sanctioning them as 'martyrdom operations,.140 
Despite the evidence in the Quran 141 and the Sunna142 that such operations are forbidden, 
nevertheless they are justified by AI - Qaeda as necessary and just under the circumstances. The 
circumstances relayed by AI Qaeda advocates are of where the enemy is more powerful, and any 
encounter will lead to an inevitable death. 143 A dominant advocate of 'martyrdom or self sacrifice 
operations"44 was Sheikh Yusuf Salih AI-Uyayri, who declared that 'suicide bombings' is a 
terminology fabricated by the Jews 'to discourage our brothers from such activities.'145 
13l Stepniak (Russian anarchist who assassinated Tsarist General Mesentzoff in 1878), quote from his essay 
underground cited in Houen A. (2002) Terrorism and Modern Literature: From Joseph Com'ad to Claran Cm'son, 
OUP: Oxford, at 57. 
136 Journal AI-Arabi cited in Ward I. (2008) 'God, terror and law' Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2008, 28(4), 783-
796 (at 789-790). 
137 Ward I. (2008) op cit at 790, see also: Israeli R, (2004) 'Palestinian Women: The Quest for Voice in the Public 
~2uar~ Through Islamikaze Martyrdom' Terrorism and Political Violence 2~04: 16,: 66-9?, at 84-8, 
Lelvesley S. (2006) 'Terrorism PLC: funding spectaculars and catastrophic fisk m law. JMLC 2006, 9 (2), I.J 1-
156 at 147. 
139 Burki S. K. (20 11) 'Haraam or Halal? Islamists' use of Suicide Attacks as Jihad.' TerrO/'isl/I and Political 
Violence, 23: 582-601 at 583. see also: EI-Ayouty Y. (1999) 'International Terrorism under the Law' JOIII'I7al of 
International and Comparative Law 1999, 5ILSA at 489. 
140 B k' 
ur IS. (2011) op cit at 586. 
141 SAN' ura n- Isa 4: 29-30 and Sura AI Baqara 2: 195. 
142 Hadith Bukhari 2: 445, narrated by Thabit bin Ad - Dahhak, Accessed at http:((muttaqun.com/suicide.html; 
Hadith Bukhari 7: 670, narrated by Abu Huraira. accessed at http:/(muttagun.com!suicide.html. 
143 AI Uyayri Y. (2003) 'The Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Self Sacrificial Operations: Suicide or 
Martyrdom?' (Translated in English by At-Tibyan, 2003). see also: Hegghammer T. (2010) Jihad i/l Salldi Arabia-
Violence and Pan Islamism since 1979. Cambridge: CUP at pp 125-126. 
144 B k' 
14l ur I S. (2011) op cit at 587. 
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It is further argued that the success of the martyrdom missions in Beirut by Hizballah has created 
a justification for suicide or the 'Evolving Islamic Mart yrdom', 146 within the Muslim world, be 
they in London or Kashmir. 147 In addition the perceived injustices of the 'Israeli occupation' has 
'legitimized the use of suicide. 148 The consistent argument used by the advocates of suicide is 
that the 'ends justify the means', and that it is a necessary method that is permitted with 'pure 
intention', whilst causing substantial damage and fear in the enemy, simultaneously increases the 
'Muslim morale. r149 However 'this weak case' received no support from the Grand Mufti of Saudi 
Arabia, Sheikh Abdul Aziz aI-Sheikh. 150 Similarly other Islamic scholars have condemned 
suicide,151 including Sheikh Gomaa, who issued a statement that suicide bombing of a Church in 
Alexandria on January 2011, was prohibited and therefore against Islam.'52 Nevertheless 'the 
ends justify the means' case in advocating suicide especially in Israel is seen to be advocated via 
the medium of Al Jazeera, 'watched by over sixty million people every week.'153 The alleged 
slogan that it is only 'martyrdom ... if it targeted Israelis,' prevails. 154 
One Ayat from the Quran (An-Nisa 4:74), often used to justify suicide, is challenged as it does 
not 'suggest or imply a violent self - sacrifice by one's own hand.'I55 In addition it clearly states 
in the same Sura that' ... And do not kill yourselves (nor kill one another). Surely, Allah is 
Most Merciful to you.' (An-Nisa 4:29). Thus, the 'cherry picking' of ayats is another method of 
misinterpreting the Islamic teachings. 156 A lay person's view can be summed by the words of one 
participant, 'I am not a scholar, but I know that nothing can defend or justify this terrorism of car 
bombs and airplanes crashing into buildings. What happened on 7th of July in my own country, 
Allah will not forgive, and Allah has not said that anyone can take innocent lives.' Int. 15. 
146 Acosta B. (2010) 'The Suicide Bomber as Sunni • Shi'i Hybrid.' Middle Eastern Quarterly 17(3), Summer 20 I O. 
at p.13. 
147 B k' S 
148 ur J • (2011) op cit at 588. 
Burki S. (2011) op cit at 588. 
149 Ibid at 588. 
I so Quoted in 'Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia: No to Suicide Bombings.' AI Hayat Nov. 27, 2009, cited in Bukri (2011) 
op cit at 589 and 599; (original article not accessible). 
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20 I\. Accessed at: http://on 
faith.washingtonpost.com/on/faithlguestvoicesl2011/01/egypts_top_muslim_leader_responds_to_suicide_bombing.h 
tml. See also: Burki S. (2011) op cit at 590. 
IS) B k' S 
154 ur I .(2011)opcitat591. 
Ibid at 591. 
155 B k' 
156 ur J S. (2011) op cit at 592. 
Ibid at 592. 
121 
5.8 What motivates Islamic terrorists? 
The fact that "Islam itself is against terrorism" Int. I, is reinforced by the scholars of Islam, and 
the participants interviewed, leads to the inevitable question of what actually motivates Islamic 
terrorists. As the foregoing discussion has highlighted, Muslims and non-Muslims often cite 
radical Islam to justify terrorist activities. But Islam, be it radical or liberal does not promote 
terrorism; however distorted perceptions and misinterpretations enhance the terrorists' agenda. 
It is imperative to note that 'majority of the Muslims are not fluent in Arabic, for example, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Indonesia. Little attention is given to explaining the actual 
implications and applications of [the Quran], Prophet Muhammad's words or the differences in 
interpretations that can be lost in translation' .157 In addition crucial elements of the law are 
omitted to justify the terrorist agenda. Bruce Hoffman advocates that the underlying motivation 
of terrorism is predominately political and that terrorism is utilised to achieve the political 
aspirations. 158 
'Terrorism research' conducted using '400 biographies' complied mainly from trial records of 
those who had no 'nationalistic' agenda and had targeted foreign land, namely the United States, 
found that the individuals recruited for jihad had no common profile, but were 'not very 
religious.' Their common aim was to seek familiar people and social interaction in a mosque. In 
the mosques their loneliness was exploited and converted into terrorism. IS9 This longing to 
belong was identified in the fieldwork analysis. Despite being British and not foreign born, some 
of the second and third generation participants identified with Sageman's hypothesis of 
belonging to a 'community'. One participant in the research conducted for this thesis articulated 
the common dilemma encountered by the British born, 'You are told that you are a Muslim, yet 
IS1 • 
IS Aboul-Enelll &Zuhur. (2004) op cit at 9. 
8 Hotrman B. (2006) Inside Terrorism revised edition. Columbia University Press: New York at p.2; Shaw C.J. 
(2007) 'Worldwide war on terrorist finance' JIBLR 2007, 22(9), 469-486 at 470; Croft S. and Moore C. (2010) 'the 
evolution of threat narratives in the age of terror: understanding terrorist threats in Britain.' In/ema/ional Affairs 
86:4 (2010) 821-835 at 826-7; Hotfman B. (2008) 'The myth of grass roots terrorism: why Osama bin Laden still 
:~:tters.' Foreign Affairs 87(3), May-June 2008, 133-138. 
Sageman M. (2004) Understanding Terror Networks I Nov.2004: 
!illQ;ilwww . .furLOl.glenotes/2004/101.middleeasl.sageman.understandingterrornCJwOIj.;s.htl11l last visited 13 July, 
2009. 
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you know nothing about your religion. I learned to read the Quran in Arabic but did not know 
what it said. I wanted to learn more about my religion and be accepted by it. I felt quite different 
and isolated. I did not drink alcohol, ate only halal food. I wanted to understand my religion. 
Although I was accepted by non-Muslim friends, I wanted more. I had this emptiness and a 
longing to learn more. This is what leads to terrorism - if you receive the wrong interpretation of 
Islam, you think that's it. It is a slippery slope, and I strongly believe that no one is born a 
terrorist, they are often manipulated into becoming one. And that manipulation is so easy when 
you have no or limited knowledge.' Int. 27. 
In his sample, Sageman, found no 'recruiter'. Sageman's findings indicate that prior to 
September 2001, young men volunteered to fight in Afghanistan. They had no intention of 
becoming 'terrorists' .160 Like Sageman in 2004, Bakker,161 two years later, published his findings 
on jihadi terrorists in Europe. He also relied on data from trial and media records. Similar to 
Sageman, Bakker found that the individuals being researched,162 were not attracted to extremism 
because of al Qaeda but through existing jihadi movements. 163 Group loyalty was a common 
feature in both studies. The individual's newly acquired 'faith' isolated them from their families 
and their previous social settings, thereby increasing their dependency on the new found 
group.l64 
The assertion that there is no 'central leadership' is elaborated in later writings in 2008. 
Furthermore Sageman, does little to advance Hoffman's 'political' hypothesis, instead he argues 
that contemporary terrorists are motivated by their 'feelings', whereas political motivated 
behaviour involves thoughts and ideology.165 'The new generation of terrorists consists of home 
grown wannabes - - self recruited, without leadership, and globally connected through the 
160 
1 Sageman, 2004: ibid. 
61 Bakker E. (2006) lihadi terrorists in El/rope, their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the 
.{~~ad: An explotory stl/dy. Clingendaellnstitute: The Hague. 
242 individuals studied. 
163 Silke A. (2008) 'Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization'. Europeun 
{~I/rna/ cifCrimin%gy. 2008;5;99 at Ill. 
1 Silke A. (2008), ibid. 
65 Sageman M. (2008) 'The Next Generation of Terror: The World's Most Dangerous Jihadists No Longer Answer 
to Al Qaeda. The Terrorists we should fear most are self-recruited wannabes who find purpose in terror and 
Comrades on the web. This new generation is even more frightening and unpredictable than its predeccors, but its 
evolution just may reveal the key to its demise.' Foreign Policy. 2008, 165:36. 
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Internet. They are young people seeking thrills and a sense of significance and belonging in their 
lives' .166 Sageman asserts that this form of terrorism consists of informal structure with no 
central funding. Their ideology and goals are unified by the internet. 167 
Alarmingly, Sageman provides evidence that forms the basis of his views. The case of Younis 
Tsouli, who was arrested by the British police in his London resident, transformed from a 
'computer geek to radical jihadist'. He was a 'crucial global organizer of online terrorist 
networks,.168 Similarly, Mohammed Bouyeri, member of the 'Hofstad Network' 'brutally 
murdered Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh on an Amsterdam street,.169 Madrid bombers,17o are 
cited as 'another example of the self-recruited leaderless jihad'. In Canada, 'mostly second 
generation Canadians' were found with 'vast quantities of bomb making materials' to attack 
Ottawa and Toronto. They were part of the 'Religious Awareness Club' that was formed on line. 
Just as other groups, they too had no direct links to al Qaeda, although they too shared the 
ideology. 171 Sageman observes that such movements of terrorism attract individuals that feel 
alienated in the society they live in. This alienation is transferred into frustration and they seek 
empathy and support from the online resources that also advocate and legitimise terrorist 
ideology and activities. m 
It is argued that the internet is a more effective forum than personal recruitment. It is a form of 
social networking where potential terrorists can share their grievances. The online forums 173 do 
impact some British Muslims, as on participant stated, 'They shouldn't have gone there in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. For example if this is your house and attacked, you would defend it as in Iraq. The 
British Army and the Americans are committing terrorism. I have great feeling that killing of 
brothers and sisters. British forces killed for no reason. Do not need to be there. Iraqis being 
killed every day.' Int. 14. He elaborates, 'I am totally against terrorism. Nothing the government 
[British] could do to motivate me.' Int. 14. 
166 
167 Sageman M. (2008), ibid. 
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Another perspective provided on the motivation of terrorists is based on findings from the 
statements 'of collaboration of justice (so - called supergrasses, referred to in Italy as repenters), 
and 'the documents of an ideological nature produced by the terrorist organisation'. 174 Just as 
Sageman did, Spatoro found that the 'collaborators' were not motivated by 'poverty or 
ignorance'. They all had upbringings that consistently viewed 'the West as an enemy and 
Westerners as infidels,.175 These prejudices were further perpetuated by the media images of the 
'negative treatment' of Muslim communities. Nevertheless, as Sageman had found these 
individuals in Spataro's research did not hold radical beliefs in their places of origin, nor were 
they religious. However in Italy, the 'marginalization' led them to search 'for a feeling of 
belonging to a [Muslim] community.'176 Manipulation of the events, namely the individual's 
vulnerability and the longing to belong to a 'homely' environment are used to transform them 
into terrorists. 
In line with the above argument of 'belonging', it is further asserted that Al Qaeda's recruitment 
across Europe is achieved through the attractiveness of its 'Global Jihad' ideology.l77 According 
to Gunaratna and Oreg, it sustains its support by utilising the individual's 'feeling[s] of 
deprivation and poor socio economic status; a feeling resonated across some Muslim 
communities in Europe.'178 Hegghammer elaborates on this concept to argue that 'the increased 
role of religion' in conflicts such as Kashmir attracts Muslim foreign fighters. 179 Although there 
are no official statistics as to how many British Muslims embark on j ihadi missions overseas, the 
fact that they do is evidenced by one participant's comments, 'I had a distant relative, the family 
talk about him. I was told that he left England for the first time in his life, it happened around 
twenty years ago and went to join the fight for independence in Kashmir. He died out there 
around six or seven years ago. We do not know how, it's all sad.' Int. 5 180 
174S • 
pataro A. (2008) 'Why do people become terrorists? A prosecutor's experience' J/CJ 2008, 6(3), 507-52./ at 
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This transformation into terrorism, according to Burke, consists of three stages. Once the 
individuals identify a cause that they wish to correct, they then embark on the second stage of 
believing that they can personally solve the injustice. The final stage transforms them into 
terrorists, as they overcome the social boundaries for their ideology. 181 
In addition it is argued that the 'indoctrination process' conducted by al Qaeda for example, has 
a 'pernicious influence' on the individuals leading to their terrorist acts. 182 The underlying 
motivation - or the foundation of their cause is based on the 'distorted view of the principles of 
the Islamic religion and a violent and criminal interpretation of the obligation of Jihad.' 183 The 
distorted view of Islam is further evidence in the recruitment literature seized by the 
authorities: 84 These documents included the 'Military Studies for the Jihad against the Tyrants', 
which was found in Manchester, May 2000; the identical version found in a flat in Milan July 
2002, albeit the latter was in Arabic and the former in English. Other documents seized in Italy 
between 2003 and 2004, contained similar distortions of the Islamic law, which according to 
Spataro was the motivator of their terrorist activities: 85 A conclusion is that 'religion [clearly] 
serves as a cultural adaptation for facilitating terrorism and war. They permit the take-over 
groups by disenfranchised young males' :86 
Such findings consistently reveal the 'distorted interpretations' of the Islamic law governed and 
motivated the terrorists' actions. Interestingly, these findings concurred with Sageman's theory 
of the 'Ieaderless jihad', but they (the collaborators here) are not home-grown terrorists. 
181Burke J, (2003) AI Qaeda- Casting a Shadow ofTen'o,.. I.B. Town's: London, at 247-248. 
182 S 183 pataro, (2008) op cit at 513. 
Spataro, (2008) op cit at 514. 
184 Hegghammer T. (2010/11) op cit at 72. see also: Spataro (2008) op cit at 5 IS. 
185 1bid at 515-516. 
186 Anderson J. (2003) 'Killer Apes on American Airlines, or : How Religion was the Main Hijacker on September 
11', in Varvin S. & Volkan V.D. (editors) (2003) Violence 0,. Dialogue? Psychoanalytic Insights on Te,.ro,. and 
Ter"orism, Institute of Psychoanalytic Association: London at 82. Spataro's findings revealed that in addition to the 
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Nevertheless, just as Spataro had done Hegghammer, submits that there now exists a movement 
of jihadis that despite not having contact with each other share a unified ideology.18? 
However, once the 'collaborators' were physically away from the 'indoctrination' environment 
upon reflection, they realised that their actions contradicted Islam. 188 This suggests that these are 
'highly suggestible individuals attracted to cult-type figures for inspiration and leadership . .t89 
The indoctrination by their religious mentor, and their eagerness to embrace Islam made them 
ideal candidates for the terrorist movement. 190 Indeed as Sarwono asserts the chosen individuals 
are 'youths who are longing for values, self-identification, or wanting to escape some stressful 
environment' .191 Although they are psychologically healthy individuals, they are described as 
'ambivalent people who are disorientated in looking into (their) future and (not knowing) what 
option ... to take.' 192 This scenario was discussed in the fieldwork, 'It is easy to become one of 
them you know a bad one because you are looking for something like directions. I feel sorry for 
some of these fanatics, they have just got into the wrong crowd. I was lucky that even though I 
did not know about my religion, I knew what is right and what is wrong. I was there for less than 
five minutes, and I got away as fast as I could. It was a back street cafe, oh man, I still remember 
it and that was years ago. But if you are not strong, they can easily brainwash you. We want to 
learn, we feel no one understands us, they become your friends, and then teach you the wrong 
stuff. They have so much evil in them, and the poor guys they believe their b**'" thinking it's the 
truth. It's a dangerous group, I hope that you do not meet one.' Int. 20 
The events in London on 7 July 2005 led to the inevitable questioning of the motivations and the 
antecedents of the perpetrators by all levels of government. The House of Commons in their 
report highlight the difficulties in understanding the motivation of the terrorists - why them 
indeed? The Report states: 
:::Hegghammer T. (2010/11) op cit at 74 and Spataro, (2008): op cit at 519. 
Spataro, (2008) op cit at 524. 
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Sarwono S.W. (2006) 'What is in their minds? The Psychology of suicide bombers in Indonesia' Paper given at 
{~P A~nl/al Convention, Kos, Greece, cited in Lowenstein (2006), op cit. 
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'What we know of previous extremists in the UK shows that there is not a consistent profile 
to help identify who may be vulnerable to radicaJization. Of the four individuals here, three 
were second generation British citizens whose parents were of Pakistani origin and one 
whose parents were of Jamaican origin; Kamel Bourgass, convicted of the Ricin plot, was an 
Algerian failed asylum seeker; Richard Reid, the failed shoe bomber, had an English mother 
and Jamaican father. Others of interest have been white converts. Some have been well-
educated, some less so. Some genuinely poor, some less so. Some apparently well integrated 
in the UK, others not. Most single, but some family men with children. Some previously law 
abiding, others with a history of petty crime. In a few cases there is evidence of abuse or 
other trauma in early life, but in others their upbringing has been stable and loving.' 193 
Thus, it is asserted that 'the security services can identify neither a uniform pattern by which a 
process occurs nor a particular type that is susceptible' .194 
There exists a vast number of the population that share the same 'antecedents' or influences as 
the 717 terrorists, yet they remain immune from the illicit terrorist activities. Ansari et al.,195 
conducted questionnaires amongst eighty practising British Muslims, with thirteen interviews, 
and found that 'social identity had a major impact on attitudes: respondents who felt their 
primary identity was Muslim held more positive views towards jihad and martyrdom, whereas 
respondents with a dominant British identity did not' .196 Thus, empathy for the 'cause' is seen as 
a strong motivator. 197 This view is echoed in the fieldwork findings. One participant stated in 
relation to the events of Iraq and Afghanistan, 'Overall it's wrong to go to another country and 
free what you want. In Iraq, there were no nuclear weapons. The real problem is that it is 
creating terrorism. Also in Afghanistan, there is no real evidence. It is wrong for England and 
other countries. As a Muslim it affects me, as a human I don't feel good about killipg innocent 
people and destroy[ing] the country. As a Muslim, kill[ing] people provokes those left alive to 
193 House of Commons (2006b) Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7'1. July 2005. HMSO: 
London at 3 I . 
194 Bux S. (2007) 'Muslim Youths, Islam and Violent Radicalisation: Addressing some Myths', PJ,BO,3 (267). 
195 Ansari H., Cinnirella M., Rogers M.B., Loewenthal K.M., & Lewis C.A. (2006) 'Perceptions of Martyrdom and 
terrorism amongst British Muslims', in Rogers M.B., Lewis C.A., Loewenthal K .. M., Cinnirella M., Amlot R. & 
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fight against and creates the problem [of terrorism], bad picture for Muslims and affects me as 
well.' Int. 16. Another participant argues, 'It has not helped our fight against terrorism, but the 
British Army has been very good, unlike the Americans. I am proud of the British Army, they 
are under so much restraint. They abide by the rules. But whether the British administration 
should have gone there, both wars are unjustified, and we won't win, no-one will. It's all wrong; 
we are losing the lives of our armed forces, and innocent civilians are dying out there. I believe 
in peaceful means of punishment such as sanctions, or get one of their own to topple Saddam for 
example. We should not be there, we are playing right into the hands of the terrorists.' Int. 27. 
Thereby emphasising that the participants viewed the British foreign policy in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as a contributing factor that motivated terrorists. 
Others argue that terrorism is ultimately 'a career choice'; as in the 'case of Amar Khyam, the 
ringleader of the fertiliser bomb-plot'. Motivation of terrorism is viewed as 'an attractive 
choice' 198. Professor Silke observes that this attractive choice is motivated by the 'danger and 
excitement [that] feature [in the] life [of a] terrorist' .199 Irrespective of the preceding analysis of 
motivation, the raw truth, especially following July 2005, is that 'the homegrown terrorists 
simply do not feel bound to the national laws of the country where they Iive.'200 One interviewee 
explained, 'Our Prophet, Peace be upon Him, said something along the lines, that we have to 
protect our nation, and they were a minority religion at the time, just as we are here. But we have 
a duty to obey the laws of this country, and not harm anyone. We have to give a good image of 
Muslims by our good deeds.' Int. 17. 
198 
199 ~ux S. (2007), op cit at 267. 
Sllke A. (2008) op cit at 116. This is epitomised by a former IRA member: • A pal1 of me missed being in the 
IRA. I had spend six years leading an action-packed existence, living each day with the excitement of feeling I was 
playing a part in taking the Orange State. At the very least, such activity gave a strange edge to my life: I lived each 
day in a heightened state of alertness. Everything I did, however trivial, could seem meaningful. Life outside the 
IRA could often feel terribly mundane ... I lived life with a weird intensity. I felt myself part of a large family 
Whose members had powerful emotional links to each other. The idea of turning my back on the IRA had become as 
repu~nant to me as turning my back on my children. As soon as I left this intense environment I found myself 
mlssmg my comrades: the dangers and risks we shared brought us together.' Collins E. with McGovern M. (1997) 
Ki!ling Rage. GrantaBooks: London, 158, and 363. Similarly former Italian terrorist stated that he missed 'the fact of 
bemg totally at risk' DeCataldo Newburger L. & Valentini T. (1996) Women and Ter/'Orism, Macmillan: London at 
137. 
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The preceding discussion, on what motivates a terrorist to become a terrorist, has highlighted that 
this is a 'long term project with no quick fixes' .201 They do not fit 'the stereotypes that shape 
public expectations,.202 Whether we accept Gunaratna's assertion of AI Qaeda as a structural 
organisation, or Sageman's internet theory or Hoffman's salient assertion that motivation is 
political with a religious guise, there is no disputing that the religious ideology underlying the al 
Qaeda continues to thrive. However, there is the 'new wave' of leaderless threat, in that there is 
no central base, and those who may lack any clear religious or political ideology but are equally 
if not more dangerous than those who do. They are connected via the internet, and rather than 
diminishing appear to be expanding. The process of manipulative socialisation coupled with the 
distorted perception of religion often entices and motivates such individuals to terrorist 
organisations and its activities. This problem is further deepened by the alleged 'clash' of 
Western ideology and Islamic teachings. 
5.9 The 'Clash'. 
There is discourse to suggest that Islam's clash with Western Iifestyle203 is a motivator for 
Islamic terrorism. Indeed it is recognised that in contemporary globalised world, there may be 
inevitable clashes to compete with the 'open markets and free trade.'204 However, some scholars 
have championed globalization, such as Francis Fukuyama,z05 Fukuyama argues that liberal 
societies inspire modernity which incorporates Western democracy of free expression and 
economy. The crucial, imperative issue for Fukuyama is that democracy is the 'fundamental end,' 
since it imparts with it the 'equal personal dignity and recognition' that is available for all its 
citizens. In turn, Fukuyama actively urges the democratic superpowers to promote their 'politics' 
on a global sphere.206 
201 
202 B.ux S. (2007) op cit at 267. 
20J Sllkes A. (2008) op cit at 118. 
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Fukuyama views the II September 2001 attacks as the 'desperate backlash against modernity.'207 
He elaborates that 'the single area in which my thinking has changed the most dramatically from 
1989 to the present concerns the likelihood and speed with which modernization and 
democratization will occur - what one might call the 'timetable' questions.' Thus when referring 
to the 'timetable', Fukuyama is perhaps linking it to his 'train' as he writes: 'modernity is a 
powerful freight train that will not be derailed by recent events,' Fukuyama's insistence that 
modernity and with it democracy will prevail, is grounded in his use of G.W.F Hegel's 
philosophy. Fukuyama adapts Hegel's account of the master and slave to demonstrate that 
'formal and mutual recognition' of democratic values will prevaifo8 - as it could be argued is the 
case of the 'Arab spring' affecting the landscape of the Middle East. The democratic revolution of 
the 'Arab spring' reinforces Fukuyama's theory that 'traditional dictatorships' deny the citizens of 
their 'humanity,.209 
FUkuyama advocates that 'if true supporters of liberal democracy and free markets are ever to 
compete successfully with the Islamists and populists of the world, they need to have a social 
agenda that gives some hope not just to the middle - class and educated, but to those who are 
isolated and excluded as well. Above all we need to stop seeing this issue through the old left -
right ideological lens of American domestic politics, and recognise that our influence is 
dependant in large measure on our ability to offer people around the world what they want, and 
not what we think they should want.,210 In brief, according to Fukuyama's theory the Islamic 
terrorism is viewed as a rebellion against the prevailing modernity. 
Another perspective is offered by Samuel Huntington who argues that 'Western intervention in 
the affairs of other civilizations is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and 
potential global conflict in a multicivilizational world.'211 He views the Muslim world as a 
civilization that is in 'clash' with the Western worlds. And it is this clash that led to the events of 
207 
Fukuyama F. (2006) 'The 'End of History' Symposium: A Response.' Open Democracy August 25,2006; at 
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209 Kurtz S. (2002) op cit at 43. 
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Hunttngton S.P. (1996) The Clash o/Civili=ations alld the Remaking o/the World Order. New York: Simon & 
Schuster at p.312. 
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11 September 2001. He argues that 'modernization' is the cause of the Islamic 'fundamentalist 
reaction'. 
In the analysis of Huntington's theory, Kurtz notes: Huntington does put forward a very nice 
account of the social roots of Islamic fundamentalism. Yet that account only begs the question of 
the long - term effects of modernization. Huntington rightly notes that the tendency of 
modernization to break traditional social bonds have actually stimulated an identity - preserving 
return to Islam ... ' However, Huntington does not deny the possibility that with long term 
exposure to technology and economic prosperity, traditional societies can embrace Western 
'individualism,.212 
Nevertheless, Huntington pragmatically urges the Western powers not to promote their 
democratic ideology, and views the Islamic world as a threat.213 This threat is triggered by what 
Huntington refers to as the increase in the younger demographics of the Muslim world,214 and 
thus, accordingly the 'confidence' in societies where regimes have been replaced by democratic 
'Arab Spring' is what Huntington had predicted would 'clash' with Western values. Yet 
Fukuyama argues that it is these aspirations of democracy that will prevent rather than perpetuate 
the 'clash' between the Islamic world and the Western powers. 
Huntington's view is that the 'clash of cultures,215 has led to a 'clash of civilizations', and the 
consequence of this is terrorism. Huntington writes, 'Somewhere in the Middle East a half dozen 
young men could be well dressed in jeans, drinking Coke, listening to rap, and, between their 
bows to Mecca, putting together a bomb to blow up an American airliner.'216 Huntington boldly 
submits that the followers of Islam possess a 'high propensity to resort to violence', and 'Islam's 
borders are bloody, and so are its innards.,217 
21:! 
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One of Huntington's critic, the late Edward Said, argues that 'the clash of civilizations' is a 
gimmick like 'The War of the Worlds,' better for reinforcing defensive self pride than for critical 
understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our time.'218 Said asserts that Huntington's 
theory overlooks nationality and identity, instead focuses on creating a prejudiced image of them 
(the Muslims) and us (in the West).219 In line with the criticism of Huntington's work, it is argued 
that there are more struggles within the Islamist world than against other civilizations.22o 
Furthermore, Huntington's view that Western national security is compromised by 'immigrants 
from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and to propagate the 
values, customs, and cultures of their home societies. This phenomenon is most notable among 
Muslims in Europe, who are, however, a small minority;,221 is echoed in the subsequent 
discussion highlighting Islamaphobia - that views Muslim as the 'dangerous' threat. 
The fieldwork analysis did not directly reveal any direct support for either Huntington's or 
Fukuyama's work, and the participants were not directly asked about either theory. Nevertheless, 
the data did reflect that on the one hand, the participants believed that their lives were as good as 
they are because of the democracy they live in: 'I am British, and it is a privilege to be in a 
country that accepts all religions and cultures, and we live so well together, how many other 
people in the world can say this.' lnt 7. However the other perspective was based on the belief 
that the State did not understand their religion and culture: 'They do not understand or accept our 
way of life. They tell us that we can't wear niqab [veil], the government should not be interfering 
with my religion.' Int. 23 
218 Said E.W. (2001) 'The Clash ofIgnorance' The Nation. October 22, 2001. 
219'How finally inadequate are the labels, generalizations, and cultural assertions. At some level, for instance, 
primitive passions and sophisticated know - how coverage in ways that give the lie to a fortified boundary not only 
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modern world, and those who react to modernism and reform by reverting - sometimes fanatically - to the 
~~~ndamentals' of their faith.' at p.xx . 
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Thus, whether one accepts Fukuyama's 'collective' and ultimate goal of global democracy, or 
Huntington's inevitable clash of civilizations and differing societies, they both address the 
predicament encountered by the counter terrorist lobby. The ultimate goal of collective 
democracy will encounter opposition by those wanting to remain loyal to their 'pre - modern' life, 
and the clash will occur as they perceive the powerful West's hegemonic policies a threat to their 
'religious' ideology. Neither theory resolves the threat of terrorism, but merely seeks to offer an 
explanation for the basis of the threat. 
5.10.1 Islamapbobia 
Discussion about Islamaphobia is imperative because it will highlight whether prejudice from 
'White' communities has further isolated the Muslim communities. Moreover it is submitted that 
tensions within the communities potentially created by Islamaphobia may hinder their co-
operation in counter terrorism. One British born woman refused to be interviewed. and offered 
an apologetic explanation, 'After the London bombings, aside from my skin colour they had 
nothing to identify me as a Muslim, and I still got spat at and called many names.' Anon. 
However the participants interviewed did not directly talk about Islamaphobia, though they 
talked about 'suspect community', which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
It is often held that 'the objectification of Muslims and Islam as the 'dangerous other' in 
contemporary western democratic societies is not new nor particularly surprising.·222 The 
'hysteria,223 around Islam and its credentials has fuelled a growth in Islamaphobia, 'that is, fear 
or hatred of Muslims and Islam,.224 It is observed that. 'Islamaphobia has been shown to be 
widespread in much of society,.m The Runnymede Report defined Islamaphobia as 'an 
unfounded hostility towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims.'226 
Ironically the Muslim beliefs are indeed 'better understood now' than at any other time,227 
nevertheless Islamic beliefs are now distorted and 'the term 'Muslim fundamentalist' is 
2" 
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commonly used and misused.228 It is such misconceptions that ignite and perpetuate the flames 
of prejudice and fear leading to Islamaphobia.229 Indeed, it is such misconceptions that have 
prompted governments to justify surveillance and profiling of 'Muslim communities'; the 
German Federal Prosecutor states 'seeming religious tolerance and kindness towards strangers as 
well as a generous practice of toleration and naturalisation have contributed to an Islamic 
fundamentalist subculture in our country'. His sentiments were echoed by the former Home 
Secretary 'as the Germans and French are often pointing out, we have a larger host community 
of those who the Germans and French allege are organising for international terror.'230 
The terrorist attacks of September 200 I and July 2005 were condemned by Muslims and seen as 
violations of the Islamic teachings.23J Nonetheless, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, there 
were reports of numerous attacks on the British Muslim population.232 According to the' Islamic 
Human Rights Commission during September 2001 a total of 206 incidents of assault, violence, 
verbal and physical abuse and other forms of malicious acts were recorded in Britain'. 233 
Muslim leaders in Britain condemned the July 2005 attacks as 'utterly criminal, totally 
reprehensible and absolutely unIslamic .... absolutely no sanction in Islam ... .'.234 Nonetheless, 
Muslims were attacked and even murdered in the aftermath of t h July 2005, and' [i]slamaphobia 
::: McGoldrick D. (2005) ibid at47. 
See: Richardson (editor) (2004) islamaphobia: issues Challenges al1d Action. Trentham Books: Stoke; Morris 
(2004) 'lslamaphobia: The Making ofa Nasty British Myth', Sunday Times. 6th June, 2004. 
230 Cited in Moeckli D. (2005) 'Discriminatory profiles: law enforcement after 9/11 and 7/1', E.H.R.L.R. 2005, 5, 
517-532 at 524 
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'Muslim adults and children were attacked, physically and verbally. They were punched, spat at, hit with 
umbrellas at bus stops, publicly doused with alcohol and pelted with fruits and vegetables. Dog excrement and 
fireworks were pushed through the letterboxes and bricks were thrown through their windows. They were called 
murderers and excluded from social gatherings. One woman in Swindon was hospitalised after being beaten with a 
metal baseball bat; two Cambridge University students had their headscarves ripped off, in broad daylight outside a 
police station; Sabra Zaman, who, in July 2001, had her scarf pulled off and two of her ribs broken in Tooting, 
London was stopped and searched by the police three times in two weeks following the terrorist attacks in the USA. 
In west London, an Afghani taxi driver Hamidullah Gharwal, was attacked shortly after 11 September, and left 
paralysed from the neck down ... Vandals attacked mosques and Asian run businesses around the country. Nine 
pigs' heads were dumped outside a mosque in Exeter. Many were said not to have reported attacks because of fear 
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is blamed for [the] attack[s].'235 Similarly, folIowing the 'failed' terrorist attacks in Glasgow and 
other regions of UK, the Muslim community promptly condemned such terrorism.236 There is 
also the formulation by the British Muslims, of 'Not in Our Name' campaign, reinforcing the 
message that 'all our communities are united against terrorism' .237 
Furthermore it is asserted that there is an onslaught on British Muslims, using the religion of 
Islam to perpetuate misunderstandings and increase the hostility, it is thus viewed 'as uniquely 
evil, or uniquely backward.' The most explicit example offered is that of the British National 
Party, which issued thousands of anti-Muslim leaflets after the London bombings with a graphic 
illustration of the devastated No.30 bus. According to the BNP, multiculturalism was to 
blame.m In the weeks following July 7 it was widely reported that hate crimes against Asians 
had increased dramaticalIy,239 with increased physical attacks.240 Islamophobia, is said to have 
been 'already high before the London bombings' has been perpetuated further with the attacks. 241 
Since the London bombings, mainstream media highlighted that counter terrorism policies may 
be compromised by increased public anxiety and consequently alienate young Muslims.242 
Bunting elaborates that the official reaction to the perceived threat from Islamist terrorism will 
have a lasting impact on 'some British Muslims.,243 One participant categorically stated that he 
had "possible sympathy" for terrorism and that 'Britain can end the world's terrorism.' Int. 9. 
235 Dodd v. (2005c) 'Murder: Islamaphobia is blamed for attack'. The Guardian: London; Guardian Home Pages: 5. 
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It is argued that the government's anti terror plans, unveiled in the wake of the London 
bombings, created a perception that the war on terror was in fact a war on Islam. 244 Thus, the 
'real danger is that' of driving the 'militant' wing underground in 'suppressing' discussion on 
ideology and ultimately challenging it.245 It is imperative that the response to the terrorist threat 
does not 'compound' the 'original' terror. Declaring war, specifically global war on terrorism is in 
the views of some 'doomed to fail,' and viewed as global Islamaphobia. It not only silences those 
Muslims challenging terrorism, but also hinders community cooperation.246 
Based on the fieldwork findings, it is difficult to assess whether Islamaphobia has created 
Counter violence from within the Muslim communities, but it has created the need for more 
community cohesion. According to commentators, the 'Trojan horse' for 'multiculturalism' is that 
it promotes differences and perpetuates segregation, and is used by the right wing groups to 
promote Islamaphobia.247 The solution by Ruth Kelly, the then Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government, was to identify and promote the need for 'integration and 
cohesion', which led to the Commission on Integration and Cohesion. 248 
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It is also hoped that the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006,249 will appease some of the 
anxieties governing Islamaphobia. It has been submitted that its enactment 'provides a 
satisfactory response for religiously aggravated offences,.2so The Racial and Religious Hatred 
Act clearly signals a message that religious hatred such as islamaphobia will not be tolerated by 
the legislature, which had been reinforced in the decision of the earlier case of Norwood v UK. 25/ 
In a similar vein it is observed that the 'rise in Islamaphobia following the events of 9/11 and 
terrorist attacks since then appears to have increased the political impetus within the United 
Nations human rights bodies to adapt further resolution2s2 on combating defamation of 
religions' .253 
5.10.2 Global Islamaphobia 
The 'war on terror' declared in the global arena by the United States is seen to be unjustly 
targeting Muslims, and is a legitimate face of Islamaphobia. It is pertinent to address the issue of 
'global Islamaphobia' as it is such conceptions that have led to the empathy of the terrorist's 
cause.
2S4 The global events appear to concern the British Muslims interviewed, on the one hand 
they demonstrated respect for the British Army but believed that global terrorism and the alleged 
hatred for Muslims could be prevented. 'The Army are honorable, they are merely doing their 
jobs, like servants they follow orders, it's not their fault. I have met many [army personnel] they 
are very nice. The army are so nice and sympathetic, they themselves acknowledge that what is 
going on is wrong. [However], the UK and America can stop the terrorism. In Palestine, 
Chechnya, Kashmir, can bring about peace and extremism can then be eliminated. People are 
fighting against injustices. This suicide started ofT in Israel - in Tel Aviv, and then spread all over 
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the world. The Jews have started this, and buy people, Muslims, our people. Suicide is now 
spreading everywhere, inside Pakistan and Afghanistan.' Int. 11. 
The events of 11 th September 200 I, and subsequent terrorist attacks are atrocious crimes that 
require genuine international concern. However, there is the anxiety that such genuine 
international concern has paved the way and opened the door to random acts of abuse to those of 
Islamic faith. 'The Government is very unhelpful because of our foreign policy. We should not 
have gone to war in Iraq; we are not pushing for peace in Kashmir and other regions around the 
world. We are not the voice for the people of Kashmir. Our foreign policy is quite aggressive, 
leads to a lot of new terrorists activity within Britain and outside against the British people.' 
Int.20. 
The justification relayed by the United Kingdom Government for the invasion and occupation of 
Iraq and Afghanistan has not always been acceptable. m Indeed, 'the legal justification for 
military action ... was self-defence in anticipation of a future attack.'256 This received 'the 
unprecedented unity,257 of support258 for invasion of Afghanistan, received little criticism or 
opposition. However, this perpetuated the perceived 'misgivings' by the Muslim communities, 
who demanded 'transparency, fairness and justice in providing evidence, and absolute 
compliance with human rights standards in the case of trials and convictions.'259 
In addition, justifications for invading Iraq were discredited, further fuelling the debate that 
Muslims were being targeted unnecessarily, thereby proliferating the Islamaphobia hypothesis. 
The data analysis from the fieldwork reflected the fact 'They [the UK} should not have gone 
there; it's worse in there because of them ... Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, they can't 
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find anything. Western forces should be out of Iraq and Afghanistan, they can sort out their own 
problems.' Int.18. United Kingdom's 'interventionist,260 foreign policy specifically in relation to 
the events in Iraq and Afghanistan, perhaps more so than Kashmir, caused concern for the 
participants, 'It affects me because it's wrong, their treatment of those in Iraqi prison, and then 
those in Guantanamo. Taking innocent lives, what they are doing is wrong.' Int. 5. One 
participant stated, 'it affects me because our people, Muslims at the end of the day, killing people 
for oil.' Int. 6. Although some accepted the justifications for the present foreign policy, they 
relayed their anxiety, 'I think the British Army now that they are there, should be supported. 
They are not representative of the best people in our society; they commit acts, dealing with 
fighters, not always well behaved. But it doesn't directly affect me, I'm not particularly happy 
with it. I can't afford to worry about all the injustices in the world. It bothers me more when 
young Asians take matters into their own hands.' Int. 7. 
Furthermore, serious concerns were expressed of the Guantanamo Bay detentions. 261 It was seen 
as some, as further evidence of 'pursuing the Islamaphobia agenda' .262 The blatant disregard for 
law in denying the Guantanamo detainees their rights as dictated by the international 
humanitarian law (IHL) prompted global concerns. Nonetheless States were not 'able to stand up 
to United States ,263. This was evidenced further by the lack of 'willingness of states to intervene 
beyond the protection of their own nationals. ,264 Thus, prompted the Court of Appeal to take 'the 
unusual step of commenting on what is viewed as 'objectionable' lack of oversight by another 
Country's courts. Breaking with convention Lord Steyn condemned publicly the 'monstrous 
failure of justice' describing the military commissions as 'kangaroo courts' which 'convey the 
260 
Moran J. (200S) 'Politics, Security, Intelligence and Liberty after 9111' in Moran J. & Phythian M. (editors) 
t~tel/igence, Security and Policing Post - 9/11. I Hampshire. Pal grave MacMillan at p.15. 
Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of 
Prisoners Cif War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq during Arrest, Internment and 
Interrogation, February 2004, available at: 
~r'w.globalsecurity.orglmilitary/library/reportl2004/icre_report_iraCLfeb2004.htm. 
Rehman (2005) op cit at 22S; Islamic HRC (2003) Failure to Repatriate Britons Masks Islamaphobia Policy: 
~~ndon. 11 August 2003. 
264 Duffy H. (2005) op cit at 43S. 
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idea of a pre-ordained arbitrary rush to judgement by an irregular tribunal which makes a 
mockery of justice' .265 
Blatant disregard of international law in the Guantanamo cases served to advance and promote 
the notion of Islamaphobia. It is the concept of 'selectivity' that was alarmingly disturbing. It is 
when 'selectivity arises in the 'pick and choose' approach to which particular areas of law, or 
particular rules therein, are acknowledged as applicable ... a perception emerges of international 
law that protects 'us' but not 'them', and constrains 'them' but not 'us' .... Areas of legal 
controversy appear at times to be manipulated to obscure the law that does not govern and has, 
sometimes quite straight forwardly, been violated.'266 Thus, the 'sense of 'otherness,,267 of the 
Muslim community in the legal arena can lead to a slippery slope of disastrous consequences. If 
the fieldwork data is to be accepted that, 'nothing could motivate me to terrorism - they are 
brutes.' Int. 19., or that 'I can understand their [terrorism] cause.' Int.6, it has to be accepted that 
the divergent interpretations of Islam combined with proactive foreign policy that wishes to 
combat global terrorism may and can lead to sympathy for the terrorist cause even amongst the 
British Muslims. 
S.11 Conclusions 
British Muslims are now at the centre stage of discussions about terrorism - as are all Muslims 
worldwide.268 Islam is depicted as the religion of terror. It has been highlighted that Islam is a 
complex religion and when misinterpretated a dangerous tool used to advance the terrorist 
agenda. However when understood correctly it can be used to combat terrorism.269 In line with 
this it is argued that the 'biggest ally in tracking down the perpetrators and our only chance of 
defeating Islamist terrorism is the Muslim community itself.'27o In order to succeed in obtaining 
their co-operation, Islam and how it can be used as a recruitment aid has to be understood, 
-L • 
. ord Steyn (2003) 'Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole'. 27 F.A. Mann Lecture, 25 November 2003, cited 
~~ DutJY H. (2005) op cit at 434-435. 
261 D~~ H. (2005) op cit at 448-449. 
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which, in the words of Jon Moran, can only be achieved through 'a detailed and dispassionate 
analysis' of Islam.271 
It is further submitted that, given the complexity and the lack of consensus on jihad,272 it is 
'erroneously labeled as synonymous with aggressive war and terrorist acts. In its essence, Jihad is 
an expression of endeavour and exertion in the cause of Allah - the principle form of Jihad, 
according to the Sunna of the Prophet, being acts of persuasion as opposed to aggression or 
violence,.273 Moreover the interpretation of jihad has to be considered within the historical 
context.274 
Irrespective of whether they are practising Muslims or not, the data analysis from the fieldwork 
has yielded the general perception that British born Muslims of Kashmiri origin, seek social and 
cultural solace in trying to learn more about Islam, and in turn coupled with social isolation they 
are vulnerable to radicalization. This is not to suggest that learning about Islam will 
automatically generate terrorism, but it is about learning the true meaning of Islam. The fact that 
the Islamic law can be misinterpretated275 is the 'slippery slope'. Int.27. 
Perhaps there is some credit to the assertion that 'each time there is an atrocity or outrage, 
Muslims are expected to apologise as if each and everyone is somehow compJicit'. 276 However, 
it is submitted that it is imperative that the community - the Muslim community - especially 
those leaders in the mosques and other teaching institutions, enforce and reinforce firmly the 
simple fact that Islam condemns such violations of terrorism;277 Condemnation does not equate 
to complicity, it is a duty. As Bux observes, effective counter-terrorism involves being able 'to 
manage or limit the 'lure' or pull of recruitment'.278 Indeed, 'legal controls perform only 
cosmetic functions, or merely treat symptoms, unless structural grievances are also addressed. ,279 
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Thus, it has been challenged and submitted both by the fieldwork data and academic 
commentary that Islamic law does not condone terrorism; indiscriminate killings and suicide are 
violations of Islam. Nonetheless it is perpetually misinterpreted and distorted to suit individual 
agendas. It has been further demonstrated that if understood 'rationally' Islamic law is 
compatible with Western values of democracy and human rights and must be applied in 
conjunction with international human rights. Importantly it is further submitted that those 
fighting 'terror' are also under an obligation to preserve the rule of law. One of the major 
consequences of 11th September 2001, is Islamaphobia and the blatant disregard and disrespect 
for law as evidenced by the treatment of the Guantanamo detainees. There presently exists 'the 
myth that certain persons lie entirely outside the protection of the law, propagated in the context 
of Guantanamo Bay [and elsewhere] - stem at least in large part from a fragmented approach to 
the legal framework and a failure to appreciate or recognise the diverse sources of legal 
protection applicable in anyone situation. ,280 Hence, the imperative necessity, of ensuring that 
the rule of law is perpetually preserved in order to succeed in suppressing terrorists and their 
atrocious acts. In the words of one participant, 'the only way we will achieve long lasting results 
against terrorism is to relay to the Muslim people that our laws protect everyone including 
Muslims.' Int. 7. Thus, the subsequent chapters will consider the counter terrorism policies and 
legislation. 
280 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Terrorism POlicing Laws and the British Kashmiri Muslim Community 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters focused on concepts around terrorism, and the research findings on 
these issues. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the participants' views in relation to 
counter terrorism policing. In considering policing powers and their perceived impact, insight 
into the selected community's relationship with the police is assessed. Their broader perceptions 
of the police will invariably affect their views on counter terrorism policies and legislation, as 
police are the 'gatekeepers' ofthe criminal justice system and indeed the front line agency for the 
administration of the anti terrorism legislation. 
The unprecedented nature of contemporary terrorism has focused the limelight firmly on Muslim 
majority communities. It is the aim of this thesis and this chapter to contribute, to the ongoing 
'understanding of terrorism'. 1 Indeed, it is via this aim of understanding contemporary terrorism 
that the government's policies and legislation can become effective and legitimate. 
Understanding is therefore interlinked to views and perceptions. This chapter will examine the 
effectiveness of anti-terrorism policing in general, and specifically in relation to the selected 
sample of British Kashmiri Muslims. 
The chapter will commence by outlining and analyzing the foundation of the executive's policies, 
namely CONTEST and especially its strands of Pursue and Prevent. Subsequent discussion will 
focus on policing of the counter terrorism legislation, preceded by discussion on counter 
terrorism and its role in neighbourhood policing. The discussion on neighbourhood policing will 
highlight its pivotal role in implementing the Prevent policies and agenda. The consequences of 
anti terrorism policing will be examined in light of the fieldwork data. 
There is no doubt that 7 July 2005 shifted the focus of counter terrorism from 'foreign bogeymen' 
to 'home - grown jihadis,.2 Thus, it accentuated the need to identify and respond to 'neighbour 
I Forst B. (2009) Terrorism. Crime and Public Policy. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge at 22. 
2 Walker C. & Rehman J. (2011) 'Prevent Responses to Jihadi Extremism' in Ramraj V. et al.. (editors) Global Anti-
Terrorism Law and Policy. Second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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terrorists.'3 Indeed it was reported by Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the then head of the MI5, 
that in November 2006, there were sixteen hundred individuals that are potential threat to 
national security from the 'enemy within.,4 The 'enemy within' was elaborated by the then Home 
Secretary, John Reid; he cautioned Muslim parents that children were in danger of being 
indoctrinated by 'radicals'.s Irrespective of how it is viewed, 'the presence of jihadis in 
neighbourhoods ... inevitably impels the state to refocus on the communities.,6 It is the aim of 
this chapter to assess the effectiveness of this policing 'focus' and consider any consequences for 
policing of this 'focus' on the Muslim community interviewed. 
6.2 CONTEST 
In response to the international and national terrorist atrocities such as the London bombings in 
JUly 2005, the government implemented in addition to the legislation, a policy 'to win over the 
'hearts and minds,7 of young, Muslims in Britain away from the 'extremist narrative,.,8 This 'soft', 
non-legislative strategy was part of CONTEST, composed of well defined tactics, referred to as 
Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. 
The rationale for CONTEST's 'elevated importance' is perpetuated by the illusive and 
'secretive' nature of the terrorism threat. 9 The CONTEST agenda focuses on international 
terrorism, but under the National Policing Plan 2005-08, and section 79 of the Police Reform and 
Social Responsibility Act 2011, domestic terrorism is also 'an overarching imperative.' 10 The 
3 Walker C. (2009b) 'Neighbour terrorism and the all risks policing ofterrorism.' Journal 0/ National Security Law 
and Policy 2009,3: 121. See also: Walker C. (2008) 'Know thine enemy as thyself: Discerning friend from foe 
under anti - terrorism laws.' 32. Melbourne Law Review 275. 
4 The Times, November 10,2006 at p.l; see also Walker C. & Rehman J. (2011) op cit, 
S The Times September 21, 2006 at p.6. John Reid is quoted: ' ... watch for signs of brainwashing in their children 
by radicals grooming them to kill themselves to murder others ... Look for tell - tale signs now and talk to them 
~efore their hatred grows and you risk losing them for ever.' 
7 Walker C. & Rehman J. (20 11) op cit. 
This dates back to Malaya conflict, where General Templar stated in 1952: 'The answer lies not in pouring more 
troops into the jungle, but in the hearts or minds ofthe Malayan people.' see: Dixon P. (2009) 'Hearts and minds? 
British counter - insurgency from Malaya to Iraq.' Journal a/Strategic Studies, 32:353; Stubbs R. (1989) Hearts and 
Minds in Guerilla Waifare. Singapore: Oxford University Press; Sunderland R. (\964) Winning the Heal1s and 
Minds a/the People: Malaya 1948.1960. Santa Monica: RAND. 
I Kundnani A. (2009) Spooked How not to prevent violent extremism. London: Institute of Race Relations, at p.1 O. 
9 Walker C. (2011) Terrorism and the Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press at p.7-9; Walker C. (2008b) 'The 
Pursuit of Terrorism with Intelligence', in Moran J. & Phythian M. (2008) (editors) Intelligence, SecU/'ity and 
folicing Post- 911 J. The UK's response to the 'War on Terror '. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan at 54. 
o Home Office (2004), London. Para: 1.3; Walker C. (20\ I) op cit at 9. 
145 
goal of CONTEST is 'to reduce the risk from international terrorism, so that people can go about 
their daily lives freely and with confidence.' 11 The European Union has implemented policies 
that mirror the goals of CONTEST,12 and the Council of European Union, albeit under the 
British Presidency in 2005, implemented the European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy, 
namely, 'To combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, 
allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice. ,\3 In its third edition of 
CONTEST, the government reiterated its initial aims of 'reducing the risk' of terrorism. 14 Of the 
four 'P's discussed in CONTEST, the purpose of this chapter is to consider the traditional Pursue 
and the contemporary Prevent, as understood by the participants interviewed. The community's 
views are core to the chapter. However, prior to that discussion, it is important to distinguish 
between the strands of policing Pursue and policing Prevent. 
6.3 Counter Terrorism Legislation and PURSUE 
Pursue emphasises 'the importance of intelligence gathering,'15 and encompasses the arrest and, 
prosecution of terrorism under the counter terrorism legislation. Pursue is not a new policing for 
the United Kingdom state. Nevertheless, irrespective of its solid foundation in counter terrorism 
law, 'new terrorism' has launched an opulence of legislation to address this threat, especially Anti 
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001; the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; the Terrorism 
Act 2006; and the Counter Terrorism Act 2008.16 Whether these are wise pre-emptive 
measures,17 or unnecessary incursions into civil liberties are acute questions. I g Qualitative 
11 Home Office (2009) 'Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The UK's Strategy for Countering International 
~errorism.' Cm. 7547, London, at para 0.17. 
Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism, 21 September 2001, updated in 2004, 2005, 2007: SN 140/01,7906/04, 
10586/04, 16090/04, 980911/05, 7233107; Action Plan on Radicalisation and Recruitment 2005 (COM (2005) 0313 flnal , 14781105, 14782/05. 
14469/05, Strasbourg, 2005 at p.2. Subsequent 6 monthly reports of the Counter Terrorism Coordinator on the 
Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism. (980911105,14734/1/05,15704/05,9589/06, 
15266/06,9666/07, 15411107,9416/08, 14862108, 15912108,9715/09, 15538/09) and the EU Counter - Terrorism 
Strategy - discussion paper (15359/09). See also: Walker C. (2011) op cit at 10. 
14 HM Government (201Ib) CONTEST. The UK's Strategy for Countering Terrorism. July 2011. Cm 8123. 
IS Walker C. (2011) Terrorism and the Law. Oxford: OUP at 8; see also Walker C. (2006) 'Intelligence and Anti 
terrorism legislation in the UK.' Crime, Law & Social Change, 44: 387; Gill P. (2009) 'Security Intelligence and 
~uman rights.' Intelligence and National Security. 24, 78. 
My then G., Walklate S., & Khan F. (2009) "I'm a Muslim, but I'm not Terrorist: Victimization, Risky Identities 
and the Performance of Safety." Brit. J. Criminal. 2009,49,736-754. 
17 Walker C. (2008e) "Keeping Control of Terrorists without LOSing Control of Constitutionalism." Stanford Law 
ReView, 2008 59' 1395-8 13 ,. • 
Vaughan B. & Kilcommins S. (2007) Terrorism, Rights and the Rule of law. Devon: Willan. 
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research about persons that this legislation may impact on the most, such as the British Muslims, 
remains deficient. 19 To overcome this deficiency, the views of the British Kashmiri Muslims will 
be utilised in this chapter to identity their opinions on Pursue as based in the said legislation. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to consider every aspect of the anti terrorism legislation, and the 
focus will be narrowed to areas of policing under counter terrorism legislation identified by the 
participants in the fieldwork. 
Some aspects of the Pursue element of CONTEST and the legislation accompanying it are rife 
with contention. This discord is reflected by the belief outlined by some of the fieldwork 
Participants that the legislation surrounding the counter terrorism policing has been 'rushed 
through, It's directed towards the latest form of terrorism, yet [terrorism] existed hundred plus 
years.' lnt. 2. The crucial basis of discontent is addressed to the legislature's front line: the police, 
'Law - police is taking advantage of it. They stop and search under suspicion, they given 
extended powers to arrest. It's wrong and then imprison for two to three weeks. People are in 
American jails - that Guantanamo Bay - they have no trial - it's wrong. They use the same laws 
against Kashmiris in Britain - it's wrong.' Int. 12. The research data revealed that the British 
Kashmiri Muslim community interviewed had significant apprehensions related to certain 
Pursue - orientated aspects of counter terrorism policing legislation, and these will be addressed, 
namely: police discretion, stop and search powers, arrest and detention, and airport policing. 
6.3.1 Police Discretion and Stop and Search 
There is no doubt that contemporary policing is faced with 'contradictory and problematic 
aspects,20 that not only threaten the image of policing but also the national security agenda, via 
its overuse of counter terrorism powers. In the analysis of counter-terrorism policing, David 
Anderson observed that some aspects of policing have perpetuated 'resentment' amongst the 
Muslim communities.21 Abuse or overuse of their dual role of engaging with the community and 
enforcing counter terrorism legislation by the police will inevitably result in 'smashing some of 
19 
li:0me Office (2010) 'What perceptions do the UK public have concerning the impact of counter terrorism 
legislation implemented since 20007' March 2010, Occasional Paper 88. London: Crown copyright. DST1, and 
~Ythen G., Walklate S. & Khan F. (2009) op cit at 736-754. 
Anderson D. (QC) (2012) The Terrorism Acts in 2011 Report o/the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the 
,!:el'rorism Act 2000 and Part I o/the Terrorism Act 2006. June 2012, London: HMSO. 
Anderson D. (QC) (2012) The Terrorism Acts in 2011 Report o/the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 o/the Terrorism Act 2006. June 2012, London: HMSO, para 8.28 at p.96. 
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the good work done to improve police - community relations.'22 In assessing the relationship 
between counter terrorism strategies and British Muslims in Greater London, other scholarly 
research has found that increased or perceived unnecessary police interventions led to less co-
operation with the pOlice?3 Moreover the same research found that when a community as a 
whole was targeted by the police, the reaction differed to that of individuals being targeted by the 
police. The perceived targeting or 'harassment' of the community had a negative impact on their 
relationship with the police. It undermined co-operation with the police.24 Indeed, history has 
established that police's use of (non - terrorism) stop and search powers have led to deterioration 
in community relationships. This form of contentious policing practice led to several official 
investigations including the Scarman Inquiry25 and the Macpherson Inquiry.26 It would appear 
that irrespective of lengthy arguments aiming to curtail police powers, the stop and search 
powers are extended, most recently by the Terrorism Act 2000, section 44. Section 47 A under 
the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 has now replaced section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, 
and has curtailed the powers in law and practice. However, it is noteworthy that at the time of the 
research, section 44 was valid, and the participants talked of the policing powers that were of use 
at that time. 
The police are in unique position where the 'freedom or authority to make judgments and to act 
as one sees tit'27 is accorded to the highest degree at the bottom rank of policing. This has 
prompted Lustgarten28 to assert that 'in taking the sort of decision that is the quintessence of their 
work, the police are guided by virtually no legal standards at all.' However, others argue that 
police discretion is necessary as the nature of the law and their role requires 'flexibility and 
highly personal subjective judgments.'29 Thus, legislation, namely the Police and Criminal 
22 Thiel D. (2009) "Good cop, bad cop?" Public Service Review: Home Affairs 20; see also: McDonald B. & Mir Y. 
(2011) "AI-Qaida influences violent extremism. UK government prevention policy and community engagement." 
{ournal 0/ Aggression, Coriflict and Peace Research Jan. 2011, 3(1) 32-44. 
] Huq A.Z. Tyler T.R. & Schulhofer S. J. (2011) "Mechanisms for Eliciting Co-operation in Counterterrorism 
Policing: Evidence From the UK." Journal o/Empirical Legal Studies 8:4; 728-761. December 2011 at 750. 
24 ibid at 742 and 748 25 • 
2 Scarman. Lord (1981) The Brixton Disorders April /0-/2/98/: Report o/an Enquiry. London: HMSO. 
6 Macpherson, W. (1999) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Repo/'t o/an Inquiry by Sir Wil/iam Macpherson 0/ 
~/uny. London: Home Office Publications. 
The definition of DISCRETION in Coli ins Dictionary (1992) Third edition. Aylesbury: Harper Coli ins Publishers. 
28 Lustgarten (1986) cited in Fielding N.G. (1991) The Police and Social Conflict: Rhetoric and Reality. London: 
Ti'e Athlone Press. p.120-130. 
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Evidence Act 198430 was implemented to provide boundaries or 'safeguards' both for the police 
and the public it serves. However, the 'elasticity' of discretion under the notion of reasonable 
suspicion is elevated by PACE's reluctance to define discretion. The basis of this framework, 
was on the recommendation of the Philips Commission31 which 'acknowledge the risk that the 
criterion could be loosely interpreted .. .' It concluded that discretion is necessary for effective 
policing and stated: 'Like others before us we have concluded that the variety of circumstances 
that would have to be covered makes this [defining discretion] impracticable.,32 
In line with the above discussion, the broadness of stop and search powers, and the police's 
discretion may have a counter-productive effect on their implementation of the Prevent strategy. 
Hence, police discretion allows for extraneous factors to become operative such as race or 
religion. Despite the safeguards of PACE, street policing is difficult to control and oversee; the 
even wider discretion allowed by the counter terrorism legislation alongside Pursue cause the 
potentially acute dangers of discrimination. The implications for policing will be elaborated via 
discussion on the counter terrorism powers and policing. 
6.3.2 Stop and Search under the Terrorism Ad 2000 
The Terrorism Act 2000 was implemented to avoid the 'ill considered, ill-defined panic 
legislation.'33 Its primary purpose was to enshrine a permanent anti-terrorism code which is 
consistent with respect for human rights without the need for derogation. In the Government's 
'Inquiry into legislation against Terrorism,'34 Lord Lloyd identified the imperative need for 
equilibrium between liberty and security. Lord Lloyd recommended that 
'i. Legislation against terrorism should approximate as closely as possible to the ordinary 
criminal law and procedure; ii. Additional statutory offences and powers may be justified, but 
only if they are necessary to meet the anticipated threat. They must then strike the right 
balance between the needs of security and the rights and liberties of the individual; jji. The 
30 
31 Hereafter referred to as PACE. 
The Philips Commission (1981) Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Report. (Cmnd 8092) HMSO: 
London. 
:: Ibid at Para. 3.25. 
Walker C. (2006b) "Clamping Down on TelTorism in the UK." Journal of International Criminal Justice 4 (2006), 
1137-1151 at 1142 34 • 
(1996) Command Paper 3420: London. 
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need for additional safeguards should be considered alongside any additional powers; iv. The 
law should comply with the UK's obligations in internationallaw.'35 
Nevertheless, based on the premise that 'public safety demands earlier intervention,'36 the 
Terrorism Act 2000, sections 44 - 47 give police the power to a 'random or blanket search.'37 
Despite the fact that this legislation has now been repealed, the subsequent discussion on section 
44 is relevant as the interviewees talked of the policing law at the time. Section 44 also reveals 
the consequences it has had on their perception of the counter terrorism police and their 
relationship with the police.38 
Section 45(l)(b) stated the broadness of the power, which 'may be exercised whether or not the 
constable has grounds for suspecting ... ' Since there is no application of 'reasonable suspicion' 
when utilising this power, Walker has 'doubts' as to whether the guidelines issued for reasonable 
suspicion in PACE will apply.39 
Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 could only be authorised by a senior police officer because 
it is considered to be 'expedient for the prevention of acts ofterrorism.'4o Its authorisations can be 
in force for up to twenty eight days,41 but the Home Secretary had to confirm the authorisation 
within forty eight hours of its implementation.42 This power of blanket stop and search was 
utilised throughout the UK, especially in the Metropolitan Police area where there were 
continuous authorizations from 2001 to 2009. It accumulated 8,550 searches in 2001-02, a rate 
which increased to 44543 stop and searches in the year 2005-06.43 Search was not limited to 
vehicles, and pedestrians stopped under Terrorism Act rose from 946 in 2001-2 to 19064 in 
35 Ibid at 3.1: Lord L1oyd. 
36 House of Commons Affairs Committee, 4th Report of Session 2005-06: Terrorism Detention Powers; HC 910 - I, 
54. 
37 Walker C. (2009) Blackstone's Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation. Second edition. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press at 168. 
:: Anderson D. (2011) "The independent review ofterrorism legislation" E. H. R. L. R 2011, 5, 544-551. 
40 Walker C. (2009) op cit at 169. 
41 8.44(3) Terrorism Act 2000. 
8.46(2) ibid 42 • 
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43 M .. 
Inlstry of Justice (2007) Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 2006. London: HMSO. 
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2005_6.44 Alanningly, 'there is a fear of the transposition of terrorism powers more widely than is 
proper.'45 Walker illustrates this with examples of the 82 year old Waiter Wolfgang, who was 
stopped under section 44 because he tried to re-enter the Labour Party's 2005 conference; and of 
Nicholas Gawbert undergoing a diabetic 'attack' was 'tasered' on a bus because he appeared to be 
acting 'strangely',46 (and he was white). 
The flexibility of these powers was re-affinned by the judiciary. In R (on the application of 
Gil/an) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner,47 the courts received the opportunity to evaluate 
section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. This case involved two applicants, who were heading 
towards an arms fair in London. They were stopped and searched under section 44; since nothing 
unlawful or incriminating was found, approximately half an hour later they were released. Their 
application for judicial review was rejected by the District Court and the Court of Appeal. Their 
appeals were also dismissed by the House of Lords. The significance of this case is that the 
powers under section 44 were held to be lawful by the national courts. In addition it was held 
that such powers did not contravene the right to liberty under Article 5 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights.48 Lord Bingham referred to the stop and search as no more than 
being 'kept from proceeding or kept waiting.'49 
Equally significant is that this case acknowledged the limitations of section 44 safeguards, and 
Lord Brown observed that it is 'clearly open to abuse.'50 Although neither of the applicants 
belonged to an ethnic minority, the issue of 'discrimination' and racial profiling was considered, 
'What then if it is found that the police are using the section 44 power more frequently to stop 
Asians than other racial groups in the community?'S! The fact that three out of the five Lordships 
felt it pertinent to address the issue of discrimination highlights the problem of prejudice in 
POlicing. It was stressed that '[ e lthnic origin ... can and properly should be taken into account in 
deciding whether and whom to stop and search provided always that ... the selection is made for 
44 Ibid. 
45 
Walker C. (2009) op cit at 170. 
46 Ibid. 
47 [ 
48 2006] 2 AC 307, thereafter referred to as the Gil/an case. 
ECHR. 
49 
R (on the application o/Gilfan) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2006] 2 AC 307, at 25. 
so Ibid at 74. 
SI 
Per Lord Hope ibid at 43. 
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reasons connected with the perceived terrorist threat and not on grounds of racial 
discrimination.'s2 Commentary on racial selection was further elaborated to incorporate 'other 
further reasons for doing SO.'S3 In coming to this decision, Lord Hope referred to the Roma Rights 
case
S4 
which held that it was discriminatory when 'all Roma were being treated in the same way 
simply because they were Roma. ,ss 
It has been submittedS6 that the 'further factors test' justifies police discrimination. Thus under its 
premise the police could 'stop and search say, all Asian males,' using gender as the 'further 
factor'.s7 However, Gil/an contributes to the ongoing debate that it is 'inevitable ... that so long 
as the principal terrorist risk against which use of the section 44 power has been authorised is 
that from al Qaeda, a disproportionate number of those stopped and searched will be of Asian 
appearance.'S8 Aside from the argument that not all Asians are Muslims, and not all Muslims are 
terrorists,59 'there is not a consistent profile to help identify who may be vulnerable to 
radicalisation.'6o The use of stop and search powers under section 44 had 'increased the level of 
distrust of our police; it has created the deeper racial and ethnic tensions against the police ... it 
has cut off valuable sources of community information and intelligence.'61 The research data 
compiled for this thesis elaborated and continuously reiterated these concerns, 'I don't think that 
there should be too much law. Security agencies should deal with it. Now filmiest evidence 
police involved, even when with no evidence.' lnt. 8. 
The Gillan case clearly highlighted the domestic judiciary's support for section 44, however its 
view was not endorsed by the European Court of Human Rights. In Gillan & Quinton v UK,62 it 
was held that not only do the section 44 powers contravene Article 8, but they were also deemed 
:: Per Lord Brown, ibid at 81. 
Per Lord Hope, ibid at 45. 
54 R (European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport (United Nations High Commissioner 
{~r Refugees Intervening) [2005] 2 WLR 1, 46. 
S6 Per Lord Hope in the GiIlan case op cit at 45. 
Moeckli D. (2007) "Stop and Search under the Terrorism Act 2000: A comment on R (Gillan) v Commissioner of 
f,oJice for the Metropolis." M.L.R 2007. 70(4). 654-679. 
lbid at 665. 
:: Gil/an op cit at 42 & 88. 
60 Walker C. (2009) op cit; Moeckli D. (2007) op cit. 
61 Report of the Qfficial Account of the Bombings in London on 7 July 2005, HC 1087 at 31. 
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2004) Written Evidence: Memorandum submitted by the 
'tetropolitan Police Allthority. 8 July 2004, HC 866 - i. 
(2010) 50 EHRR 45. 
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'neither sufficiently circumscribed, nor subject to adequate legal safeguards against abuse. ,63 
Nevertheless there are limits to this judgment. Stop and search without reasonable suspicion has 
not been ruled out, as confirmed by Austin v United Kingdom. 64 In this case it was held that it is 
necessary to stop and search without reasonable suspicion, especially where the police 
authorities consider it crucial to prevent 'serious injury or damage. ,65 Similarly Colon v The 
Netherlandi6 it was held that stop and search is justified without reasonable suspicion on the 
basis that the officer has sufficient grounds to search. Accordingly the domestic courts in R (on 
the application of Roberts) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolos;s,67 held that a search 
was valid without reasonable suspicion. Although this case involved section 60 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the facts of the case could be applied under the counter 
terrorism policing. R boarded a bus without the means to pay the fare. She offered a false name 
and address to the bus Inspector, and subsequently to a police officer. She further falsely stated 
that she had no identification. The constable conducted a search, despite R's resistance, of her 
handbag. R contended that such a stop and search violated articles 5 and 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It was held that the search was justified despite the lack of 
reasonable suspicion, a 'good reason for search' was sufficient.68 
Thus the police still have to address the 'Herculean,69 task of balancing due process and ensuring 
the safety of the nation.7o Indeed the Lords' in their decision in Gil/an have openly disturbed the 
fragile balance of due process and national security to uphold the police's powers. In Oil/an, they 
have send an alarming signal that domestic courts will tolerate and overlook human rights, such 
as liberty in preference for national security.7! 
63 Dennis 1. (2011) "Editorial- Counter Terrorism" Crim. L.R. 2011,3,175-176; see also Cm. 8003. TSO. 2011. 
: (39692109); (2012) 55 E. H. R. R. 14; [2012] Cri m L.R. 544; Times, March 26, ~012. 
Judgement ofTulkens J. See also: "Positive or Neutral Judicial Treatment. Austm v UK (39692/09) European 
~ourt of Human Rights. 15 March 2012. Case Analysis." 
67 App No. 49458/06 (2012) 55 E.H.R.R SE5. 
(QBD) (Administrative Court) 2012; [2012] EWHC 1977. 
68 Ibid at para. 21. 
69 Dworkin R. (1986) Law's Empire, at 239, cited in MacAmhlaigh C (2010) op cit. 
70 Longstaff A. & Graham 1. (2008) "Anti-terrorism and police powers: should we be concerned?" Criminal Justice 
Matters, 73(1), 15-16. 
71 MacAmhlaigh C. (2010) 'Case Comment. Revisting the rule of law under the ECHR: Gillan and Quinton v 
United Kingdom.' Edin L.R. 2010. 14(3). 477-482 at 482. 
153 
The academic commentary following the European Court's decision amplifies the debate that the 
British courts' priority of national security supersedes the need for justice in terrorism policing. 
Andrew Ashworth comments on the dismissive nature of the English courts, and that it took 
Strasbourg to concur with Walker72 that twenty to thirty minutes detention by the police under 
section 44, is indeed 'deprivation ofliberty.t13 
However, others have argued that in coming to its decision, the European Court failed to address 
crucial, imperative issues that are encountered exclusively in counter terrorism.74 Buxton's paper 
submits that the European Court declined to consider the underlying reasons for the anti 
terrorism legislation. There was the lack of balance of consequences of the pre-emptive policing 
and the crime itself, namely terrorism. In Buxton's opinion, terrorism differs from crime in 
general, and thus the balance addressed by Lord Brown in the House of Lords decision was 
erroneously overlooked by the European Court. In addition, the inference under Article 8 was not 
balanced by the underlying reason for section 44.75 In turn, Buxton, suggests, 'that a court 
administering a living instrument, whose jurisprudence in other areas professes significant 
respect for the policy and political decisions of Member States, should at least debate what is at 
stake before dismantling a major part of a state's terrorism legislation.'76 Nevertheless it is 
noteworthy that Buxton's stance was not endorsed by the Government, who on reflecting on 
Gillan then abolished section 44. 
While the Gillan & QUinton's judgmene7 is embraced by some, however on closer scrutiny it has 
alarmed others. Just as academics and senior judges ponder over policing powers under the 
Terrorism Act 2000, so do the participants of the British Kashmiri Muslim community. Whilst 
some believe that the law is excessive, others state: 'We have a responsible government. I try not 
to get involved with groups that come close to limits of the law. But as one of the young males 
that could be a threat to this country, I have not experienced any adverse affects from 
government, police or British society. I am proud of this country and its press for not reacting too 
;2 2006, Crim. L.R. 751. 
3 Ashworth A. (2010) "Case Comment. Gillan & Quinton v UK: human rights - Article 5 - stop and search as 
deprivation of liberty." Crim. L.R 2010, 415-419. 
74 Buxton R. (2010) "Case Comment. Terrorism and the European Convention." Crim. L. R. 2010,7,533-542. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid at 536. 
71 
Buxton R. (2010) op cit at 533-542. 
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strongly to the heinous crimes committed by the London bombings.' Int. 7. In the light of that 
forgiving attitude, there might be some hope that the implementation of section 47 A, which 
fOllowed the fieldwork for this thesis, will allay some community concerns. 
Section 47A offers a higher threshold for its use, than its predecessor section 44. The Code of 
Practice issued for Section 47A identifies 'reasonable suspicion' in broad terms.78 It states that the 
grounds used for reasonable suspicion should be based on objectivity and each case should be 
considered on its individual merits, namely on 'intelligence' and 'information'. It is emphasised 
that 'generalisations' and 'stereotypical images' are to be avoided,79 and paragraph 4.9.3 of the 
Code elaborates on possible justifications for the use of section 47 A, it identifies the conditions 
for arrest: physical demography, the individual's mannerisms, 'clothing' and 'carried items'. Thus, 
as indicated further on in the Code, this is 'to promote public confidence' and, if necessary, 
community members should be able to examine the documentation for the use of individual 
section 47A powers.so This Code attempts to create safeguards and creates a higher threshold for 
the use of section 47 A, but individual officer's discretion prevails.81 It has been recommended 
that the Code needs to elaborate to incorporate a comprehensive guideline on the individual 
officer's discretion. 82 
The authorisation for section 47A stop and search can only be undertaken by the authority of a 
senior police officer who 'reasonably suspects that an act of terrorism will take place', and that 
such an action 'is necessary to prevent such an act.' In addition the senior authorizing police 
officer stipulates the timing and the geographical area which the powers under section 47 A 
cover. The order must still be confirmed by the Secretary of State within forty eight hours. The 
duration of the powers cannot now exceed the maximum of fourteen days; renewals must be on 
the basis of further evidence or intelligence.83 It is hoped that such a 'correction' in 'favour of 
78 Home Office (2012) Code of Practice (England, Wales and Scotland) for the Exercise of Stop and Search Powers 
under Section 43 and 43A of the Terrorism Act 2000 and The Authorisation and Exercise of Stop and Search 
Powers relating to Section 47A of, and Schedule 6B to, the Terrorism Act 2000. London: HMSO. May 2012, at para. 
3.4.1. 
79lbid. 
:0 Ibid at para, 5.5.3. 
I Anderson D. (QC) (2011) Report on the Operation in 2010 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and of Part I of the 
~errorism Act 2006. London: HMSO. July 2011, at p.7. 
83 Ibid at p.74. 
Anderson D. (2011) op cit at pp.65-66. 
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liberty' will appease the tensions created by section 44.84 However, the lasting impact of section 
44 may require time to subsidy and ultimately restore the Muslim community's confidence in the 
police. 
Despite the replacement of section 44 by section 47A, it remains important to consider the 
decade-long effects of section 44 and how they may have 'had a lasting impact on individuals.'85 
Parmar's qualitative research reveals that those arrested under section 44, were of the opinion 
that they were selected because of their 'Muslim' appearance, and their Asian heritage.86 The 
consistent belief held by Parmar's participants that they are unfairly targeted led to 'social and 
political disenfranchisement.'87 Parmar asserted that section 44 powers did indeed change the 
individual's perceptions of the criminal justice system and in particular policing, thereby 
undermining community relationships, and alienating the very individuals whose co-operation is 
crucial for effective counter terrorism operations.88 As Parmar acknowledges such permanent 
and lasting memories of section 44 will not be easily amended or healed by section 47 A's 
slightly milder approach. 89 
In assessing perceptions of the UK public 'concerning the impact of counter terrorism legislation 
implemented since 2000', the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory for the Office of 
Security and Counter Terrorism, in its quantative study found 'negative perceptions to be most 
prevalent in Muslim communities who articulate feelings of being viewed as 'guilty until proven 
innocent,.'90 Of all the groups, they found that 'Muslims in particular reported concern that the 
proposal to increase pre-charge detention periods to 42 days might be used to harass innocent 
84 
8S Anderson D. (2011) op cit at p.71. 
Parmar A. (2011) "Stop and Search in London: counter-terrorist or counter-productive." Policing and Society 
~1:4, December 2011, 369-382 at 371. 
87 Ibid at 375-376. 
Ibid at 377 88 • 
It has been argued that racial prejudice exists within the police community: see: The Philips Commission (1981) 
op cit at 954; Bowling B. & Philips c. (2002) Racism, Crime and Justice. London: Longman; House of Commons 
Home Affairs Committee (2007) Young Black People and the Criminal Justice System. Second Report of Session: 
2006-07. Vot. 1. London: TSO; Dowds L. & Young J. (1996) British Social Attitudes Survey. London: Dartmouth at 
47;. Hall S., Lewis G., & McLoughlin E. (1998) The Report on Racial Stereotyping. Milton Keynes: Open 
Umversity; Bowling B. (1999) Violent Racism Oxford: Oxford University Press; Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (1997) Winning the Race: PoliCing Plural Communities. HMIC Thematic inspection Report on Police 
~ommunity and Race Relations. London: Home Office. 
90 Ibid at 379-380. 
J:lome Office (2010) 'What perceptions do the UK public have concerning the impact of counter terrorism 
legislation implemented since 20007' March 2010, Occasional Paper 88. London: Crown copyright. DSTl at p.19 
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Muslims.'91 In addition 'a populous poll carried out in June 2006 using a sample of 1,131 
Muslims', found that 47 per cent of Muslims believed that counter terrorism legislation was 
being used 'unfairly' on Muslim communities, in comparison to 34 per cent who believed that 
they were applied fairly towards Muslims.92 
In addition, it has been found that '[i]n the police service there is a distinct tendency for officers 
to stereotype people. That creates problems in a number of area, . . . Discrimination and 
unfairness are the result.'93 BBC journalist Mark Daly, in his covert recordings, highlighted that 
racism was prevalent even four years after the Macpherson findings, and that the attitude of the 
police is reflected in their practice.94 The Ministry of Justice in 200995 confirmed the 
disproportionately high number of stop and search powers applied to persons of black and Asian 
ethnicity, with the former eight times more likely, the latter more than twice likely than white 
people to be impacted. 96 
In light of this data it has been argued that, 
'[t]he blunt reality, more than a decade after Macpherson and several years after the reforms 
were implemented, is that aggregate - measured levels of disproportionality for grounds 
based searches have not improved. Moreover, compared to the late 1990s, the situation has 
become worse for black and Asian people. The relative chances of people in these groups 
b . . hi' d ,97 emg searched, compared to whites, ave apparent y mcrease . 
Miller's research does not sustain that schemes such as Neighbourhood Policing may have 
assisted in reducing some of the disproportionality. This would suggest that mutual 
understanding created by community engagement has the potential to decrease the police's 
91 lbid at 19. 
92 Ibid at 29. 
93 Macpherson W. (1999) op cit at 32. It was concluded that the police is "collective failure of an organisation to 
provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be 
~een or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, 
Ifnorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people." at 6.34. 
9 BBC documentary (2003) The Secret Policeman. One officer is reported to have said, "Like around here ifthere's 
a car full of black people or a car full of Asians you pull it because we have got no, we have got no really ethnic 
minorities round here, you can guarantee it will be full ofshit coming across to rob or do something." 
9S Statistics an Race and the Criminal Justice System 200718: A Ministry of Justice Publication under section 95 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1991. London: Ministry of Justice. 
96 Miller J. (2010) "Stop and Search in England: a reformed tactic or business as usual." Brit. J. Criminal. 2010, 
~P(5), 954-974. 
Ibid at 968. 
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prejudice that results in disproportionate use of stop and search, and increase the awareness that 
over-usage of such powers will lead to disengagement of the community. 
6.3.3 The Pre-Crime Justification 
Lord Carlile of Berriew8 endorsed the enhancement of the stop and search powers bestowed on 
the police by the Terrorism Act 2000. Their extension is advocated on anticipatory grounds, 
namely that the police must be able to proceed or 'intervene' prior to the actual crime - 'before a 
terrorist act is committed.,99 Lord L10yd of Berwick advised that counter terrorism required 'pre-
crime' legislation. 100 The government has also asserted the need for such pre-emptive steps: 'to 
avoid is the situation where at a later point, people turn around and say: If you'd only been 
vigilant as you should have been, we could have averted a terrorist attack.,101 This justification 
was endorsed and advocated by the Metropolitan Police Anti terrorist Branch following the July 
2005 bombings. lo2 
However, these necessary new ways of policing have caused concern not only for the members 
of the British Kashmiri Muslim community, but also for academic commentators. It is argued 
that the anti terrorism legislation has implemented the 'politics of pre emption [that] go beyond 
the established language and techniques of risk.,lOl This dilution of due process is perpetuated by 
the additional duty of safeguarding national security for the police. Criminal justice had its roots 
in processing impartiality and separation from politics, whereas national security is administered 
by the elected executives, namely the government. The creation of the 'hybrid' system has 
98 
Report on the Operation in 2004 o/the Terrorism Act 2000, at 
http://www.statewatch.orglnews/200s/may/terrorism-act-2004-rep.pdf. last visited on 10 March 2011. 
99 Ibid at 20; see also Lord Lloyd of Berwick Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism. Cm 3420, London. 
100 My then G. & Walklate S. (2006) "Criminology and terrorism: which thesis? Risk society or governmentality?" 
~rit. (.Criminol. 2006,46(3),379-398 and McCulloch J. & Pickering S. (2009) "Pre-crime and counter terrorism: 
Imagmmg future crime in the 'war on terror'." Brit. J. Criminol. 2009,49(5),628-645. 
101 Tony Blair quoted in Desroches F. (2005) "Policing in the Post 9/11 Era," Research and Evaluation Branch, 
~yal Canadian Mounted Police. 
"The threat from international terrorism is so completely different that it has been necessary to adopt new ways of 
:.v0rking .... The advent of terrorist attacks designed to cause mass casualties, with no warning, sometimes 
InVolving the use of suicide, and with the threat of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons means that 
~e can no longer wait until the point of attack before intervening. The threat to public is simply too great to run the 
rtsk ... the result ofthis is that there are occasions when suspected terrorists are arrested at an earlier stage in their 
planning and preparation than would have been the case in the past." London Anti Terrorist Branch (SOI3) (2005) 
;'~ubmission in Support of Three Month Pre-Charge Detention." 5 Oct 2005. 
l Amoore L. & De Goede M. (2008) "Introduction: Governing by Risk in the War on Terror", in Amoore L. & De 
Goede M. (editors) Risk and the War on Tel"ror. 5-19. Oxon: Routledge. 
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completely blurred the boundaries of where policing or national security commence. 104 Since 'the 
norms of prosecution no longer apply,'105 there is the creation of 'laws against law,'I06 which 
'erode or eliminate traditional principles, standards and procedures of criminal law that get in the 
way of pre empting imagined sources of harm.'lo7 It is submitted that police prejudice may 
distort the boundaries of 'evidence' and 'intelligence'. It is argued that '[w]hile race, ethnicity and 
religion are used as proxies for risk, counter measures are used as proxies for crime and 
specifically terrorism.' 108 
The disproportionate use of police powers will be overshadowed by the executive's drive to 
prevent terrorism, and simultaneously increasing the 'threat' by alienating the source, the 
community whose cooperation is vital. Evidence that negative impacts have occurred was 
confirmed by the fieldwork: 'Any law that creates fraction is not good, for example stop and 
search, and asking not good questions. Not these problems thirty years back. We want to keep 
the peace.' Int.l8. They view that they are simply being 'targeted' because of their religious 
affiliation was expressed: 'The police, because if Muslim they think we are guilty of terrorism. 
We have to prove innocence, those innocent threaten by it.' [Since we are Muslims, the police 
think we are guilty of terrorism. We have to prove our innocence and as innocent people we feel 
threatened by the police]. Int.l9. They reiterated that the policing was unjustifiable because of 
the label Muslim. 'They think we are guilty yet they cannot prove that we (the Muslims) have 
committed a crime at all - do you understand? They have us all labeled.' Int.22. However, the 
concept of 'protection' by the law was highlighted also: 'But the law protects us too.' Int. 27, is a 
statement that is continuously tested in the implementation of the counter terrorism legislation. 
104 
10S McCulloch J. and Pickering S. (2009) op cit. 
Former British Home Secretary, David Blunkett, quoted in Wolfendale J. (2007) "Terrorism, Security and the 
~reat of Counter-Terrorism," in Conflict & Terrorism, 2007, 30: 75-92. 
107 M~Culloch J. & Pickering S. (2009) op cit at 632. 
Encson R. (2008) "The State of Pre-emption Managing Terrorism through Counter Law," in Amoore L. & De 
~~ede M. (editors) Risk and the War on Terror. 57-76. Oxon: Routledge, at 57. 
McCulloch J. & Pickering S. (2009) op cit at 635. 
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6.3.4 The Arrest Power under Anti Terrorism Legislation 
Following Strasbourg's decision in Gillan, the government has been willing to limit section 44,109 
but it sustains the facility of other legislation that grants additional powers to the police in their 
fight against terrorism. The underlying principles of the hybrid policing and national security 
measures dominate, and this is evident in section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000. It provides that 
'A constable may arrest without a warrant a person whom he reasonably suspects to be a 
terrorist.' Based on section 40, the person can be arrested even where no offence has been 
committed. I 10 
Terrorism has always profited from 'special' treatment. In R v DPP, expo Kebilene, IJJ Lord 
Cooke graciously expressed 'that one might treat terrorism as a special subject apparently 
indicating it might not be disproportionate to put burdens on the defendant in times of 
terrorism.'1I2 Similarly in McVeigh and others v UK,1/3 the Commission declared that the law 
can reflect the threat of deviance, namely, terrorism, 'in order to secure the fulfillment of an 
obligation,'1I4 for the sake of article 5(1)(f). Thus, the anti terrorism legislation has followed 
suit; the higher the perceived threat, the stricter the legislation, and the wider, discretionary 
powers for the police. From the onset, section 41 attracted disquiet especially in relation to 
human rights. Lord Lloyd of Berwick advised that as no offence had occurred, there was the 
conceivable violation of Article 5 of the European Commission on Human Rights. IIS However, 
Brogan v UKI16 was used to justify the Government's stance on section 41, which had held that 
arrest did not have to be linked to a specified offence. I 17 
109 Dennis I. (2011) "Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill." Crim. L. R. 2011, 10,741-742; see 
also: Middleton B. (2011) "Re balancing, reviewing or rebranding the treatment of terrorist suspects: the counter 
~~~rorism review 2011" J. Crim L. 2011,75(3),225-248. 
Walker C. (2009) op cit. 
11 I [ 
112 1999] 3 W.L.R. 972. 
Rowe J.J. (2001) "The Terrorism Act 2000" Crim. L. R. 2001, July, 527-542 at 529. 113 
114 ~1981) 5 EHRR 71. 
liS In Rowe J. J. (2001) op cit at 529. 
H.L.Debates, vo1613, co1.676. 
Article 5(\): "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in 
the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ... C. the lawful arrest or detention of a 
per~on effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of 
h~vlng committed an offence." 
1\7 (\989) 11 EHRR 117. 
Rowe 1. (2001) op cit at 529. 
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Section 41 (1) allows the 'precautionary' and also 'multiple arrests,.1I8 This is epitomized in 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Raissi.1/9 Lofti Raissi's arrest under section 41 was 
based on infonnation received from the FBI and his alleged involvement with a 11 September 
hijacker. It was held to be within the 'reasonable suspicion' to arrest the wife for aIJeged 
complicity but not the brother. 120 
Next, to conceal police interrogation methods and indeed their source of information, section 41 
is in the unique position of enabling the police to withhold infonnation as to why the arrest is 
taking place. 121 In doing so, the police retain the luxury of utilising information from their 
anonymous informers. This practice received the seal of approval from Lord Chief Justice Lowry 
in Ex parte LynchJ22, when it was held that a precise verbal report from the police would not be 
necessary.123 It was held that it was sufficient for the arresting officer to state: 'I was arresting 
him under [the particular statutory power] as I suspected him of being involved in terrorist 
activities .. ,'124 
6.3.5 Section 41 and Detention 
It is the extraordinary detention subsequent to section 41 arrest that caused more concern than 
arrest powers to the participants in the research. Unlike PACE, these capacious powers under 
section 41 (3) allow the police to detain up to forty eight hours on police authority. In order to 
avoid any challenges under Article 5(3) as in Brogan and others v UK, J25 judicial review is 
required at forty eight hours of detention. Then the judiciary can grant extension up to fourteen 
days from the time of initial arrest.126 Judicial involvement was not deemed appropriate by some 
in the House of Commons,127 nevertheless the importance of judicial review was a legal 
118 Walker C. (2009) 0 ch at 135. 
119 [2008] EWCA Civ. 1237. 
120 The Courts upholding O'Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] AC 286, held that 
'reasonable suspicion' had to be objective, and the arresting officer in arresting the brother could not rely on the 
knowledge or order of a senior officer. 
121 Walker C. (2009) op cit at 136. 
12l (1984) 28 June QBD. 
12] Walker C. (2009) op cit. at 136. 
Il4 [1980] NI 126 at 128. 
125 App nos. 11209, 11234,11266/84,11386/85, Ser A 145 - B (1988). 
Il6 Walker C. (2009) op cit. at 138. 
127 11 ••• unconvinced that it is legitimately ajudicial function, rather than an Executive one. The decision to extend 
detention under existing legislation is usually based on intelligence material in the hands of the Executive that 
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necessity that prevailed. 128 It is notable that the controversial twenty eight day extension granted 
by the Terrorism Act 2006 has now been limited to fourteen days by the Protection of Freedoms 
Act 2012. This is a decision that the Government initiated with the recognition that the pre 
charge detention of fourteen days was held to be 'exceptional' and the Government conceded that 
the 'twenty eight day detention is so exceptional that I continue to believe that Parliament should 
have the opportunity to debate the issue first.'129 
In granting the extension after 48 hours, the judicial authority has to satisfy itself that further 
detention is necessary to obtain complex evidence including by further interrogation _ 
questioning, or awaiting results of an analysis or an examination. 130 This request must be based 
on reasonable grounds, and on the judicial satisfaction that the detainee is 'a terrorist' within 
section 40.131 The judicial authority must also ensure that investigation is being undertaken in a 
diligent and expedient manner. m The safeguard for the detainee l33 is highlighted in paragraph 
33, whereby a written or oral statement can be submitted to the judiciary, and the detainee can 
seek legal representation for the hearing. However this safeguard is compromised by paragraphs 
33(3) and 34, wherein the judge can exclude the detainee and his or her advocate from the 
hearing and withhold information from them. The lack of disclosure places restrictions on due 
process, but is considered necessary because of the nature of terrorism investigations. 134 The use 
of paragraph 33 was tested in Ward v Police Service for Northern Ireland, 135 where it was held 
by the House of Lords that paragraph 33 was necessary for counter terrorism policing. However, 
cannot be considered appropriate for judicial consideration. The information is often of such sensitive nature that it 
cannot be disclosed to a detainee or his legal adviser without compromising the source of the intelligence, thus 
endangering lives or impeding an investigation. By giving that power to a judicial authority, the jUdiciary would 
ineVitably be seen as part of the investigation and prosecution process, which could bring its independence into 
~uestion." Ann Widdecombe, Hansard HCvol. 341, col. 172,14 Dec. 1999. 
I 8 Walker C. (2009) op cit, at 138. 
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130 Walker C. (2011) Terrorism and the Law Oxford: Oxford University Press at p.156-157. 
131 Ibid at 156. The Colville Report (1987) Colville Report para 5.16 is often used as a guide to justify further 
detention. (See Walker C (2011) op cit at p.157 for further information), 
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~s well as the guidance from PACE, which apply to legal representation, 
13
4 
Walker C. (2009) op cit at 138. 
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CuI/en v Chie/Constable of/he Royal VIs/er [2003] UKHL 39 at Para, 67 per Lord Millett, 
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the Lords cautioned that in excluding representation, the judges have to be extra diligent and 
seek clarification of the police's requests. Walker contends that there is the risk that such practice 
lacks impartiality since the judge does not have the 'independent means' to analyse the police's 
documents. 136 For extensions beyond seven days, the powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 are 
now governed by section 23 of the Terrorism Act 2006, and can be renewed for a further seven 
days, up to fourteen days.137 
Section 41 arrest promotes and aids the government's Pursue strategies. The Inquiry into 
Legislation against Terrorism,138 stressed the need for 'special arrest powers' in counter terrorism 
legislation, and this received the police's overwhelming affirmation for such 'critical' means.139 
However such endorsement 'affords excessive and oppressive powers.,140 This is demonstrated 
by the embarrassing and damaging examples within the criminal justice system, such as the 
Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four. Indeed, '[i]f all the safeguards of PACE are necessary 
to avoid miscarriages of justice then it must be recognised that in terrorist cases greater risks of 
injustice are accepted than in the ordinary course of criminal cases.'141 Aside from the crucial 
drawback of miscarriages of justice, there is the risk that such broad policing powers may 
compromise the police's relationship with communities and hinder the counter terrorism work. 142 
In addition it has been recommended by Anderson that section 41 should not be used in 
circumstances where the individuals are going to be charged under ordinary criminal legislation. 
Further Anderson argues that individuals arrested under section 41 should have a legal recourse 
to make an application for bail.143 It is accepted that transparency may impede the work 
necessary in policing terrorism. However accountability to the executive and judiciary is of 
paramount importance to sustain police credibility. 
136 Walker C. (2009) op cit at 138. 
::: Ibid. The 28 day detention is presently being reviewed by the present Government. 
13 (1996) Cm. 3420. London. 
14
9 
Walker C. (2009) op cit., at 156. 
o Ibid at 157. 
141 The May Inquiry, Sir John May (1993-94) Report of the Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the 
conVictions arising oul oflhe bomb attacks in Guildford and Woolwich in 1974, Final Report. HC 449, Para. 21.8. 
142 Walker C. (2009) op cit at 157. 
143 Anderson D. (QC) (2012) The Terrorism Acts in 2011 Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of 
the Terrorist Act 2000 and Part J of the Terrorism Act 2006. London: HMSO. June 2012 at p.67. 
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The necessity for section 41 is claimed to be based around the complexity of evidence in 
terrorism policing. 144 Charles Clarke l45 outlined an example of 21 July 2005 when thirty eight 
thousand exhibits; one hundred and sixty crime scenes; fourteen hundred fingerprints and eighty 
thousand CCTV videos,146 and the police had the task of compiling and analysing the evidence. 
Walker argues that powers under PACE, allowing those arrested for serious arrestable offences 
to be detained up to ninety six hours could also apply to terrorism cases,147 however, the 
complexity and the nature of terrorism offence, as previously discussed, does indeed warrant 
'special' extensive powers as advocated by the executive. 
Anderson's reservations on section 41 are also voiced by the participants in the research. One 
participant expressed this opinion, echoed also by other participants, "I feel - I know I am 
innocent but sometimes I feel threatened. If stopped and searched, they put me in lock-up, if they 
put charges on me for example that I am attached to a group, I may not be able to prove that I 'm 
not. It scares me. It scares me that they can keep me in lock-up for long time." Int. 16. 
The concern voiced by the academics and participants is perpetuated by the knowledge that 
despite detentions of duration of one to seven days under section 41, forty nine percent of 
arrestees are released without being charged. 148 Perhaps there is substance to the assertion that 
section 41 detention 'has enabled suspects to be charged who may otherwise have had to be 
released.'149 In addition, just as preventive policing cannot be quantified, there is the difficulty of 
quantifying such 'intelligence gathering' section 41 arrests and subsequent detentions. 150 It is only 
with 'more safeguards' such as a complete adversarial judicial reviewsl51 that policing can retain 
its integrity and comply with respect for liberty and due process. 
144 
145 Walker C. (2009) op cit at 157. 
146 Hansard HC vol. 438, col. 341. 26 October 2005. 
147 Walker C. (2009) op cit., at 161. 
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149 Metropolitan Police Service (2008) Counter terrorism Command cited in Walker C. (2009) op cit., at 159. 
ISO Home Office (2007) Options/or Pre-Charge Detention in Terrorist Cases. London: HMSO at 5. 
151 Walker C. (2009) op cit., at 161. 
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6.3.6 Summary of the participants views on Sections 44 and 41. 
It is noteworthy that section 41 powers caused concern for some participants but not at the rate 
that section 44 had an impact on those interviewed. None of the participants identified the 
individual sections, but they had awareness and knowledge of the counter terrorism powers 
available to the police. Their awareness of section 41 powers stemmed from high profile counter 
terrorism events, such as 'Operation Pathway', when twelve students were arrested in 2009, 
majority of Pakistani origin. However, the section 44 powers clearly generated a more emotive 
impact across generations, and such stop and search powers that in their opinion depict 'all 
Muslims as terrorists.' Int. 16. Thus, section 44 appeared to create a stronger response and hostile 
feelings towards the police. 
6.3.7 Airport Policing151 
The law surroWlding airport policing is perceived to be excessive and unreasonable by some of 
the surveyed British Kashmiri Muslims: 'I say enough to terrorism, yet they accuse people 
incorrectly especially at airports. My son went away to Dubai, and his friend was stopped and 
interviewed. They were innocent.' Int. 9. 
Airport policing is not a new concept and has the endorsement of international conventions. 1 53 
Part Five and Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 supplement the existing policing. Airport 
policing reflects the 'all- risks,Is4 policy that is deemed necessary to prevent terrorism by treating 
everyone boarding an aircraft as a potential risk. Attacks on II September 200 I itself and at the 
Moscow airportl55 demonstrate the gravity of the situation. There is no dispute that pre emptive 
policing especially at airports is necessary to combat terrorism. The additional legislative powers 
(accompanied by code issued in 2007, and a revised code in 2009156) enable the officer to 
question a person even when they have no suspicion. IS7 In addition to questioning the officers 
152 The formal title is 'Ports' Policing but for the purpose of this thesis it is referred to as 'airport policing'. Because 
the interviewees referred only to airport policing, none of them mentioned seaport. 
153 E.g., (Hague) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (10 I LM 133, 1970); (Montreal) 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (101 LM 1151, 1971). Walker 
~4 (2009) op cit., at 174. 
155 Walker C. (2009) op cit., at 174. 
156 24 January 2011, at Domodedovo. 
157 Home Office (2009) Examing Officers under the Terrorism Act 2000 Code of Practice. London:TSO. 
S12001/427; http://www.homeoffice.gov.ukldocuments/cons-2007-tact-cop-exam-officers/cons-2007-code-of-
practice?view=Binary. 
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have the right to search. ls8 These powers are based on the officer's discretion and do not require 
'any grounds for suspicion against any individual prior to the exercise of the powers.t1S9 Research 
conducted elsewhere on Schedule 7 found that Muslims stopped under these powers believed 
that they were unfairly targeted simply because of their religion. This affected their outlook on 
policing, and they held the view 'that they were being targeted as Muslims, and that the questions 
were being used to build up profiles of them and to gather information in general about Muslim 
communities.'16o There was concern that the power enabled detention of up to nine hours without 
additional authorisation.161 
Of particular concern to the participants interviewed for this thesis is that of body scanners: 
'security is intense - they take naked photos of us at airports by the machines. It's an invasion of 
my privacy, it's wrong especially for our women,' Int. 3. Scanners are not required by Schedule 
7, however, Schedule 7 facilitates their use. Body scanners used at Manchester Airport, (for 
example), are reported to cause very little health risk, but, they have caused concern about 
privacy, and the European Commission have refused to allow Manchester Airport 'to extend 
[their] three year 'experiment' beyond 31 October 2012,'162 and these are to be replaced by 
'privacy friendly security scanners.,163 
Schedule 7's compatibility with Gillan has been questioned by those analysing the counter 
terrorism policing, whether the powers used are 'sufficiently circumscribed', and 'subject to 
adequate legal safeguards against abuse.'l64 Nevertheless, Schedule 7 has been commended for 
its usefulness in counter terrorism operations. Examples include Aabid Khan who was stopped at 
Manchester Airport with, material promoting violent jihad in the Western societies; Yassim 
158 Lord Woolfheld in R v Hundal; Rv Dhaliwal [2004] EWCA Crim. 389, that there is a "clear distinction between 
requiring someone to answer questions and requiring a person to produce either documents or other information to 
the prosecution and a case where what the person concerned is compelled to do is to allow the relevant authority to 
~nduct a search." Para. 18. . . 
Home Office (2009) Examing Officers under the TerrOrISm Act 2000 Code of PractIce. London:TSO, para:9-1 0 
at p.7. 
160 Chaudhury T. & Fenwick H. (2011) The impact of counter terrorism measures on Muslim communities. EHRC 
~fsearch report. June 2011, pp.22-29; see also Anderson D. (2012) op cit at 107. 
16 Anderson D. (QC) (2012) op cit at p.5. 
2Retrieved from: 
http:www .manchesterairport.co.uklmanweb.nsf/contentlManchester Airporttotestnewgenerationofprivacy friendly sec 
urityscanners. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Gil/an & Quinton v UK op ciit at [87]. 
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Nassari at Luton Airport and Sohail Anjum Qureshi possessed material on how to implement 
terrorist activities. 165 Hauria Chentouf, when stopped at Liverpool airport had concealed in her 
possession a USB pen drive. This contained extensive material on constructing explosive 
devices, and photos of a known terrorist. An additional example is that of Ishaq Kanmi and his 
two companions, when stopped at Manchester Airport, all had in their possession material 
relating to jihad, including a video promoting and demonstrating attacks on airline staff. 166 
It is these sorts of benefits of Schedule 7 that have received recognition by the judiciary, who 
held that Schedule 7 examinations at the airports are 'an essential tool in the protection of the 
inhabitants of this country from terrorism.'167 In CC v The Commissioner of Police of the 
Metroplolis and Secretary of State for the Home Department,168 it was held that Schedule 7 
powers could not be utilised to obtain information to justify the security services and the police's 
application for a control order. However, Collins J. despite finding for the claimant elaborated 
and clarified on the importance of Schedule 7 powers. It was reiterated that to protect 'the 
inhabitants of this country from acts of terrorism', the officers may utilise Schedule 7 powers to 
determine if a suspect is actually a terrorist,169 and to use the powers even when they have 
knowledge on the individual stopped, and there are no limits to the 'questions,.170 The judgment 
elaborated that the 'proper recipients' of the information obtained under Schedule 7 are naturally 
the police, the security services and the Secretary of State.!7! Moreover, the role of the solicitor 
was defined 'as an observer to ensure proper procedure, but beyond that he would have nothing 
to do,' since there 'is an obligation to answer questions.'172 Thus, the ruling was described as 
'overall to be favourable' for the Governrnent. 173 
As with other powers bestowed by anti terrorism legislation, airport policing increases risk of 
impropriety. It is true that 'compared to the number of passengers passing', there are 'very few 
165 
Anderson D. (QC) (2012) op cit at p.SI. 
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examinations',174 but airport policing is more 'visible' to, and unavoidable by, the public in its 
application than most other special powers.175 Overuse of policing powers will undermine its 
integrity, and Goldsmith submits that even police forces can receive condemnation for the 
actions of a few.176 Granted that the British policing has not provoked public outrage, there is 
still the opinion of some, as noted earlier, that airport policing is improperly administered, and 
thus the officers need to give due consideration to policing propriety.l77 
To summarize, the foregoing examples have established that the role of Pursue, whilst 
imperative in counter terrorism work, has to be implemented with due diligence and 
accountability that has received some recognition with the implementation of Section 47 A. The 
participants interviewed had reservations and anxiety about the stop and search powers and 
airport policing, as well as the detention, albeit to a lesser degree for the latter. Despite their 
limited experiences of section 41 powers, they were aware of its existence via the high profile 
cases highlighted by the media. These further perpetuated their concern that counter terrorism 
policing powers are extensive and aimed incorrectly, in their opinion, at Muslim communities. 
Thus according to their submissions in their interviews, they felt threatened rather than protected 
by the aforementioned counter terrorism policing. Moreover, Pursue can become 
counterproductive when seeking also to achieve Prevent. Hence detailed consideration needs to 
be given next to the requirements of Prevent. 
6.4.1 Prevent 
It is the Prevent strategy within CONTEST that has the aim of 'understanding what leads people 
to become radicalised, so we can stop them becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism or violent 
174 Walker C. (2011) op cit at 104. 
17S Goldsmith A.J. (2010) "Policing's new visibility." Brit. J. Criminol. 2010, 50(5) 914·934. 
116 This is related to the overuse of police powers by Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers at Vancouver airport. 
The police officers used taser to subdue a Polish national, who later died, the incident was recorded by an bystander 
~7~d relayed to the media. Ibid. 
The L10yd Report (1996) recommends: "Examining officers should therefore make every reasonable effort to 
exercise the power in such a way as to minimise causing embarrassment or offence to a person who has no terrorist 
c?nnections. The powers to stop and question a person should not be exercised in a way which unfairly 
dIscriminates against a person on the grounds ofrace, colour, religion, creed, gender or sexual orientation. When 
deciding whether to question a person the examining officer should bear in mind that the primary reason for doing 
so is to maximise disruption of terrorist movements into and out of the UK." Inquiry into Legislation against 
Terrorism. London: Cm 3420 at Para 10.57. 
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extremism in the first place.'178 The aim of Prevent is to target those that are not covered by the 
counter terrorism legislation because they have not committed an unlawful act, but, as the name 
states, to prevent them from reaching such a state and simultaneously deterring others. 179 
The Prevent approach aims to address the 'ideology' and underlying issues that may enable the 
recruitment of individuals into 'violent extremism'; to further eliminate such extremism, the 
strategy would be utilised to offer alternatives, and offer support in identified areas. The aim 
extends to simultaneously increasing community 'resilience' to extremism and addressing 
'grievances'. It is acknowledged that such a strategy requires 'developing intelligence, analysis 
and information, and improving our strategic communications.tl80 It is further conceded that 'the 
greatest terrorist threat we currently face is from terrorists who claim to act in the name of Islam . 
. . ' and thus '[a]t this stage much Prevent activity takes place with Muslim communities.'181 The 
policy is a notable innovation since there was never any similar policy for the Irish Republican 
communities. In the revised Prevent strategy,182 the Government acknowledged that Prevent 
must not be used as exclusively a 'police programme', and that only via this approach can the 
Prevent agenda succeed in community co-operation with the police and security services. IS3 
By way of implementation in 2007, the Department for Communities and Local Government 
aspired to a 'community - led approach to tackling violent extremism,'184 and thereby allocated 
six million pounds for Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Funds. This was to target the 
seventy local authorities that the government perceived to be in need of Prevent interventions. 
The fund was further increased in 2008, leading to the conclusion that 'the total money spend on 
Prevent ... from April 2007 - 11 is likely to be eighty million pounds. It is expected that, by 
April 2011, over 61.7 million pounds will have been provided to local authorities for Prevent 
work .... In March 2009, it was anticipated that by 2011 the total Prevent budget would have 
178 H.M.Government (March 2009) Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare The UK's Strategy/or Countering 
International Terrorism. London: Crown copyright. Cm. 7541; p.4. 
179 H. C. (2010) Preventing Violent Extremism. 6th Report of Session 2009·10. HC 65. London: HC Published. 30 
March 2010. 
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increased by a further one hundred million pounds.,185 However, in 2011, funding was curtailed, 
and the community cohesion projects were removed from the Prevent budget. 186 
The initial allocation of the funding to the local authorities corresponded with the density of 
Muslim residents. 187 Since the aim of Prevent is to eliminate the terrorist threat, it is perhaps 
prudent and pragmatic that the funding be distributed accordingly. Indeed, Charles Farr, from the 
Office for Security and Counter Terrorism identifies the 'targeted population' in the following 
terms:-
'There is a group of people that have been radicalised and are committed to violent 
extremism and the only solution to that group of people in this country is criminal 
investigation and prosecution. There is a much larger group of people who feel a degree 
of negativity, ifnot hostility, towards the state, the country, the community, and who are, 
as it were, the pool in which terrorists will swim, and to a degree they will be complicit 
with and certainly not report on activity which they detect on their doorstep. We have to 
reach that group because unless we reach that group they may themselves move into a 
very sharp end, but even if they do not they will create an environment in which terrorists 
can generate with a degree of impunity that we do not want .... That is to degree what 
Prevent is all about.'188 
It has to be accepted that such a blanket approach opened the door to criticism but the 
government's justification was that it could not be seen to ignore the disastrous risks that derive 
from the distortion of Islam. However, after its review in 20 11, funding now was not based on 
Muslim popUlation but on assessment of the risk of radicalisation, and thus allocated to only 
twenty five 10ca1 authorities. 189 Irrespective of the reviews of funding, the work of Prevent is 
considered to be an integral part of counter terrorism, thus the subsequent discussion will 
consider the justification of Prevent and the criticism of this strategy. 
::: Kundnani A. (2009) op cit at 11-12; see also Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare (2009) op cit at p.16. 
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6.4.2 How effective is the Prevent strategy? 
Although no direct question was posed to the research participants about Prevent, the question 
was asked whether government policies against terrorism (in general), are helpful or unhelpful. 
The participants, interestingly, talked about Prevent notwithstanding the researcher's silence. 
(The participants views were ascertained prior to the 2011 review). Prior to proceeding to the 
participants' views, it is worthwhile to consider the available research on this topic. 
In analysing Prevent, Kundnani utilised qualitative research based on thirty two interviews, He 
found Prevent to be 'counter productive,!90 Kundnani's thesis is based on the theory that the 
function of Prevent is to target the 'entire population of Muslims,,191 His interviewees highlighted 
that community needs were overlooked by the goals of central government:- 'the chief executives 
of the local authority drove it through - which means that the usual processes of consultation and 
accountability were bypassed, It was presented as a fait accompli', and that '[a]n underdeveloped 
and vulnerable voluntary sector is easily pressured into uncriticaIly accepting government 
programmes.'192 Kundnani's research argues that the government's needs took precedent over the 
perceived local issues, 'we have no information from the police as to whether there is actually a 
problem of extremism in this area.'193 Some workers assigned to Prevent projects, lacked 
transparency, and thus were evasive about how they obtained the funding, As one youth project 
manager told the research team, 'A lot of people are having to hide the Prevent name because of 
perceptions of young people - we kept it hidden for some time.'194 Nevertheless, the money 
distributed by the government is utilized, and the government in 2009, responded to criticisms 
that Prevent funding was ineffective in confronting and dismantling the 'extremist' ideology. The 
then Communities Minister, Hazel Blears l95 took the bold step of defining extremism, 'as a belief 
in the supremacy of the Muslim people, in a divine duty to bring the world under the control of 
hegemonic Islam, . , , ideology [based] in a twisted reading ofIslam.' I 96 
190 Kundnani (2009) op cit at? & 9, 
191 Ib'd I at p.13. 
192 Ib'd I at p.IS. 
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The outstanding criticism of Prevent is of 'its sole focus on Muslims' which leads to its 
ineffectiveness, as Muslims themselves reject being singled out l97 and targeted. 198 An additional 
criticism is apportioned to the government's aim via Prevent, to provide a 'moderate' 
interpretation of Islam. This is seen to allude to state intervention in faith, and thereby 
eliminating the concept of 'separation of power',199 submitted contrary view is that, 'the contents 
of a religion or belief should be defined by the worshippers themselves', and not the 
govemment.200 In light of such criticism, the review of Prevent acknowledged that funding for 
local community projects had to be regularly reviewed and monitored via research that will 
assess the effectiveness of Prevent.20! In addition the 2011 review provides Prevent the 
'flexibility' to expand its sole focus on Al Qaida related terrorism, and address all forms of 
terrorism.202 
In their analysis of the Prevent scheme, two leading commentators on the field of terrorism 
concluded that 'while the strategic thrust is correct, policy delivery can be criticized. ,203 Their 
criticism is based on the 'slow and uncertain rate of achievement' that does little to engage the 
actual 'extremism.' Further, the authorities have little 'direction' and mosques are ineffective,204 
since, 'evidence suggests that extremists are increasingly moving away from mosques to conduct 
their activities in sports centres, paintball centres or activity camps, private homes or other 
premises to avoid detection. ,205 Their third criticism is based on the view that radicalization has 
links to 'social and political conditions and generational changes in identities.' As emphasized by 
the author's fieldwork findings, Walker and Rehman also acknowledge that Prevent's image of 
'policing' has created distrust. Their solution to this 'might be an organizational division in 
Prevent activities with those concentrating on community cohesion falling within the remit of 
197 'Young people have responded to these projects with a large degree of animosity. There is actually a stigma that 
is now attached to those that accept Prevent funding, that it is dirty money.' and that 'The Prevent strategy takes the 
Islamic faith as problematic. How can you accept money that tarnishes your religion? We can smell the stench of 
~:~amaphobia.' quoted in ibid at 27. 
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200 Jahangir A. (2008) Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion O/' Belief Mission to the UK. 
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local authorities and those dealing with individuals or organizations at risk assigned to the 
police. ,206 Their final criticism is based on the Pursue element of CONTEST, as discussed 
earlier, Walker and Rehman also argue that excessive policing perpetuates social tensions and 
prevents cooperation from the communities. Indeed the House of Commons Affairs Committee 
provide, 'a clear perception among all our Muslim witnesses that Muslims are being stigmatized 
by the operation of the 'Terrorism Act:' this is extremely harmful to community relations.'207 
Interestingly, many such concerns were addressed by the Government208 initially in 2010, and 
then in its review in 2011, when it was recognised that Prevent as it existed was 
counterproductive, and not able fully to achieve its aims?09 It concurred with the criticism that 
Prevent's single focus on Muslims ignores the fundamental factor that Muslims live in a 'cross-
community' environment. The Government was further criticised in this report that interference 
in theology in advocating 'moderate' Islam was not within the government's scope of powers. 
Prevent's role as Pursue in 'sheep's clothing' was another factor that made it counterproductive, 
as its focus had shifted from recognising the signs of radicalisation to pursuing radicalisation. It 
is recommended that under the supervision of the Home Office funds will be allocated to the 
'appropriate' sources, and towards 'democratic debates', which would address the crucial 
misconceptions that may lead to 'radicalisation,?tO Significantly, the Justification' of the Prevent 
approach was accepted, namely that since al-Qaeda targeted within Muslim communities, thus it 
is inevitable that Prevent will focus on Muslim communities. The ultimate solution to improved 
relations with Muslim communities and to minimise the conception that Muslim communities 
are a target can only be achieved through 'communication'. 2 I I This communication could perhaps 
address if not alleviate the allegations of spying on the community. These allegations were also 
expressed commonly in the fieldwork, 'The government is being unhelpful with its policies of 
2~ W I . 
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gathering intelligence and creating spies within the community. With its schemes such as 
Prevent, it is creating more suspicion, even if people wanted to talk they are too afraid.' Int. 27. 
The British Prime Minister, acknowledged the limitations of the Prevent strategy. Addressing the 
Munich Security Conference, David Cameron stated, 'some organisations that seek to present 
themselves as a gateway to the Muslim community are showered with public money while doing 
little to combat extremism. This is like turning to a rightwing fascist party to fight a violent white 
supremacist movement.'212 Elsewhere the government stressed that 'the continued existence of 
[the] preventative strand of CONTEST.,213 The government continues to value the importance of 
Prevent2U• Prevent is still considered to be the government's imperative tool in counter 
terrorism, 'The heart of Prevent - targeted, local work to support people who are most vulnerable 
to radicalisation and to disrupt propagandists for terrorism - will also remain.'215 
There is the revised aim that the focus of Prevent funding will be concentrated only on counter 
terrorism. 'Like CONTEST as a whole Prevent will now address radicalisation to all forms of 
terrorism. We will prioritise according to the risks we face ... ,216 Indeed it is envisaged that 
with the accountability for the funds, the Prevent strategy will no longer be considered the 'cash 
cow which any enterprising Muslim group could tap into.'217 Commentators welcome this need 
for 'clarity', in the Prevent issues, as embraced by the government.218 There has been too much 
ambiguity, which was voiced also by the British Kashmiri Muslims, 'Not sure what the 
government has achieved so far, they have programmes in place. At the local mosque, a couple 
of guys tried to get the grant from the government terrorism money, but others - backward 
people - refused.' Int. 8.219 
212 Quoted in Wintour P. (2011) "David Cameron tells Muslim Britain: stop tolerating extremists." The Guardian 5 
Feb 2011. 
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Thus, the government recognized in CONTEST 3, that 'the relationship between Prevent and 
Pursue . .. must be carefully managed.'22o Indeed in their 'empirical evidence' Innes et aI., argue 
that 'Prevent policing is not causing detectable harm in police relations with Muslim 
communities. ,221 However such criticism is now addressed by the revisions to Prevent which 
specifies and decreases ambiguity by incorporating a central method, with its control in the 
Home Office222, and vigilance by an independently appointed 'oversight,.223 Significantly, the 
important inter-dependent relationship of Prevent and Pursue is clarified, namely that 'Prevent 
depends on Pursue to facilitate the disruption and conviction of people engaged in radicalisation 
activities which are clearly illegal; Pursue depends on Prevent to restrict the number of people 
engaging in terrorism - related activity.' It is emphasised that the allegations of Prevent being 
used to gather personal information were unmerited by the government's research. Nevertheless 
guidance is issued to prevent 'spying,.224 
Irrespective of the criticisms and allegations, the necessity for Prevent intervention is highlighted 
by those in favour of it. Sir Norman Bettison of ACPO presented the dilemma of not intervening 
earlier when speaking about the London bombers,m and that appropriate intervention under 
Prevent could (with hindsight) have prevented the attacks?26 The risk factor of Prevent is that 
the Muslim community may be alienated and may lead to increased radicalisation227, as 
~~~ Home Office (201Ib) op cit at para. 5.27. 
Innes M., Roberts C., & Innes H. (2011) 'Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing. A Report to the Association 
~2~ChiefPolice Officers.' Cardiff: Cardiff University (Universities' Police Science Institute) at 86. 
Home Office (2011) Prevent Strategy June 2011. London: HMSO. Cm 8092, at p32. 
m Ibid at p.96. 
l24 Ibid at p.31. 
225 "Hasib Hussain was a young man, a third generation Leeds - born individual. He was a model student at Matthew 
Murray School in East Leeds. He went on at the age of eighteen to strap a rucksack to his back and blew up the 
number thirty bus that we have all seen in the scenes that followed 7 July bombings. We started to unpick what was 
known about Hasib Hussain. He had never come to the notice ofthe police at any stage in his young life and 
therefore in terms of opportunities for the police to intervene to prevent what went on to occur, there were just no 
hooks there. However, what we did discover is that as a model student whilst at Matthew Murray School his 
exercise books were littered with references to al-Qaeda, and the comments could not have been taken as other than 
supportive documents about al-Qaeda. To write in one's book is not criminal and would not come on the radar of the 
police, but the whole ethos, the heart of Prevent is the question for me of whether someone in society might have 
thought it appropriate to intervene. What do I mean by intervention? I do not mean kicking his door down at 6 
O'clock in the morning and hauling him before the Magistrates. I mean should someone have challenged that?" Sir 
~~rman Bettison quoted in HC (2010) op cit. at 17. 
227 HC (2010), op cit at 17. 
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recognised by the British Kashmiri Muslims, 'I think they could do more to educate people and 
tell people why it is doing what it's doing. Because it seems as though the Government is against 
the community. Therefore [it has] increase[d] segregation, if people are segregated they are more 
likely to commit terrorism.' Int. 1. To overcome this common perception from the fieldwork 
data, perhaps there is credibility to having 'a proportionate and risk - based approach to 
delivering Prevent, along with greater clarity as to what the programme aims to achieve, are 
needed before any useful perfonnance measures can be agreed at national and locallevel.,228 
It has to be recognised that: '[t]he Prevent strand will continue to require some very brave 
decisions in the future.' In order to target 'underground' radicalisation, Prevent, it is argued has to 
continue to function. Thus, the risk that the funding is 'misused' is minimal in comparison to the 
benefits of the Prevent scheme?29 The effe~tiveness of Prevent to date is also outlined in the 
following exceptional view obtained from the research data, 'What do I know about politics or 
government? Let me see, these are good schemes going, they make young Muslim men aware of 
certain things and work with Muslim communities to make them aware, and stop extremism and 
create awareness of terrorism.' Int. 26. 
The goals of Prevent were shared by the participants interviewed in this thesis, for instance, just 
as the government perceived the need to isolate the extremists, so did some of the British 
Kashmiri Muslim participants in their views: 
'Preventage end [The Prevent policy] in England is about intelligence, gaining informants but 
not dealing with extremists. They have to deal with people that are a threat, as I said earlier, 
Malaysia is effective because it banned Salafi - Wahabbi books, as long as there is literature 
here, we cannot defeat terrorism. We have to engage with them and offer solutions. Muslims 
are turning to religion, we have to offer alternatives to these religious means, the Salafi 
branch, otherwise we will lose.' Int. 17. 
228 Ibid at 66. 
229 Carlile, Lord (2010) "Terrorism: Pragmatism, Populism and Libertarianism - The Inaugural John Creaney 
Memorial Lecture." 3 March 2010, at http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/assets/Carlile_Transcript.pdf. last visited 
28/2/2011. 
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The concern that British Muslims are rightly perceived as 'potential recruits,230 to terrorism, was 
also shared by some of the British Kashmiris interviewed by the author: 
'It is damaging society as a whole. For example, policies such as Prevent, we are going to do 
this, risk alienating people, making them grassers. Historically what Muslims are going 
through what the Irish went through. I find it offensive that they will pump things into 
helping us. But we will protect our community not because I am going to get money, but 
because like any other citizen, it's my civil duty to protect this country. Pumping money 
equals in cahoots with government and that could be harmful for the community .... 
Government is trying to be helpful, but the way it's going about it is not working. It's going to 
play into the hands of extremism. Jftake government's money, they are seen as sold, and no-
one will respect it. We are not learning from Northern Ireland.' Int. 13. 
The fact that such counter terrorism work is an 'uphill' struggle for the government was 
recognised by some of the British Kashmir Muslim participants, 'It's hard, the government, they 
are trying but not achieving. Achievement does not match what they are trying to do. Only 
recently trying to understand the minds of individuals trying to cause these problems. There is 
the clash of cultures; Iraq thing; religion that does not sit well with Western society.' lnt. 7. The 
'Iraq thing' was elaborated by another participant's response to the same question: 
'Government very unhelpful because of foreign policy, shouldn't have gone to war in Iraq. 
Not pushing peace in Kashmir and other regions around the world and voice for people of 
Kashmir. Our foreign policy is quite aggressive - leads to a lot of new terrorist activity within 
Britain and outside against the British people.' Int. 20. 
This view outlines the limitations of Prevent, namely that it does not address the external 
government policies that appear to create sympathy for the extremist ideology. Interestingly, 
quantative research conducted elsewhere in the United Kingdom, confirms that co-operation with 
the police and security services is related to the individual's perception of the 'state authority' or 
government institution.m 'Belief in the legitimacy of the state' was found to be crucial in 
attaining co-operation in the counter terrorism policing.232 
230 K d 'A un nam . (2009), op cit at 40. 
231 Huq A.Z. TylerT.R. & Schulfer SJ. (2011) op cit at p.747. 
232 Ibid at 748. 
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6.4.3 Prevent and Neighbourhood Policing 
It has been ascertained during the foregoing discussion that Prevent has been linked to 
intelligence gathering for the police's counter terrorism purposes.233 This purpose is said to be 
interlinked with 'local neighbourhood policing,.234 For an complete discussion on Prevent, the 
work of neighbourhood policing requires analysis and discussion. 
The government's counter terrorism strategy has further extended the role of the police. The 
Prevent strand dictates that local policing units avert the facilitation of terrorism and 
simultaneously engage the community with acuity that negates prejudice and fosters co-
operation.235 The commanding instructions are to 'help communities protect themselves and 
counter the efforts of extremist radicalizers.'236 This additional responsibility is burdened with a 
'terrorist threat' that is both immediate and present.237 
Intrinsically, the police institutions in general are the local gatekeepers and the primary 
protectors of national security, and the role of the neighbourhood policing has been further 
elevated by the Prevent strand of CONTEST. Thus 'the need to extend the policing reach into 
communities to inhibit extremism at source' is a need at its highest level.238 
Community liaison and engagement of the public is not a new phenomenon to the British police. 
It dates back to 1829 when Commissioners Rowan and Richard Mayne acknowledged that 
effective policing required the community's participation: 
'To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfill their duties is dependent on public 
approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on the ability to secure and maintain 
public respect. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of 
the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of 
securing observance of laws.'239 
233 K d . 
un nam A. (2009) op cit. 
234 Innes M. (2006) "Policing Uncertainty, Countering Terror through Community Intelligence and Democratic 
Policing." The Annals o/the American Academy o/Political and Social Science. 2006, 60S; 222. 
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Contemporary society revived these principles by recognising that public approval was equally 
important to achieving reduced crime. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998, section I was a 
significant landmark in acknowledging the importance of community partnership. Thus the 
National Neighbourhood Policing Programme was introduced in the Government's 'Building 
Communities, Beating Crime', White Paper.240 The then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke24I 
emphasised the need for a 'new' approach that adapted the community.z42 This reinforced the 
need for policing in partnership with the public, and thereby sharing responsibility. It served a 
dual function whereby it 'empowered' the communities to make joint decisions with the police, 
and simultaneously offered the police information and indeed community co-operation. 243 
This sharing of power signaled the commitment that the police bestowed on the partnership of 
civilians. The Police and Justice Act 2006 reinforces the need for police authorities 'to consult 
communities,.244 Bames and Eagle argue that consulting with the wider community requires long 
term commitment, and this has to be considered by the policing institution,z45 It is noteworthy 
that section 79 of the Police Refonn and Social Responsibility Act 20 It, ensures that policing 
institutions prioritise national policies. In essence, the Secretary of State, utilising this power, can 
and has instructed Police and Crime Commissioners to change the 'policing protocol' according 
to the national rather than the local agenda. This is of particular significance in areas of the 
country where terrorism may otherwise not be considered as high a priority as the regional 
issues. 
In this way, the Prevent agenda is only as effective as the local, neighbourhood policing 
programme. Its central role is emphasised by Sir Nonnan Bettison, who advocates that 'the 
foundations of neighbourhood Policing must be in place. It is at the neighbourhood level that 
240 Home Office (2004) Building Communities, Beating Crime: A Better Service jor the Twenty-First CentUlY. 
Norwich: The Stationary Office. 
241 Home Office (200S) Neighbourhood Policing: Your Police, Your Community,' Our Commitment. London: Home 
~ffice Communication Directorate. 
2 "Neighbourhood policing today is about having dedicated resources for local areas, with mixed teams of officers, 
special constables, community support officers, wardens and others using intelligence and real time data to catch 
more criminals. And it is about developing a new relationship between the police and public - one based on active 
co-operation." Charles Clarke, ibid at p.l. 
243 Mayhill A. (2006) Community Engagement in Policing: Lessonsjrom the Literature. London: Home Office at iv. 
244 Barnes I. and Eagle T. (2007) "The Role of Community Engagement in Neighbourhood Policing." Policing 2007, 
1~2) 161-172 at 170. 
Ibid at 171. 
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work needs to begin in the 'upstream' activity of preventing individuals, particularly young 
people from drifting into violent extremism,.246 He elaborates by identifying two prerequisites 
crucial for an effective foundation: the need for increased involvement 'within the communities', 
and the crucial aspect of generating, sharing and developing 'community intelligence. It is only 
via these two points of local policing that the national security 'jigsaw' can be completed.'247 This 
method of police work is described by Bettison as the 'softer . . . non law enforcement 
intervention.'248 Hence, the neighbourhood policing is pivotal to the counter terrorism measures. 
Equally the security services are no longer able to solely prevent extremism?49 
The police's softer role demands that they work with local authorities and the counter terrorism 
units. This will ensure that the neighbourhood policing's role is not compromised whilst others 
enforce the counter terrorism legislation.25o According to Bettison, it is the sharing of 
information that is crucial to the success of the neighbourhood police. The 'principles' in the 
'Practice Advice document' for the neighbourhood policing support those outlined in the Prevent 
strategy?SI Thus Bettison identifies that through Neighbourhood Policing the 'Channel scheme' 
in Prevenr52, has one hundred and twenty cases of 'individuals' requiring 'some kind of 
intervention.'253 This 'Project Channel scheme' is an initiative based on partnership and 
information sharing. In brief, it has been described as 'a police coordinated multi - agency 
partnership that evaluates referrals of individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism.' In 
essence it is mUlti-disciplinary team that works together involving educators, voluntary workers 
and Local Authority child protection, domestic violence and management of high risk 
offenders.254 
246 Bettison N. Sir (2009) "preventing Violent Extremism - A Police Response." Policing 2009, 3(2): 129-138. (1 
May 2009) at 133. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid. 
~:: Clarke R.V. & Newman O.R. (2007) "Police and the Prevention of Terrorism. " PoliCing 2007,1(1) 9-20. 
Bettison N. Sir (2009) op cit at 133-134. 
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35. 
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Neighbourhood policing has changed the face of Prevent,255 via community engagement.256 
Consequently, the local police do not appear as formidable as the counter terrorist police despite 
the fact that one works under the umbrella of Prevent and the other under Pursue. It is this 
crucial difference that was identified by some of the British Kashmiri Muslims interviewed. 
They had clear reservations about the counter terrorism legislation and policing, but immense 
respect for their local police, as summarised by one participant: 'within this area, the local police 
have been brilliant, They are hand in hand with local community, to support and work with us to 
benefit us all. The phone call that I got earlier it was them to tell me that they would be doing car 
checks today, and I told them about the funereal taking place, so they said that they will not 
check those cars today - see how they are good to us, so I respect them and tell others to do the 
same - we are lucky. When Glasgow [terrorist plot] happened, the police asked us for advice as 
to how to tackle it, and we assisted the police.' Int. 13. This common view of local policing was 
continuously reiterated: 'Please write this, the police in ... is okay so far.' Int. 19. 
The importance and the effectiveness of good community - local - neighbourhood policing 
especially in counter terrorism work, is demonstrated by other researchers. Martin Innes's 
research involved twenty six semi-structured interviews with police officers and others working 
on counter terrorism at national and local levels. Innes found that understanding of cultures or 
sub cultures was crucial to neighbourhood policing. He concluded that the practice of Islam 
varied within communities, and without such understanding it is extremely difficult to do 
effective counter terrorism work.257 
Later publications also found that police personnel view Prevent as an integral addition to the 
existing 'policing practices' in Neighbourhood Policing. It was asserted that Prevent's 'efficacy' 
is dependent on the existing policing practices. In brief, Prevent policing mirrors the 
neighbourhood policing of engaging community and generating intelligence. The 'tensions 
25S Neyroud P. (2007) "Community Policing" Policing 2007, 1 (2) at 127-129. 
256 Waddington P .AJ. (2007) "Editorial" Policing 2007, 1 (2), 129-131; see also Crawford A (2007) "Reassurance 
policing: feeling is believing" in Henry A. & Smith DJ. (editors) Transformations of PoliCing. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Pf,·143-168. 
7 tnnes M. (2006) op cit at 225 and 230-31. 
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between the Prevent and Pursue are evident on occasions.' They found that Prevent thus had to 
undertake the role of 'consequence management for 'Pursue'. ,258 
Next, based on his work in Bradford, where over eighty percent of Bradford Pakistani Muslims 
'come from rural Kashmir itself,'259 Baines identifies as linked and important the effectiveness of 
local policing and its counter terrorism work. In this area comprising the fourth largest Muslim 
community in the UK, 'community engagement' was achieved. This enabled the police and 
indeed the national security services to act prior to, rather than following, events. Subsequent to 
the Bradford riots in 2001, Baines' analysis demonstrates that Bradford developed a firm 'conflict 
- prevention strategy.' This foundation was utilised following the terrorist attack in London on 7 
July 2005.260 'The police adopted a broad approach of building trust and confidence with all 
communities and a comprehensive, non institutional, open, transparent approach was 
undertaken.'261 This led to expansion to the police's perceptions of the local communities, 
'particularly with the Muslim communities.'262 Thus 'Iow levels of tension' followed the days and 
months after July 2005, for example, they effectively contained the rumours circulating about 
Muslims being attacked in the city. Baines attributes all the work in Bradford to the 'introduction 
of Neighbourhood Policing Teams, ... [which] has provided an excellent opportunity for 
localised community engagement through neighbourhood teams.'263 Baines continuously 
reiterates that only long term commitment can sustain trust and confidence required to have a 
working relationship with the communities, and thus undertake productive counter terrorism 
work. 
Another example of a predominately British Kashmiri Muslim community is that of High 
Wycombe, where 'the largest single Muslim community is from Mirpur district of Pakistan,'264 
also known as Pakistani administered Kashmir. The undertaking of 'Operation Overt' led to 
arrests and counter terrorism investigations in the High Wycombe area in August 2006. High 
:58 Innes M, Roberts C. & Innes H. (2011) op cit at 3·4. 
59 Baines M. (2007) "Winning Hearts and Minds: Managing Community Tensions." PoliCing 2007,1(3) 316·326. 
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profile media coverage featured 'the news of an intended terrorist plot by Islamic extremists to 
blow up airplanes in flight from the UK to the US.'265 The local police assignment following 
these events was to ensure that the local communities addressed the 'reality of the situation', and 
to alleviate the pressures the communities may be facing. Half way in its implementation of 
Neighbourhood Policing, Thames Valley police appointed a 'Muslim Community and Diversity 
Officer'. Together with neighbourhood policing, they worked with the principles endorsed in 
Prevent. Via this approach they not only found balance in a potentially confrontational situation, 
but developed mutual understanding, and the community addressed the need to confront the 
extremist ideology that existed amongst them.266 
The 'pressing demand for more and better secret intelligence at the local level in UK',267 requires 
work on the Prevent strategy. As the former Director General of the MI5 states, 'secret 
intelligence needs to be fused with information derived from overt engagement with the 
community, where once again the police role is key.'268 This pragmatism reflects the importance 
of Neighbourhood Policing and that, without it, the national security agenda will be 
compromised.269 Thus, although detailed discussion on police accountability is beyond the remit 
of this thesis, it is worth noting that with 'effective accountability,270 Neighbourhood Policing 
will continue to thrive in its counter terrorism role. Raine and Dunstan argue that police 
accountability is crucial 'where the delicate and difficult issues of public trust and confidence are 
at stake.'271 They formulated their analysis on the basis of six pilot studies undertaking 
'accountability in local [English] policing,' and found that such practice enhanced the public trust 
and respect for the individual local services. In addition, it aided co-operation by perpetuating the 
265 Ibid at 57. 
266 "This was the first time that the community acknowledged that there were radicalized extremist elements in their 
midst, began to take ownership of the issue, and engage with the police and other agencies to understand and address 
the problems. For the police, it was an opportunity to really understand the community we police, ... and who were 
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'sharing and exchange of experiences and perspectives', simultaneously addressing local 
grievances.272 
Hence, it is submitted that by addressing such grievances, the government's counter terrorism 
policies and legislation will be more effective. The grievances highlighted to the writer by some 
of the participants were not being addressed by their local police. For example, one participant 
stated a common view that, 'It is damaging to the community by focusing on one element of law: 
terrorism, and not illegal drugs - heroin, which is what is the real problem in the community.' Int. 
4. In conducting her research in Bradford following the Bradford riots, Bolognani also found 
from her interviewees that drugs were considered to be a major social problem and concern for 
the community.273 Listening to local concerns also enables the police to overcome the inevitable 
tension linked with underlying national security work, and indeed the contradictory dual nature 
of Prevent leading to Pursue. Hanniman274 utilising Murphy's27S thesis, discusses such a 
dilemma facing the local, neighbourhood policing. He writes: 'The national security based 
version of community policing can view the community simply as a source of security 
information and criminal intelligence rather than as strategic source. ,276 His argument is based on 
the theory that in manipulating the individuals to 'spy' on their neighbours and the general 
community to reinforce their patriotism can and will 'quickly alienate a community.'277 
The interview data suggests that to overcome such a predicament, a good option may appear to 
be the 'need [for] education.' Int. I. As highlighted by the High Wycombe policing, mutual 
knowledge can foster and sustain engagement and indeed prevent alienation that can undermine 
the foundations of the community. Others have elaborated on this concept and advocate that the 
blurred and intertwined role of police and security services, requires replicas of 'Muslim Contact 
Unit' situated in London. Its introduction following the events of 11 September 2001, has led to 
272 Ibid. 
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'successes,.278 They argue that the Muslim Contact Unit accomplished in instilling measures that 
adhere to and enhance the missions issued by the Prevent strategy. Interestingly the Muslim 
Contact Unit was initiated prior to the government's CONTEST scheme. They re-affirm that the 
most appropriate model for community involvement and cooperation is that of neighbourhood 
policing.279 Its 'mutual benefit' policy enables 'a process that can be harnessed to establish the 
presence of any suspicions about potential terrorist activities. ,280 
However, rather than an institutional development with some representatives, Spalek et al.'s 
research reveals that the imperative approach in counter terrorism policing is open engagement 
with the whole community. m This viewpoint is shared by the participants from the British 
Kashmiri Muslim community, who commonly stated, 'Education is vital and should educate our 
children to stop extremism, every religion teaches peace. So religious education should be 
increased - irrespective of which one - they all say peace. Ijust wish people you know would talk 
to us and then we can all understand, so I can understand and they can understand me and my 
religion.' Int. 11. Perceived lack of mutual understanding revealed limited confidence in the 
police and the law as voiced by one participant, 'They don't understand us - so the community is 
suffering. They should be fair and trust so at the moment communities do not trust police or law. 
It's all part of big picture - not just UK - whole world in this situation.' Int.16. 
The foregoing discussion highlights the crucial role that neighbourhood policing plays in counter 
terrorism work, and that it can be only fulfilled with what is perceived to be genuine local 
policing. Understanding of the complexities of the interpretation of Islam (as discussed in the 
previous chapter), and the social issues, for example illicit drugs, affecting the community is a 
crucial step towards the right direction. 'Major drug problem in the area - crime problem - people 
278 Spalek B., El Awa S., & McDonald L.Z. (2009) Police - Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the Pwposes 
of Counter Terrorism: An Examination. Project Report: 2009. University of Birmingham at 24. 2~9 Ibid at 26. 
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"In attempting to understand the issue of terrorism from the perspectives of Muslim community members, it 
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political views on the war in Iraq, viewpoints about arrest, deportation or investigation under counter-terror laws, 
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the form of interrogation or intimidation but rather through dialogue instigated through social interaction. valuable 
to mutual understanding and trust." Spalek et al., (2009) op cit at 37. 
185 
abusing system, surprised not collapsed yet - not same as fifteen years ago, more respect for 
police. Now contempt for police - real criminals appear to be getting away with it.' lnt. 8. It is 
beyond the remits of this thesis to discuss the 'drug issue' in detail, it nevertheless has to be 
acknowledged as a 'social disorder' or a 'social problem.' Research undertaken by others has 
encountered similar concerns raised by the participants of this thesis.282 
It has been proposed that the work of counter terrorism via Neighbourhood Police provides the 
important foundations for the existence of a democratic policing mode. Just as the current 
terrorist threat does not fit the traditional crimes, perhaps the appropriate response to such a 
danger requires community led policing.m In line with this argument, some of the potentially 
wider consequences of counter terrorism policing will now be considered. These were 
specifically identified by the participants interviewed. Despite their subjectivity as to the 
'community' that the participants are inhabitants of, they require consideration as they may 
determine the perception of terrorism and indeed counter terrorism policing. 
6.S Wider Consequences of Terrorism Policing on the British Kashmiri Muslim 
Community. 
6.S.1 Suspect Community? 
The common view shared by the participants' interviewed within the selected British Kashmiri 
Muslim community is that they are the 'new' suspect community in the United Kingdom. Legal 
and political commentators have observed the change in landscape especially after 1] September 
2001 and July 2005 in Britain. Bold statements have expressed that 'our new suspect community, 
people of Muslim faith, against whom a vicious, sectarian, and most unreported war is well 
under way.'284 This sphere of discourse is perpetuated by the 'tide of pessimism,28s linked to 
international counter terrorism and its association with Muslims. It has been recognised that 
scrutiny and spotlight is firmly fixed on the followers of Islam and that these communities have 
282 lnnes M. et al., (2011) op cit at 55; Bolognani M. (2009) op cit; Chaudhury T. & Fenwick H. (2011) 'The impact 
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'increasingly become suspect communities in the US and parts of Europe just as the Irish are in 
UK.'286 
A suspect community is defined as 'a group in the population becomes a suspect community 
when government officials or the rest of the population fears that any member is involved in 
terrorist actions and needs to be watched carefully.,287 This concept seems to fit succinctly to the 
Muslim community in Britain. However, the subsequent discussion will also highlight the 
discourse surrounding the doubts about the concept of 'suspect community', and whether it is a 
valid term that can be applied to the British Muslim communities. This will be interlinked with 
findings from the research data. 
The term 'suspect community' was advocated by Hillyard,288 who used it to demonstrate the 
effects of British counter terrorism legislation, namely the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1974, on the 'Irish community'. These 'special laws' created solely for the Irish 
promoted Hillyard's argument that such terrorism policing had ' . . . constructed a suspect 
community in Britain. The wide powers of examination, arrest and detention, the executive 
powers to proscribe selected organisations, the range of specific offences under the Acts, the 
power to issue exclusion orders and a whole range of provisions covering seizure and 
investigation, have all played their part in making the Irish living in Britain, or Irish people 
travelling between Ireland and Britain, a suspect community.'289 Hillyard's thesis identifies the 
police as undertaking a crucial role in the creation of the Irish suspect community. He argued 
that the police disproportionately targeted the Irish population in Britain.290 It was the blanket 
approach adapted by the police, irrespective of religious or political affiliation, anyone 'Irish' 
would be a person of interest, this further contributed to the ideology of 'suspect community,.29\ 
286 
Lutz J.M. & Lutz B.J. (2004) Global Terrorism Routledge: London. 287 
288 L~tz & Lutz (2004), op cit., at 264. 
HllIyard P. (1993) Suspect Community: People's Experiences of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain. 
London: Pluto Press 289 • 
Ibid at 257.8 
290 Pantazis C. & Pemberton S. (2009) "From the old to the new suspect community: examining the impacts of 
~ecent UK counter terrorist legislation." Brit. J. Criminol. 2009, 49(5), 646·666. 
9, Ibid. However, there is disagreement on this aspect, namely that nost Irish whether at ports or in Britain were not 
ever subject to terrorism policing, and that Hillyard's sample was very smaII and non-random; this is highlighted 
further in the subsequent discussion on Oreer's work. 
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Moving on, it is now contended that the present counter terrorism law and policies, specifically 
in relation to policing, have transferred the term 'suspect community' to Muslims. It is conceded 
that there are differences within the Muslim population, but they are branded as one by their 
'ummatic identity and shared experiences.,292 Hence, Pantazis and Pemberton elaborate Hillyard's 
theory and submit that the Muslims in Britain are the suspect community, which is, ' ... a sub-
group of the population that is singled out for state attention as being 'problematic'. Specifically 
in terms of policing, individuals may be targeted, not necessarily as a result of suspected wrong 
doing, but simply because of their presumed membership to that sub-group. Race, ethnicity, 
religion, class, gender, language, accent, dress, political ideology or any combination of these 
factors may serve to delineate the sub_group.,293 They argue that the legal 'suspicion' applies to 
all that are perceived to be members of the suspect community as being terrorists. They present 
the example of all Asians being targeted by the police, yet they are not all Muslims, it is because 
they share the 'skin colour'. 
The suspect community theory is corroborated by those advocating it by the further concept of 
the 'war on terror' and how it targets Muslims. Hence, the police powers are utilised to fight this 
war on the Muslim 'enemy within,.294 But the basis for the 'war', according to Pantazis and 
Pemberton is commenced by carefully worded rhetoric of the executive,295 and elaborated by 
official documents using language such as 'Islamist terrorists:296 Thus, it is argued that despite 
the qualification that Muslims are 'law abiding' and 'peaceful' - these words convey very little as 
the overall message relays guilt of all Muslims, and the continuous increase in police anti 
terrorism powers further confirm the need to seek protection from the Muslims.297 In addition, it 
is submitted that the powers that HilIyard had referred to in his original 'suspect community' are 
now transferred to the Terrorism Act 2000;298 the assertion that '[I]aw is thus an integral part of 
292 Ibid at 649. 
29) Ibid at 649. 
294 Fekete L. (2004) "Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State." Race and Class, 46, 3-29. 
295 "We do not yet know the exact origin ofthis evil. But, if, as appears likely, it is so-called Islamic 
fundamentalists, we know that they do not speak or act for the vast majority of law abiding Muslims throughout the 
world." Tony Blair, then Prime Minister, Hansard (2001), "International Terrorism and Attacks in the USA", Col. 
603. http://www.publications.parliarnent.uklpalcm200102/cmhansardlvoI0914/debtextlI0914-01.htm. 
296 HM Government (2006) Countering International Terrorism: The UK's SI/·ategy. London: HMSO at I. 
297 P . & 
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the repression and organisation of state violence, whether it takes place in a person's home or in 
police custody.,299 
It is the police that are seen to perpetuate the concept of this 'new' suspect community. However, 
Pantazis and Pemberton concede that 'it is ... impossible to tell how many Muslims have been 
stopped and searched under the Terrorism ACt.,300 They observe that the 'soft' policing is 
contradicted by the 'hard' policing, which mirrors that of the 'Irish' policing. This in turn creates a 
fear of Muslims amongst the overall British society, and thus creating 'social divisions', and 
indeed antagonism.301 
A prominent critic of the Hillyard's thesis accordingly rejects Pantazis and Pemberton's assertion, 
as their work is based on Hillyard's 'flawed' theory of suspect community.302 Greer accepts the 
evidence that some Muslims in Britain have been 'negatively stereotyped'. However he disagrees 
with the view that the counter terrorism laws have created or contributed towards this negative 
stereotype, or indeed the notion of a Muslim suspect community. Greer adapts a pragmatic 
approach in his assessment of the present situation, and thus recognises the inevitable link of the 
terrorist threat to Islam. He elaborates his contention to emphasise that the legislation is there to 
protect and safeguard. In Greer's analysis of Pemberton and Pantazis' definition of suspect 
community, he submits that it is misleading and inconclusive. Thus, Greer defines suspect 
community as follows: 'A 'community' can be considered to be under official suspicion if, and 
only if, a substantial majority of those who share its identity are under official suspicion, and or 
if this identity is, in and of itself, sufficientto arouse systematic official suspicion.'303 
Greer proceeds to prove that the British Muslims do not fit this category of a suspect community. 
He questions the existence of a Muslim 'community', especially since there are increasing 
variables within the Muslim populations but concedes that they 'are united by a common faith.' 
He argues that it is justified that 'some at least should be under official suspicion', and thus areas 
:: Hillyard P. (1993) op cit., at 262. 
Home Affairs Committee (2005) "Terrorism and Community Relations", Sixth Report. London: House of 
Commons, cited in Pantazis and Pemberton (2009) op cit., at 656. 
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Greer S. (2010) "Anti - terrorist laws and the UK's 'suspect Muslim community': a reply to Pantazis and 
io~mberton." Brit. J. Criminol. 20 to, 50(6), 1171-1190. 
Ibid at 1178. 
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such as Birmingham, High Wycombe and Reading are correctly identified, as credible evidence 
has demonstrated the potential threat. In addition, there are Muslims who are supportive of the 
anti-terrorism legislation and recognise its necessity.304 
It is acknowledged that 'the root of the problem is ideologica1.,305 Greer thus asserts that it is a 
'fact' that since the ideology arises from Muslims, they will be 'disproportionately' besieged. But 
he contends that the police are to be commended for demonstrating caution; engaging with 
communities and not targeting all Muslims, while accepting that 'some' have to be addressed. 
The 'reality' is indeed very 'complicated', and the government's policies and legislation reflect the 
conflicts. On the one hand Muslims are given the shared responsibility of policing terrorism 
under Prevent, and this, according to Greer, demonstrates the Muslims' shared trust by their co-
operation in the schemes.306 Accordingly, the profile of suspect community is not shared by all 
Muslims. Moreover, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which serves to protect Muslims, 
contradicts Pantazis and Pemberton's theory that Muslims are state targets. Crucially, it is 
submitted that Pantazis and Pemberton overlook the 'material discrimination' that Muslims 
encounter, namely their lower socio-economic status and limited education,307 and incorrectly 
correlate that with their thesis of the Muslim suspect community.308 
Hence, Greer concludes that there is 'simply no evidence' to support the theory of the Muslim 
suspect community. He urges others to 'dismiss' Pantazis and Pemberton's thesis because in his 
opinion there is not sufficient evidence to state that a 'substantial majority' of Muslims in Britain 
]04 Ibid. 
]05 Head ofMIS, Jonathan Evans, The Guardian, 6 Nov. 2007., cited in Greer S. (2010) op cit 1171-1190. 
]06 Greer S. (2010) op cit., at 1183. 
]07 Some aspects are discussed in Chapter 2 in relation to the British Kashmiri Muslims. 
]01 Greer S. (2010) op cit at 1183. Greer argues that for Pemberton and Pantazis' theory to receive credibility it must 
consider twelve issues: that the threat from Islamist terrorism is real; 'war on terror' is a term that has little official 
support; the fight against terrorism will remain for the 'foreseeable future'; the consequences of terrorism act are 
drastic; thus the challenge for the officials running the country is to find the balance in protecting citizens and 
promoting due process in its counter terrorism legislation; the threat from Muslims is by 'nature and not by official 
deSignation'; thus because of its nature Muslims will be affected the most; therefore counter terrorism has to 
consider some Muslim areas and communities as suspicious; but not all; there is no right 'to be free from official 
~uspicion'; to manage terrorism. it is important to target those suspected by credible policing and intelligence. there 
IS no alternative to such counter terrorism policies; consider the balance between 'inference' and 'illegitimate 
violation'. 
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are under suspicion. 309 In rejecting Pantazis and Pemberton's work, Greer advocates that 
attention should focus on the priority of addressing all 'extremists'. 310 
6.5.2 British Kashmiri Muslim community's views on 'suspect community'. 
Solely on the basis of the research data, it is submitted that it is unwise to completely ignore or 
reject the suspect community thesis. There may well be limitations to both HiIlyard, and Pantazis 
and Pemberton's ideology, just as there are equally salient arguments in Greer's criticism of 
them. Nevertheless, the thesis is supported by the views of the community interviewed. Pantazis 
and Pemberton highlight the potential pitfalls of the anti terrorism policing that have to be 
addressed for legislation and policies to achieve the purpose they are implemented for. 
The common opinion that 'of course we are the suspect community,' (lnt.12), cannot be ignored. 
The interviewee elaborates to state, 'wherever we go, they think we are terrorists. We are being 
spied on by our own. There was a member in the mosque, he was recording information for the 
police. All our meetings, pray times, it's all wrong. September 11 proved which countries were 
involved, most were Middle East, yet Pakistanis are under more suspicions. We, they don't think 
of us as Kashmiris, we are seen as Pakistanis. Britain and USA aware of whose involved, yet 
why are we target? Wahabees or Salafist do not even exist amongst us. Pakistanis have suffered 
the most since 9/11 - no respect for us - affected us the most.' Int. 12. Some simply stated, 'We 
are a suspect community. Muslim community singled as terrorism. Terrorist is a Muslim, that's 
what they all think.' Int. 6. Interestingly in conducting their research on Muslim communities, 
Chaudhry and Fenwick concluded that 'among Muslims who participated in this study, [there 
was the view] of being treated as 'suspect community.,311 It is notworthy, however, that the 
participants in this study conducted by the writer, did not mention Islamaphobia,312 or indeed 
refer to it as a catalyst for terrorism, they continously referred to themselves as the 'suspect 
community'. 
309 On the Hillyard critique, see also:Nickels et al. (2010) 'A comparative study of the representations of 'suspect' 
communities in multi-ethnic Britain and of their impact on Irish communities and Muslim communities.' Institute for 
the Study of European Transformations. London; Liberty (2004) 'The impact of anti terrorism powers on the British 
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Nevertheless, it would appear that circumstances changed distinctly after 11 September 200 I, 
'before 9/11 I had great white - Anglo friends. Now I am wary of socialising with the farmers I 
had a good relationship because they see us all as terrorists. We are all seen in the same light; we 
build this country, are loyal to it, worked hard, but now viewed as suspect community.' lnt. 11. It 
was recognised that terrorism was now interlinked with being a Muslim: 'We're singled out as a 
suspect community. The fear of terrorism from Muslims, the threat of terrorism comes from 
Muslims. Bombs from Ireland, not scared of Catholics or Protestants, naturally afraid of what 
they don't know. It's our community that they see and single out. Not proud of things fellow 
Muslims have done, but not ashamed to be a Muslim.' Int. 15. 'We're a suspect community -
definite, highlight on us Muslims,' Int. 5, was re-emphasised. Their link with Pakistan was 
perceived to worsen their image in the wider society, 'Muslims are seen as suspect community, 
especially Pakistani Muslims because we are not Kashmiris because we have Pakistani passports, 
even with our British ones it tells them we are born in Pakistan, yet it's Kashmir. So scanning 
only Muslims at airport, especially in USA, only Saudi Arabia spoke against it, but Pakistanis are 
given a bad name.' Int. 9. 
There was the feeling of being doubly victimized, because they are Muslims and of Kashmiri 
origin, and thus a minority within a minority. 'We are suspect in the British eyes because 
terrorists are Muslims, so we have to accept that I suppose. They still treat us far better than if we 
were in Pakistan. The rest of Pakistanis they treat us as the lowest of the low. They see 
uneducated, backward, farmers, how have they got here. Some done something for themselves -
how can they succeed. They treat Kashmiris like dirt. They give us no respect, rest of Pakistanis 
here call us 'Mirpuris', it's like being called a Paki or n*""*r by the whites, who have more 
respect for us than the Pakistanis do.' Int. 8. 
Commentators have acknowledged that the 'self-esteem' of the individuals is interlinked with 
their 'social status of their cultural identity.'313 This cultural identity thus becomes vulnerable 
When the majority view it as 'less equal'. Hence, just as they perceive themselves as 'less equal' as 
313 Pinto M. (2010) "What are Offences to Feelings Really About? A new regulative principle for the Multicultural 
Era." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (OJLS) 2010,30(4),695-723 at 70S. 
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they are being equated to being suspects by the wider British society, and more so by their 
origins, (and if one discusses the isolated role of Sufism in mainstream Islam, as in Chapter 
Two), their vulnerability is perpetuated. It is certainly beyond the remit of this thesis to consider 
the aspect of cultural identity in depth,314 however it warrants some attention. Indeed the 
question on 'identity' was never posed to the participants, the question asked was in relation to 
whether as a community, they are seen as suspect or worthy of respect. The responses were 
spontaneous, and these issues strongly affect the individuals who voiced the foregoing opinions, 
though this view was not articulated by any members of the first generation. In recognising the 
British Kashmiris' role in the environment they live in, the legislature, policy makers and the 
police can accordingly address their vulnerabilities that could be exploited by those aiming to 
radicalise, and simultaneously prevent their alienation. 
Although the participants were interviewed prior to the review on Prevent in 20 11, this review 
recognizes that a sense of 'belonging' prevents radicalization.31S It was further acknowledged 
that 'radicalisation occurs as people search for identity, meaning and community.'316 The view 
that they are a suspect community was intertwined with how they are perceived by other 
communities, 'We are the lowest of the low. The Pakistanis think that we are a joke - they mock 
us, and the British, they treat us better, but find some of our faith and culture different. And that 
scares them, so they see us a threat - I like that phrase suspect community, I think it fits us.' Int. 
22. 
Others were perhaps more inclined towards the views expressed by Steven Greer's work, 'The 
Pakistanis are worse, hundred times worse than the British will be or have been with us. They 
class us as 'Mirpuris' - that is insulting - give us no identity - they laugh at us, at our faces. I am 
314 For further reading on cultural identity, see Clark K.B. & Clark M. P. (1947) "Racial Identification and 
Preference in Negro Children", in Newcomb T.M. & Hartley E.L. (editors) Readings in Social Psychology New 
York: Henry Holt, 169-78; Erikson E.H. (1956) ''The Problem of Ego-Identity." 4 J American Psychoanalytic 
Association 56-121; Phinney J.S. (1990) "Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults: Review of Research" 108 
Psychol 8u1l499-5 14; Porter J.R. & Washington R.E. (I993) "Minority Identity and Self Esteem" 19 Annu Rev 
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Society: Implications of the French Ban For Interpretations of Equality." 41 LSR 699-736; Spinner-Haley J. & 
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British Muslim first, and I have no loyalty for Pakistan, Kashmir, you are talking about, it doesn't 
really exist. I have a Pakistani friend and you know what she said, 'You're ok because you are 
educated you're different.' It's something that a white fascist would say. Just think if British 
treated us the same, we certainly would not have anywhere to turn to. You have to understand 
this British terrorism stuff - it really does all scare me. But I think it's all to protect everyone that 
includes me and my family, so maybe we are a suspect community, but that is the reality - the 
bombers - they were Muslims. They don't treat us badly because we're Mirpuri, it's because 
Muslims did it. I don't want to be a suspect community, but after 9111 they think all Muslims are 
bad.' Int. 24. 
The assertion offered by Greer that Muslim suspect community does not exist in Britain, is 
shared by some participants who state that they are, 'Not a suspect community; my middle class 
community is respected.' Int. I; 'We're not a suspect community, only target minority, leave the 
rest of us alone,' Int. 3; 'it views as good, perhaps not with respect,' Int. 10; 'the majority view us 
with respect, but minority view as bad such as the BNP.' Int. 19. In addition, there was the 
recognition of inevitability: 'inevitable that treat as suspect community, majority have been from 
our background, but respect is given to our achievement. People recognise achievements of 
individuals and communities that do well. We are on the up, most people within this country can 
see and accept that.' Int. 7. This tone was reiterated, 'although it is a suspect community, we have 
a lot to be proud of - the law protects us too. We have the freedom of movement and rights 
equivalent to all British citizens, so we are part of society, and we should do our utmost to 
uphold our responsibilities too.' Int. 27. 
Their view of being a suspect community was not solely because of terrorism policing or counter 
terrorism legislation. Some firmly believe that the media had labeled them accordingly, 'We're a 
suspect community, especially because of the media, but it doesn't affect me personally.' Int. 2; 
'Suspect community, evidenced by immigration statistics and media representation is bias. As I 
said before it's a bit vague, they label group, and they may not be that, that's when things go 
wrong,' Int. 16. The notion of suspect community was seen to be the factor of media, and the 
government were seen to preserve and protect the community as one participant observed, 
'Suspect community by the media and non-British Muslims. Also given respect by the 
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government, given freedom to carry out religion, which it could easily have banned, admiration 
for the government in that sense.' Int. 20; 'Definitely a suspect community ... people believe the 
media, it's powerful how they portray. There should be restrictions on what the media can and 
cannot say because it leads to consequences, people killed,' Int. 23. Interestingly, in their 
research of newspaper content, Nickels et al., found that the Irish and Muslim communities 'are 
represented as suspect' and that 'a more direct association is made between Muslim communities 
and suspicion.'317 Similarly Mythen et al.'s research involving four focus group discussions and 
subsequent interviews, with thirty two British Muslims in North West of England, found that 
media contributed to 'all Muslims ... [being] depicted as similarly risky.'318 
It is not possible to formulate general conclusions from the findings of the British Kashmiri 
Muslims interviewed. However, they do highlight the fact that overwhelmingly the belief that 
they are 'suspect community' prevails. Whether the contributing factor is policing, the anti 
terrorism legislation, or the media is a disputed topic. However, when undertaking counter 
terrorism work, to ignore or reject this view would be unmerited, undeserved, and unproductive. 
6.5.3 Fear 
The ultimate goal of CONTEST, as emphasised in earlier discussion, is to ensure 'people go 
about their daily lives freely and with confidence.'319 The principles underlying are to decrease 
fear, but its use or perhaps misuse has led to the increase in fear in the British Kashmiri Muslim 
community interviewed. The prevalent feelings of fear (also identified in Chapter Three), were 
directly linked to their perception of being a suspect community. Irrational as this may sound, the 
fear witnessed by the researcher is genuine and on a high scale. In turn, they demonstrated fear 
for the researcher, "I really don't want you to be locked up because you didn't give them my 
name." Int. 5. 
317 Nickels H.C., Thomas L., Hickman M.J. & Silvestri S. (2010) Working Pape/' 13. A Comparative Study of the 
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This subject was discussed in a serious manner, and the researcher had to observe the principles 
of objectivity. The fear stemmed from the policing of terrorism and its links to national security; 
since they perceived themselves as 'suspect', thus they feared the consequences of being 'Iocked-
up'; 'taken away'; 'house raids'; and simply because they are Muslims. The fear for the researcher 
was mainly demonstrated by the women and the younger generation of males. The discussion of 
the word 'terrorism' was seen to be a taboo. One participant withdrew consent when the subject 
matter was discussed and stated, 'Why didn't you choose a safer subject, this is too dangerous. 
You're one of us not one of them, and being a Muslim they will put you away and shut you up.' It 
is difficult to articulate in words the level of fear, however, what it does demonstrate is that for 
terrorism policing and legislation to be effective, this fear must be addressed. Simply not wishing 
to talk about terrorism relays the message that there is the danger of forcing radicalisation 
underground, and thereby subjecting terrorism policing to a near impossible task of confronting 
extremism ideology. The analysis that 'fear is a socialIy pervasive human emotion,320 is evident 
in the research participants. 
Academic commentary recognises that 'emotions shape our beliefs,'321 and such beliefs influence 
the outlook of surroundings including policing. Just as the participants of the British Kashmiri 
Muslim community in this thesis expressed fear, others have found similar responses from their 
research with Muslim communities: 'our participants described themselves as situated in a 
paradoxical position of fearing and being feared.,322 The participants' of this thesis openly 
expressed reluctance in talking about terrorism, 'because what's the point of drawing attention to 
yourself. Why do you do this, it's too dangerous.'323 Their need to appear inconspicuous was 
deemed to be part of their safety network. The 'irony' is that the police, who represent a symbol 
of safety and comfort for some, also provoke fear in others.324 This is described as a form of 
police 'repression' that 'takes place in a person's home.'325 The fear is fuelIed by the high profile 
]20 Spigelman J. (2010) "The forgotten freedom: freedom from fear." I. C.L. Q 2010,59(3),543-570. 
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focus of the anti terrorism policing on Muslims. It has been recognised that 'police methods' 
escalate the Muslim community's 'insecurity' and therefore increased fear is a logical outcome.326 
In recognising this fear, it has to also be acknowledged that fear about the counter terrorism 
policing does not necessarily reflect the facts. 327 The subjectivity of fear has to be balanced for 
there to be an effective outcome. Hence, it is submitted that subjective and illogical some of the 
fear of these participants may be, but it is imperative that it is addressed, and via this 
'modification', achievement and progress can be made on the Prevent scheme and counter 
terrorism policing. 
6.6 Conclusions 
The discussion in this chapter has highlighted the dilemma encountered by those implementing 
counter terrorism policing. If society is seen to appear to act 'too passively and [thus] unable to 
protect life and property, then the government loses its legitimacy and may be voted from office. 
If however, the government reacts too harshly, then it also sacrifices popular support and may 
even increase popular support for the terrorists. ,328 Indeed the executive's predicament is 
reflected in the police's implementation of counter terrorism policies and legislation. However as 
one commentator in the field of terrorism law observes, 'preconceptions and skewed 
application,329 are not the answers to counter terrorism policing. 
The data analysis from the fieldwork highlights the softening of the participants' attitudes 
towards Prevent and the local, neighbourhood policing, but there exists an aversion and fear of 
the pro-active, ardent national security policing attached to Pursue. This paradox is mirrored in 
the views expressed by the participants, and their perceptions of themselves. 
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The necessity of anti-terrorism policing is reflective of a responsible society that not only 
promotes the protection of its citizens but simultaneously prevents the horrific consequences of a 
terrorist attack. However, it is intrinsically imperative to acknowledge that these justified means 
may have some adverse effects, such as the creation of suspect communities in various 'targeted' 
areas of Britain. To completely deny or ignore the existence of the perception of this concept 
would be detrimental to the policing and national security agenda. Simply put, counter terrorism 
policies will only succeed with police and community engagement. 
The research undertaken for this thesis shows that the police need to demonstrate responsiveness 
to the community's needs and grievances, and via such interactions engage in understanding the 
cultural elements that are the foundations of the community. The executive has issued policing 
powers to anticipate all possible risks, be they via section 47 A, section 41 or Schedule 7, but, it is 
for the local and national police to use those powers proportionately and with due care. The 
police's image is 'tarnished' with allegations and realities of discrimination,330 and to overcome 
this problem, the police have to work assiduously to re-establish the trust and confidence of the 
communities they serve. Intrinsically to confront extremism and radicalisation, they must avoid 
temporary solutions via the over use of the counter terrorism legislation. Police are the 
inescapable forefront of the counter terrorism agenda, and their hybrid role demands they 
preserve due process. Similarly in administering the capacious powers given to the police, the 
executive is duty bound to implement simultaneous safeguards to preserve and uphold the rule of 
law.m It is only then that their aims outlined in counter terrorism legislation can be achieved. 
330 Sharp D. & Atherton S. (2007) "To serve and protect? The experiences of policing in the community of young 
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31 See: Moran J. & Phythian M. (2008) "Introduction" in Moran J. & Phythian M. (editors) Intelligence, Security 
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Chapter Seven: Terrorism Activity Laws and the British Kashmiri Muslim Community. 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on police and their powers under the counter terrorism legislation. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss terrorist activity laws in relation to the participants' 
views. The Anti terrorism legislation targets various terrorist activities. In Chapter Six, pre-
emptive policing was discussed in combination with the government's CONTEST strategy, this 
chapter will also address and examine some of the government's legislation that aims to 
contribute to and sustain the CONTEST agenda. The relevant measures includes 'membership' of 
proscribed group in order to aid global anti terrorism policies; the second part of the chapter will 
consider proscription powers that have been extended from organisational membership to 
expressions, referred to in short as 'glorification', aswell as the offence of withholding 
information. The third aspect of discussion relates to the anti terrorism legislation on finances, 
and its impact if any on the Muslim participants interviewed. 
The counter terrorism legislation reflects the Government's determination to be pre emptive and 
reduce risk. Therefore they declare certain people or groups as enemies and suspects. The core 
issue is that of the underlying fear of everyone, but due to limitations of personnel and 
capabilities, pragmatism dictates that only certain groups are more 'at risk' such as certain 
Muslim communities. For its effectiveness, the government needs the approval and support of its 
citizens; an example of encouraging this is the offence of 'withholding of information,' in the 
Terrorism Act 2000, section 38B.1 
7.2 Proscription powers: Membership of an Organisation 
7.2.1 Overview 
Organisational proscription was inaugurated into the British legislation in the current era by the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974, albeit that it was applicable then only to organisations linked 
to Northern Ireland. However as the executive's threat from other organisations increased, 
coupled with international concerns, the proscribed organisations were further elaborated in the 
I Walker C. (2009b) 'Neighbour Terrorism and All Risks Policing of Terrorism. 3 J. Nat'L Security & Pol'y 2009 
(University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law). 
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Terrorism Act 2000 and Terrorism Act 2006.2 The Terrorism Act 2000 provides that the Irish 
organisations already listed remain proscribed under Schedule 2, while section 3 of the Act 
applies to other organizations, whether Irish or based outside the UK. These latter include groups 
operating in or behalf of Kashmir, namely: Harkat ul Mujahideen; Harakat ul Mujahideen; 
Harakat ul - Jihad-ul-Islam; Harkat - ul - Mujahideen / Alami; Jaish e Mohammed; Jamaat ul -
Furquan; Khuddam ul-Islam; Lashkar e Toyyaba, these were all proscribed for the first time in 
2001. Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000, outlines that the applicability of proscription is 
reserved for those organisations that are 'concerned in terrorism',3 and that concern refers to those 
who 'commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages 
terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in terrorism.'4 This criterion, has been elaborated by Part 2, 
section 21 of the Terrorism Act 2006, and section 22 which ensures that the name change of a 
group does not escape its proscription. 
7.2.2 Factors determining proscription 
This applicability of proscription is at the executive's discretion. The test for the proscription of 
international groups was illustrated by Lord Bassam, 
'First we would have to consider carefully the nature and scale of the group's activities; 
secondly, we would have to look at the specific threat that it posed to the UK and our citizens 
abroad, which is clearly a very important consideration, as well as the extent of its presence 
in this country .... Thirdly, we would also have to consider our responsibility to support 
other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism.'5 
Although this test was held to appropriate by Anderson in his review of the counter terrorism 
legislation, he categorically disagreed with Lord Bassam's third element. It was asserted that in 
proscribing groups, national rather than international interests should take precedence.6 The 
broadness of Lord Bassam's criteria provides a buffer for the political spectrum 'serving the 
2 Thorne K. (2006) Proscription often'orist groups in the UK. May 2006. 
http://www.hdcentre.orglfileslProscriptionUK.pdfvisited: 14 April 2011; Walker C. (2009) Blackstone's Guide to 
The Anti - Terrorism Legislation. Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
J Section 3(4). 
4 Section 3 (5). 
s 
Hansard HL vol. 613, col. 252. (16 May 2000). 
6 Anderson D. (QC) (2012) The Terrorism Acts in 2011 Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation (?fthe 
Terrorist Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006. London: HMSO. June 2012, para 12.9 at p.136. 
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interests of healthy trade relations and smooth diplomacy.'7 This is evident by the groups that are 
not proscribed, despite fulfilling Lord Bassam's hypothesis. For example, AI-Shabab; Fuerzas 
Armadas Revoluclon arias de Colombia (F ARC); Jalshal-Mahdi, which is the Iraq Shia Militia 
responsible for attacks on British forces in Basra.8 
The political ambiguity portrayed by the executive was on one occasion clarified by the judiciary 
in Lord Alton of Liverpool and others (In the Matter of the People's Mojahadeen Organisation of 
Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department. 9 This case held that in considering section 
3(4) the Secretary of State is compelled to identify an 'honest belief on reasonable grounds' and 
secondly where decisions are made on 'policy grounds', 'discretion' has to be considered. 10 
National security concerns often prohibit the executive from revealing the evidence obtained 
about organizations, (but the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission, can still inquire).11 
It is also thought necessary to maintain discretion concerning information obtained from foreign 
allies who view these groups as terrorists. The Court of Appeal identified that in coming to its 
decision the Secretary of State had to provide evidence, that the organisation to be proscribed 
continued to remain 'concerned in' terrorism,12 and that legal equity dictates that there be 
continuous assessment of the organisations,13 and 'not put their names in a filing cabinet and 
forget about them.'14 Thus it was recommended by Anderson that there should be a time limit for 
proscription of organisations set at two years, with a review for any renewals. IS In addition the 
criteria should substitute 'a balance of probabilities test for the standard of reasonable belief.'16 
It has been argued that the politicalIy fuelled 'discretion' of the Secretary of State has the 
potential to proscribe organisations that would otherwise be considered lawful and viewed by the 
international arena as fighting for self determination. Although Britain is compelled to abide by 
7 Walker C. (2009) op cit at 41. 
: Ibid at 41. (but al Shabaab is now proscribed under SI 20 10/611). 
PC 1 02/2006,30 November 2007. paras 67, 68; also: Secretary of State for the Home Department v Lord Alton of 
f;!verpool [2008] EWCA Civ. 443 at para 22. 
Walker C. (2009) op cit at 42. 
110' 
12 Iscussed further in the subsequent section: 7.1.5. 
Walker C. (2009) ibid. 
13 
PC 1 02/2006. 30 November 2007 at para 7.3. 
14 HC Standing Committee O. col. 65 (18 January 2000). Charles Clarke. 
15 Anderson O. (QC) (2012) The Terrorism Acts in 201 I Report of the Independent Reviewer on/he Opera/ion (if the 
Terrorist Act 2000 and Part I of the Terrorism Act 2006. London: HMSO. June 2012. para 12.11 at p.137. 
16 Ibid. para 12.12 at p.137. 
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international law on self determination, the capacious nature of the Terrorism Act 2000 creates 
the environment for proscription of many organisations. This aspect was recognised in R v F, 17 
when the Court of Appeal held that the Terrorism Act 2000 does not offer an exemption for 
those organisations that are resisting 'oppressive regimes,.18 
In the case of Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman,19 Rehman, a Pakistani 
citizen legally living in the UK was refused indefinite leave by the Secretary of State. (Although 
this case concerned deportation, the justification for the deportation is relevant for the present 
discussion). Rehman argued that the Secretary of State's decision was unlawful since he was not 
a threat to 'UK's security', and that his alleged 'links' were against India and therefore not risk to 
British national interests.2o The House of Lords held that even in cases where there is 'no direct 
threat' to UK, an individual's 'action against a foreign state may be capable indirectly of affecting 
the security of the United Kingdom.,2l It was accepted that 'it cannot be proved that he has 
carried out any individual act which would justify the conclusion that he is a danger,,22 but 
'The Secretary of State, in deciding whether it is conducive to the public good that a 
person should be deported, is entitled to have regard to all the information in his 
possession about the actual and potential activities and the connections of the person 
concerned. He is entitled to have regard to the precautionary and preventative 
principles rather than to wait until directly harmful activities have taken place.,23 
Perhaps what is equally alarming is that Lord Hoffman bluntly stated that 'decisions as to whether 
something is or is not in the interests of national security are not a matter for judicial decision. 
They are entrusted to the executive,,24 and elaborated that the 'question of whether something is 'in 
the interests' of national security is not a question of law. It is a matter of judgment and policy:25 
17 [2007) EWCA Crim 243. 
18 Muller M. (2008) 'Terrorism, Proscription and the Right to Resist in the Age of Conflict.' Denning Law Journal, 
2008, Vol.20 pp.lll-l3l. 
19 [2001) UKHL47; [2003) I AC 153. 
20 Tomkins A. (2010) 'National security and the role ofthe court: a changed landscape?' L.Q.R 2010, 126 (Qct), 543-
567. 
21 
22 Lord Slynn: Secretary 0/ State/or the Home Department v Rehman [2003) I AC 153 at [16). 
23 Rehman [2003] I AC 153 at [65] per Lord Hutton. 
Per Lord Slynn at [22]. 
24 At [50]. 
2S 
Lord Hoffman at [50]. 
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Indeed Lord Steyn concluded that it is necessary to accord 'great weight to the views of the 
executive.,26 
The Rehman case 'reconfirmed,27 the views expressed by Lord Finlay L.C. in Halliday8 and 
those of Viscount Maugham in Liversidge that 'suggested rule has no relevance in dealing with 
an executive measure by way of preventing a public danger when the safety of the state is 
involved.'29 Although the courts in Rehman appear to endorse the government by stating that the 
national security concerns are 'clearly a matter for executive discretion and nothing else,'3o they 
differed in their opinion in the Alton case. Albeit, Rehman is perhaps overshadowed by the 'great 
weight given' 'to the views of the executive on matters of national security,'31 the Alton case 
demonstrates that when considered necessary the contemporary judiciary will disagree with the 
executive. 
The Bassam criteria are applied in legislation that (as discussed in Chapter Six) that came into 
existence well before II September 2001. As noted earlier by Walker,32 academic commentators 
have reinforced and reiterated the argument that proscription of an organisation is primarily 
governed by political and inter-personal relationships between States rather than just the British 
national security agenda.33 Thus international diplomacy takes precedence over the adherence to 
the rule of law governing counter terrorism. In such ways, the credibility of the law and the 
British executive is challenged by the discourse on the proscription criteria. Before exploring this 
matter this chapter discuss the views of the participants in relation to the situation in Kashmir, 
prior to proceeding on the aspect of proscription. 
7.2.3 British Kashmiri Muslim participants' views on Kashmir 
The situation in Kashmir and how that political situation may impinge on British Muslims of 
Kashmiri origin, was considered in Chapter Two. Some of the participants had no interest in, and 
26 At [31]. 
27 T k' 
'8 om IOS A. (20 I 0) op cit. 
; R v Hal/iday [1917] A.C. 260 HL. 3: Livel'sidge & Andel'sol7 [1942] A.C. 206 at 218-219. 
31 Livel'sidge & Andersol7 [1942] A.c. 206. 
J2 Lord Steyn in Rehman op cit; Tomkins (20 10) op cit. 
JJ Walker C. (2009) op cit at 42. 
Muller M. (2008) op cit at 125. 
203 
limited knowledge about Kashmir, and therefore focused on other sections of the interview. 
Interestingly however when asked 'Would you describe the Kashmir political situation as 
terrorism or not?', all had a response. Those that were 'Dismissive' or 'indifferent' Int. 2, to the 
situation in Kashmir, responded with a brief, 'Not terrorism, freedom fighting, it's all about 
control of power and land.' In1.2. Others offered elaborate responses, 'conflict in the area - one 
man's freedom fighter is another's terrorist - depends on which side of the coin. Delhi nightclub 
is terrorism, not terrorism when Indian policeman shot in Kashmir. The majority of Muslims are 
merely fighting for their rights. Muslim side feel oppressed and view Indians as terrorists and 
vice versa. Minority ruling - lines are blurred.' Int. 7. 
The overall opinion, with a few exceptions, was that, 'it's not terrorism - not as media showing, 
the term used last 10-15 years, Kashmir movement is different like 1947 movement started. It 
was highlighted in the 1990s because international terrorism started 1993, 1998 and 200 I, this 
situation has existed since 1947, it's a freedom movement, they want right of self determination 
- so they can decide what they want separation or be part of India or Pakistan, can't say it's 
terrorism.' Int. 16. The empathy or sympathy for Kashmir was articulated by the participants. 
They commonly attempted to distinguish between the situation in Kashmir and the terrorism that 
Occurred elsewhere in the world: 'I don't agree with suicide bombers - terrorism is bad. I 
disagree with it. However, people trying to protect themselves the definition is blurred. 
Distinction if going to hotel, for example, Mumbai and kill innocents it's wrong, and disagree 
with it, but in Kashmir, they want independence from India and Pakistan, they want freedom 
therefore not terrorism. For example, Beslan, it's definite terrorism, I believe that as a practising 
Muslim. It's political, Muslims gone wrong by killing innocent people - committing suicide -
reason Muslim extremists gone wrong - we take over and kill. Our Prophet peace be upon him, 
forgave people. In terms of Kashmir, people can relate to it and feel helpless.' Int. 17. 
This theme that the events of Kashmir are not terrorism, was elaborated further, 'According to 
me, the UN is a judge, dispute in 1947, I remember it, I was a young lad. India, civilians fought, 
no Pakistani army they were not involved, when Nehru thought that Kashmir was going to lose 
it, asked UN for a ceasefire. UN did so on the condition of a referendum, but this was never 
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granted. India never gave them rights, but terrorism is them, not those fighting freedom. Kashmir 
are innocent - fighting for a referendum that was never granted. It's all on record. Kashmiris are 
not terrorists, the Indian army and government are.' Int. 19. Some participants considered 
violence outside Kashmir as terrorism, 'Not terrorism because both sides fighting to get their land 
- but suppose if doing in other places, for example, India, it is terrorism.' Int. 26. There were 
exceptions who stated that they did not know, however, there was only one participant that 
viewed the events as terrorism:- 'actualIy yes in parts because it has no official recognition army, 
considered as terrorism because guerrilla army (Kashmiris) and yes I consider it terrorism too.' 
Int. 20. Nevertheless, the British Kashmiri Muslim participants commonly observed when asked 
about proscription of Kashmiri organisations, 'they are freedom fighters in Kashmir. If fighting 
outside then ban but only when in Kashmir then should not be banned. They are not harming 
Britain.' Int. 12. 
The terrorist groups that were identified in Chapter Two, and proscribed by the Terrorism Act 
2000, namely, Jaish E Muhammad, Lashkar E Toiba and Harkat UI Mujahideen were not known 
by some of the participants, 'Not heard of these groups.' Some knew only as to what had been 
relayed to them in the media, 'Yes just heard on the media - it's all media is that.' Int. 14. It is 
worth noting that some of the first generation men paused and appeared to deliberate over this 
question, 'Banned in Pakistan - just know them via media. Otherwise no connection, none here.' 
Int. 19. However, not all the participants were that cautious, 'Heard of the first two - the jihad 
groups. Seen them on my visit to Azad Kashmir, driving by in their cars. They are viewed as 
freedom fighters, helping those in Indian administered Kashmir.' Int. 24. The view 'freedom 
fighters' was endorsed by others, 'Yes heard of them - fighting for their cause of Islam.' Int. 10; 
'These Kashmiri groups, now seen as terrorists by these people, they were fighting for their 
rights.' Int. 11. Others elaborated, 'They are like freedom fighters, they fight against the Indian 
army and do not target innocent individuals.' lnt. 12, and some with ambivalence, 'They like 
fighting in Kashmir - things mixed up at the moment - can't classify clearly what media present 
them as terrorists. I'm not sure if they are terrorists, they are a bit strict: believe that should fight 
against non-Muslim. It depends on where they are fighting really. Wrong when killing in 
Pakistan. I'm not really clear about this.' Int. 16.34 
)4 F 
urther views on proscription of these groups will be discussed alongside subsequent academic commentary. 
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Having presented the views of the participants on the proscription of the Kashmiri groups, it is 
fitting to provide further analysis on the discussion of proscription. 
7.2.4 Analysis 
Proscription is a powerful legislative tool that criminalises organisations and those associated 
with the groups. Its incorrect use has the capacity to fertilize and perpetuate antagonism amongst 
those affected towards the state. It has been asserted, in line with the fieldwork data, that in 
proscribing an organisation, it is imperative that due process is observed, hence, upholding 
international law and recognising that organisations may be compelled to resort to violence for a 
legally recognised political hypothesis. 35 
Moreover, it is acknowledged that proscription of groups does indeed 'devolve wide discretions 
to the government of the day, with few effective checks and balances.,36 The political bias in 
proscription of groups has raised 'valid concerns', since decisions made in response to the 
public's fear are not always objective.37 One commentator observes, '[ilt is not being unduly 
cynical to say that politicians know that if they are not seen to be doing all that is possible to 
discourage and prevent an attack they will be punished politically, especially in the event of a 
serious terrorist threat occurring. ,38 Further, in a climate of fear justification - however irrational, 
submitted by the ruling executive in proscribing groups are readily accepted by the pUblic.39 
Cram elaborates to address the 'inherently political nature' of such decision making - in the 
present discussion: relating to proscription.4o 
It has been argued that in electing the government, society and communities within it, rely on 
this executive to preserve their existence.41 In the case of terrorism, the government's response in 
3S • Muller M. (2008) op Clt at 130. 
36 Lynch A., McGarrity N., & Williams G., (2009) 'The Proscription of Terrorist Organisations in Australia.' 
Federal Law Review, Vol. 37 at 3. 
37 Ibid at 12-13. 
38 Hogg R. (2007) Submission No.6 to PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Terrorist Organisation 
Listing Provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995, 31 January 2007 at 16. 
39 See Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Monash University, Submission No.2 to PJCIS, Parliament of 
Australia, Inquiry into the Terrorist Organisation Listing Provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995,22 January 
2007 at 5-6. 
40 Cram I. (2010) 'Beyond Lockean Majoritanism? Emergency, Institutional failure and the UK constitution.' H.R.L 
~ev.201O, 10(3),461-485. . 
Locke J. (1690) in Hampton (1997) Political Philosophy Colorada: Westvlew Press. 
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its passing of legislation is to preserve public safety, via legislation that considers pre emptive 
measures, (as discussed in Chapter Six also). Formal enactment (which may involve proscription 
of groups) is imperative to protect civil society. In turn the government responsible for the 
legislation is deemed to be acting appropriately until society 'denounces' its 'prerogative powers'. 
Hence, applying this theory to the terrorism law discussed in these chapters, in that 'majority' and 
not unanimous decisions would serve to govern, and would do so with majority backing and 
perform in accordance 'to the laws of nature.' However, it has been submitted that this theory 
fails to consider minority rights and their recourse to justice. To balance the power, it is 
anticipated that the executive is accountable to peer review, but where the governing body has 
majority representatives in Parliament, as was the case with the last Government in UK, this 
accountability becomes futile, as 'party loyalties' dominate the passage of the legislation. Thus 
the scrutiny of the anti terrorism legislation is dependent on the unelected judiciary to preserve 
the credibility ofthe legislation and uphold the rule of law. 42 This is an uphill struggle effectively 
demonstrated by Rehman, that the domestic judiciary is reluctant (despite the exception of Alton) 
to challenge the decisions of its elected executive. 
There is the view shared by the participants that in proscribing the Kashmiri organisations the 
British government has done so with inadequate research on the group's activities. 'It's going 
against freedom of speech and basic human rights, especially if no evidence of their acts (please 
underline the no).' Int. 23. There was ambivalence as to what the Kashmir groups represented, 'If 
they are true freedom fighters then it's wrong to ban them, surely someone has to stand up to the 
atrocities of the Indian army, but if proven to be terrorists, which I am not sure they are here, 
then we have to ban them.' Int. 27. The view that proscription was based on political ideology 
rather than the 'facts on the ground', and thus one participant expressed, 'It's hypocritical to ban 
groups like that and then not enforce the law that Israeli foreign minister indicted as war 
criminal. We don't ban groups of interest to us [Britain)' Int. 17. In addition, they struggled with 
the offences and 'punishment' related to proscription of the Kashmiri groups and described such 
issues as existing 'because of Indian pressure' Int. 12; 'it's a superpower so Britain listens to India, 
no other reason to ban these groups.' Int. 10. 
42 Cram I. (2010) op cit at 461-485. 
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In summary it is argued that proscription is imperative for national security and that when the 
. organisation is declared 'criminal' publicly; this deters and prohibits those sympathetic to the 
group from joining its 'ranks'. In addition, it undermines the group's 'undesirable activities', 
ceases its support that is necessary for the organisation's long term survival.43 Proscription is also 
viewed as a preventative measure that is essential for national security and the democratic 
process.44 Walker proclaims that when 'assailed by political violence, then legal systems must 
both counter 'violence' and address the 'political ends' behind it.,45 However, as the fieldwork 
data demonstrates there were doubts voiced by the participants that in proscribing Kashmiri 
groups the legal system is being overzealous. It is submitted that any possibility of impropriety is 
redressed by the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission, (POAC).46 
7.2.5 Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission (POAC) 
The appropriate redress to the misuse of proscription is afforded by the Terrorism Act 2000 in 
two elements. The first involves the application to the Secretary of State;47 should that be 
refused, the second is a submission to the POAC.48 Submission to the Secretary of State has to 
come from the proscribed organisation or a 'person affected' by the proscription as identified in R 
v Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex parte British Broadcasting Corporation. 49 However, 
the only case effective in deproscription is that of Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
Lord Alton of Liverpool, 50 when Lord Alton, his eighteen peers from the House of Lords and 
sixteen members of the House of Commons, described themselves as 'persons affected,' even 
though they were not members of the PMOl.51 Interestingly their position as 'persons affected' 
was not disputed by the CourtS.52 
4) Oickson B. (2005) 'Law versus terrorism: can law win?' E. H.R.L.R 2005, I, 11-28. 
44 Lynch A., McGarrity N. & Williams G. (2009) 'The Proscription of Terrorist Organisations in Australia.' Federal fsaw Review. Vol. 37 at 3. 
Walker C. (2011) Terrorism and the Law. Oxford: OUP at p.341. 
46 O' k 
IC son B. (2005) op cit. 
47 S . 
48 ectlon 4(1) Terrorism Act 2000. 
49 Section 5 Terrorism Act 2000. 
so [2000] 3 WLR 1327. 
SlOp cit, [2008] EWCA Civ. 443. 
52 People's Mujahedin of Iran. 
Walker C. (2009) op cit. 
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Although POAC 'offers some antidote to executive dominance,'53 it remains minimal. The 
absence of independent reviews54 offers little comfort for those seeking protection from hasty, 
politically bias decisions. The test for whether proscription is lawful is guarded by the cloak of 
secrecy surrounding the hearings.55 The government's alleged evidence surrounding the 
proscribed organisation cannot be examined and indeed cross examined. Moreover the danger of 
being perceived to be in the ranks of the proscribed organisations deters any 'person affected' 
from pursuing a claim. The Terrorism Act 2000 offers some immunity to those challenging 
proscription via the POAC,56 but this is limited to certain offences. 57 
7.2.6 Application and Effectiveness of Proscription 
Section 11 (1) Terrorism Act 2000, outlines the circumstances in which a person 'belongs', or 
'professes to belong' to a proscribed group. 58 However, this has led to some ambiguity when 
being analysed by the courts, as identified in Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions; 
Attorney General's Reference (No.4 of 2002).59 It was held that 'it is far from clear, in my 
opinion, whether it should be understood to denote an open affirmation of belonging to an 
organisation or an acknowledgement to fall within section 11(1), would have to be true.,60 Lord 
Bingham's views have been concluded to encompass 'both affirmation and acknowledgement' of 
the said organisation.61 To preserve 'blameless conduct,' the Sheldrake case provided that 
'security concerns do not absolve member states from their duty to observe basic standards of 
faimess.'62 Thus section 11 (I) and section 1I (2) had to be considered in conjunction, however as 
observed by Walker it is burdensome on the defendant to overcome section \\(2) criteria, and 
53 
Walker C. (2009) op cit at 45. 
54 • 
55 Walker C. (2009) op Clt at 47. 
Walker C. (2009) ibid at 45. 
56 S . 
. ectlOn 10 Terrorism Act 2000. In discussing this section, Mr. Clarke states: 'The clause does not provide general 
Immunity, and it would be wrong to do so. If, for instance, it emerged during proceedings that an individual had 
been involved in a bombing attack or had incited an act ofterrorism abroad, immunity in respect of criminal 
proceedings would not apply. That strikes the right balance. Offences involving waepons, articles, information, and 
so on are omitted from the immunity provided in the clause because they do not relate directly to proscription.' 
~ansard HC Standing Committee D, col. III (25 January 2000). 
Walker C. (2009) op cit at 45. 
58 Ib'd 48 59 I at . 
60 [2004] UKHL 43. 
61 Lord Bingham at para 48. 
62 Walker C. (2009) op cit at 49. 
She/drake v Director of Public Prosecutions; Attorney Genera/'s Reference (No..! of 2002) [200';} UKHL -13. per 
Lord Bingham at para. 21. 
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'purely passive membership can suffice for conviction.'6J But, in R v Ahmed (Rangzieb). M the 
courts considered membership under section 11 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and concurred with 
the judgment of Jack J. in Smith Kline Beecham Plc v Greig Aver/5 that 
, ... voluntary and knowing association with others with a view to furthering the aims of the 
proscribed organisation. We agree with the submission made to us that in some cases it will 
be necessary to make clear that unilateral sympathy with the aims of an organisation, even 
coupled with acts designed to promote similar objectives, will, whilst being clear evidence of 
belonging, not always be sufficient; the jury may need to consider whether there is the 
necessary element of acceptance or reciprocity which will be involved in belonging.'66 
In Hundal and Dhaliwal. 67 it was established that prosecution under section 11 was valid for 
events that occurred outside the UK to prevent what was described as 'a coach and horses to be 
driven through the objects of the legislation.'68 
Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides offences that do not involve membership but 
directly or indirectly relate to assisting the proscribed organisations. An example was outlined by 
Parliamentary debates, 
'We accept that there could be a genuinely benign private meeting to be addressed by a 
member of a proscribed organisation ... However, we cannot accept the arranging of public 
meetings to be addressed by members of proscribed organisations, even when the person 
arranging the meeting does not think that the address wi1l support the organisation.'69 
:~ Walker C. (2009) op cit at 50. 
[2011] EWCA Crim 184 (CA (Crim. Div», Rangzieb Ahmed argued that he was a member of Harkat ul 
~ujahideen (Kashmiri group), and not AI Qaeda. 
[2009] EWHC 1488 QB. 
66 para 89. 'Case Comment R l' Ahmed (Rangzieb) case in detail.' Arch. Rev. 2011,3,4-5. 
61 [ 
68 2004] EWCA Crim 389; [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 19. 
[At 12]. The facts of the case: both defendants acknowledged to membership of the international Sikh Youth 
Fe~eration in Germany, but argued that had lapsed in April 2001, and Dhaliwal's had lapsed in October 2000. 
~elther was aware of its proscription in Britain. 
Charles Clarke, Hansard HC vol. 353, col. 655 (10 July 2000). 
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Section 13(1) considers 'display in public alIegiance with, or support for' the proscribed 
organisation, as identified in Rankin v Murray.70 
7.2.7 Further Analysis 
The statistics on prosecutions relating to Kashmir are not available, and most reported cases have 
related to non-Kashmiri groups. Nevertheless, the participants expressed anxiety in relation to 
these powers: 'Even though I don't support these groups, I am scared that if I say I understand the 
cause I am committing an offence. I am not saying I understand either, but I just give you 
example.' Int.l2. The view, '[i]fthey are terrorists, then it's good law,' Int. 19, was reinforced by 
some of the participants. 
There is also the common recognition that British security takes precedence, 'can't really say 
anything - some of their leaders were from Middle East, very generalIy say kilI them - jihad. 
When something comes in law, disadvantage for many, one person's view, such as the leaders 
saying about jihad and the whole community affected, have to pay for that, but security of 
Britain is priority.' Int. 16. The common view ascertained from the participants interviewed was 
that the Kashmiri organisations proscribed under Terrorism Act 2000, 'should not be banned. If 
sat down and talked with them, they will probably be less than one percent bad, we can only end 
things by negotiation not war.' Int. 11. The lack of regular review of the proscription decision 
caused concern to some who concluded, 'They should ban alI groups, not just Kashmiri groups,' 
Int. 5, and the view, 'fine, but shouldn't just discriminate against Muslims.' Int. 2. Others 
acknowledged the advantage of proscription of the said Kashmiri organisations in aiding the 
recognition of Kashmir, 'I'm happy for them to be banned as long as legitimize Kashmiri defence 
that is recognised by Kashmiri people, rather than India or Pakistan. Recognise the state of 
Kashmir and defence for that state, then I'm happy with it.' Int. 20. 
Proscription powers are regarded necessary in the legislature's fight against national and 
international terrorism. It has been acknowledged that weakening and diminishing terrorist 
activities is a step towards the ultimate goal. However, this goal is clouded by the illusion and 
pragmatism of international diplomacy and the national political agenda over the reality of the 
70 [2004] SCCR 422. This case involved the accused wearing a ring with initials 'UYF'. 
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situation, thus blurring the boundaries of self determination, as some argue is the case in 
Kashmir and other parts of the world. The importance of proscription is emphasised by those 
responsible for its implementation: 
'There are three principal reasons why we think proscription is important. First, it has been, 
and remains, a powerful deterrent to people to engage in terrorist activity. Secondly, related 
offences are a way of tackling some of the lower level support for terrorist organisations ... 
Thirdly, proscription acts as a powerful signal of the rejection by the Government - and 
indeed by society as a whole - of organisations' claim to legitimacy ... The legislation is a 
powerful symbol of that censure and is important.o7l 
It is this confidence in the executive, and the necessity of proscription that evoked comments 
such as, 'It's a responsible government, would treat right winged organisation in the same way. I 
trust their judgment, some of these organisations do need to be banned; free speech but can't let 
anyone do what they like, extreme examples have to be limited.' Int. 17. Thus it is the importance 
of such legislation that led to its extension to proscribe elements of 'speech' - referred to as 
'glorification'. 
7.3 Glorifying Terrorism. 
7.3.1 Background 
The bombings on July 2005 instigated a review of the counter terrorism legislation and the need 
to instill confidence in state - security policing, to ease the inevitable anxieties related to such 
terror activities. The government took the initiative of proscribing and criminalising the 
'glorification' of terrorism, ensuring that published or distributed material did not contain 
'encouragement' or incitement to terrorism. 72 Three crucial issues were identified73 that further 
justified the need for such legislation. These were the perceived gap in law that did not include 
71 Hansard HC Standing Committee 0 col. 56 (18 January 2000), Charles Clarke. 
72 It was successfully argued that 'the July events indicate that there are people in this country who are susceptible to 
the preaching ... of an argument or a message that terrorism is a worthy thing, a thing to be admired, a thing to be 
celebrated and then act on the basis of that .... What this Bill is about is trying to make that more difficult that 
transition from people encouraging, glorifying to then an act being undertaken.' Hansard Commons Draft Terrorism 
Bill, Written and Oral Evidence, HC 515-1, October 11,2005,0.3. 
7] Hunt A. (2007) 'Criminal prohibitions on direct and indirect encouragement ofterrorislll', Crim. L. R. 2007, 441-
458. 
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'incitement' to terrorism. 74 The second issue was precipitated by the Council of Europe 
Convention on the Prevention ofTerrorism,75 which requires its member states to legally prohibit 
'public provocation to commit terrorist offences', which, 'was defined as all forms of 'incitement' 
to terrorism.'76 
The third imperative issue, is that of the United Nations Security Council77 adopted Resolution 
1624 (2005)78, to address 'incitement' to terrorism. This initiative received the whole hearted 
endorsement of the UK, who had only two months earlier suffered the catastrophic consequences 
from the London bombings. The Security Council's Preamble, 
'Calls upon all States to adopt such measures as may be necessary and appropriate and in 
accordance with their obligations under international law to: a). Prohibit any law 
incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts; b). Prevent such conduct; c). Deny safe 
haven to any persons with respect to whom there is credible and relevant information 
giving serious reasons for considering that they have been guilty of such conduct.,79 
In addition, the Resolution encouraged interstate co-operation to effectively implement the 
incitement offence, and to inform the Counter Terrorism Committee80 about each state's 
progression on this resolution. sl It has been described as a 'spontaneous reaction' that required 
little 'deliberation.'82 It is argued that 'modern' terrorism is fuelled by its worldwide 
communication links, and that the offence of incitement will target the roots of communication 
that are necessary for its survival. The criminalisation of incitement to terrorism, according to 
Ronen deters 'the conditioning of the audience', since 'the success of decentralised, anonymous 
74 Baroness Scotland: Hansard, HL Vol. 676, col. 455 (December 5, 2005). The House of Lords acknowledged: 'It is 
an offence ... to incite people to engage in terrorist activities generally, or to incite them obliquely by creating the 
climate in which they may come to believe that terrorist acts are acceptable. That is the gap that we want to close, 
both to enable us to fulfil our international obligations and because we believe that it is desirable in its own right.' 
75 CECPT, Article 5. See also: Hunt A. (2006) 'The council of Europe Convention on the Prevention ofTen'orism', -I 
~lIropean Public Law 603. 
Hunt A. (2007) op cit at 442. 
;: Which recalls se Res 1566 (2004). 8 October 2004. 
September 2005. 
79 
8 UN Doc. Res. 1624 (2005), preambular paras, 3 & 8. 8~ CTC established following SC Res. 1373 (2001). . 
See s.e Res 1624 (2005), operative paras 2, 3, 5. By mId July 2007, 88 states had reported to the CTC. See also 
~N Doc. S/2008/29 para 5; UN Doc S/2006/737, paras 5-6, both relate to CTC Reports. 
Ronen Y. (2010) 'Incitement to terrorist acts and international law.' L.J.l. L. 20 I 0, 23(3), 645-674. 
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terrorism depends on a strategy of a persistent and invasive indoctrination - ideological, religious 
or intellectual.,s3 
7.3.2 United Kingdom's response 
United Kingdom issued its domestic response with the introduction of the Terrorism Act 2006. 
In turn, section 21 Terrorism Act 2006 provided the authority to proscribe groups that 'glorify 
terrorism' and amended the Terrorism Act 2000 to include a revised version of section 3 (SA), 
which allowed the authority to proscribe groups that 'promote or encourage', as well as the 
'unlawful glorification of the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or 
generally) of acts of terrorism.' Walker observed that '[t]he boundaries between incitement and 
glorification are difficult to draw.,84 However, in advocating the legislation, the debates reflect 
the recognition of differentiating between history and present events, 'cultural events or those 
that celebrate a part of our collective memory, such as Guy Fawkes and bonfire night, and people 
who glorify acts of terror to try to encourage similar acts here and now in existing 
circumstances.'8s These powers were utilised to proscribe AI - Ghuraboa86 whose comments after 
the bombings of July 2005 caused concern: 'What I would say about those who do suicide 
operations or martyrdom operations is that they're completely praiseworthy. I have no allegiance 
to the Queen whatsoever or to British society; in fact if I see mujahideen attack the UK I am 
always standing with the Muslims.'87 
In addition, the Terrorism Act 2006, implemented 'highly controversial ... speech offences' in its 
sections I and 2.88 Section 1 has produced what Hunt refers to as 'statement offence',s9 and is 
defined in the Act as 'a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of 
the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to 
them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences.' 
The 'Convention offences' are specified in Schedule 1 and are subject to change under section 
83 Ibid at 657. 
84 W 
alker C. (2009) op cit at 55. 
85 Paul Giggins, Hansard HC vol., 438, col. 994 (3 March 2005). 
86 'The Strangers' is an Islamist group. It succeeded AI-Muhajiroun (,The Emigrants'), founded by Omar Bakl'i 
Muhammad and others in Saudi Arabia from 1983-2004. 
87 Q d' 88 uote 10 Hansard HC vol. 449, col. 493 (20 July 2006). 
89 Walker C. (2009) op cit at 57. 
Hunt A. (2007) op cit at 443. 
214 
20(9). Section 20(6) provides that the composition of the statement is broad enough to include 
'words, sounds, or images,90 and publication can occur 'in any manner,91 including 'electronic 
service.,92 However, section 1(4) stresses the need to consider all factors and 'circumstances' of 
the statement: 'there is a difference in how an academic thesis on an issue and a radical and 
inflammatory pamphlet are likely to be understood.'93 Since the publication of the statement is 
the essential element of the actus reus, it must be made to 'members of the public,.94 The 
legislature has created a definition of relevant audiences to incorporate, via section 20(3), 'the 
public' outside Britain, such as Kashmiris in Pakistani or Indian administered Kashmir.95 The 
offence's requirement is for 'some' members of the public to be subjected to it.96 Thus, 'small 
cohesive congregations,97 may be considered to be in the remit of the offence.98 
The mens rea is identified by section 1(2)(b), namely, that the maker of the published material 
'intends members of the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by 
the statement to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism or Convention offences; or is 
reckless as to whether members of the public will be directly or indirectly encouraged or 
otherwise induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate such acts or offences.' The 
burden of proof for the defence99 is on the accused to satisfy that the 'reckless' act was not 
supported by the defendant, and in addition that it does not relay the opinion of the accused. 100 
It is observed that '[t]he most controversial aspect of the offence is indirect encouragement' and 
thus attempt was made by the legislative authority to 'clarify' this issue.101 The 'non-legal' 
definition of 'glorify' endorsed by Baroness Scotland: 'To glorify is to describe or represent as 
admirable, especially unjustifiable or undeservedly', 102 and the defence for this is to 'preface their 
90 Walker C. (2009) op cit at 57. 
91 Section 20(4). 
92 Walker C. (2009) op cit at 57. 
93 Home Office Circular 8/2006, The Terrorism Act 2006, para 3. 
94 
Baroness Scotland, Hansard HL vol. 676, col. 435 (5 December 2005). 
9S Walker C. (2009) op cit at 58; see also Jones A., Bowers R., & Lodge H.D. (2006) The Terrorism Act 2006. 
~xford: Oxford University Press. 
Walker C. (2009) op cit. 
97 
98 Jones A. et al., (2006)?p cit at para 2.35. 
Walker C. (2009) op Clt. 
99 S . 
100 ectlOn 1(5)(b) and 1(6) create the defence. 
Walker C. (2009) op Clt at 59. 
iOI Ibid. 
10' 
- Hansard HL vol. 677, col. 583 (17 January 2006), Baroness Scotland. 
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remarks with the statement that they do not condone or endorse acts of terrorism or encouraging 
people to kill others. They could express sympathy and even support for the activity, but not in a 
way that encourages people to commit acts of terrorism.'103 It remains to be seen as to how the 
courts will assess this 'formula' especially under the premise of section 1(4).104 
Academic commentary has noted the significance of 'indirect incitement' and that there is no 
definition of this term 'beyond the concept of glorification.'105 The underlying concept of national 
security and the aim to restrict terrorist activity is prevalent throughout this legislation. However, 
there was the concern l06 expressed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights which stated: 
'terms such as glorification, praise and celebration are too vague to form part of a criminal 
offence which can be committed by speaking.'107 
This concern is further perpetuated by section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. Section 2 provides 
the offence of 'dissemination of terrorist publications' recklessly, or otherwise, thereby mirroring 
the direct or indirect encouragement referred to in section I. Terrorist publication dissemination 
is identified in section 2(2).108 This includes 'its distribution, circulation, giving, selling, lending, 
offering for sale or loan, provision of a service to others that enables them to access or acquire, 
transmitting electronically, or possessing 'with a view' to the foregoing activities section 2(2).'109 
The publication itself can occur in a variety of 'forms', and 'it covers matter likely to be 
understood ... as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to the commission, 
103 Hansard HC vol. 439, col. 429 (9 November 2005), Hazel B1ears, and Hansard HL vol. 676, col. 458 (5 
~;cember 2005), Baroness Scotland. 
Walker C. (2009) op cit at 60. 
105 Ibid. Indirect incitement is defined as 'every statement which glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in 
the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences; (ssl(3)a & 2(4)(a», 'and is a statement from which those 
members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified as conduct that should be 
emulated by them in existing circumstances.' section 1(3) & 2(4)(b). 
106 C . . . 
rttlque of the legislation will be considered in the subsequent sectIOns. 
107 Hansard HC vo!. 443, col. 1664, March 16,2006, Session 2005-2006, HL 75 - 11 HC 561 -I, at [27] -[28]. 
108 Section 2(2) states: 'For the purpose ofthis section a person engages in conduct falling within this subsection if 
he a). distributes or circulates a terrorist publication; b). gives, sells or lends such a publication; c). offers such a 
publication for sale or loan; d). provides a service to others that enables them to obtain, read, listen to or look at such 
a publication, or to acquire it by means ofa gift, sale or loan; e). transmits the contents of such a publication 
electronically; or t). has such a publication in his possession with a view to its becoming the subject of conduct 
f~Jling within any of paragraphs (a) to (e). 
Walker C. (2009) op cit at 61. 
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preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism,' and 'likely to be useful in the commission or 
preparation of such acts .. .' 110 
Similar to section I (6), the availability of defence under section 2(9) may create some ambiguity 
for the courts, as forewarned by Lord Carlile that scholastic studies on terrorism could be 'turned 
into samizdat activity.'111 A similar situation occurred (although the student was arrested under 
section 58, and this did not test sections 1 and 2), at the University of Nottingham in 2008, where 
a postgraduate student down loaded material from the US Justice Department website, and he 
shared it with his friend, a former student. The material consisted of an Al-Qaeda training 
manual, and the University executive held that such research or study is illegal under the current 
legislation. 112 (Although the student was arrested, he was released without charge and 
subsequently received compensation). 
It is perhaps significant that subsection (8) creates an offence to disseminate irrespective of the 
fact that it may have no impact on the person receiving the material. The courts have thus 
concluded that it is the material itself that is assessed as in R v Rahman, Rv Mohammed, 113 and 
limited regard is given to the fact that it occurred recklessly. 
Section 3 considers the internet, and this is crucial since there were in Britain alone over four 
thousand 'extremist' websites in 2008, in comparison to twelve in 1998. 114 The scope of the on-
line or 'cyber terrorismollS was illustrated by Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan, who was arrested in 
2004 in Pakistan. He stated, 'most of al-Qaeda's communication was done through the 
internet.'116 Section 3 provides that a constable assesses and concludes that the provider of an 
internet site has 'unlawfully terrorism - related' material, and thus issues a notice to remove 
within two weeks, and a failure to comply results in liability. I 17 
110 Ibid. 
I11 Carlile, Lord (2005) Proposals by Her Majesty's Government/or changes to the lall's against terrorism. London: 
~?me Office, para 28. I~ The Guardian, 24 May 2008: p.8; http://freehicham.co.uk; Times Higher Educational Supplement 24 July 2008: 
Vice Chancellor Sir Colin Campbell; see also Walker C. (2009) op cit at 62·63. ::~ [2008] EWCA Crim. 1465. 
Home Office (2009) Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The UK's Strategy/m' Countering intemational 
~~rrorism. London: Cm. 7547, para 5,14; Walker C (2009) op cit at 63. 
Walker C. (2011) op cit at 374. 
116 7'1. 7" 
117 I"e lImes 3 August 2004 at p.l. 
See Walker C. (2011) op cit at 376. 
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7.3.3 Critique of the Glorification and Dissemination Legislation under Terrorism Act 
2006. 
It is submitted I 18 that sedition laws l19 that had traditionally been used to uphold the safety of 
society, and deter all forms of violence, are now reproduced in counter terrorism. This anti _ 
terrorism law encompassing sedition targets the glorification of terrorism. The discourse 
surrounding such legislation has prompted a diversity of opinions. Concern is expressed that 
curtailment of speech is an unnecessary measure that does little to deter violence, but rather it 
deters political dissent. In addition, it undermines the function of democracy which sustains its 
esteemed position from the discarding or rejection of criminalisation of speeches, via 
encouragement of open debates and transparent media. The advocates of such laws on the 
curtailment of speech believe that a responsible society has to eliminate the 'permissibility 
conditions' that promote aggression, irrespective of terrorism risks. They link the speech with the 
potential or actual event. 120 
British legislation has been partly instigated to allay the fears perpetuated by some Islamic 
speakers promoting sympathy and justification for terrorist actions. 121 This reasoning is shared 
by many of the participants in the research for the thesis, summed by one interviewee in response 
to 'glorification legislation', 'if banned I agree with the government ... preaching youngsters, 
brainwashing them at seventeen or eighteen, you need to stop it. Not kill innocent people for no 
reason ... it's not education of Islam.' Int. 14. Thus, it has been argued that there is the need to 
differentiate between 'extremist political speech and criminal incitement.,122 It has been 
asserted l23 that where it can be identified that 'direct' harm can occur from the speech such as 
how to bomb a car, the speech should be criminalised, but other forms of speech that 'advocate 
118 Sorial S. (2010) 'Can saying something make it so? The nature of seditious harm.' Law & Phi!. 20 I 0, 29(3), 273-
305. 
119 Sedition was abolished by Coroner's and Justice Act 2009, section 73. 
120 Sorial S. (2010) op cit. The test for sedition, which prior to the Terrorism Act 2006 was considered as a 'common 
law offence.' R v ChiejMetropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate; ex parte Cholldhllry [1991] 1 QB 429, where the 
applicant alleged that defendant had the offence of seditious libel in distributing the novel 'Satanic Verses'. It was 
held by Watkins J. 'Proof of an intention to promote feelings of ill will and hostility between different classes of 
subjects does not alone establish a seditious intention. Not only must there be proof of an incitement to violence in 
this connection, but it must be violence or resistance or defiance for the purpose of disturbing ... some person or 
body holding office or discharging some public function oflhe state.' (at 453). 
121 S . I 12' Orta S. (2010) op cit at 282 . 
. Ibid at 283. 
I') 
- Barendt E. (2005) 'Threats to Freedom of Speech in the UK.' UNSW Law JOII/'na/28(3), 2005, 895-899. 
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violence' generally should not be an offence since they are considered 'remote from the actual 
commission of criminal acts."24 
In advocating freedom of expression, it has been asserted that although there are 'harms' that 
have taken place as a consequence of an individual or individuals expression, they do not merit 
legal prohibitions on expressions or speech. 125 Scanlon distinguishes between 'expression' and 
actions; he concludes that despite the expression of others, the ultimate decision is that of the one 
undertaking the action, (in the present discussion, he would refer to the individual undertaking 
the act of terrorism). Thus according to this hypothesis, the criminal offence is the act and not the 
expression, (that may have encouraged or supported the action) because the individual 
performing the action ultimately has the choice, and chooses to act accordingly. 126 
Next, it is argued that terrorist discussions, and indeed 'propaganda,I27 should be accessible to 
provide counter arguments and scrutiny. Moreover, (as discussed in the previous chapter), to 
prevent terrorism it is imperative that it is not 'driven underground'; 128 with this consideration it 
has been submitted that, 'speech will no longer act as a safety - valve. The supporters oftel'rorism 
might be deterred from encouraging or glorifying it publicly, but there is no evidence that they 
will be prevented from counseling it in private or from participating in such activity.'129 Others 
concur, 'unless we are able to hear and understand the views of our political adversaries, we 
cannot hope to turn their minds and convince them that they are wrong, or even change our own 
behaviour to accommodate opposing views that turn out to be right.'I3O 
Accordingly the views from the data analysis mirrored academic commentary, 'It's against the 
British values, the freedom of speech. Everything goes in the same way, media links all terrorist 
groups as highly skilled, proper network. They try to risk people simultaneously, provoke 
people. It's against the classic value of freedom of speech, and should be limits 011 this - when 
124 Sorial S. (2010) op cit at 283. 
125 Scanlon T. (1972) 'A theory of Freedom of Expression,' Philosophy and Public Affairs J (2) Winter 1972: 204-
226 at 213. 
:~: Sorial S. (2010) op cit at 283. 
Ibid at 284-285 1~8 Ibid. . 
I~'J 
130 Barendt E. (2005) op cit at 898. 
Saul B. (2005) 'Speaking of Terror: Criminalising Incitement to Violence.' UNSW Law JOlI/'l1aJ 28(3), 2005,868-
886. 
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vague things like expressing views, does not mean glorification.' Int. 16. Freedom of speech is 
viewed as pivotal to a democratic society, one participant argued, 'What about democracy? It's 
freedom of speech if really trying to harm different, but should be able to talk it out and talk 
about this. Talk is democracy.' Int. 25. 
Thus, it is argued, 'exceptionally strong reasons must be produced to justify proscription, 
otherwise we allow the state wide discretion to determine the content of acceptable public 
debate.,13l The interviewees commonly outlined as to what they perceived to be the exceptionally 
strong reasons, 'If sympathetic or support terrorism that kill civilians for example, in Pakistan 
bombing in Peshwar, then bans on glorification is correct, London bombing affected civilians, 
not government, it's wrong. But they are wrong in targeting all, for example someone is 
researching on nuclear science, they are wrongly targeted, someone we know was researching on 
nuclear science for academia, taken away [by security services] that is wrong.' Int. 9. 
These 'exceptionally strong reasons' mentioned in the previous paragraph will now be outlined in 
the subsequent discussion. Academic commentary discussed shares the opinion that speech for 
example that justifies the actions of terrorist groups in Kashmir, are 'acts of expression', and 
should not be prohibited or criminalised. 132 However, it is elaborated that a speech by a member 
of the religious order,133 is 'in principle' subject to counter terrorism legislation such as that of 
Terrorism Act 2006. This argument is based on Austin's 134 work on iIIocutionary speech; 135 of 
the five criteria utilised by Austin. Two of the five criteria are selected to advance this argument, 
namely verdictive and excercitive speech acts. These involve the delivery of verdict by a person 
in authority, (for example, the words issued by an umpire in a cricket game - 'you are out' have 
expressed an opinion and a verdict, however if a spectator had used the same words or sentence, 
they would lack the 'illucutionary force'). Excercitive are the 'giving of a decision in favour of or 
against a certain course of action, or advocacy of it. It is a decision that something is to be so, as 
131 
132 Barendt E. (2005) op cit at 899. 
See Saul B. (2005) op cit at 868-886. ~ 33 Although she writes, '\ am sceptical of the efficacy of censorship, given the ease and speed with which these 
Ideas are disseminated through various media outlets, including the internet.' 
134 A . d 
ustm J .L. (1955) HolI' la do Ihings wilh words', Oxford: Claren on Press. 
135 'An illocutionary act is an act we perform in saying something. It is what we do, in saying what we say. Paradigm 
illocutionary acts include warning, promising and marrying. Perlocutionary acts, by contrast, are 'what we bring 
about or achieve by saying something'.' 
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distinct from a judgment that it is SO.'136 Hence it is argued that 'when a verdictive is performed, 
the words fit the world: he says 'Out' because it is out. When an exercitive is performed, the 
world fits the words: you are fired because he says 'You're fired.'137 
The case of United Slates v Rahman,I38 is utilized to demonstrate this theory in counter terrorism 
legislation. This case involved the prosecution of an Islamic cleric primarily on the content of his 
speech. 139 The prosecution contended that Rahman, as a cleric, lead the lectures and sermons, 
and had said, 'do jihad with the sword, with the cannon, with the grenades, with the missile ... 
against God's enemies.' Rahman's defence that his 'political views and religious practices', were 
not considered by the courts to adversely affect the freedom of speech, and were 'not simply the 
expression of ideas.'140 Irrespective of the differences in the UK and the US legislation the 
content of Rahman's speech can be applicable in Britain and elsewhere in the world. Utilising 
Austin's analysis of illocutionary force, contain both verdictive and exercitive criteria, highlights 
that 'his words actually do the acts in question.'141 They are verdictive in the use of 'infidel', 'evil' 
and their order - counseling is deemed exercitive. In essence, he creates the environment for 
terrorism, and his position relays power and status to make the audience receptive to his 
'commands'. This is in the context that those attending the sermons do so to learn and seek 
religious inspiration. 142 Thus, the content of an Imam or cleric's speech is of particular 
significance as it carries an 'illucutionary force.' The Imam's status conveys the message as 
'norms' that are obligatory. Hence the 'permissibility conditions' should be criminalised. It is the 
status of the cleric that is of significance. 
136 A 'JL . ustm . . (1955) op Clt at 154. 
137 Langton R. (1998) 'Subordination, Silence, and Pornography's Authority,' in Post R. (editor) Censorship and 
Silencing: Practices of Cultllral Regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press and J. Paul Getty Trust. 261-284 at 
265. 
1]8 
I] 248F. Supp 254, S. D. N. Y. 1994. 
9 Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and nine co-defendants charged with crimes including breach of sedition laws, 
n~mely 'seditious conspiracy', 'to levy a war of urban terrorism against the United States, and by force to prevent, 
hmder and delay the execution of the laws ofthe United States.' ibid at 259. 
140 It was recognised by the Court of Appeal that words of this nature - ones that instruct, solicit, 01' persuade others 
to commit crimes of violence _ violate the law and may be properly prosecuted regardless of whether they are 
uttered in private, or in a public speech, or in administering the duties ofa religious ministry. The fact that speech or 
conduct was 'religious' does not immunise him from prosecution under generally applicable criminal statutes.' 
(p.117). 
'41 S d' I or la S. (20 I 0) op cit at 297. 
1"2 Ibid. 
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The argument is elaborated to emphasise that Austin's 'iIIucutionary speech act' excels as 
'enabling'. Thus placed in the context of alienation, the uncertainty of identity, and media's 
portrayal of Islam's image and Western policies, the 'enabling' speech is the catalyst for terrorist 
action. In additional circumstances where individuals have limited knowledge of religion, in this 
case Islam, the cleric's words can have a profound impact. Hence it has prompted comments 
from those interviewed: 'I agree with that, glorification is how terrorism breeds and breeds in 
this area here. Impressionable, susceptible people there and around here, like that London 
bomber, I agree that there should be control on these people, completely agree that it should be 
illegal.' Int. 15. Indeed the sermons or counseling provides the individuals with 'reasons' to act 
thereby the 'straightforward line of causation can be established between the words and 
commission of violence.'143 Thus the 'but for' criteria is applicable in such circumstances. 144 Had 
the cleric's speech not created the 'but for' chain, the subsequent action would not have occurred. 
The argument is not confined to a religious cleric, it can also be applied to a youth group 
facilitator or community leader, cricket coach, whom young and impressionable see as a figure 
of authority - the examples are endless but what is relevant here is the status that is relayed by 
the individual's role. 
Indirect encouragement is considered worthwhile as a topic for criminal law when it is said to be 
'cultivating certain environments.'145 It is the extremist ideology that perpetuates the terrorism 
'culture'. In searching for identity and religion, it is asserted by academic commentary that 
'there's a strong possibility that he'll first come into contact with Islamists. They are over 
represented both on the internet as well as in the print media. r146 This view is shared by one 
interviewee who provides, 'I can empathize how people wanting to learn about Islam get into the 
wrong groups and learn the wrong Islam ... I say hooray to that [re: glorification legislation]. 
You have to understand that it's good to have freedom of speech, but if that incites hatred -
whether its religious or racial it has to be curtailed, so it should extend to the far right groups as 
well as ignorant Muslim extremists who brain wash kids that have no idea about the meaning of 
Islam. We are like blank slates they can tell us anything and we will believe, and I supposedly 
have a high I.Q.' Int. 27. Moreover as recognised by Pirie, traditionally, religious leaders are 
143 S . I 
144 ona S. (20 I 0) op cit at 302. 
14S Sch~uer F. (1993) 'The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm' Ethics 103 (July 1993); 635-653 at 642. 
1 Sonal S. (20 I 0) op cit at 304. 46 S . I 
ona S (20 10) op cit at 304. 
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seen as the 'elite', and certainly in the Kashmiri (Indian or Pakistani) hierarchy, and thus 
followers are 'impressed by command there is a danger that we see little else.'147 
In this light, the importance of legislation such as sections I and 2 ofthe Terrorism Act 2006 can 
be understood since it is unwise to protect all speech, especially in cases where the authoritative 
speech 'enacts permissibility conditions' and 'instructs, recommend or order' the use of 
aggression on others. 148 Similarly, it has been submitted that any incitement to terrorism 
compromises the foundations of a democracy, and thus should not receive the guardianship of 
the law which is afforded to the freedom of expression. In essence, society is compelled to 
prevent the incitement of terrorism and hence any restrictions that may arise from such 
legislation are necessary means to uphold the rule of law. 149 
However, such restrictions on speech caused concern to some participants interviewed given that 
the legislation's target reached beyond Britain, 'If glorifies and promotes harm against British 
people - then fine, but if sympathizes with a particular nation [Kashmir] not good, because like 
banning freedom of speech. It has affected me because lack of freedom of speech, have to be 
careful what you say. Even sympathy for people of Kashmir, said in a certain way, could be in 
trouble. Law is subjective in what it sees as promoting terrorism and sympathy; it's a fine line.' 
Int. 20. 
Furthermore, there is also the assertion voiced by some of the participants that such legislation 
creates a 'police state, we have to adhere to what they are thinking or go to prison. There's no 
freedom of speech, it's victimisation and discrimination.' Int. 23. Academics view it as 'a thin 
disguise for the imposition of restriction on open discussion."so It has been observed that since 
contemporary terrorism cannot be subdued and eliminated by the use of force and modern 
artillery, 'it will be won, instead by those who can best marshal their metaphors.'ISI The fragility 
of the rule of law is tested by the pragmatism that the bombers in London, are 'home grown, 
politically and intellectually.' That the radicalisation occurred in Yorkshire and Luton, reflects 
the testimony that terror co-exists with democracy. This dual phenomena instinctively creates a 
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shield to deflect the terror. The shield consists of the Terrorism Act 2006, and the proscription of 
'statements that are likely to be understood by members of the public as indirectly encouraging 
the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism.'J52 In turn, it is argued that section 1 (3) 
Terrorism Act 2006, paradoxically increases the terror that it aims to decrease. It has been 
described as 'a prime expression of the neurotic dependency of terrifying state and terrified 
citizen.' I 53 
It is further argued that although terrorists, 'seek to strip off the mask of law to reveal the nihilist 
heart of coercion within', the executive legislature and democracy must ensure that 'rule of law is 
not a mask but the true image of our nature.'IS4 Such commentators are dismissive of the 
concerns raised in the preceding discussion about glorifying terrorism by Islamic speakers and 
others in positions of authority. Instead they assert: 'for it is not the terror of the mad mullah and 
the clerical catastrophist that presents the immediate threat to the citizens of Britain or indeed 
America. That threat and that terror lie within.'155 The discourse evident in the scholarly works is 
reflected in the data analysis, one participant states, 'I can see where they go with it. Overall if 
glorify terrorism and attacking UK, I have no issue, protect our young ones.' Int. 13, whilst 
another simply states, 'Just suspect, no one glorifies!' Int. 4, namely that the Muslim community 
are viewed with suspicion and that no one actually glorifies terrorism. 
To summarise, whilst some of the participants interviewed recognised the need for proscription 
on speech, they also had anxiety as to what it constitutes, and whether they themselves may 
unknowingly commit such an offence. The discourse surrounding 'glorification' of terrorism was 
echoed by the participants, they were commonly keen to curtail speech because they recognised 
that those in position of authority can easily influence 'vulnerable youths' Int. I I. However, others 
argued that 'talk' Int. 25, was also necessary to prevent terrorism, they viewed curtailment of 
speech as a form of 'victimisation and discrimination' lnt. 23. In addition, it has been asserted 
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that restrictions on speech could drive the discussion on terrorism 'underground', which, if openly 
discussed could be challenged. 
7.4 The Offence of Withholding Information 
The participants interviewed were not specifically asked about this offence, but when asked if 
they felt protected by the law, there was anxiety amongst some that they now lived in a 'police 
state' Int. 23, that demanded information that they 'I might have accidently stumbled on, and I 
didn't know that it was terrorism until it's too late, so does that make me guilty?' Int. 26. 
Crucial to the government's anti terrorism agenda is the co-operation of the public as outlined in 
CONTEST, and discussed in Chapter Six. Section 38B(2) Terrorism Act 2000 provides the 
offence of failing to disclose information on terrorism activity without reasonable excuse. 156 It 
may be viewed as a prudent step towards implementing civil duty but in enforcing the public to 
disclose the offence can perpetuate the notion of a 'police state' and unnecessary intrusion that 
has little to do with terrorism but more with state control. 157 
It has been suggested that section 388(1) creates 'inactivity' as an offence. 158 The words 'of 
material assistance' are crucial, thus information that is ambiguous does not compel disclosure. 
Attorney General's Reference (No. 3 of 1993),159 held that the mere belief that a terrorist offence 
had occurred was insufficient, and the prosecution had the burden of proving that the terrorist act 
had been committed. However, Walker observes that section 38B(1) covers situations where the 
offence mayor 'would be committed.' The element of the section 38B involving mens rea was 
tested in Sher;j60when the courts held 'that it was not sufficient for the prosecution to establish 
that a defendant had closed his eyes, but that the jury was entitled to conclude, if satisfied that he 
had deliberately closed his eyes to the obvious because he did not wish to be told the truth, that 
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the fact was capable of being evidence to support a conclusion that the defendant either knew or 
believed the fact in question.'161 
The breadth of section 38B is underlined by four instances where no defence is offered under 
section 38B(4).162 Firstly, it is telling that there is no concession to the emotional ties created by 
the proximity of relationship of the one participating in terrorist activity and the one who is 
legally compelled to disclose information. The second context involves legal privilege. Although 
Lord Denning in Sykes,163 preserves privilege for solicitors, medical and ecclesiastical 
professions, the current guidelines issued by the Law Society provide that privilege does not 
apply in cases where there may be 'serious bodily harm', and thus the defence under section 
38B(4) is not applicable. l64 The third area identified by Walker is that of the right to silence, to 
ensure that the suspect does not self incriminate. Although case law precedent has preserved the 
'privilege against self incriminationol65, nevertheless the catastrophic consequences of terrorism, 
renders silence under section 38B as withholding information and therefore the offence under 
section 38B is enforced. In a similar vein, Walker comments that journalists are compelled just 
as other civilians to disclose information and that this therefore emphasises the priority of public 
safety. 
The importance of this offence ensures that, ' ... it will be the seriousness of the terrorist activity 
about which a defendant has failed to give information which will determine the level of 
criminality, rather than the extent of the information which could be provided which will affect 
the sentence.'166 However, Walker comments that it is 'troubling' that the prevention of harm 
principle takes precedent over the 'culpability of the accused.'167 Nevertheless, there is the 
recognition of the importance of section 38B when appropriately utilised in circumstances when 
there is 'evidence of involvement in terrorism;' when police have evidence such as in the case of 
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the 2117 bombers, where information is crucial to prevent terrorism; where 'active bystanders' 
have information and 'passive bystanders' such as family members have knowledge. 168 
The importance of section 388 for prevention, and protection from terrorism is undermined by 
the lack of evidence on its effectiveness. The Jellicoe Report l69 stated: 'the section is of 
significant value to the police service, but that service could operate without it if required you do 
so.' Its 'crippling effect' on the media creates 'genuine doubts about its implications in principle 
and about the way it might be used in the course of interviewing someone . . . it has an 
unpleasant ring about it in terms of civil Iiberties.'l7o It is submitted that legislation such as 
section 388 mirrors the 'informer's society which exists in totalitarian states,oI71 a view that is 
paraphrased by the participants interviewed, 'It's like big brother Russian style.' Int. 23. Walker 
argues that the priority of 'social responsibility' dominates and dictates legislature's goals with 
limited consideration to its adverse effects to society and communities within it. 172 However the 
participants interviewed voiced concern and anxiety about the legislation, 'It's like I didn't at 
first want to be interviewed, I'm afraid of being accused of doing something or not reporting 
something that I know nothing about. I read about this withholding information stuff and it really 
scared me.' Int. 16. Another participant reiterated his feelings on section 388,173 ') agree with the 
law but how do I know when to be suspicious and report people, like I said what if someone is 
staying with me, and I didn't know that he is a terrorist, but he turns out to be one, who's going 
to believe that I knew nothing.' Int.13. 
7.5 Financing of Terrorist Organisations 
Financing is said to be pivotal to the existence and expansion of the terrorist activity,I74 and thus 
it is fitting that counter terrorism financing be discussed here. Some participants also recognised 
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the importance of the government's counter terrorism financing measures, whilst others 
expressed concern. The significance of counter terrorism financing has been recognised by the 
British legislature prior to September 2001, when this issue became the focus of the international 
arena. Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989, Part III was based on the opinion that '[m]oney is a 
crucial factor in the continuance of terrorism.'175 Moreover, it has been highlighted in Chapter 
Two that the terrorist organisations in Kashmir have allegedly received considerable funding 
from British residents. Thus, an assessment of counter terrorism financing is a pre requisite for 
the effectiveness of CONTEST policies addressed in the previous chapter. 
7.5.1 Overview of the UK Counter Terrorism Financing Legislation. 
Part III of the Terrorism Act 2000 encompasses legislation which 'exceeds the demands of the 
United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.,176 The legislation 
is further extended by the powers bestowed by the Anti Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 200 I. 
However the 'tangible' offences are addressed by the Terrorism Act 2000,177 and the broad 
definition of 'terrorist property' in section 14 has the aim of curtailing all possible avenues of 
terrorist finance activities. Section 15 prohibits fund raising when a person has the 'reasonable 
cause to suspect' that it could be utilised for terrorism, 178 therefore actual awareness of the events 
is crucial for prosecution under section 15. 179 In R v McDonald. RajJerty & O'Farrell/80 
members of the real IRA were prosecuted under section 15 (and section 17). They believed that 
they were purchasing weapons from a Iraqi agent, who was actually a CIA and British security 
service agent. 
Section 16 creates the offence of possessing finances or materials that have the potential to be 
used for terrorism. As with section 15, Sproat argues that there must be 'reasonable cause to 
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suspect' for prosecution under section 16.181 Section 17 prohibits 'funding arrangement' that may 
be used for terrorism purpose. Section 18 creates the offence related to terrorist 'money 
laundering.' For each of these offences, the gravity of the crime is reflected by the custodial 
sentence of up to fourteen years. In addition an omission to report as governed by section 19 
creates the offence. 
The Anti Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 'supplements' the counter terrorism financing 
powers issued in the Terrorism Act 2000; it introduced 'account monitoring and customer 
information orders, and extra powers to freeze the assets of overseas bodies or residents.'182 
Additional powers are implemented by the Counter Terrorism Act 2008, Schedule 7, which is 
viewed as ' ... very potent regulations with the ability to require, at the say - so of the Treasury, a 
business to completely cease trading with another business or with the whole of a Government. 
In fact, they constitute some of the widest powers on finance matters that I can remember 
coming through the House.'183 An example of its operation is that of the 'Financial Restrictions 
(Iran) Order 2009.'184 Thus 'in response to the risks posed to the national interests of the UK t185 
by Iran's plans of nuclear weapons, Parliament was presented with a 'request to impose 
'restrictions' on Iran's financial institutions. 'This was the first use of powers under Schedule 7.' 
The order prohibited those in the financial services from working with Bank Mellat or indeed the 
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines. According to the Treasury, Sarah McCarthy-Fry, both 
organisations are actively involved in the advancement of Iran's nuclear plans. 186 As observers 
have commented this demonstrates the 'far reaching ... effect' of Schedule 7 Counter Terrorism 
Act 2008. 187 
Any redress to the evidence submitted is governed by the umbrella of national security and thus a 
'lack of disclosure' inevitably effects the chalIenge. In addition, a breach of directions may lead 
to a custodial sentence of up to two years, and thus Parliament scrutiny should be accordingly 
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forthcoming and observed for all 'orders,.188 The crucial feature of this legislation is the 
capacious powers it has bestowed on the Treasury which can either follow the lead of the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) or act unilaterally. 
These capacious powers provided to the Treasury are further extended by the Terrorist Asset-
Freezing Etc. Act 2010. These powers enable the Treasury to freeze assets of individuals and 
groups in the United Kingdom and abroad, on the 'reasonable belief' that they are involved in 
terrorism. No conviction of the individuals is required for these powers to be enforced. The basis 
of this reasonable belief is to protect the public from terrorism. 189 However Anderson 
recommended that the Treasury should justify its actions to Parliament, and promote 
transparency through 'quarterly reports'. 190 
7.5.2 Effectiveness of the Counter Terrorism Financial Crimes. 
In examining the effectiveness of the said legislation, Sproat found any analysis 'problematic,.191 
Nevertheless, Sproat found that 'seventy four counter terrorism finance charges' occurred 
between 11 September 2001 and 31 July 2007, which consisted of seventeen per cent of the total 
charges under the powers issued by the Terrorism Act 2000.192 
The 'problematic' nature identified in the above paragraph, was addressed by Anderson's 
evaluation of the counter terrorism financing. 193 The importance of the legislation is underlined 
by several high profile convictions. One example is that of the two Algerian men: Brahim 
Benmerzouga and Baghdad Meziane l94, who raised two hundred thousand British pounds 'for 
terrorist causes.'195 Mr Justice Curtis in sentencing emphasised the need to consider the severity 
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sector or a description of persons within that sector.' Rees & Moloncy, ibid. 
189 Anderson D. (QC) (2011) 'First Report on the Operation of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010' London: 
~e Stationey Office. December 2011, at p.3-4. 
Ibid at p.4. 
191 Intelligence and Security Committee (2009) COl/Id 717 have been Prevented? Review of the Intelligence 011 the 
London Terrorist Attacks on JI/ly 2005. London: HMSO, May 2009, pp.88-9: 'that such a simple, yet essential, piece 
of the evidence base - the successful conviction of terrorists - was not only unused, but was not even available.' 192 
193 Sproat P. (20 I 0) op cit at 315-335. 
Anderson D. (QC) (2011) 'First Report on the Operation of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010' London: 
~~e Stationey Office. December 2011. 
IQ5 Rv Meziane [2004] EWCA Crim 1768. 
Sproat P. (2010) op cit at 315-335. 
230 
of the offence namely, the 'conspiracy to defraud in respect of banks and credit card companies 
and entering into a funding arrangement for the purposes of terrorism.' I 96 
The Intelligence and Security Committee l97 states that section 17 Terrorism Act 2000 offences 
were utilised to convict Komoka, Bourouag and Abusalama in 2007. In the same year Hasan 
Mutegomgwa was convicted under section 17. In 2008, (Omar Trevor Brooks) Abu Izzadeen, 
Simon Keeler, Shah Jalal Hussain, and Abdul Muhid were convicted under section 15 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000. The custodial sentences awarded to them reflected the seriousness of the 
offences, and re-emphasised to those sympathetic to terrorist activity that terrorist financing 
results in severe consequences. 198 Such examples have resulted in the FA TF to conclude: 
'The provisions criminalising terrorist financing under sections 15-18 of the TACT 
[Terrorism Act 2000], read together with the definitions in sections 1 and 14 have a 
very wide coverage. The UK authorities are firmly of the opinion, and the evaluation 
team agreed, that this is sufficient to ensure the successful prosecution of the 
provision or collection of funds for use by terrorist organisations and individual 
terrorists.'199 
However, there was the recognition and acknowledgement that for the legislation to be 
completely effective global co-operation is crucial.2oo Perhaps what is of greater significance is 
that counter terrorism financing via the Terrorism Act 2000 is viewed as a 'key intelligence 
role,'2ol and indeed '[e]nquiries following the attacks of 7 July and attempted attacks of 21 July 
demonstrated the critical role of terrorist finance investigation in progressing specific enquiries 
and establishing an enhanced intelligence picture.'202 In addition, it has been argued that the 
counter terrorism financing investigations have been used to 'identify' 'the warning signs of 
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criminal or terrorist activity.'203 Thus in the words of Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, 'The powers 
for the seizure and forfeiture of terrorist cash and property remain useful and necessary powers, 
though there are some problems with the collection of statistics.'204 These words were echoed by 
Anderson (QC) three years later.2°5 
The July 2005 bombings and subsequent 21 July plot may be viewed as 'self funded'. However 
there are those that have actively sought funding from al-Qaeda, such as Dhiren Barot/06 thus 
emphasising the need for perpetual scrutiny. The Joint Money Laundering Steering Group 
website provides that 'suspicious' activity reported by the bank that an individual with a salary of 
twelve thousand per annum, had a turnover of two hundred and fifty thousand, upon 
investigation it transpired that the funds "were linked to terrorist organisation and that there was 
no individual in existence.207 'This fraud resulted in over eight hundred thousand being 
fraudulently obtained.'208 
Nevertheless, there are limitations to the counter terrorism finance initiatives, as observed by a 
senior member of a national counter terrorism financial organisation, 'In terms of domestic 
terrorism, people who are determined to attack the country in which they reside, the banks have 
really no chance under this system of identifying suspicious behaviour unless through some 
sheer fluke.'209 
There is also the view210 that counter terrorism finance legislation and regulations have produced 
'inefficiency and waste,,211 and that 'Suspicious Activity Reports, sensitive to political 
considerations, now flood the systems, making it difficult to separate the wheat from the 
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chaff.,m In addition, Donohue submits that stringent regulations have resulted in the counter 
terrorism finances moving to territories that are extremely difficult to identify. 
Donohue's third criticism is that counter terrorism financing has had a detrimental effect on 
charities, thus alienating 'important allies both at home and abroad.'213 This detrimental effect is 
voiced commonly by of the British Kashmiri Muslims interviewed, 'Financing was sent for the 
poor and now they are suffering, now we are not even allowed to sent money to our families, we 
never funded terrorists. Also banned money to madarasses, it's wrong.' Int. 11. However Sproat 
argues that this assertion submitted by Donohue on charities, is incorrect and that 'there is little 
hard evidence' that the counter terrorism legislation on finances has had any 'negative impact on 
charities.'214 The data analysis reveals that the participants interviewed contradicted some of 
Sproat's assertions, 'sometimes people sending money to the charities - the right people - if 
British government says we are sending to terrorist it's wrong.' Int. 14. 
The fourth criticism is that such regulation and legislation is 'counter productive' since terrorist 
organisations have commenced diverting the money from 'paramilitary' to 'political activity.'215 
The participants interviewed had some reservations on the limits to financing, 'If can be proved 
terrorists - then limit finances - without prove it is not enough, as is the present.' Int. ]2. (In other 
words, it is asserted that if the government can prove that persons are terrorists then the finances 
should be limited. However, without any prove of their terrorist involvement, as in the present 
case, then the finances should not be limited). One participant bluntly stated, 'when no evidence 
of their acts ... it's a person's personal choice, paid tax, it's up to them who they payor not, not 
the government's obligation. To me it's another way of state policing.' ]nt. 23. There was also the 
difficulty of distinguishing between 'freedom fighters' and 'terrorists', 'Any financing of terrorists 
should be prohibited but freedom fighters - that is a difficult one.' Int. 27. Donohue submits that 
counter terrorism financing 'initiatives have been spectacularly unsuccessful in making a 
significant dent in terrorist operations.,216 This assertion is disputed by those who 'claim that 
counter terrorism financing initiatives have had some success in ending planned terrorist 
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operations.'2I7 In addition, the Intelligence and Security Committee218, acknowledges that 'the 
intelligence and security agencies and the police have prevented a number of attacks. Since 2000 
they have prevented twelve terrorist plots in the UK. Most of these have taken place since 
CREVICE in 2004,' this includes the work undertaken by counter terrorism financing, which is 
described as 'one weapon amongst an arsenal.'219 The counter terrorism financing work is seen as 
crucial to the on-going counter terrorism agenda. 
This view is also echoed by some of the participants (albeit not as commonly), who endorsed the 
government's anti terrorism finance legislation, 'I agree with it - shouldn't be financing - when 
you give money you're as good as being the terrorist themselves.' Int.13. There was also the view 
that proscription of the groups should extend to finances, 'If these groups are banned should limit 
funds too.' Int. 7. Others were keen to express their compliance with the law, 'We request all not 
to finance we are peaceful citizens of this country,' Int.1S. 
However, more equivocation occurs, 'where funds are sent by expatriates back to the region 
[such as Kashmir], there are not just reasonable, but strong grounds to suspect that they are to be 
used for terrorist purposes.'220 A view that is commonly contradicted by the data analysis, 'Limits 
on financing not really interested, but created problems for people to send money innocently. I 
send money to parents and if I send it one lump sum, if buying land or a house, I cannot, I am 
wary even though innocent and legal.' Int. 16. 
7.6 Conclusion 
A responsible society is compelled to eliminate terrorist activities. In order to do this the counter 
terrorism legislation has to balance the national security agenda and the individual's rights to a 
fair process as well as maintaining community endorsement. 221 The preceding discussion has 
established that the laws on terrorist activities discussed in this chapter have caused concern in 
one British Muslim community, whose co-operation is vital for counter terrorism to be effective. 
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The participants interviewed reflect and mirror the discourse surrounding legal and academic 
commentators. 'Alarm bells are justifiably rung by the executive's possession of a wide and 
largely unconstrained discretion affecting the lawfulness of political and religious groups. ,222 
The research findings emphasise and re-emphasise that terrorism activity is not justified and 
. should be punished, but the difficulty arises on the issue of what is terrorism. The participants 
interviewed are divided and perplexed by the laws on proscription of international groups; they 
question as to why the United Kingdom considers the Kashmiri 'freedom fighters' as they 
described them, as terrorists. The government's 'Manichean debate,'223 of 'either you are with us 
or against us' is difficult for the participants to accept. They view themselves as 'with' the 
government, yet do not agree with the government's stance on Kashmiri 'militants', who they 
believe are not a threat to the British national security. However, as emphasized at the outset, 
international solidarity together with national interests dictates the UK's counter terrorism 
legislation. The 'chill'224 on community relationships may be viewed as an inevitable 
consequence by some, but the government's aim is to protect its citizens and diminish terrorism. 
The interviewees felt threatened by some areas of law. They commonly recognised the need to 
curtail speech promoting terrorism, but feared that they may inadvertently be implicated by 
unknowingly saying 'the wrong thing.' (Int. 13), or not reporting information that they should 
know but have no knowledge of, an example given by one participant was that if a guest was 
staying with them, and was a terrorist, who would possibly believe that the participant had no 
knowledge of the guest's terrorist links. Similarly they questioned the terrorism financing, and its 
implications on the individuals compelled to financially assist those in their place of birth, 
namely, Kashmir. There is no clear cut answer to such genuine anxieties experienced by the 
participants of this Muslim community. One partial answer may reside in the pressing need to 
'listen to and act on the grievances of community,,225 to ensure that SUppOlt for terrorism is 
eliminated and the counter terrorism strategies prevail. This can ultimately only be achieved by 
the additional recognition that there is the overwhelming need for education, and to inform 
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communities that the law is balanced with rights for each individual irrespective of their religion 
or place of origin. 
There may be the further 'danger of net-widening surveillance.'226 Nevertheless, the significance 
of some of the powers discussed under the counter terrorism legislation cannot be ignored, 
curtailing activities may have created the 'police state' articulated by some of the interviewees, 
but certain activities have to be curtailed. As terrorism is increasingly lethal the government's 
response has to mirror those activities to preserve national security. Yet equity in law can only be 
achieved with appropriate and balanced judicial re-dress that at present this is not always 
forthcoming. In the words of Lord Bingham: 'Security concerns do not absolve member states 
from their duty to observe basic standards of fairness.'227 Thus, the concluding Chapter Eight 
will focus on the lessons to be learned and recommendations to be made. 
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Chapter Eight Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter is to conclude the thesis with a discussion about the analysis and 
findings presented in the preceding chapters. It has been established that the ongoing terrorism 
threat is interlinked with Islam and Muslim communities. Hence the focus of the counter 
terrorism legislation is on the Muslim communities. This thesis has identified one such Muslim 
community, and via a qualitative study highlighted the effectiveness or in some cases the 
counter-productive anxiety that the counter terrorism legislation has created for the participants 
of the British Kashmiri Muslim community. 
8.1 The Rhetoric and Reality 
The basic premise of the research as identified by Chapter One was to test whether the legal 
conception of terrorism and the implications of counter terrorism laws are in conflict with the 
views of the British Kashmiri Muslims. In addition, it was an objective to identify whether the 
clash is because of the manner of implementation of British law, or the manner of 
implementation of the 'Kashmiri' culture combined with Islamic beliefs. It has been established 
initially in Chapter Four that whilst the participants accepted the legal definition of terrorism as 
identified by section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the clash arose from the manner of the 
implementation ofthe said counter terrorism law. They could not accept how the foreign fighters 
such as those in Kashmir could be perceived as terrorists, and they commonly viewed them as 
those legitimately fighting for self determination. Moreover, the clash arose not necessarily 
because of their Islamic beliefs, since they unanimously accepted that their religious faith as 
identified in Chapter Five, did not support terrorism. However, their view of terrorism is 
influenced and affected by the historical and present situation in Kashmir, about which many of 
them have decided views. Furthermore, as highlighted in Chapters Six and Seven, they viewed 
the British foreign policy, such as the events in Iraq and Afghanistan, as a catalyst that created 
support for terrorism, and ultimately hindered counter terrorism work in their locality. Whilst 
they felt protected by the local police, they were overall threatened by the national counter 
terrorism measures as discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. 
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8.2 Analysis of the Reality 
It may be simplistic to state that Muslims are responsible for the terrorism, but it is equally 
simplistic to claim that Muslims are not tainted by those claiming to commit terrorism in the 
name of Islam. There is indeed an inevitability that the focus of media attention will be on 
Muslim communities. However the objective eye of the law requires and dictates that decisions 
should not be ruled by emotions but be based on facts. Overzealous implementation of the anti 
terrorism legislation hinders the community co operation that is vital for counter terrorism. 
The broad definition of terrorism discussed in Chapter Four does little to solve the predicament 
regarding those insurgents that are perceived as 'freedom fighters' by some and 'terrorists' by 
others. This is the conflict that appears to exist with the British Kashmiri Muslims interviewed 
and the government's stance on the Kashmiri 'terrorist groups'; the participants struggle to accept 
that they are terrorists when they do not directly affect the United Kingdom's national interests. 
Saul's solution is to formulate an 'international definition' of terrorism that recognises 'legitimate 
forms of violent resistance to political oppression,'i and thus they would have to adhere to the 
international legislation on armed conflict and be liable for 'war crimes.' In recognising the 
'terrorist' in Kashmir as those fighting for self determination as some of participants interviewed 
view them, there would also be the official recognition of the ongoing Kashmiri dispute. The 
ascription of the label 'Terrorism', referred to as 'moralised name calling',2 offers no long term 
solutions for the dispute. Saul succinctly states that 'it is not possible coherently or systematically 
to describe, analyse, understand or ultimately counter the threat posed by terrorism unless there 
is basic agreement on what constitutes it.'3 
In Chapter Two, it was presented that the conflict in Kashmir continues to remain unresolved. 
Significantly, the discourse in Kashmir is being exploited by the extremist elements to create and 
perpetuate sympathy for terrorism. British Kashmiri Muslims are particular vulnerable because 
of their marginalization. The allegation is that their identity and their status in society is eroded 
by their Pakistani 'counter parts' who perceive them as 'inferior'; their religion differs from the 
I Saul B. (2006) Defining Terrorism in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, at p.317. 
2 Wardlaw G. (1982) Political Terrorism: Theory. Tactics and Counter measures. Cambridge: Cambridge 
}lniversity Press at p.8. 
Saul B. (2006) op cit at 320. 
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majority Christian faith, coupled with underachievement in the education system, they face 
social isolation and disenfranchment. It is perhaps not surprising that out of the various origins of 
Muslims residing in the United Kingdom, that the majority of the 'home-grown' jihadis are of 
Kashmiri - or 'Mirpuri' origin. Chapter Three highlighted that all the participants interviewed are 
of 'Mirpuri' origin, and they encapsulate the 'identity' predicament faced by the British born 
generations. The dynamics facing these individuals4 are also epitomized by the identification of 
themes and typologies, discussed in Chapter One from the fieldwork data. 
8.3 Themes and Typologies 
It is accepted that each person's contribution to the research findings is distinct. Nevertheless on 
closer scrutiny there are common and similar responses which are categorized below.s These 
form the basis of the thesis findings and understandings of the British Kashmiri Muslims. It is 
important to re-emphasise that these findings may not represent the general or popular views of 
British Kashmiri Muslims across the country, however, they represent the views of the 
participants in this fieldwork. It is important to note that these common or similar responses are 
not ideal types but used to highlight aspects of the research findings. 
8.3.1 The Dismissive. 
The Dismissive are those that are of the second and third generation British Kashmiri Muslims. 
These were construed by identifying their responses to questions specifically on the situation in 
Kashmir. Although they identify themselves as Muslims, irrespective of whether they are 
practicing or not, they have no awareness or concerns about their ancestral land. They identify 
themselves as British' not 'British Kashmiri', when informed that the researcher was 
interviewing British Kashmiri Muslims. One interviewee effectively described her feelings, 'I 
don't really know about Kashmir - not exposed to the war over there, difficult to have an opinion 
of it having been brought up over here. It doesn't have an impact on me at aIL' Int.22. There was 
embarrassment at the fact that Kashmir was not a significant factor in their lives, 'J feel 
embarrassed. Sorry, don't know anything at all about it.' lnt. 23. Another comment was 'not well 
read up on it.' Int.!. Some expressed no embarrassment or apologies for their lack of knowledge 
4 Discussed in chapter six also. 
s Some of the categories/views overlap, and therefore are identified accordingly. 
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or awareness of the situation in Kashmir, boldly stated, 'I am indifferent to it,' Int. 2 and 'what 
situation? You describe [to] me the situation.' Int. 25. The Dismissive are successfully summed 
by one participant who states on Kashmir, 'I have to have a view, I'm not really that fussed. It's 
not my area, why should I get involved.' Int. 26. 
Although this group was 'indifferent' to the situation in Kashmir, it was not to the issues 
surrounding Muslims around the world: 'I am not too concerned about Kashmir, more concerned 
about Palestine and Iran, do you know all the atrocities going on out there.' Int. 8. 'What is 
happening in Palestine is disgusting', Int. 26; 'I don't know a huge amount about Kashmir, no 
political position on that but I can understand why someone in West Bank or Gaza would 
commit terrorism because they have no power to do anything, but I could not be sympathetic 
towards it. Understanding is different from sympathy.' Int. 15. Their main source of knowledge 
was obtained from 'what is conveyed in the media.' 1nt.23. 
8.3.2 Advocates of Kashmir 
Unlike the Dismissive, the Advocates of Kashmir had considerable awareness of the political 
situation in Kashmir, and perhaps not surprisingly were more articulate. This group was also 
construed from their responses on Kashmir. They consisted of first and second generation 
British Kashmiri Muslims. This group was in unison in declaring that the situation in Kashmir is 
'diabolical. I think international community should do more. In 1947, when partition happen, 
there was UN resolution but no action was taken, nothing happened. Iraq and Iran threatening to 
ban them, why are there rules for one community and another for others. Pakistani Administered 
Kashmir, they have taken off Gilgit, the best part of Kashmir. Everyone is using and abusing 
Kashmir, the UN, I mean the Americans, they are the UN, it only serves American needs.' Int.13. 
The Advocates of Kashmir spoke passionately about their views in Kashmir, 'Situation in 
Kashmir is depressing, the people over there are suffering, the rest of the world is ignoring them. 
I'll divide this response into two since Kashmir is in two parts. Pakistani administered Kashmir 
which some describe as Azad Kashmir, is an oxymoron to me, it suffers at the hands of Pakistan 
financially and politically. Financially because Pakistan is using it, takes its resources and gives 
nothing in return. Politically because there is no democracy, it's a puppet government of 
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Pakistan; if they disagree they are sent to prison or banned. Indian administered Kashmir is 
worse still, there is no freedom of movement, what is worse is the abuse to the women, girls as 
young as nine are being raped by the Indian army. The abuse is government sanctioned; 
everyone turns a blind eye to the atrocities that the army is committing there. I want you to write 
this in your thesis: Muslim women are raped by the army as a way of demoralizing the men and 
the whole community, and then these women are further abused by the community who shun 
them as though it was their fault. They also line up men and boys, shoot them or take them away. 
People, Muslim people are living in constant fear in that part of Kashmir. So is it any wonder 
that they retaliate with anger. With such abuse, your rationality will disappear, and you will want 
revenge will you not? As Shakespeare said, 'If you prick me do I not bleed? If you tickle me do I 
not laugh? If you poison me do I not die? If you wrong me, shall I not revenge?' there I've said it 
aIL' Int.27. 
Some shared their personal accounts of what they had witnessed during their visits to Indian 
Administered Kashmir. This perpetuated their need for advocating and asserting on behalf of the 
Kashmiris. 'It's unfair, inhumane what is happening in the Indian controlled Kashmir, against the 
United Nations and Human Rights, because India has the strength and population, so they fear 
loss of business, so people are not speaking out because benefits from India. Seen children and 
women done things that I cannot discuss with you because you are a sister, and murdered. People 
defend their rights; want independence not terrorism. What they do there is against humans 
especially the shameful things to our sisters.' Int. I J. Another participant described his 
experiences, 'Indian army and government treating people inhumanely, been to Kashmir, visited 
in 1998, viewed it all, it's terrible. Here in England because of Indian pressures Kashmiris are 
detained forever, yet the judge gave sentence of seven years, that passed long time ago. I have 
visited them in prisons here. They keep as what you call political prisoners.' Int. 12. 
The Advocates viewed the situation, the conflict in Kashmir as a legitimate war, and not 
terrorism. 'They are not terrorists but freedom fighters, they just want independence.' Int. 12. 
'Kashmir is not terrorism. Only fight for their rights. One man's freedom fighter is another's 
terrorist. It's against .American agenda, until 15-20 years they called them freedom fighters.' 
Int.13. 
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Their criticism was not just leveled at the Indian government, 'Pakistanis treat us unfairly, and 
there is no electricity yet in Pakistani part of Kashmir. Kashmir should be independent of both 
Pakistan and India.' Int.9. However the situation on the Indian side was seen to be harder to live 
with, 'Pakistani controlled Kashmir is better than Indian controlled Kashmir, they are not using 
force against us ... it's not ideal but at least we have the freedom of movement. We are not 
tortured. It's not democratic, our resources are drained by Pakistan, they only use us.' lnt. 16. 
Unlike the Dismissive, who believed that there was 'no role for the British government.' Int.2. 
The Advocates believed that Britain had a crucial role to play in finding a solution to the 
Kashmiri conflict, 'The best way forward is to talk. Only certain countries respected by both 
sides are from the UN: Russia, China, France. USA and UK. UK has a history of involvement in 
the area, maybe partly responsible for creating the mess there, could act as mediator.' Int. 7. 
However some were pragmatic as to Britain's limitations, 'There is a role for UK but al\ depends 
on how involved Muslim people are in politics, lobbying group could write and do something. 1 
think Britain could but whether they will because India is helping them on war on terror. Its 
strategically important because of water, India won't give up; people of Kashmir are unfortunate 
caught in the middle.' Int. 17. 
The issue of the UK's involvement in the Kashmiri dispute evoked some emotional responses 
from this group. 'The main role is USA, but UK if not considering its own benefit and did justice, 
could persuade the USA to do something about it. All the innocent that are dying there their 
blood is on UK's hands because they left the situation there, they are in a position to do 
something and should do so.' Int. 19. Voices were raised when asked whether the UK should be 
involved, 'Yes, they created the bloody mess, Lord Mountbatten and his elite, the EU, USA and 
all the superpowers could stop this tomorrow if they wanted to, they just don't care as long as it 
doesn't affect them personally.' Int. 27. 
8.3.3 The British Patriots. 
This group comprised perceived their Britishness to be a priority. This group comprised of first, 
second, third generations, both male and female. Their loyalty was first and foremost to their 
country, and they held a belief that all solutions could be obtained from the British system. They 
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were constituted by their response to whether there was anything the UK government could do 
that would create sympathy for terrorism, and from 'further comments'. 'I genuinely think that 
no society or government is perfect or well behaved. Countries with the highest morals are 
countries that look out for people weaker than myself, and these are the West. Misguided in 
opinion, for example, Iraq, but I could never turn against them. Most countries are flawed but the 
reaction of the West after July 2005, people saw that we were treated so well by the government 
and media. It changed a lot of opinion that Muslims are treated well by the UK.' Int. 7. 
The Patriots possessed the unwavering faith in the British system, 'This is my home. I am 
influenced by Western society. My home I will defend. And I won't go against Islam, I will use 
the political system to bring change, but not everyone can afford that and are easily influenced 
by extremist elements.' Int. 13. 'British society is great, but politics 1 disagree, but best place to 
live in the world. Pakistan would not let us in as the British have done, I have greatest respect for 
it.' lnt. 8. 
Accordingly, this group placed its trust in the law, 'make sure you write: the law and policing in 
this country is very good.' Int.3. They expressed and recognised that it was not a perfect system, 
'I think as a country, we are extremely mature, we have one of the best legislation in the world. 
This country does not do things lightly, government is proud of expressing opinion. 1 trust the 
lawmakers in this country, sometimes reactionary after 9-11, personal freedom taken away, but it 
does happen. But we will find equilibrium in years again, as soon as things calm down.' Int. 8. 
The limitations of the British way of life were described as 'side effects of medicine, and we 
cannot survive without medicine.' Int. 19. 
The Patriots expressed the need to defend their country, 'I am proud to be a British Muslim, and 
if needs must I will defend my country.' Int. 27. In addition some felt it necessary to undertake 
counter terrorist work, 'Need people amongst the government to keep an eye on things, need 
Asian to work with secret services. I would do it to protect the country. Only person that could 
access them is a fellow, Asian, Muslim male. People's opinions mellowed when they witnessed 
terrorism in their own country, in London, but I think that there may still be people out there still 
a danger.' Int. 7. The Patriots continuously expressed concerns for national security, and took 
personal responsibility for the British actions, 'We should stop aggressive foreign policy, 
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strengthen our own UK borders, increase national security to stop leading to terrorism. I think 
with less aggressive foreign policy, we will have decrease in terrorism.' Int. 20.6 
8.3.4 The Advocates ofUmmah 
The Advocates of Ummah, unlike the Kashmiri Advocates were concerned about the worldwide 
Muslim perspective, and some were Dismissive of Kashmir. These were also construed from 
their responses to whether they could be sympathetic to terrorism, and their further comments. 
They viewed Islam as priority, contrary to the Patriots; British identity was secondary to their 
concerns for the Muslim Ummah. They expressed frustration in their current status; vexed at the 
West for 'demonizing Islam,' Int. 22, and in turn threatened by the law and government policies. 
The Advocates of Ummah consisted of second and third generation British Kashmiri Muslims. 
It is perhaps not surprising that they were affected by international and national issues 
concerning Muslims. 'Things like making laws on burqa [veil], it affects me. Freedom to express 
Our beliefs, what gives them the right to interfere. They are blatantly trying to attack Islam, in a 
way they are provoking sympathy towards terrorism. And it affects me because our people -
Muslims at the end of the day, they are killing people for oil.' Int. 6. Theirs is the opinion that 
they are being indirectly and directly targeted for being Muslims, 'We are living in police state, 
adhere to what they are thinking or go to prison. No freedom of speech, victimisation, 
discrimination. I went to Jummah [Friday] lecture and a WPC was there. It's wrong, they 
WOUldn't go to a normal talk.' Int. 23. 
These Advocates did not feel as though they belonged to the society they lived in: 'I'm a traveler, 
not part of the Muslim community or part of Britishness, travelling through life.' Int.17. These 
sentiments were elaborated, 'I am conscious of being judged by people, inside and outside the 
Muslim community. People have stereotypes of Muslims, I struggle to have to set an example so 
they can go away and think maybe they are not at all that bad. 1 always find it shocking that 
people can't distinguish between propaganda and what is real.' Int. 22. 
Accordingly, they felt threatened by the law and government policies. To illustrate an example 
for the purpose of this group, 'Law is disproportionate, more likely to be stopped if Asian or 
6 Emphasise added. 
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Arab. It's harmful to inter community relations and damaging. Yet insignificant amount of 
people involved in terrorism: 230 people convicted in the two million Muslims. IRA, Abu 
Ghraib, Guantanamo, not learned any lessons, repeat the same mistakes.' Int. 17. 
8.3.5 The Seekers 
The Seekers belonged to second and third generation British Kashmiri Muslims. They could not, 
and did not, share the perspective of Islam that is practiced by their parents. They are an 
important group because they highlight the potential pitfalls discussed in Chapters Two and Five. 
Not knowing about Islam, and in their quest for knowledge, some encountered potentially 
dangerous routes, 'I wanted to learn about Islam, they took me to a cafe. It was spooky and dark, 
the guy started lecturing, and I realised it was trouble, so I quickly got out and never went back. 
They can brainwash you into thinking it's the real stuff, and they do it so cleverly that the cops 
don't ever go after them.' Int.20. Another said, 'Harkat UI Mujahideen, terrorist group trying to 
recruit people in England, I was trying to find more about Islam on the Internet and they were 
trying to recruit, I never gave my details to them.' Int.6, when asked ifhe knew about the terrorist 
groups in Kashmir. 
The difficulties encountered by the Seekers are summed up by one participant in response to 
which sect of Islam she practiced, 'I used to have no idea about religion, I learned things parrot 
fashion but did not know what it meant. I had a craving to learn about Islam, I knew more about 
Christianity, so whilst at University, I contacted a group and asked them to give me knowledge, I 
wanted to join their group. The woman on the phone had converted into Islam, I remember this 
vividly, laughed at me, she said, 'how can you be born Muslim and not know about Islam?' You 
have to understand my parents are illiterate, they tried their best, but their knowledge is only 
about what they got told not what they read, and a lot of their practices are cultural from India, 
not Muslim. So I taught myself, slowly, but it's hard, still hard. I can understand how people 
wanting to learn about Islam get into wrong groups, and learn the wrong things that are not 
Islam. You know to this day there is still a gap.' In1.27. 
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8.3.6 The Guardians 
This group consists of both first and second generation. For the Guardians counter terrorist 
policies are secondary to their daily neighbourhood watch. It is important to highlight this group 
because they do not see terrorism as a major problem. Although their intentions are genuine 
meaningful, they reflect that priorities of a community may differ from the official priority of 
counter terrorism. Counter terrorism legislation and policies are a significant, life saving utility, 
however, for Guardians fighting illegal drugs is seen to be a more important agenda. In essence, 
what these findings highlight is that a balanced approach is necessary for successful 
incorporation of shared agendas. 
They viewed the growing drug problems in their community as the evil of a1l evils. Terrorism to 
them was a distant problem; their immediate concern is the illegal distribution of drugs and gang 
warfare. Thus they resent the money and policing being utilised on what they perceive as a lesser 
threat, and firmly hold the opinion that priority should be given to fighting illegal drugs. The 
Guardians were described as 'the godfathers; they got rid of the dealers around here.' Int.2. 
There was perplexity that the issue of drugs was not pivotal to the research. The focus on 
terrorism was seen to be purposeless by the Guardians, 'No-one, especially the law not doing 
enough, it should question the kids that drive forty thousand pounds cars, and drug addicts, 
instead of label1ing all as terrorists. It is damaging to the community by focusing on one element 
of law: terrorism, and not illegal drugs, heroin, which is what is the real problem in the 
community.' Int.4. 'Problems not because of terrorism but because of money laundering drugs. 
When I deposit one thousand pounds [GBP], they say where did you get it from? When I 
withdraw they ask what are you going to do with it? A man of my age, I have worked hard all 
my life, and now made to feel like a criminal because of these drug dealers, it's all wrong.' Int.3. 
The theme of 'major drug problem in the area,' Int. 8, was reiterated by others who expressed 
their frustration at the police's perceived lack of intervention. 
8.4 Further analysis 
The above 'groups' emphasise the fact that even within one community there are varied opinions 
and priorities. It further highlights that whilst terrorism is a significant concern for some, it is not 
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a major or indeed the immediate concern for all, and thus counter terrorism is not always a 
priority. Their social needs as far the 'Guardians' are concerned, take precedence over any other 
criminal justice or national security agenda. 'Factionalism and in-fighting' within the Islamic 
theology is reflected in Muslim communities in the United Kingdom; perpetuating the confusion 
experienced by some of the British born Muslims who are not able to relate to the clash of 
culture with religion, as emphasised by 'The Seekers'. Significantly, when constructing their 
identities, the second and third generation of participants commonly emphasised their 
'Britishness', and described themselves as 'British', irrespective of their individual views on the 
British government. 
Islam is a religion that in the pre-colonial era was described as 'the best social and political order 
the times could offer. It prevailed because everywhere it found politically apathetic people 
robbed, oppressed, bullied, uneducated, and unorganised and it found selfish and unsound 
governments out of touch with people. It was the broadest, freshest and cleanest political idea 
that had yet come into actual activity in the world.'7 The image of Islam is now tarnished by 
misrepresentations, and authoritarian Islamic regimes. Thus as discussed in Chapter Five. Islam 
is regarded by some as a religion that advocates and sanctions terrorism. The majority of 
Muslims, including those interviewed by the author, categorically state that terrorism is not 
compatible with Islam. However there continues to exist a minority that acts and attacks in the 
name of Islam. It is thus crucial that the tensions that are exploited by those misrepresenting 
Islam are addressed. It is equally significant that the 'role models' within the Muslim 
communities continuously condemn the acts of terrorism, and simultaneously recognise the 
'clashes' within society. Prevent work when effectively utilised could address these dynamics and 
enable the recognition of the core principles ofIslam. 
The core dilemma faced by the government is addressed by Moran and Phythian that there exist 
aspects of policing discussed in Chapter Six, and the legislation discussed in Chapter Seven that 
'is seen as being aimed primarily at Muslims.'8 Indeed the participants interviewed believed that 
some aspects of the law viewed them as guilty simply because of their religion. The fear 
7 
8 Wells H. O. (1925) The outline of History: Being a Plain History Life and Mankind. London: Cas sell at 613-14. 
M.oran J.& Phythian M. (2008) 'Conclusion: Future Directions in the 'War on Terror" in Moran 1. & Phythian M. 
(editors) Intelligence, Security and PoliCing Post - 9//1 The UK's response to the 'War on Terror'. Hampshire: 
Pal grave Macmillan at p.223. 
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addressed by the author illustrates their severe anxiety and the diminished trust in the legislative 
process. Chapters Six and Seven identified that the counter terrorism policing and legislation is 
in danger of creating 'the increasingly unpalatable and counterproductive consequence of making 
no distinction between friend and foe.'9 However, the effectiveness of the neighbourhood policy 
cannot be underestimated. It is via such projects, for example those of Bradford and High 
Wycombe, discussed in Chapter Six, that enable the two sides to achieve permanent progress. 
The review of the Prevent Strategy, also discussed in Chapter Six, highlights some of the lessons 
learned in the mistakes made since its commencement, is an extremely useful tool for counter 
terrorism work. However, along with other allegations, Prevent has the task of re-instilling 
confidence in the communities, and overcome its link with espionage that has been identified by 
the participants of this thesis. 
8.S Overview of the Research Process 
There are lessons to be learned and limitations have to be identified for future research. On 
reflection, the overall research process conducted for this thesis, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
worked well. The data generated were on aspects of counter terrorism policies and laws that were 
of importance to the interviewees. Their candid views identified areas that may not at first 
glance, appear to be related directly to counter terrorism, such as those of the Seekers and the 
Guardians, but are crucial in understanding this group, and their vulnerabilities and strengths. 
The researcher was politely informed that the interview process was 'tiring' and too long for 
some of the first generation participants. \0 As highlighted in Chapter Three, there were access 
difficulties with the females, some of whom refused to participate in a study that had 'terrorism' 
as a subject matter. The practical constraints of a self-funded PhD did not yield a sample 
representative of the general British Muslim population. 
A salient feature that the research process generated was that of fear, as discussed in Chapters 3 
and 6. It is imperative that researchers working in this field give due consideration to this issue. 
This is particularly significant because the emotion of fear may affect the scholarly aspect of the 
9 
Walker C. (2009b) 'Neighbour Terrorism and the All-Risks Policing of Terrorism.' 3 J. Nat'l Security & Poly at 
168. 
10 
To obtain a detailed data, the questions were all necessary. 
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research process, and in some circumstances halt the research itself. The level of fear in the 
community was such that the researcher whilst conducting the fieldwork, had concerns about 
'bringing on' undue suspicion from the public authorities to the researcher herself because of the 
nature of thesis, and that the participants may also be at risk because of their involvement in the 
study. This fear experienced by the researcher was ultimately addressed via a reflective diary, 
and discussions with an understanding supervisor, both of which aided the writer to reflect that 
the fear is irrational, and that the research is a legitimate, scholarly study. These methods ensured 
that the data secured were not influenced by the researcher's personal feelings; the researcher 
ensured that prior to every interview all emotions, particularly those related to fear, were 
addressed because any preoccupation with personal feelings could hinder her focus on the 
individual interviewees and their views. 11 Nevertheless, it is recommended that future research in 
this area should be undertaken by a minimum of two researchers. 
A crucial limitation of this thesis is that it does not, (due to time restrictions, and concerns for the 
participant confidentiality), following the interviews of the participants, also interview the 
Counter terrorism policing branch of the area. It would be interesting to see how they perceive 
the legislation and policies, and their views on the results of the interview. 
8.6 Future Trends 
It is an unfortunate fact that the threat from terrorism continues to remain prevalent. Since the 
commencement of the thesis Bin Laden has been declared dead, but the ideology of al-Qaeda is 
alive and exists without him. The counter terrorism work is as relevant now as it was seven years 
ago. It is recommended in line with the fieldwork findings, that Prevent is the way forward. Its 
community involvement is effective, but its delivery is questionable. The perception that it is 
'espionage' on Muslim communities hinders community co operation. The 'softer 1 2, 
implementation is certainly more effective in preventing terrorism l3 than the 'harder' image of 
Pursue which appears to perpetuate the marginalisation of the Muslim communities. Simply put, 
11 
Complete focus was necessary to assure the individual interviewees on aspects such as confidentiality, and manual 
recording ofthe interviews requires additional concentration that cannot be compromised by the researcher's 
~ersonal feelings. . 
. Joseph Nye's definition of 'soft power' as 'the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion.' 
:~ Nye J. (2004) Soft Power: The means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. 
Forst B. (2009) Terrorism, Crime and Public Policy. ' Cambridge: Cambridge University Press at p.392 and p.440. 
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the participants of this research, support local policing and the national counter terrorism 
measures need to be implemented by local rather than regional or national policing. It is 
submitted that further research is necessary specifically on ascertaining the views of the Muslim 
communities on how to implement CONTEST, which this thesis did not address in detail, may 
offer another perspective. 
The challenges faced by the government of the day reflect the 'dilemma' in addressing terrorism. 
Should the government act 'passively' it risks losing its credibility and public support; should it 
act 'harshly' it further risks the loss of public support and may create sympathy for the terrorist's 
cause. 14 Prevent presents us with the unique opportunity of understanding the characteristics of 
the Muslim communities; otherwise these communities may appear excessively complex and 
inaccessible. In collaboration with neighbourhood policing, Prevent enables interference from 
outsiders that may in other circumstances be rejected. However, the fragility of this work is 
evidenced by Prevent's inadequate methods of enforcing its practices. Nevertheless, it has the 
potential of a fruitful, promising future. 
In essence, it is crucial in achieving the public trust, to ensure that the executive discretion via its 
legislation be challenged by judicial oversight, which as discussed in Chapters Six and Seven is 
not always forthcoming. Measures incorporated in the name of national security have to be 
balanced by judicial redress - to maintain the credibility of the separation of powers which is 
crucial for the survival of our democracy. 
The 'war on terror' has the danger of creating unfettered, unchallenged legislation that may 
indeed benefit the terrorists rather than the counter terrorism objectives. Nonetheless, the counter 
terrorism policing and legislation is necessary because amongst other duties, it is the core duty of 
the State to protect its citizens from terrorism and terrorist atrocities. However, the universal 
nature of law has to be safeguarded, this clarifies and reinforces to the 'marginalised' 
communities that the law is respectful and thus has to be respected. 
14 Enders W. & Sandler T. (2006) The Political Economy o/Terrorism. New York: Cambridge University Press at 
p.27. 
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Appendix One 
Headings for the Interview Schedule / Guide 
A. Personal Background 
Following discussion on confidentiality and ethical issues: 
Confidentiality Statement: Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research. The 
information obtained will be used solely for the purposes of the thesis. Your anonymity and 
confidentiality will be protected; 1 will not be using your actual name. Your experiences, 
attitudes and views on the questions are relevant to the research, any form of illegal or criminal 
activity is not - and once you verbalize that the interview will be terminated. 1 will be asking you 
questions on an area of law, namely terrorism, and with that there are limits to confidentiality 
that are imposed by the law: s.38A Terrorism Act 2000 and s.1 Terrorism Act 2006. Therefore 
should you reveal to me any information about committing a terrorist offence, and / or 
financially supporting a terrorist organization; about encouraging others to commit acts of 
terrorism, whether it involves distributing leaflets, making statements online or lecturing, 1 will 
be obliged to report you to the relevant authorities. It is okay to say, '1 can understand why 
people join or what motivates them ... ', but not beyond that. The notes that I will be taking 
during the interview will be transcribed following the interview, and as 1 stated earlier, 1 will 
record the information in the thesis only. Should you have any concerns about confidentiality, 
please feel free to express them before we start the actual interview. 
1. Interview will commence by ascertaining the gender, socio-economic status and age of the 
participant. 
2. Were you born in the UK? Were your parents born in the UK? 
3. How long have you lived in the UK? 
4. Do you have family / relatives in Kashmir? 
5. How often have you visited Kashmir? 
6. Are you a practicing Muslim, ifso, what sect of Islam do you practice?'5 
15 This is relevant since the government 'endorses' Sufism over other Islamic sects in its 'Prevent" document. 'The 
government was expressing a theological preference for Sufism over other trends': Kundnani A. (2009) Spooked! 
How to Prevent violent extremism. Institute of Race Relations: London, at p.36. See also: Pantazis C. & Pemberton 
S. (2009) 'From the 'old' to the 'new' suspect community: examining the impacts of recent UK counter-terrorist 
legislation.' Brit. J. Criminol. 2009, 49(5), 646-666. 
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B. General Attitudes towards the situation in Kashmir 
1. What are your views about the situation in Kashmir? 
2. Would you describe the Kashmir political situation as terrorism or not? 
3. If there is terrorism, who is committing it? 
4. Do you see a role for the UK government in the Kashmiri conflict? 
C. General attitudes towards terrorism 
I. What does the term 'terrorism' mean to you? 
2. What do you think Islam says about terrorism? 
3. What is 'Jihad' and how does it relate to terrorism? 
4. What do you know about groups such as Jaish E Muhammad, Laskhar E Toiba, and 
Harkat UI Mujahideen? 
5. Do you think the Pakistani Army or the police are committing terrorism? 
6. Do you think the Indian Army or the Indian police are committing terrorism? 
7. Do you think the British Army is committing terrorism in Iraq or Afghanistan - if yes, 
how does that affect you? 
8. Is there anything else that British society does which could motivate you to be 
sympathetic to terrorism against that society? 
D. Counter Terrorism Law in the UK 
I. Do you accept the definition of terrorism that is in the Terrorism Act 2000? 
(Researcher will state definition in the TA) 
2. How do you feel about the banning in UK law of the Kashmiri groups? 
3. How do you feel about limits on financing those groups? 
4. How do you feel about bans on glorification etc? 
5. Has the law on counter-terrorism, namely: 
a. Proscription (the banned list) of terrorist groups; 
b. Glorification of terrorism (e.g. lecturing on support of terrorism); 
c. Financing 
Affected you? Your friends or relatives? 
Is it compatible with your beliefs and culture? 
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6. Have you had any contact with the police involving terrorist activities? 
7. Have you been stopped and searched? 
8. Do you think that the 'law' is doing enough or not doing enough to combat terrorism? 
9. Do you think that it is beneficial or damaging? If it is damaging, to whom: the 
community, the government or to you as an individual? And why? 
10. Do you feel 'protected' or threatened by the law? 
11. Do you feel the government is being helpful or unhelpful in assisting the community to 
resist extremism and terrorism? 
12. Do you think you are being singled out for treatment as a suspect community or as a 
community worthy of respect? 
13. Do you have any comments on the topics of terrorism law and policing in the UK? 
The above may have to be changed into simpler language, and may require translation in the 
'Kashmiri' language (for those that do not speak English). 
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Appendix 2: 
Interview Consent Form 
I, (participant's name), understand that I am being asked to participate in 
an interview that forms part of Kaniz I. Sattar-Shafiq's PhD thesis, School of Law at the 
University of Leeds. It is my understanding that this interview will cover the topic of terrorism 
and Kashmir. 
I have been given some general information about the thesis, and the subject matter. I understand 
that the interview will be conducted at my convenience. 
I understand that my participation in this interview is completely voluntary and that I am free to 
refuse to participate, without consequence, at any time prior to or at any point during the 
interview. 
I understand that the information will be kept completely confidential and will be used only for 
the purpose of the PhD thesis. 
I understand the confidentiality statement outlined to me by the researcher. 
Signature: 
Date (optional): 
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Appendix 3: Critical Self Reflection. 
Prompts to reflect on and 'step back': 
1. Feelings: Positive Negative. 
2. Transference Counter transference 
3. Behaviour - ~on-verbal communication in the interview 
4. How did the views of the participants affect my feelings? 
What are the best things that happened in the interview, and what are the worst things that 
happened? 
5. Did I lead the interview? 
6. Was it participant lead?! 
I 
See La Torre M.A. (2005) • Self-Reflection - An Important Process for the Therapist.' Per~peclives in Psychiatric 
Care. 2005,41(2): 85. 
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Appendix 4: Characteristic Analysis of the Participants. 
All the participants interviewed were of 'Mirpuri' origin. 
Interviewee Age Generation Education Employment Religion Gender Proficiency 
(in or Time in in English 
years). UK Language 
\ \8-24 British BSc (Hons) Seeking Non- Male Fluent 
born, Graduate Employment Practising 
second Muslim 
generation. 
2 25-35 British Masters Business Non- Male Fluent 
born, Graduate Analyst Practising 
second Muslim 
generation. 
3 70+ First No formal Retired Islam:Sufism Male Can read 
generation, qualifications: Textile and write 
In UK 45- basic worker. in English. 
50 years. education. 
4 70+ First None Retired Islam: Male Can speak 
generation Foundry Sufism. very basic 
In UK 45- worker English 
50 years. only. 
5 \8-24 British BA (Hons) Telesales Islam: Male Fluent. 
born, Sufism 
second 
generation. 
6 18-24 British A Level Student Islam: Male Fluent 
born, third student Sufism. 
generation 
7 25-35 British MSc. IT support Non- Male Fluent 
born, Graduate Manager in Practising 
second the public Muslim 
generation. sector. 
8 25-35 British BSc. (Hons). Computer Non- Male Fluent 
born, Programmer Practising 
second byHM Muslim 
generation. Government. 
9 65-70 First None Retired Islam: Male Speaks 
Generation. Textile Sufism. very basic 
In UK 40- Worker English 
45 years. 
10 70+ First None. Retired Islam: Male Speaks 
Generation. Textile Sufism. very basic 
In UK 45- Worker English 
50 years. 
11 55-65 First No formal Taxi Driver Islam: Male Has good 
Generation. education, but Sufism. command 
In UK 40- did attend of English. 
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45 years. schools. can read 
and write 
at basic 
level. 
12 55-65 First None Interior Islam: Male Fluent in 
Generation. Designer Sufism. verbal 
In UK 40- English. 
45 years. but cannot 
read or 
write. 
13 36-45 British BA (Hons). Employed by Non- Male Fluent 
born, the Local Practising 
second Authority and Muslim 
generation. is also a 
Councillor. 
14 45-54 First No Formal Councillor [slam: Male. Moderate 
Generation, Education. and Travel Sufism. English 
in UK 35- Agent. Language. 
40 years. 
15 25-35 British BA (Hons) Self Non- Male. Fluent 
born, Employed: Practising 
second Motor Muslim 
generation Trader. 
16 25-35 First BA (Hons) Office Islam: Male Fluent 
Generation, Administrator Sufism. 
in UK for 7 
years. 
17 25-35 British BA (Hons) Professional Islam: Male Fluent 
born, Sufism. 
second 
generation 
18 55-65 First None Travel Agent Islam: Male Fluent 
Generation. Sufism. 
In UK 45-
50 years. 
19 65-70 First BA Graduate Retired Bank Islam: Male Fluent 
Generation. Manager in Sufism. 
In UK 45- the UK; Ex-
50 years. Army 
Intelligence 
in Pakistani 
administered 
Kashmir. 
20 18-24 British MA graduate Student Non- Male Fluent 
born, Teacher Practising 
second Muslim 
generation 
21 25-35 First None Unemployed Islam: Female Basic 
Generation. Single Parent. Sufism. 
In UK 10-
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15 years 
22 25-35 British BSc (Hons) Student Islam: Female Fluent 
born, third Sufism. 
generation 
23 18-24 British Undergraduate Student Islam: Female Fluent 
born, third student Sufism. 
generation 
24 35-45 First None Housewife Islam: Female Moderate 
Generation. Sufism. 
In UK 15-
20 years 
25 25-35 British MA Social Islam: Female Fluent 
born, Worker with Sufism. 
second Local 
generation Authority. 
26 25-35 British BSc (Hons) Teacher, Non- Female Fluent 
born, employed by Practising 
second local Muslim 
generation authority 
27 35-45 British Masters Legal Practising Female Fluent. 
born, Profession Muslim: No 
second sect. 
generation 
258 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aboul-Enein Y.H & Zuhur S (2004) Islamic Rulings on Warfare. Strategic Studies Institute: 
Carlisle Barricks 
Acosta B (2010) 'The Suicide Bomber as Sunni - Shi'i Hybrid.' Middle Eastern Quarterly 17(3), 
Summer 2010 
Ahmad, S. S. (2004) History of Pakistan and Role of the Army. Karachi, Royal Book Company. 
Akehurst M. (1987) Nicaragua v. United States of America, Indian JIL 27 (1987), 357 
AI Uyayri Y. (2003) 'The Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Self Sacrificial Operations: 
Suicide or Martyrdom?' (Translated in English by At-Tibyan, 2003). 
Alexander R (2009) 'Money laundering and terrorist financing: time for a combined offence.' 
Camp. Law 2009, 30(7), 200-204. 
Alexander Y (1977) "Terrorism and the Media in the Middle East" in Alexander Y & Finger 
S.M (eds) Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: John Jay Press)pp.166-208 
Alexander Y (1977) "Communications Aspects of International terrorism", International 
Problems 16 Spring 1977, pp 55-60 
Alexander Y (1978) "Terrorism, the Media and the Police", Journal of International Affairs, 
32:1, pp. 101-113 
Alexander Y (1979) "Terrorism and the Media: Some Considerations", in Alexander Y et al. 
(eds) Terrorism: Theory and Practice (Boulder, CO: Westview Press) pp.159-174 
AIi D (2007) Recognising the Kashmiri Community in the United Kingdom: Implications for 
Education Attainment. Race Equality Teaching Trentham Books: London. 
AIi, N., Ellis, P. and Khan Z. (1996) "The 1990's: A Time to Separate British Punjabi and 
British Kashmiri Identity", N.G. Singh and L Tabot (editors), Punjabi Identity: Continuity and 
Change. New Delhi:Manohar. p. 229-256. 
Ali S.S & Rehman J (2005) "The Concept of Jihad in Islamic International Law" Journal of 
Conflict & Security Law Nov.2005; C&S Law 2005 10 (321). Oxford University Press 
Almond H.H Jr. (1984) "The Use of Organized Groups by State as Vehicles to Promote their 
Foreign Policy", in Henry Hyunwook Han (editor) Terrorism, Political Violence & World Order. 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, pp.229-66 
Allott P (1999) 'The concept of International Law' 1999 10 EJ1L 31 
259 
Almond RH Jr. (1984) "The Use of Organized Groups by State as Vehicles to Promote their 
Foreign Policy", in Henry Hyunwook Han (editor) Terrorism, Political Violence & World Order. 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, pp.229-66 
Amigo B.A (2010) 'Identity, international terrorism and negotiating peace: Hamas and ethics 
based considerations from critical restorative justice.' Brit. J. Criminol. 2010, 50(4), 772-790 
AQ100re L. & De Goede M (2008) "Introduction: Governing by Risk in the War on Terror", in 
Amoore L & De Goede M (editors) Risk and the War on Terror. 5-\9. Oxon: Routledge. 
Anderson D (2011) "The independent review of terrorism legislation" E. H. R. L. R 2011, 5, 544-
551. 
Anderson D (QC) (2012) The Terrorism Acts in 201/ Report of the Independent Reviewer on the 
Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part I of the Terrorism Act 2006. London: The 
Stationery Office. June 2012. 
Anderson D (QC) (2011) 'Report on the Operation in 2010 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part I 
of the Terrorism Act 2006.' London: The Stationery Office. July 2011. 
Anderson 0 (QC) (2011) 'First Report on the Operation of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 
2010' London: The Stationery Office. December 2011 
Anderson J (2003) 'Killer Apes on American Airlines, or : How Religion was the Main Hijacker 
on September 11', in Varvin S & Volkan V.D (editors) (2003) Violence or Dialogue? 
Psychoanalytic Insights on Terror and Terrorism. Institute of Psychoanalytic Association: 
London 
An-Na'im A.A (2002) 'Upholding International Legality Against Islamic and American jihad', 
in Booth K. and Dunne T (editors) Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order. 
Palgrave: London 
Ansari H., Cinnirella M., Rogers M.B., Loewenthal K.M., & Lewis C.A (2006) 'Perceptions of 
Martyrdom and terrorism amongst British Muslims', in Rogers M.B., Lewis C.A., Loewenthal 
K.M., CinnireIla M., Amlot R. & Ansari H (editors) 'Proceedings of the British Psychological 
Society Seminar Series Aspects of Terrorism and Martyrdom', eCommunity: International 
Journal of Mental Health and Addiction, 2006 
Ansari H (2002) Muslims in Britain Minority Rights Group: London 
Anwar M (1979) Myth of Return: Pakistanis in Britain. Heinemann: London 
Archbold Review (2012) "Case Comment. Terrorism offences - definition of "terrorism" in 
Terrorism Act 2000 - international law. " Arch Rev. 2012, 3:2-3 
Arden M (2005) "Human Rights in the Age of Terrorism" L.Q.R 2005,121 (Oct), 604-627 
260 
Armstrong K (2002) Islam A Short History Random House, NY & Toronto 
Aron R (1966) Press and War London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 
Ashworth A (2010) "Case Comment. Gillan & Quinton v UK: human rights - Article 5 - stop and 
search as deprivation of liberty." Crim. L.R 2010, 415-419. 
Ashworth A (2007) "Security, Terrorism and the Value of Human Rights", in Goold B & 
Lazarus L (eds) Security and Human Rights. Hart Publishing: Oxford 
AsIan R (2004) 'Why do they Hate US?' Slate. August 6 2007 
Aust H.P (2012) 'Publication Review. State Responsibility for International Terrorism. Problems 
and Prospects. Kimberly N. Trapp.' E. J. 1. L. 2012, 23(1), 275-278 
Austin J.L (1955) How to do things with words', Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Awn lP (1984) in Kelly M (editor) (1984) Islam: The Religion and Political Life ola World 
Community. Praeger: New York 
Awan I (2012) "Misconceptions oflslam." C. L. & J. 2012, 176(18),253. 
Badar M.E (2011) 'Islamic law (Sharia) and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.' 
L. J. 1. L. 2011,24(2) 411-433 
Baines M (2007) "Winning Hearts and Minds: Managing Community Tensions." Policing 2007, 
1(3) 316-326. 
Baker M (1987) 'The Western European Legal Response to Terrorism' 13 Brookings JIL 1 
Bakiraogll:l 0 (2010) 'A socio-Iegal analysis of the concept ofjihad.' 1. C. L.Q 2010,59(2),413-
440 
Bakker E (2006) Jihadi terrorists in Europe, their characteristics and the circumstances in 
which they joined the jihad: An expiatory study. Clingendael Institute: The Hague 
Ball P (2005) This means war The Guardian (London). Thursday August 4, 2005 
Ballard R (2002) "The South Asian Presence in Britain and its Transnational Connections" in 
Singh H & Vertovec S (editors) Culture and Economy in the Indian Diaspora. London: 
Routledge. 
BaIJard, R. (1991) "Kashmir Crisis: View from Mirpur". Economic and Political Weekly Vol 2, 
No 9, pp 513-17. 
261 
Bar S (2004) 'The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism' Policy Review No. 125,2004 
Barendt E (2005) 'Threats to Freedom of Speech in the UK.' UNSW Law Journal 28(3), 2005, 
895-899 
Barendt E (2011) 'Religious hatred laws: protecting groups or belief?' Res Publica 2011. 17(1). 
41-53. 
Bames I. and Eagle T (2007) "The Role of Community Engagement in Neighbourhood 
Policing." Policing 2007, 1(2) 161-172 
Bamum, D. (2006) "Indirect Incitement and Freedom of Speech in Anglo-American Law" 
E.H. R.LR. 2006. 3.258-280. 
Barradori G (2003) Philosophy in Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and 
Jacques Derrida (University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 
Bassiouni Cherif M. (1983) in Freedman L.H & Alexander Y. (editors) Perspectives on 
Terrorism. Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources 
BBC News (2010) 'Islam 4 UK Islamist group banned under terror laws,' 12 January 2010. (It is 
the Islamist group planning to march in Wootton - Bassett. 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hil8453560.stm. 
BBC News http://news.bbbb.code.uk/go/pr/fr/-2/hi/southasia/3 I BI925.stm. published 17th of 
March 2006. 
BBC Radio 4 (2008) 'Transcript of the File on 4 - financial war on terror,' 3 June, at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uklll shared/bsp/hilpdfs/03_06_08_fU4_terror.pdf. 
BBC, 11 July 2005 Kashmiri Anxiety Over UK Attacks. http://www.jammu-
kashmir.com/archives/archives2005/kashmir20050711 a.html. 
BBC documentary (2003) The Secret Policeman. 
Beckett A (2004) "The making of the terror myth" Guardian Feature Pages. p.2 Oct 15,2004. 
Beer L (1995) 'Human Rights - The forgotten fight - the human rights defenders who have 
themselves been victims of violence and discrimination.' LS Gaz. 24 May 1995. 92 (22) 
Bell, J. Bowyer (1978) A Time of Terror. New York: Basic Books 
Bell, J. B. (1975) Transnational Terror AEI Hoover Institute Studies, No.51 (Stanford, CA: 
Hoover Institute Press). 
262 
Bellemare D (2012) "Bringing terrorists before internal justice: a view from the front lines: notes 
for an address.' Crim L.F. 2012, 23(4) 425-435 
Benz C.R & Newman 1. (1998) Qualitative - Quantitative Research Methodology: Exploring the 
Interactive Continuum. Carbondale, IL; Southern Illinois University Press 
Bergesen AJ & Han Y (2005) "New Directions for Terrorism Research" International Journal 
of Comparative Sociology Vo1.46. Issue 1-2. Page 133 
Berman N (2006) 'Intervention in a 'Divided World': Axes of Legitimacy.' E.J.IL 2006. 17: 
(743) 
Berko A., Erez E. & Globoker J.L (2010) 'Gender, crime and terrorism: the case of Arab / 
Palestinian women in Israel.' Brit. J. CriminoI. 20 I 0, 50(4), 670-689. 
Bettison N. Sir (2009) "preventing Violent Extremism - A Police Response." PoliCing 2009, 
3(2): 129-138. (l May 2009) 
Bhatt, S. (2003) "State Terrorism versus Jihad in Kashmir" Journal of Contemporary Asia. Vol 
33, Issue 2. p. 215 
Big News Network.com; May 24, 2007 
Birmingham Post (2008) "Muslim Women's Voice will be Heard in Debate." 26 March 2008 
Bix B (1996) Jurisprudence: Theory and Context. Westview Press, Oxford 
Blears H (2009) "Many voices: understanding the debate about preventing violent extremism." 
Lecture at the LSE, 25 Feb. 2009. http://www.communities.gov.uk!speeches/corporate/many 
voices. 
Bolognani M (2006) A 'Community Criminology' Perceptions of Crime and Social Control 
amongst Bradford Pakistanis. (PhD Thesis) School of Sociology and Social Policy. University of 
Leeds. November 2006. 
Bolognani M (2009) Crime and Muslim Britain: Race. Culture and the Politics of Criminology 
amongst British Pakistanis.' London: 18 Tauris. 
Banner D (2006) "Responding to Crisis: Legislating Against Terrorism" L. Q. R. 2006. 122 (Oct). 
602-631 
Bono S (2008) 'In pursuit of religious and legal diversity: a response to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury and the 'Sharia debate' in Britain', Eec L.J 2008. 10(3).283-309 
Bowling B & Phi lips C (2002) Racism. Crime and Justice. London: Longman 
263 
Bowling B (1999) Violent Racism Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Brandon, B. (2004) "TerroriS'ln, Human Rights and The Rule of Law: 120 Years of the UK's 
legal response to Terrorism". Crim.L.R. 2004. December. 981-997. 
Brass P (1974) Language, Religion and Politics in North India Cambridge University Press: 
Camb~idge. 
Breed W (1955) "Newspaper 'Opinion Leaders' and the Processes of Socialisation", Journalism 
Quarterly32, Summer 1955, pp.277-84 
Buncombe A & Marks K (2007) 'Trial and Terror: On 717 Anniversary, Jeep Passenger Appears 
in Court over Bomb Attacks.' The Independent 8 July, 2007 
Bunting M (2005) Comment & Analysis: Fear and loathing: Anxiety about terrorism is now 
shaping all of Britain's political debate and refining allegiances. Guardian Leader Pages. The 
Guardian (London) Final Edition. August 29 2005, at p.15 
Burke Johnson R (1997) 'Examining the Validity Structure of Qualitative Research.' Education. 
118 (2): 282. 
Burke J (2003) Al Qaeda - Casting a Shadow of Terror. l.B. Town's: London 
Burki S. K (2011) 'Haraam or Halal? Islamists' Use of Suicide Attacks as J ihad'.' Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 23: 582-601 
Bush J (1993) 'How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction after Alvarez-Machain' 1995, 45 
Stanford Law Review 939 
Busuttil J (1991) 'Humanitarian Law in Islam' The Military Law & Law of War Review 1991, 
30, 113 
Bux S (2007) 'Muslim Youths, Islam and Violent Radicalisation: Addressing some Myths', 
PJ,80,3 (267) 
Buxton R (2010) "Case Comment. Terrorism and the European Conv~ntion." Crim. L. R. 2010, 
7,533-542. 
CampbelI, C. (2005) "Wars on Terror and Vicarious Hegemons: UK, International Law and the 
Northern Ireland Conflict" International and Comparative Law Quarterly, April 2005. 
Carlile, Lord (2005) Proposals by Her Majesty's Government/or changes to the laws against 
terrorism. London: Home Office 
Carlile, Lord (2007) 'The definition of terrorism.' Cm. 7052. London. 
264 
Carlile, Lord (2010) "Terrorism: Pragmatism, Populism and Libertarianism - The Inaugural John 
Creaney Memorial Lecture." 3 March 20 I 0, at 
http://www . pal icyexchange.org.uklassets/Carl i le _ Transcri pt. pd f. 
Carrington C.J (2001) 'What is th~ Truth about Islamic Terrorism', 
http://www.onthruth.com/islamwtc.html. last visited July 2009, and 
http://www.islamreligion.com/articles/238/modified 
Casciani D (2010) "Prevent extremism strategy 'stigmatising' warn MPS". 
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/uk_news/8593862.stm. 30 March 20 I 0 
Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Monash University, Submission No.2 to PJCIS, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Terrorist Organisation Listing Provisions of the 
Criminal Code Act 1995, 22 January 2007 
Cassesse A (1989) 'The International Community'S 'Legal' Response to Terrorism' 1989, 38 
ICLQ 589,591-596 
Cassesse A (2003) International Criminal Law Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Cassesse A (2012) "The legitimacy of international criminal tribunals and the current prospects 
of international criminal justice." L. J 1. L. 2012, 25(2), 491-501. 
Cavanaugh K (2012) 'Speaking law to war.' Jc.& S.L 2012,17(1).3-24. 
Cayland, Sir R. (1945) "India: A Restatement" Oxford University Press. 
Chaudhury T & Fenwick H (2011) 'The impact of counter terrorism measures on Muslim 
communities.' Durham University. Equality and Human Rights Commission 2011 
Chaudhury T & Fenwick H (2011) The impact of counter terrorism measures on Muslim 
communities. EHRC Research report. June 2011. 
Chenoy K (2006) 'Contending Nationalisms: Kashmir and the Prospects for Peace.' Harvard 
International Review 2006, 28(3) :24. 
Cherryholmes C.H (1992) 'Notes on Pragmatism and Scientific Realism.' Educational 
Researcher, 14: 13-17 
Choudhry S (2009) 'Managing linguistic nationalism through constitutional design: lessons from 
South Asia.' IeJL 2009, 7(4),577-618 
Clapham A (1996) The Human Rights in Private Sphere Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Clarke C [2005] Home Office www.homeoffice.gov.uk 15 September, 2005 
265 
Clark K.B & Clark M P (1947) "Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children", in 
Newcomb T.M & Hartley E.L (editors) Readings in Social P:,ychology New York: Henry Holt, 
169-78 
Clarke R.V & Newman G.R (2007) "Police and the Prevention of Terrorism." Policing 2007, 
1(1) 9-20. 
Cline R.S. & Alexander Y. (1986) Terrorism as State-Sponsored Covert Warfare. Fairfax, VA: 
Hero Books 
Cliteur P (2012) 'State and religion against the backdrop of religious radicalism.' l.J. C. L 2012, 
10(1),127-152 
Clutterbuck R (1990) Terrorism and Guerilla Warfare. London: Routledge. Pp.89-1l4 
Coli ins Dictionary (1992) Third edition. Aylesbury: Harper Coli ins Publishers. 
Collins E & McGovern M (1997) Killing Rage. GrantaBooks: London 
Coli ins J (1981) "Definitional Aspects" in Alexander Y. & Ebinger E (editors) Political 
Terrorism & Energy. New York: Praeger; Ward low, (1982), ibid; Lodge, (1988), ibid, at p.2 
Conlan T (2005) BBC warns staff over 'terrorism' Friday December 16, 2005. BBC monitoring 
ON LINE. 
Cook R (2005) Comment & Analysis: The struggle against terrorism cannot be won by militmy 
means: The GB must seize the opportunity to address the wider issues at the root of such 
atrocities. The Guardian (London). Final Edition. July 8, 2005, at p.24 
Cooper B (2004) New Political Religions. Or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism University of 
Missouri Press. Columbia, MO 
Coulson N.J (1957) 'The State and the Individual in Islamic Law' 6 ICLQ 195749 
Cozier B (1960) The Rebels: A Study of Post-war Insurrections. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Cram 1 (2010) 'Beyond Lockean Majoritanism? Emergency, Institutional failure and the UK 
constitution.' H.R.L Rev.2010, 10(3),461-485 
Cram I (2009) 'Terrorism investigations and the coerced disclosure of journalists' materials.' 
Comm. L. 2009, 14(2),40-45 
Crecher, M. (1953) "The struggle for Kashmir". Ryerson Press 
266 
Crenshaw M (1988) "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental & Organizational Approaches" in 
Rapoport D.C (editor) (1988) Inside Terrorist Organizations. Columbia University Press. New 
York. 
Creswell J. W. (2007) Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design Second Edition. London: Sage 
Publications 
Croft S & Moore C (2010) 'The evolution of threat narratives in the age of terror: understanding 
threats in Britain.' International Affairs 86:4; 2010, 821-835 
Curtis A (2005) Comment & Analysis: Creating Islamist phantoms: We dreamed up 'al-Qaida' 
Let's not do it again with 'evil ideology' Guardian Leader Pages, The Guardian. (London). 
August 30, 2005. at p.18. 
D'Amato (1985) Nicaragua and International Law: The 'Academic' and the Real, AJIL 79 
(1985),657 
DarJington Y & Scott D (2002) Qualitative Research in Practice: Storiesfrom the Field. Alien & 
Unwin Publishers 
Dart J (2001) "Bin Laden's Strategy: War and the Religious Imagination" The Christian Centure 
118:30. Nov 7, 2001 at p.4. 
Das D.K (2005) 'From the Editor - in - Chief Police Practice and Research (An International 
Journal), May 2005, 6(2), 95-97. 
Davis H (2005) "Lessons from Turkey: Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the Protection of Free 
Speech" E.H.R.L.R 2005, 1,75-85 
Daymon C & Holloway I (2002) Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and 
Marketing Communications. Routledge 
DeCataldo Newburger L. & Valentini T (1996) Women and Terrorism, Macmillan: London 
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (2010) 'What Perceptions do the UK Public have 
Concerning the Impact of Counter - terrorism Legislation Implemented since 2000?' London: 
Home Office Occasional Paper 88. 
Dennis I (2011) "Editorial - Counter Terrorism" Crim. L.R. 201 I, 3,175-176 
Dennis I (2011) "Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures BilL" Crim. L. R. 2011,10, 
741-742 
Denscombe M (2003) The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects. 
Open University Press: Maidenhead 
267 
Denzin N.K (1994) 'The Art and Politics of Interpretation.' in Denzin N.K & Guba Y.S (editors) 
Handbook of Qualitative Research. pp.SOO-515. London: Sage Publications. 
Desroches F (2005) "Policing in the Post 9111 Era," Research and Evaluation Branch, Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police. 
Dickson B (2005) 'Law versus terrorism: can law win?' E.HR.L.R 2005, I, 11-28 
Dixit J.N (2002) India-Pakistan in War and Peace. London: Routledge 
Dixon P (2009) 'Hearts and minds? British counter - insurgency from Malaya to Iraq.' Journal of 
Strategic Studies, 32:353 
Dodd V (2005) Number of faith crimes has risen five7fold in the fortnight since London 
bombings Guardian Home Pages. July 23, 2005, at p.4 
Dodd V (200Sb) Attacks on London Guardian Home Pages. (London) August 4,2005 at p.6 
Dodd V (200Sc) Attacks on London: Murder: Islamophobia blamed for attack. Guardian Home 
Pages, The Guardian (London) Final Edition. July 13, 2005 at p.5 
Dodd V (2005) Radical plan to stop Muslim extremism. Guardian Home Pages. (London). 
September 17, 2005, at p.1 
Doe B (2006) 'Another country', TES magazine, 23 June 2006: 
http://www.tes.co.uklarticle.aspx?storycode=226l962 
Donoghue L.K (2001) Counter- Terrorism Law. Dublin: Irish Academic Press 
Donohue L.K (2006) 'Anti terrorism finance in the UK and the US,' Michigan Journal of 
International Law, vo1.27, pp.303-43S 
Dowds L & Young J (1996) British Social Attitudes Survey. London: Dartmouth 
Duffy H (2005) The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
Durkheim E (1965) The Division of Labour, translated by George Simpson. The Free Press: New 
York 
Duschinski H (2009) 'Destiny Effects: Militarization, State Power, and Punitive Containment in 
Kashmir Valley.' Anthropological Quarterly 2009,82(3); 691 
Dutt S (2002) 'The Indo-Pakistan Summit: Faltering Steps towards Peace? Sagarika Dutt 
comments on Indo - Pakistan Relations in the Light of the Recent Failed Summit in Agra.' New 
Zealand International Review, 2002, 27(1) at 2 
268 
Ebbs C.A (1996) "Qualitative Research Inquiry: Issues of Power and Ethics" Education Vol. I 17, 
Issue 2, 1996, p.2l7 
Enders W & Sandler T (2006) The Political Economy o/Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Efron E (1971) The News Twisters. Los Angeles: Nash; 
EI-Ayouty Y (1999) 'International Terrorism under the Law' Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 1999, 5ILSA at 489 
Ellis P & Khan Z (1999) 'Political Allegiances and Integration: The British Kashmiris' in Weil S 
(editor) Roots and Routes, Ethnicity and Migration in Global Perspective. Magnes Press, The 
Hebrew University: Jerusalem 
Ellis P. and Khan Z. (1998), "Diasporic Mobilization on the Kashmiri Issue in British Politics". 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Vo124, Issue 3. p. 471 
Erikson E.H (1956) "The Problem of Ego-Identity." 4 J American P.sychoanalytic Association 
56-121 
Ericson R (2008) "The State of Pre-emption Managing Terrorism through Counter Law," In 
Amoore L. & De Goede M (editors) Risk and the War on Terror. 57-76. Oxon: Routledge 
Epstein EJ (1973) News From Nowhere New York: Vintage 
Esposito J (1992) The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? OUP: Oxford 
Esposito J.L (2002) What Everyone needs to Know about Islam Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Etienne M (2005) 'The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers' Journal o/Criminal Law & Criminology, Vol. 95, Issue 4, 
p.1195 
European Parliament resolution of May 24,2007 on Kashmir. (2005/2242 (1Nl) C 102E/473. 
European Parliament resolution of 24 May 2007 on Kashmir: present situation and future 
prospects. (2005/2242 (INI) ) at CI02E / 474. Official Journal a/the EU. 24/4/2008. 
Evans G (1995) "Kashmir the Intractable Conflict" Contemporary Review Vol 267: 1157. Dct 
1995. p. 178 . 
Evans A (2000) "The Kashmir Insurgency: As Bad As It Gets." Small Wars and Insurgencies 
I I: 1, Spring 2000, pp69-81. 
269 
Falk R (1988) Revolutionaries & Functionaries: The Dual Face of Terrorism. New York: 
E.P.Outton 
Fekete L (2004) "Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State." Race and Class, 46, 3-
29 
Feldman 0 (2006) "Human Rights, Terrorism & Risk: The Roles of Politicians and Judges" PL 
2006, SUM, 364-384 
Fialka J.J (1991) Hotel Warriors: Covering the GulfWar(Baltimore: Published by the Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, distributed by the John Hopkins University Press). 
Fielding N.G. (J 991) The Police and Social Conflict: Rhetoric and Reality. London: The Athlone 
Press. 
(Financial Action Task Force) FATF (2007) Third Mutual Evaluation Report Anti Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism the UK of GB and Northern Ireland. 
Financial Action Task Force, Paris. 29 June 2007. 
Firestone R (1999) Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam. Oxford: OUP 
Filippo M.O (2008) 'Terrorism crimes and international cooperation: critical remarks on the 
definition and inclusion of terrorism in the category of international crimes'. E.J.1. L 2008, 19(3), 
533-570 
Fiss 0 (2006) "The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law" Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies Summer 2006 
Fitzgerald M & Muncie J (1981) 'Humanising the deviant' in Fitzgerald M., et al (editors) Crime 
& Society: Readings in History and Theory. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
Fluehr-Lobban C. (1994) Islamic Society in Practice Florida: University press of Florida 
Forbes E (2005) Terrorism on trial Guardian, (London). August 2, 2005 
Forcese C (2006) "The Capacity to Protect: Diplomatic Protection of Dual Nationals in The' War 
on Terror' 17 Eur J.Int 'I L. 369 April 2006 
Forst B (2009) Terrorism, Crime and Public Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Friedlander R.A (1979) "The Origins ofInternational Terrorism" in Alexander Y. and Finger, op 
cit., pp.30-45 
Friedlander R (1979) "Coping with Terrorism" in Alexander Y. et al., (editors) Terrorism: 
Theory & Practice (Boulder: Westview Press), p.236 
270 
Friedman T (1984) "The Power of the Fanatics" New York Times Magazine, 7 October 1984. 
p.68-69 
Fukuyama F (1992) The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press 
Fukuyama F (1995) Trust. New York: Free Press 
Fukuyama F (2001) 'History is Still Going our Way - Liberal Democracy will Inevitably Prevail.' 
Wall Street Journal. October 5, 2001. 
Fukuyama F (2006) 'The 'End of History' Symposium: A Response.' Open Democracy August 
25,2006; at http://www.opendemocracy.netldemocracy-fukuyamalfukuyama_3852.jsp 
Fukuyama F (2007) 'Keeping up with the Chavezes' Wall Street Journal February 1 2007 
Ganor B (2002) 'Defining Terrorism: Is one man's Terrorist another man's Freedom Fighter?' 
Police Practice and Research 3: 4, 287-304 at 295. 
Garland J., Spalek B., Chakraborti N., (2006) 'Hearing Lost Voices. Issues in Researching 
'Hidden' Minority Ethnic Communities'. 406 Brit J. Criminology 2006. 423 
Gearty C (2003) "Terrorism and Morality" E.HR.L.R. 2003. 4. 377-383 
Geelani S.A.R (2009) Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners at 
http://bkaf.org.u klartic le 3. htm I 
Gelher E (198\) Muslim Society Cambridge: CUP 
Gill P (2009) 'Security Intelligence and Human rights.' Intelligence and National Security. 24, 
78. 
Gill T (1989) Litigation Strategy at the International Court. A Case Study of! he Nicaragua v. 
United States Dispute 
Giorgi A (2002) 'The Question of Validity in Qualitative Research.' Journal of 
Phenomenological Psychology, 33(1): 1 
Gitlin T. (1980) The Whole World is Watching: The Making and Unmaking of the New Left. 
Berkley: University of California Press. 
Glasius M & Kaldor M (2002) "The State of Global Civil Society: Before and After September 
11" in Glasius et al (editors) Global Civil Society 2002 New York: Oxford University Press. 
Pp.3-34 
Glennon M (1992) 'State Sponsored Abduction' 86 AJIL 746 
271 
Glover J (2007) Sufism and Jihad in Modern Senegal: the Murid Order Rochester New York: 
University of Rochester Press. 
Goldman R.K (2006) "Under the counter terrorism." Euro. Law, 2006 , 61 
Goldsmith AJ (2010) "Policing's new visibility." Brit. J Criminol. 2010,50(5) 914-934. 
Goodson L & Philimore J (2004) Qualitative Research in Tourism: Ontologies, Epistemologies 
& Methodology. Routledge 
Gould M (2008) 'Islam, the Law and the sovereignty of God' Policy Review 0:149 
Gray C (2002) 'The US National Security Strategy and the New Bush Doctrine' on Pre emptive 
Self Defence', 2 (2002) Chinese Journal of International Law 440 
Gray E., Jackson J. & Farrall S (2011) "Feelings and functions in the fear of crime: applying a 
new approach to victimisation insecurity." Brit. J Criminol. 2011, 51 (I), 75-94 
Greenberg M.H & Norton A.R (1980) International Terrorism: An Annotated Bibliography and 
Research Guide. Westview Press, Boulder, CO 
Greenwood C (1996) The International Court of Justice and the Use of Force, in V. Lowe/M. 
Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty Years of the International Court of Just;ce, 1996,373-85 
Greer S (2008) 'Human rights and struggle against terrorism in the UK' EHRLR 2008,2, 163-
172 
Greer S (2010) "Anti - terrorist laws and the UK's 'suspect Muslim community': a reply to 
Pantazis and Pemberton." Brit. J Criminol. 2010, SO( 6), 1171-1190. 
Grieve D (2006) "A well-ordered society? It's time to cry freedom" The Times May) 6, 2006 
Guillaume G (2003) 'Terrorism and International Law,' Grotius Lecture, British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, London, 13 November 2003 
Gunaratna R (2003) Inside Al Qaeda Global Network afTerror New York: Berkley Books 
Gunaratna R & Oreg A (2010) 'AI Qaeda's Organizational Structure and its Evolution.' SlUdies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 33: 1043-1078, 2010 
Halberstam M (1992) 'International Kidnapping' 86AJIL 736 
Haleem I (2004) "Micro Target, Macro Impact: The Resolution of the Kashmir Conflict as a key 
to Shrinking AI-Qaeda's International Terrorist Network." Terrorism & Political Violence, 
VoI.J6 (No.l) Spring 2004 
272 
Hall S., Lewis G., & MCLoughlin E (1998) The Report on Racial Stereotyping. Milton Keynes: 
Open University 
Hanniman W (2008) "Canadian Muslims, Islamaphobia and National Security Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police." International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 2008,36(4) at 280. 
Hansard, HL col. 586: November 11,2008. 
Hansard HL vo!. 677, co!. 583 (17 January 2006),' Baroness Scotland. 
Hansard HC vol. 439, col. 429 (9 November 2005), Hazel Blears 
Hansard, HL Vo\. 676, col. 455 (December 5,2005). 
Hansard Commons Draft Terrorism Bill, Written and Oral Evidence, HC 515-1, October 11, 
2005 
Hansard, House of Commons Vol. 438, Cols 371-372, October 26,2005 
Hansard HC vol., 438, col. 994 (3 March 2005). 
Hansard HC vo\. 449, col. 493 (20 July 2006). 
Hansard HC vol. 353, col. 655 (10 July 2000). 
Hansard HL vol. 613, col. 252. (16 May 2000). 
Hansard HC Standing Committee D, col. III (25 January 2000). 
Hansard HC Standing Committee D col. 56 (18 January 2000), Charles Clarke 
Hansard HC Vol. 904, col. 475, January 28 1976 
Haque, M. S. (2003), "The Revival of Realism in International Politics After September 11 and 
Its Ethical Impact". International Journal of Politics and Ethics. Vol 3 Issue I, p. 135. Nova 
Science Publishers. . 
Haque, S. (2003b), The_Amnesty International, Rights at Risk. Amnesty's International Concerns 
Regarding the Security Legislation and Law Enforcement Measures. London. Amnesty 
International, 2002, at p. 5. 
Harris D & Joseph S (1995) (Editors) The International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights & 
UK law. Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Harris L (2006) 'Jihad Then and Now' Policy Review 2006, 139:71 
273 
Hassan F (1982) 'The Sources of Islamic Law', 1982, 76 Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law 67 
Hayman A (2009) The Terrorist Hunters Bantam Press: London 
Heck P (2004) 'Jihad Revisited' Journal of Religious Ethics, 32( 1),2004: 96-98 
Hegghammer T (2010) Jihad in Saudi Arabia - Violence and Pan Islamism since 1979. 
Cambridge: CUP 
Hegghammer T (2010111) 'The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of 
Jihad.' International Security 35(3), Winter 2010/11,53-94 
Henderson K.A (1998) 'Researching Diverse Populations.' Journal of Leisure Research, 30( 1): 
157. 
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (1997) Winning the Race: Policing Plural 
Communities. HMIC Thematic Inspection Report on Police Community and Race Relations. 
London: Home Office. 
Herman E (1982) The Real Terror Network. Boston: South End Press; 
Hewitt, T. (1997) "Kashmir the Unanswered Question". History Today Vol 47, Issue 9, 
September 1997. p. 607. 
Higgins R & Flory M (editors) (1997) Terrorism and International Law. Routledge: London 
Highet K (1987) Evidence, the Court, and the Nicaragua Case, AJIL 81 (1987), 1. 
HiIlyard P (1993) Suspect Community: People IS Experiences of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts 
in Britain. London: Pluto Press. 
Hilali A.Z (2005) 'Confidence and Security - Building Measures for India and Pakistan' 
Alternatives; Global, Local. Political 30:2, p.191 
Hilali, A. (1999.), "Kashmir: A Dangerous Flashpoint in South Asia". Bulletin of Concerned 
Asian Scholars. Vol 31, Issue 2. p. 62. 
Hindle G (2007) "Policing Terrorism in the UK" Policing (2007) I (I): 38-42. 
Hindu Times, October 31, 1999 
Hirschi R (2005) "Preserving Hegemony? Assessing the Political Origins of the EU constitution" 
3 Int '11. Const. L. 269, May 2005 
274 
HM Government (2011 b) CONTEST. The UK's Strategy for Countering Terrorism July 20 II 
Cm 8123 . . 
H.M.Go:emment (March 2009) Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare The UK's Strategy jar 
Countermg International Terrorism. London: Crown copyright. Cm. 7541 
HM Government (2006) Countering International Terrorism: The UK's Strategy. London: 
HMSO, July 2006 
HM Treasury (2007) The Financial Challenge to Crime and Terrorism. Home Office, Serious 
and Organised Crime Agency, and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. London: HM Treasury. 
February 2007. 
HMSO (2008) The National Security Strategy o/the United Kingdom. Cm 7291. March 2008 
HMSO (2007) Preventing Violent Extremisms: Department for Communities and Local 
Government. London: HMSO. April 2007. 
Hoffman B. (1998) Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press, New York 
Hoffman B (2002) 'Religion and Terrorism Interview with Or Bruce Hoffman' 
http://www.religioscope.com/info/articles/003Hoffmanterrorism.htm 22/2/2002 
Hoffman B (2006) Inside Terrorism revised edition. Columbia Uni~ersity Press: New York 
Hoffman B (2008) 'The myth of grass roots terrorism: why Osama bin Laden still matters.' 
Foreign Affairs 87(3), May-June 2008, 133-138. 
Hogg R (2007) Submission No.6 to PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Terrorist 
Organisation Listing Provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995, 31 January 2007 
Home Affairs Committee (2005-06) 'Terrorism and Community Relations' 6th Report. HC 165 
-1 para. 
Home Affairs Committee (2007) Young Black People and (he Criminal Justice System. Second 
Report of Session: 2006-07. Vol. 1. London: TSO 
Home Office (2004) Building Communities. Beating Crime: A Better Servicejor the Twenty-
First Century. Norwich: The Stationary Office. 
Home Office (2005) Neighbourhood Policing: Your Police, Your Community; Our Commitment, 
London: Home Office Communication Directorate. 
Home Office (2007) Options for Pre-Charge Detention in Terrorist Cases. London: HMSO 
275 
Home Office (2009) Home Office Statistical Bulletin; Operation of police powers under the 
Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stops and searches. Great 
Britain 2008109. 26 November 2009. London: HMSO 
Home Office (2009) 'Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The UK's Strategy for Countering 
International Terrorism.' Cm. 7547, London 
Home Office (2009) Examining Officers under the Terrorism Act 2000 Code of Practice. 
London: TSO 
Home Office (20 I 0) 'What perceptions do the UK public have concerning the impact of counter 
terrorism legislation implemented since 2000?' March 2010, Occasional Paper 88. London: 
Crown copyright. DSTI 
Home Office (2011) Prevent Strategy June 2011. London: HMSO. Cm 8092 
Home Office (2011) The Government Response to Report/rom the Joint Committee on the Draft 
Detention of Terrorist Suspects (Temporary Extension) Bills. Session 2010-12 HL Paper 161, 
HC Paper 893. Draft Detention of Terrorist Suspects (Temporary Extension) Bills. November 
2011. London: HMSO. Cm.8220. 
Home Office (2011) at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/review-of-prevent-
strategy/ 
Home Office (2012) Code of Practice (England, Wales and Scotland) for the Exercise (~lS{op 
and Search Powers under Section 43 and 43A of the Terrorism Act 2000 and The Authorisation 
and Exercise of Stop and Search Powers relating to Section 47A of, and Schedule 6B to, the 
Terrorism Act 2000. London: HMSO. May 2012 
Home Office (2012) 'Review of the Operation of Schedule 7 A Public Consultation.' (Office for 
Security and Counter-Terrorism). Crown Copyright 
Home Office Circular 8/2006, The Terrorism Act 2006 
Hope C (2011) "Wikileaks British Muslims sending problem children 'al Qaeda' schools." The 
Telegraph 4 February 2011. http://www.telegraph.co.ukfnews/worldnews/wikileaks 
Houen A (2002) Terrorism and Modern Literature: From Joseph Conrad to Claran Carson. 
OUP: Oxford 
House of Commons (1999) Hansard Debates. 14 Dec 1999, vol. 341 
House of Commons (1999/2000) Cm 4774 'Human Rights Foreign & Commonwealth Office 
Annual report 2000' - House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online. 
276 
House of Commons Research Paper 01172, (2001) 'September 11: The Response', available at 
http://www . pari iament. uk/commons/lib/research/rp200 I IrpO I-072.pd f. 
House of Commons (2002) Hansard Debates, col. 596-604. Jack Straw (The then Foreign 
Secretary). 10 June 2002 
House of Commons (2002) Hansard Debates, Mr Richard Spring. 10 June 2002, co1.598. 
House of Commons (2002) Hansard Debates Mr Khalid Mahmood. 10 June 2002, Col. 602. 
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2004) Written Evidence: Memorandum submitted 
by the Metropolitan Police Authority. 8 July 2004, HC 866 - i. 
House of Commons (2005) Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7 July 
2005. (2005-06 HC 1087) 
House of Commons (2006) Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Policy and 
Human Rights - Twenty-Fourth Report. HL 240 (HC 1576) Session 2005-06 Printed 24 July 
2006 
House of Commons (2006b) Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 711r 
JUly 2005. HMSO: London 
House of Commons (200612007) Report submitted on I January 2007 
House of Commons (2006/07) South Asia Foreign Affairs Select Committee. 41h Report with 
proceedings, evidence and appendices. (HC 55) 
House of Commons (2007/2008) Cm 7340 'Human Rights Annual Report 2007'. House of 
Commons Parliamentary Papers Online. 
House of Commons (2010) Preventing Violent Extremism. 6th Report of Session 2009-\0. HC 
65. London: HC Published. 30 March 2010. 
House of Commons (2010) Report to House of Commons Communities and Local Government 
Committee. Preventing Violent Extremism. 6th Report of Session 2009-10. HC 65. London: 
House of Commons. 30 March 2010. 
House of Commons Affairs Committee, 4th Report of Session 2005-06: Terrorism Detention 
Powers; HC 910 - I, 54. 
House of Commons Standing Committee D, col. 65 (18 January 2000) 
House of Lords Constitution Committee (2008-09) Fast Track Legislation (2008-09 HL I 16) 
http://www.vakilnol.com/bereacts/Laws/Jammu-And-Kashmir-Disturbed-Areas-Act-1992.htm. 
277 
http://www.satp.orglsatporgtp/countries/indialstates/jandk/document/actsandordinances/J&KSpe 
cialpoweract.htm. 
http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki.harkat-ul-mujahideen. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilterrorism-in-kashmir. I Ith July 2006. 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/jun/09jk2.htm. Date: 12 July 2006. 
http://www.edms.org.ukledms/2008-2009/312.htm. 
hUp:llwww.meramirpur.com/pahari-langua-e-and-its-implications-for-britain.html. 
http://www.britsoccrim.org/ethical.htm 
http://www.islamreligion.com/articles/238/ 
http:www.manchesterairport.co.uklmanweb.nsf/contentlManchesterAirporttotestnewgenerationo 
fprivacyfriendIysecurityscanners. 
Hunt A (2007) 'Criminal prohibitions on direct and indirect encouragement of terrorism', Crim. 
L. R. 2007,441-458. 
Hunt A (2006) 'The council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism', 4 European 
Public Law 603. 
Huntington S.P (J 996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order London: 
Simon & Schuster 
Huq A.Z. Tyler T.R. & Schulhofer S. J. (2011) "Mechanisms for Eliciting Co-operation in 
Counterterrorism Policing: Evidence From the UK." Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 8:4; 
728-761, December 2011 
Ignatieff M (2005) The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press at 144. 
Ignatius D (2006) "Are we Fighting Islamic Fascists?" Washington Post 18 August, 2006: 
p.A21. 
Innes M, Roberts C & Innes H (2011) 'Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing. A Report to the 
Association of Chief Police Officers.' Cardiff: Cardiff University (Universities' Police Science 
Institute) at 86. 
Innes M (2006) "Policing Uncertainty, Countering Terror through Community Intelligence and 
Democratic Policing." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 
2006, 605; 222. 
278 
Intelligence and Security Committee Report on the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 
(Cm.6785, London 2005) 
Intelligence and Security Committee (2009) Could 7/7 have been Prevented? Review of the 
Intelligence on the London Terrorist Attacks on July 2005. London: HMSO, May 2009 
International Crisis Group (2003a) Kashmir: The View from Islamabad. 4 December 2003. ICG 
Asia Report No.68. Islamabad / Brussels. 
International Crisis Group (2003b) Kashmir: The View From New Delhi. BrusselslNew Delhi: 
ICG Asia Report No. 69 
Islamic HRC (2001) UK Today: The Anti-Muslim Backlash in the Wake of 11th September 2001. 
London 
Islamic HRC (2003) Failure to Repatriate Britons Masks Islamaphobia Policy: London. II 
August 2003. 
Israeli R (2004) 'Palestinian Women: The Quest for Voice in the Public Square Through 
Islamikaze Martyrdom' Terrorism and Political Violence 2004, 16: 66-96 
. Jabara A (2002) "Introduction" Arab Studies Quarterly. 2002 
Jakab A (2011) 'Breaching constitutional law on moral grounds in the fight against terrorism: 
implied presuppositions and proposed solutions in the discourse on 'the rule of law versus 
terrorism'.' 1. J. C. L. 2011,9(1),58-78. 
Jalal A (2003) Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy. Routledge: New York 
Jamieson A (1989) The Modern Mafia Conflict Studies, No.224, Research Institute of the Study 
of Conflict & Terrorism 
Jahangir A (2008) Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief Mission 
to the UK. (United Nations, 7 February 2008) 
Jasper L. (2005) Comment and Debate: Trevor Philips is in danger of giving succour to racists: 
Any chair of the eRE who doesn't know whether 'coloured' is inappropriate term should 
consider his position. The Guardian (London) Final Edition. October 12,2005, p.32 
Jellicoe Report (1983) Review o/the Operation o/the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1976, Cmnd 8803 
Jenkins B (1984) The Who, What, Where, How & Why of Terrorism. Paper presented at Detroit 
Police Department Conference on "Urban Terrorism: Planning or Chaos": Detroit 
279 
Jenkins B (1987) "The Future Course ofInternational Terrorism" in Kurz A ibid 
Jenkins B (1985) International Terrorism: The Other World War. Santa Monica: RAND 
Joffe W.S (2001) 'Investigating the Acquisition of Pedagogical Knowledge: Interviews with a 
Beginning Teacher of the Gifted.' Roeper Review, 2001, 23(4): 219. 
Johns A. H (1995) 'Sufism in Southeast Asia: Reflections and Reconsiderations'. Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 1995, 26( I), 169 
Joint Committee on Human Rights Hansard HC vol. 443, col. 1664, March 16, 2006, Session 
2005-2006, HL 75 - 1 I HC 561 -1 
Joly D (2005) Muslims in prisons: A European challenge. Full Research Report. Economic and 
Social Research Council: Swindon 
Jones A., Bowers R., & Lodge H.D (2006) The Terrorism Act 2006. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Jones I & Gatton C (2003) Research Methodsfor Sport Studies. Routledge: London 
Juergensmeyer M (2001) quoted in Dart J. (2001) "Bin Laden's Strategy: War and the Religious 
Imagination" The Christian Centure, Vo1.l18; Issue: 30. Nov.7 2001 
Jupp V (1989) Methods of Criminological Research. London: Unwin 
Jordan J & Boix L (2004) "AI-Qaeda and Western Islam" Terrorism & Political Violence, 
Vo1.l6, No.1 Spring 2004. pp 1-17 
Kadian R (1993) The Kashmir Tangle: Issues and Options. Westview Press 
Kahn (1987) From Nuremberg to The Hague: The United States Position in Nicaragua v. United 
States and the Development ofIntemational Law, Yale JIL 12 (1987) 
Karsedt S (2003) "Terrorism and New Wars", in Walker & Gokay (editors) (2003) 11 September 
2001: war, terror andjudgement. London: Frank Cass 
"Kashmir: The Way Forward", Kashmir Study Group (February 2000) at 
http://www.kashmirstudygroup.org/bottom.html. 
Keene S. D (2011) 'Terrorism and the Internet: a double - edged sword.' 1. M. L. C. 2011, 14(4), 
359-370 
Keough, A. (2006) "Crime Brief' 156NLJ756.5May2006. 
280 
Khaddhuri M (1955) War and Peace in the Law of Islam The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore & 
London 
Khadduri M (1966) The Islamic Law of Nations - Shaybani's Siyar: Translated with an 
introduction notes and appendices by M Khadduri. The John Hopkin's Press, Baltimore, 
Maryland 
Khaliq U (2002) 'The accommodation and regulation of Islam and Muslim practices in English 
law', Ecc L.J. 2002. 6(31). 332-351 
Khan Z (2000) Diasporic Communities and Identity Formation: The post-colonial Kashmiri 
experience in Britain. University ofLuton: Luton. 
Kibble D (1996) "The Threat of Militant Islam: A Fundamental Reappraisal" Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism 19; 353-364 
Kirkpatrick J (1984) "Defining Terrorism" Catholicism in Crisis. Sept.1984, 41-4; 
Klaic D. & Orr J (editors) (1990) Terrorism and Modern Drama. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press 
Knapp M.G (2003) 'The Concept and Practice of Jihad in Islam' Parameters 2003, 33(1):82 
Korbel, 1. (1956) "The Danger in Kashmir". Princeton University Press. 
Kostakopoulou D (2006) "Thick, Thin and Thinner Patriotisms: Is This All There Is?" 26 O.!LS 
73-106, 85-6 
Kumar M (2005) 'The Hidden Conflict: False Optimism and Silent Strategy In Kashmir'. 
Harvard International Review, 2005, 26(4) at 36 
Kundnani A (2009) Spooked. How not to prevent violent extremism. London: Institute of Race 
Relations 
Kurz A (1987) Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism. New York: Praeger publisher 
Kurtz S (2002) The Future of 'History': Francis Fukuyama vs. Samuel P Huntington.' Policy 
Review 
Kurzman C. (Editor) (1998) Liberal Islam: A Source Book Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Kurzman C (2011) 'Where are All the Islamic Terrorists?' The Chronicle of Higher Education. 
JUly 31,2011. Accessed: http://chronicle.com/article/Where-Are-AII-IslamicIl28443/ 
La Torre M.A (2005) 'Self-Reflection - An Important Process for the Therapist.' Per.~pectives in 
Psychiatric Care. 2005,41(2): 85 
281 
Lacquer W (1977) Terrorism Boston-Toronto. Little, Brown & Co. p.1 09. 
Laquer W (1986) "Reflections on Terrorism" Foreign Affairs 65 (Fall, 1986),86-100; 
Laquer W (1987) The Age of Terrorism Boston: Little Brown 
Lacquer, Waiter (1999) The New Terrorism Fananticism, and the Arms of Mass Destruction. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.3 
Lacquer, W. (2004) "The Terrorism to Come" Policy Review 126: 2004 at p.49. Hoover 
Institution Press. 
Lahlou M.S &Tanega J (2007) 'Islamic Securitisation: Part II - A proposal for International 
Standards, legal guidelines and structures'. J.I.B.L.R 2007,22 (7),359-372 
Landers W. M. & Posner R.A (1975) "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group 
Perspective", 18 J.L. & Econ. 875 
Langton R (1998) 'Subordination, Silence, and Pornography's Authority,' in Post R (editor) 
Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
and J. Paul Getty Trust. 261-284 
Lauderdale P & Oliverio A (2005) "Terrorism as Deviance or Social Control: Suggestions for 
Future Research" International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. 46; 1-2; p.153 
Lauderdale, P. & Oliverio, A. (2005b) "Introduction: Critical Prospective on Terrorism" 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vo146: \-2: p. 3 
Leather K_ (2003) Kashmiri Separatists. Origins, Competing Ideologies and Prospects for 
Resolution of the Conflict. New York: Novinka Books. 
Leedy P.D & Omrod J.E (2010) Practical Research 9th edition. New Jersey: Pearson 
Publications 
Leeman R. W (1991) in Johnpoll B. K (editor) (1991) The Rhetoric of Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism. New York: Greenwood Press 
Legal Department of the IMF (2003) Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism: A Handbook for 
Legislature Drafting. Washington DC: IMF 
Leigh I (2008) 'National Security, Religious Liberty and Counter terrorism', in Moran J & 
Phythian M (editors) Intelligence, Security and Policing Post - 9/11.' Hampshire. Pal grave 
MacMillan 
282 
Leigh I & Lustgarten L (1994) In from the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary 
Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Leivesley S (2.0.06) 'Terrorism PLC: funding spectaculars and catastrophic risk in law'. JMLC 
2006,9(2), 141-156 
Liberty (2.0.04) 'The impact of anti terrorism powers on the British Muslim population.' London: 
Liberty 
Livingstone N.C. & Arnold T.E (1986) (eds) Fighting Back. Winning the War Against 
Terrorism. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books; 
Livingston S (1994) The Terrorism Spectacle. Boulder Co: Westview Press. p.2 
Lichter L. et al. (\ 982) "The Once and Future Journalists", Washington Journalism Review, 
December, 1982 
Locke J (169.0) in Hampton (1997) Political Philosophy Colorado: Westview Press 
Lodge J. (editor) (1988) The Threat of Terrorism. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 
London Anti Terrorist Branch (SOJ3) (2.0.05) "Submission in Support of Three Month Pre-
Charge Detention." 5 Oct 2.0.05. 
Londras F and Davis F (2.0 1 .0) 'Controlling the executive in times of terrorism: competing 
perspectives on effective oversight mechanism.' 0.J. L. S (2.0 1 .0), 3Q( I), 19 - 47 
Long C., Stansbury K. (1994) 'Performance Assessments for Beginning Teachers: Options & 
Lessons.' Phi Delta Kappan 1994, 76(4): 318 
Longstaff A & Graham J (2.0.08) "Anti-terrorism and police powers: should we be concerned?" 
Criminal Justice Matters, 73(1), 15-16. 
Lord Carlile of Berriew QC (2.0.09) Report on the Operation in 2008 of the Terrorism Act 2000 
and of Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006. London: Bell Yard. June 2.0.09. 
Lowe V & Young J (1978) 'Suppressing Terrorism under the European Convention' 1978, 25 
Netherlands fLR 3.05. 
Lowenstein L (2.0.06) 'The Psychological Aspects of Terrorism' JPN, 2006, 170, 752 
Lutz B & Lutz J (2.0.04) Global Terrorism New York, Routledge 
Lynch A, McGarrity N & Williams G (2.0.09) 'The Proscription of Terrorist Organisations in 
Australia.' Federal Law Review, Vo\. 37 at 3. 
283 
MacAmhlaigh C (2010) 'Case Comment. R~visting the rule of law under the ECHR: Gillan and 
Quinton v United Kingdom.' Edin L.R. 2010, 14(3),477-482 
Macpherson, W (1999) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, Report of an Inquiry by Sir William 
Macpherson ofCluny. London: Home Office Publications. 
Maillot A (2004) The New Sinn Faein: Irish Republicanism in the Twenty-First Century New 
York: Routledge 
Malanczuk P. (1997) Akehurst 's Modern Introduction to International Law Routledge: London 
Malik I (2002) Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Manningham-Buller, E. Dame (2007) "Partnership and Continuous Improvement in Countering 
Twenty First Century Terrorism." Policing 2007, 1 (I) 
Manzoor S (2005) 'What ifall Muslims weren't terrorists?' Guardian New5paper: London, 2nd 
March,2005 
Margolis, E. S. (2000), War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan. Kashmir. and 
Tibet. Routledge: New York: 
Marshall R. (2005) "How the 'War on Terrorism' Fuels More Violence", Washington Report on 
Middle East Affairs. Vo1.24: Issue 7; September- October 2005. p.7+. Copyright 2005 American 
Educational Trust; Gale Group; at p.7 
Maxwell J.A. (1996) Qualitative Research Design An Interactive Approach. Applied Social 
Research Method Series. Vol.41. London: Sage Publications 
May W.F (1974) "Terrorism as strategy and Ecstasy" Social Research 41. 1974. pp.277-98 
Mayer A.E (1991) Islam and Human Rights.' Tradition and Politics. Westview Press: Boulder, 
CO 
Mayhill A (2006) Community Engagement in Policing: Lessonsfrom the Literature. London: 
Home Office 
Maykut P & Morehouse R (1994) Beginning Qualitative Research: A Philosophic and A 
Practical Guide. London: Falmer Press 
Mazarr MJ (2004) ;The Psychological Sources of Islamic Terrorism: Alienation and Identity in 
the Arab World.' Policy Review 125:39 
McCulIoch J & Pickering S (2009) "Pre-crime and counter terrorism: imagining future crime in 
the 'war on terror'." Brit. J. Criminal. 2009,49(5),628-645. 
284 
McDonald B & Mir Y (2011) "AI-Qaida influences violent extremism. UK government 
prevention policy and community engagement." Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace 
Research Jan. 2011, 3(1) 32-44. 
McGoldrick D (2005) 'Multiculturalism and its discontents' HR L.Rev 2005,5(1), 27-56 
McVicar A., Munn-Giddings C& Abu-Helil C (2012) Exploring the development of action 
research in nursing and social care in the UK: A comparative bibliometric review of action 
research designs in social work (2000-2010). Sage Publications 
Middleton B (2011) "Rebalancing, reviewing or rebranding the treatment of terrorist suspects: 
the counter terrorism review 2011" J. Crim L. 2011, 75(3), 225-248 
Miller J (2010) "Stop and Search in England: a reformed tactic or business as usual." Brit. J. 
Criminol. 2010, 50(5), 954-974. 
Miller J.A (1979) "Political Terrorism and Insurgency: An Interrogative Approach" in Alexander 
Y. and Finger, op cit., pp65-91 
Mills C.W (1959) 'On intellectual craftsmanship' in Mills C. W (editor) The sociological 
imaginations pp. I 95-226. London. Oxford University Press 
Mill J.S (1989) On Liberty and other writings. (Editor: Collins S). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Milne S (2005) Comment and Debate: This law won't fight terror- it is an incitement to 
terrorism: Censorship, internment and bans on non-violent political parties will increase the 
likelihood of further attacks in Britain . The Guardian (London) - Final Edition. Guardian 
Comment & Debate, Pages. p.33. October 13, 2005 
Ministry of Justice (2007) Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 2006. London: 
HMSO. 
Moeckli D (2005) 'Discriminatory profiles: law enforcement after 911 1 and 711', E.H.R.L.R. 
2005, 5, 517-532 
Moeckli D (2007) "Stop and Search under the Terrorism Act 2000: A comment on R (Gillan) v 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis." ML.R 2007, 70(4),654-679. 
Molleda J-C. & Maeno A (2008) 'Balancing Public Relations with Socio-economic and political 
environments in transition: comparative, contextualized research in Columbia, Mexico and 
Venzuela.' Journalism & Communication Monographs 2008, 10(2): 115 
Mooney, J. & Young, J. (2005) "Imagining Terrorism: Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism, Two 
Ways of Doing Evil" Social Justice. Vol 23, Issue 1,2005; p. 113 
285 
Moore C. (2011) "The days of doing deals with Muslim Extremists are over." The Telegraph 4 
Feb. 2011. 
Moran J (2008) 'Politics, Security, Intelligence and Liberty after 9/11' in Moran J & Phythian M 
(editors) Intelligence. Security and Policing Post - 9/11.' Hampshire. Palgrave MacMillan 
Moran J & Phythian M (200S) "Introduction" in Moran J & Phythian M (editors) Intelligence. 
Security and Policing Post - 9/11. The UK's response to the 'War on Terror', Hampshire: 
Pal grave MacMillan 
Morris (2004) 'Islamaphobia: The Making of a Nasty British Myth', Sunday Times. 6th June, 
2004. 
Motley J.B (19SI) "International Terrorism. A New Mode of Warfare" International Security 
Review 6 (Spring 1981), pp93-123; Wright J.W (1984) "Terrorism: A Mode of Warfare" 
Military Review. Oct. 1984.35-45. 
Motzki H (2002) The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence. Meccan Fiqh before the Classic Schools' 
Brill: Boston 
Muller M (2008) 'Terrorism, Proscription and the Right to Resist in the Age of Conflict.' 
Denning Law Journal, 2008, Vol.20 pp.III-Dl. 
Murphy C (2005) "Securitizing Community Policing: towards a Canadian public policing 
model." The Canadian Review of Policing Research. Vol. I. 
Murray D (2011) "The Prevent strategy: a textbook example of how to alienate just about 
everybody." The Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uklnews/uknews/terrorism-in-the-
ukl7540456IThe-Prevent-strategy-a-textbook-example-of-how-to-alienate-just-about-
everybody.html. 
Murray S.A et al., (2009) 'Research Methods and Reporting' BMJ 24 October 2009; 339: 958-
960 
Mushkat R (1987) 'Is War Ever Justifiable?' International & Comparative Law Journal 1987,9, 
227 
Mustafa D (2005) '(Anti) Social Capital in the Production of an (un) Civil Society in Pakistan.' 
The Geographical Review. 2005, 95(3) at 328 (American Geographical Society). 
My then G., Walklate S & Khan F (2009) "I'm a Muslim, but I'm not Terrorist: Victimization, 
Risky Identities and the Performance of Safety." Brit 1. Crim 2009,49, 736-754. 
My then G & Walklate S (2006) "Criminology and terrorism: which thesis? Risk society or 
governmentality?" Brit, 1. Criminol. 2006, 46(3), 379-398 
286 
Naeem F.S (2009) 'Sufism and Revivalism in South Asia: Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanvi of 
Deoband and Mawlana Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareilly and Their Paradigms of Islamic 
Revivalism.' The Muslim World 2009,99(3),435 
Nafziger G.F & Watton M.W (2003) Islam at war: A History. Praeger Publishers: Westport 
Nagarajah S. (2005) G2: Inside story: Mistaken identity: Since the July 7 bombings much 
attention has been focused on the Muslim community while attacks on Hindus and Sikhs have 
been largely ignored. Guardian Feature Pages. The Guardian (London). September 6 2005 
Nathan K.S & Kamal M.H (2005) (editors) Islam in Southeast Asia: Political. Social & Strategic 
Challenges/or the Twenty-first century. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 
Neville P. "The Origins and Development of Irish Republicanism: Peter Neville Surveys the 
Growth of Republicanism in Ireland Up to the Present Day". History Review, 200 I. p.35 
Newburn T. & Reiner R (2004) "From PC Dixon to Dixon PLC: Policing and Police Powers 
since 1954" Crim.L.R 2004. August. 601-6/8 
Newell D & Courtney C (1991) Media Law - A year in the Media Law Society'S Gazette. LSG 
88.42 (17). 20 November 1991. 
Neyroud P (2007) "Community Policing" Policing 2007, I (2) at 127-129. 
Nickels H.C., Thomas L., Hickman M.J & Silvestri S (2010) Working Paper 13. A Comparative 
Study of the Representations oj'Suspect' Communities in Multi-Ethnic Britain and of their 
Impact on Irish Communities and Muslim Communities - Mapping Newspaper Content. London 
Met. University Institute for the Study of European Transformations. London 
Nimmorg D.D & Combs J.E (1985) Nightly Horrors: Crisis Coverage by Television Network 
News (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press); 
Noorani A.G (2002) "The Dixon Plan", Frontline, Vol. 19: 21, 21-25 October 2002. 
Nyazee LAX (2000) Islamic Jurisprudence (Usul al - Fiqh). Islamabad: Islamic Research 
Institute Press 
Nye J (2004) Soft Power: The means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs. 
Oba A.A (2002) "Islamic law as customary law: the changing perspective in Nigeria" ICLQ 817 
Office for National Statistics (20 I J) Population Estimates by Ethnic Group: Methodology Paper. 
Newport, Crown Copyright 
287 
Office for National Statistics (2011) Population Estimates by Ethnic Group 2002-2009. 18 May 
2011. Newport: Crown Copyright. 
Official Journal of the EU: 'Kashmir: present situation andfuture prospects. '(24/04/2008) 
Ollapally, D. (2003) "America's War on Terrorism on South Asia: Political and Military 
Dilemmas". White House Studies. Vol 3, Issue 4, p. 445 
Olivia J.G (2007) 'The legal protection of believers and beliefs in the UK'. Ecc L.J. 2007, 9(1). 
66-86 at 85-86. 
Oliverio, A. (1997) " The State of Injustice: The Politics of Terrorism and the production or 
order". International Journal of Comparative Sociology. Vo!. 38, 1-2; p. 48 
Onwuegbuzie AJ (2002) Why Can't We All Get Along? Towards a Framework for Unifying 
Research Paradigms.' Education, 122 (3): 518 
Oommen T.K (2001) "Religion as Source of Violence" The Ecumenical Review. Vo1.53, 2001. 
p.168 
Osho (2006) in http://www.oshoworld.com/newsletter/PDF/aug06/religion and terrorism.pdf 
Ousman A (2003) "Religious Violence and Absolute Solutions" Queen's Quarterly Vol.l1 0: 
Issue 3. Fall 2003. p.347 (Queen's Quarterly; Gale Group) 
Office of the Inspector General, US Dept. of Justice, "The September 11 Detainees: A review of 
the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of 
September 11 Attacks", June 2003. 
Pantazis C & Pemberton S (2009) "From the old to the new suspect community: examining the 
impacts of recent UK counter terrorist legislation." Brit. J. Criminol. 2009, 49(5), 646-666. 
Parmar A (2011) "Stop and Search in London: counter-terrorist or counter-productive." Policing 
and Society 21 :4, December 2011, 369-382 
Parmar S (2009) 'The challenge of 'defamation of religions' to freedom of expression and the 
interval human rights' EHRLR 2009, 3, 353-375 
Parenti, Michael, (1986) Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media. New York: St 
Martin's Press. 
Paris J (2010) Prospects jor Pakistan. London: Legatum Institute. 
Patton M (1990) Qualitative Evaluation & Research Methods Newbury Park: Sage 
288 
Paz R (1998) "Is there an 'Islamic Terrorism?"'. Institute for Counter-Terrorism 
http://wwwiot.org.11I 
Paust 1.:1. (1979) "A Definitional Focus" in Alexander Y. and Finger S.M (editors) Terrorism: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives. New York: John Jay Press; pp. 18-29 
Pease R (2005) 'Estate Planning for Middle East clients'. P. C.B 2005, 3. 143-154 
Peers S (2003) 'EU Reponses to Terrorism', 2003,52 1CLQ 227 
Pfaff W (2003) "Terrorism: Bush 11 redefines the term". Commonweal. Vo1.130. Issue ID. May 
23, 2003, p.S 
Pirie F (2010) 'Law before government: ideology and aspiration.' OJL.S 2010. 30(2). 207-228. 
Phinney 1.S (1990) "Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults: Review of Research" I OS 
Psychol Bull 499-514 
Phinney J.S et aI., (2002) "Ethnic Identity, Immigration, and Well-Being: An Interactional 
Perspective" 57 J Social Issues 493-510 
Phythian M (2008) 'In the Shadow of 9/1\ Security, Intelligence and Terrorism in the UK', in 
Moran J &Phythian M (editors) Intelligence. Security and Policing Post - 9/11.' Hampshire. 
Pal grave MacMiIlan 
Pilger J. (2008) "Hone that Ignorance, Fabricate that Fear." New Statesman. Vol. 137: 4903, June 
30200S 
Pillar P.R (2001) "Terrorism Goes Global: Extremist Groups Extend Their Reach Worldwide" 
Brookings Review. Vol. 19. Issue 4. Fall 2001. p.34 
Pinto M (2010) "What are Offences to Feelings Really About? A new regulative principle for the 
Multicultural Era." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, (OJLS) 2010, 30(4),695-723 
Pollitt K (2006) "Wrong War, Wrong Word" The Nation September 11,2006 issue. 
Porter J.R & Washington R.E (1993) "Minority Identity and Self Esteem" 19 Annu Rev Social 
139-6\ 
Posner R (1979) "Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory' 8 Journal of Legal Studies 
Posner R.A (1985) "An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law" Columbia Law Review October 
1985. 
Posner R (200 \) "The Speech Market" in Frontiers of Legal Theory 62-94 
289 
Posner R (200 I b) "Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis" 54 
STAN.L.REV. 737,741 
Post J.M (1987) "Rewarding Fire with Fire? Effects of Retaliation on Terrorist Group 
Dynamics" In Kurz A (editor) The Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism. New York, 
Pra~ger Publishers. 
Press Trust of India "Mushraff wants to meet Hurriyat Leaders". Indian Express, July 5, 2001, 
p. l. 
Provost R (2002) International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Cambridge University 
Press 
Pugach C.M (2001) "The Stories Choose to TelI: Fulfilling the Promise of Qualitative Research 
for Special Education", Education. Vo1.67, Issue 4; p.439 
Quddus M.A (1981) Pakistan: A case study of a Plural Society '. Minerva Associates: Pakistan. 
Raine J. W & Dunstan E (2007) "Enhancing Accountability in Local Policing." Policing 2007, 
1(3) at 327-341. 
Ramadan T (2004) Western Muslims and the Future of Islam Oxford University Press: Oxford 
Ramanathan U (2005) 'India and the ICe.' JI.C.J 2005, 3(3), 627-634 
Ranstorp M (1996) "Terrorism in the Name of Religion", Journal of International Affairs. 
Vo1.50, Issue I pAl 
Rapoport D. (1979) "The Politics of Atrocity" in Alexander & Finger, op cit., ppA6-61 
Rapoport D. & Alexander Y. (editors) (1982) The Morality of Terrorism: Religious &Secular 
Justifications. Oxford. Pergamon. 
Rathbone A & Rowley C.K (2002) "Terrorism" Public Choice 111,2002 
Ratner S.R (2005) 'Foreign occupation and international territorial administration: the chalIenges 
of convergence.' EJIL, 695 
Reason P & Rowan J (editors) (1981) A source book of new paradigm research. London: John 
Wiley & Sons 
Rees G & Moloney T (20 I 0) 'The latest efforts to interrupt supply lines: Schedule 7 to the 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.' Crim. L. R. 2010, 2,127-135. 
Report on the Operation in 2004 of the Terrorism Act 2000, at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/terrorism-act-2004-rep.pdf. 
290 
Rehman J (2000) 'Accommodating religious identities in an Islamic state: International law, 
freedom of religion and the rights of religious minorities' International Journal on minority and 
Group Rights 7, 139-165; 
Rehman J (2003/4) 'Islamaphobia after 9111: International terrorism, Sharia and Muslim 
minorities in Europe: The case of the UK', 3 European Yearbook of Minority Issues 217-35; 
Rehman J (2005) Islamic State Practices, International Law and the Threat from Terrorism. A 
Critique of the 'Clash of Civilisations' in the New World Order. Oxford: Hart Publishing 
Rehman J (2007) 'The Sharia, Islamic Family Laws and International Human Rights Law: 
Examining the Theory and Practice of Polygamy and Talaq' 21 INT JLPF 108 
Rehman J (2007b) 'Islam, 'War on Terror' and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the UK: 
Dilemmas of Multiculturism.' Human Rights Quarterly, 29(4), 2007, 831-878 
Rehman S (2009) British Kashmiris, Challenges and Opportunities. 
http://bkaf.org.uk/articlel.html 
Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the 
Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions 
in Iraq during Arrest, Internment and Interrogation, February 2004, available at: 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/reportl2004/icre_reportjraq_feb2004.htm 
Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7 July 2005.' (2005-06 HC 1087) 
Richardson (editor) (2004) Islamaphobia: Issues Challenges and Action. Trentham Books: Stoke 
Robertson D (1998) Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Roberts A (2004) "Righting Wrongs or Wronging Rights? The United States & Human Rights 
Post- September 11" EJIL 2004.15 (721). 
Romaniuk P & Fink N.C (2012) From Input to Impact Evaluating Terrorism Preventing 
Programs. Center on Global Counter terrorism Cooperation. (Canada, UK, Netherlands). 
Romero P.M (2006) "An Immunological Approach to Counter-Terrorism and Infrastructure 
defense law in electronic domains' 14 1nl 'I. J L & lnfo Tech 101 Spring 2006 
Ronczkowski, M. R. (2004) "Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime: Intelligence Gathering 
Analysis, an Investigations" CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL. 
Ronen Y (2010) 'Incitement to terrorist acts and international law.' L.JJ.L. 20 I 0,23(3),645-674. 
291 
Rorty R (1990) 'Pragmatism as anti-representationalism' in Murphy J.P (editor) Pragmatism: 
From Pierce to Davidson. Westview Press: Boulder, CO 
Rowan C & Mayne R (1829) The Nine Principles of Policing. 
http://www.civitas.org.uklpubslpoliceNine.php 
Rowe J.J. (2001) "The Terrorism Act 2000" Crim. L. R. 2001, July, 527-542 
Rubenfield J (2002) "A Reply to Posner", Stanford Law Review, Vo!. 54, 2002 
Runnymede Commission Report (The) (1997) Islamaphobia: a challenge for us all. London, at 4 
Sageman M (2004) Understanding Terror Networks Nov.2004: 
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2004/101.middleeast.sageman.understandingterrornetworks.html 
Sage man M (2008) 'The Next Generation of Terror: The World's Most Dangerous Jihadists No 
Longer Answer to Al Qaeda. The Terrorists we should fear most are self-recruited 
wannabes who find purpose in terror and comrades on the web. This new generation is 
even more frightening and unpredictable than its predeccors, but its evolution just may 
reveal the key to its demise'. Foreign Policy. 2008, 165:36 
Said E. W (2001) 'The Clash ofIgnorance' The Nation. October 22, 2001 
Sarantakos S (1993) Social Research Hampshire. Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Saul B (2006) Defining Terrorism in International Law Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Saul B (2006b) "The Legal Response of the League of Nations to Terrorism". Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 2006, 4 (1): 78-102 
SaulB (2005) 'Speaking of Terror: Criminalising Incitement to Violence.' UNSW Law Journal 
28(3), 2005, 868-886. 
Saul 8 (2005a) "Attempts to define 'Terrorism' in International Law" NILR 2005 Lll 57-83 
Saul B (2005b) "Definition of , Terrorism' in the UN Security Council 1985-2004". Chinese 
Journal of International Law 2005 4(1) 141-166 
Scan Ion T (1972) 'A theory of Freedom of Expression,' Philosophy and Public Affairs I (2) 
Winter 1972: 204-226 
Scarman, Lord (1981) The Brixton Disorders April 10-12 1981: Report of an Enquiry. London: 
HMSO. 
Schachter 0 (1994) "United Nations Law", in American Journal of International Law, Vo!. 87, 
1994. 
292 
Schaffert R. W (1992) Media Coverage and Political Terrorists: A Quantitative Analysis. (New 
York: Praeger Publishers) . 
Schauer F (1993) 'The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm' Ethics 103 (July 1993); 635-653 
Schelling T.C (1966) Arms & Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, especially 
"The Diplomacy of Violence" pp.I-34. 
Scheppele K.L (2011) 'Global security law and the challenge to constitutionalism after 9111.' P.L. 
20J J. April. 353-377. 
Schepel\e K.L (2006) "North American Emergencies: The Use of Emergency Powers in Canada 
and The USA" April 2006: 4 Int 'I J. Const.L.2 I 3 
Schmid A.P & De Gaaf J.F.A (1980) Insurgent Terrorism afJd the Western News Media: An 
Exploratory Analysis with a Dutch Case Study (Leiden); 
Schmid, A.P., Jangman, A. J. et al (1988) Political terrorism: A New Guide to Actors. Authors. 
Concepts, Data Bases. Theories and Literature. Transaction Books, New Brunswick 
Schmid A. P. (2011) (editor) Handbook of Terrorism Research London: Routledge. 
Schmid A.P (2012) "The Revised Academic Consensus Defintion of Terrorism." Per!lpectives on 
Terrorism May 2012, Vo\.6, Issue 2 
Scobeooa. (2001), "Asia: The Most Dangerous Place?" Parameters Vcl 31, Issue 2, p. 129. (US 
Army War College) 
Scott D (2002) Qualitative Research in Practice: Stories from the Field. Crows Nest, N.S. W: 
Alien & Unwin 
Sear L.H (2001) in The News International. Nov.21 2001 
Sedgwick M (2004) "AI-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism" Terrorism & Political 
Violence, Vol. 16, No.4 (Winter 2004) pp.795-814. Publishers: Taylor & Francis. Inc. 
Senurk R (2002) 'Adamiyyah and Ismah: The Contested Relationship between Humanity and 
Human Rights in Classic Islamic Law' 20028 Islam Arastirmalan Dergisi [Turkish Journal of 
Islamic Studies] 39-69. 
Shackle S (2010) 'The mosques aren't working in Bradistan.' New Statesman 20 August 20 I 0, at 
http://www.newstatesman.com/society /20 I 0/08/brad ford -bri ti sh-pakistan. 
Shah, S. (2005) "The UK 's Anti-Terror Legislation and House of Lords: The First Skirmish" 5 
HUM RTS. L. REV.403 2005. 
293 
Sharp D & Atherton S (2007) "To serve and protect? The experiences of policing in the 
community of young people from black and other ethnic minority groups." Brit. J Criminol. 
2007,47(5),746-763. 
Showkat A & Motta H.A (2003) "Declare 'em Dead: Families of disappeared men appeal [toJ 
PM." Srinagar Times, 18 April 2003. 
Shaw C.J (2007) 'Worldwide war on terrorist finance' JIBLR 2007,22(9),469-486 
Singer P (2004) in Nussbaum M.C & Sunstein C.R (Eds) Animal Rights: Current Debates and 
New Directions. Oxford University Press 
Sigal,L (1973) Reporters and Officials: The Organisation and Politics 0/ News Making 
(Lexington, Mass: Heath). 
Silke A (2008) 'Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization'. 
European Journal o/Criminology, 2008, 5: 99 
Silverman C (1998) 'An appeal to the UN: Terrorism must come within the Jurisdiction of an 
International Criminal Court' 4 New England & Comparative Law Annual: 
www.nesl.edu/intljournaJIVOL4/CS.HTM. 
Skinner D.E (2009) 'John Glover, Sufism and Jihad in Modern Senegal: The Murid Order'. 
A/Nco 2009, 79:2; 315 
Smith M.L.R (1997) Fighting for Ireland. The Military S(rategy of the Irish Republican 
Movement. Routledge, New York 
Sofaer A (1986) 'Terrorism and the Law' Foreign Affairs 901 
Sorial S (20 I 0) 'Can saying something make it so? The nature of seditious harm.' Law & Phi!. 
20 I 0, 29(3), 273-305. 
Sovndal V., De Kerchove G & Emmerson B (2012) 'Remembering the victims of terrorism: a 
collective commitment to respect for human rights.' E.H.R.L.R 201 2. 3, 247-248 
SpaJek B., El Awa S., & McDonald L.Z (2009) Police - Muslim Engagement and Partnerships 
for the Purposes of Counter Terrorism: An Examination. Project Report: 2009. University of 
Birmingham 
Spataro A (2008) 'Why do people become terrorists? A prosecutor's experience' .fIC) 2008, 
6(3), 507-524 
Spear, T. (1955) A History 0/ India. Penguin Books, Baltimore 
294 
Spence D (2002) "Shocking News" Ent L.R. 2002, 13(2), 27-30 
Spenkle D.H & ptercy F.P (2005) Research Methods in Family Therapy. Guildford Press: New 
York 
Spigelman J (2010) "The forgotten freedom: freedom from fear." I.C.L.Q 2010,59(3),543-570. 
Spinner-Haley J & Theiss-Morse E (2003) "National Identity and Self-Esteem" I Perspectives 
on Politics 515-32. 
Sproat P.A (2008) 'Counter terrorist Finance Policies in the UK: The Silver Bul\et for 
Terrorism?' in Moran J & Phythian M (editors) Intelligence, Security and Policing Post - 9/11 
The UK's response to the 'War on Terror '. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmil\an 
Sproat P (20JO) 'Counter terrorist finance in the UK: a quantitative and qualitative commentary 
based on open - source materials.' J. M L. C. (2010), 13(4),315-335. 
Stanley L (editor) (1990) Feminist Praxis. Routledge: London 
Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 2007/8: A Ministry of Justice Publication 
under section 95 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. London: Ministry of Justice. 
Stein R (2003) 'Evil as love and liberation: The mind of a suicidal religious terrorist', in Moss D 
(editor) (2003) Hating in the first person plural: Psychoanalytic essays on racism, homophobia, 
misogyny and terror. Other Press: New York 
Stohl M (1984) "National Interests and State Terrorism in International Affairs" Political 
Science 36 (July 1984) 37-52; 
Stohl M (1984b) "International Dimensions of State Terrorism" in Stohl M. and George A. (eds) 
The State as Terrorists. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, p43-58; 
Straw, J. (2002) "Statement by the Foreign Secretary" Jack Straw, House of Commons, London, 
JOth June 2002. http://www.sco.gov.uk!servlet. 
Street H (1977) Freedom, the Individual and the Law 4th edition. Penguin 
Stubbs R (1989) Hearts and Minds in Guerilla Warfare. Singapore: Oxford University Press 
Sunderland R (1964) Winning the Hearts and Minds of the People: Malaya 1948 - 1960. Santa 
Monica: RAND. 
Suter, K. (2005), "Terrorism on International Law". Contemporary Review October 2005. Vol 
287:1677, at p. 216 
Tarn C.J (2009) 'The use offorce against terrorists' E.J.I.L 2009, 20(2), 359-397. 
295 
Tashakkari A & Teddfe C (2003) (editors) Handbook ofmixed methods in the social and 
behavioural sciences. Sage: London. 
Times Higher Educational Supplement 24 July 2008: Vice Chancellor Sir Colin Campbell 
The Quran 
The Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism (1996) Cm.3420. London. 
The May Inquiry, Sir John May (1993-94) Report of the Inquiry into the circumstances 
surrounding the convictions arising out of the bomb attacks in Guildford and Woolwich in 1974, 
Final Report. HC 449 
The Guardian, July 15,2005, 'Attacks absolutely un-Islamic, says Muslim scholars' 
The Guardian, 24 May 2008: p.8; http://freehicham.co.uk 
The L10yd Report (1996) Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism. London: Cm 3420 
The Phi lips Commission (1981) Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure Report. (Cmnd 8092) 
HMSO: London. 
The Times 3 August 2004 
The Times, November 10, 2006 
The Times September 2 I, 2006 
Thiel D (2009) "Good cop, bad cop?" Public Service Review: Home Affairs 20 
Thorne K (2006) Proscription of terrorist groups in theUK. May 2006. 
http://www .hdcentre.org/files/Proscription UK.pd f 
Thornton S. & Mason L. (2007) "Community Cohesion in High Wycombe: A case study of 
Operation Overt." Policing 2007, 1(1),57-60 
Thornton T.P (1964) "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation", in Eckstein H (editor) (1964) 
Internal War: Problems & Approaches. New York: Free Press of Glencoe. 
Thrush B (1994) 'US Sanctioned Kidnappings Abroad' 1994,11 ArizJICL 181 
Tilman R (2002) 'Durkheim and Veblen on the Social Nature of Individualism.' Journal of 
Economic Issues, 2002, 36(4) : 1104 
296 
Tkacik J.H (2002) 'Kashmir: A 50 Year Controversy - Hindu and Muslim Hatreds Run Too 
Deep to be Resolved by Governments either in New Delhi or Islamabad.' World and I May 
2002, 17:5,20 
Tomkins A (2010) 'National security and the role of the court: a changed landscape?' L. Q.R 
2010, 126 (Oct), 543-567. 
Tony Blair, then Prime Minister, Hansard (2001), "International Terrorism and Attacks in the 
USA", Col. 603. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uklpalcm200102/cmhansard/voI0914/debtext/10914-01.htm. 
Townsend C (2002) Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Travis, A (2005) "Reprieve for 'extremist' mosques" Guardian Home Pages. p.1 O. Dec. 162005. 
London 
Trehan J (2002) 'Terrorism and the funding of terrorism in Kashmir'. Journal of Financial 
Crime Feb 2002, 9:3 at 20 I. 
Tuchman G (1972) "Objectivity as Strategic Ritual", American Journal of Sociology 77, 
Jan.1972, pp660-79. 
Turner P.S (1993) Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Moralist. Routledge: New York. 
United Nations (2012) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human righrs 
defenders, MO/'garet Sekaggyg. Mission to India (10-12 January 20 11). A/HRC/l9/551 Add. I. 6 
February 2012 
United Nations Security Council (1948) Resolution 47 (1948) Resolution of 21 April 1948 
United Nations Security Council (1950) Resolution 80 (1950) Resolution of 14 March 1950 
Van Den Hoonaard w.e (2001) 'Is Research-Ethics Review a Moral Panic?' The Canadian 
Review of Sociology & Anthropology. Vo1.38: I, p.19 
Vaughan B & Kilcommins S (2007) Terrorism, Rights and the Rule of law. Devon: Willan. 
Venkatraman A (2007) 'Religious Basis for Islamic Terrorism: The Quran and Its 
Interpretations.' Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30:3, 229-248 
Vertovec S (2002) in Haddad Y (editor) Muslims in the West: From Sojamers 10 citizens Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
Waddington P.AJ (2007) "Editorial" Policing 2007, 1(2), 129-131; see also Crawford A (2007) 
"Reassurance policing: feeling is believing" in Henry A & Smith DJ (editors) Tramjormalions 
of Policing. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
297 
Waldron J (2003) "Security and Liberty: The Imagery Of Balance. "Journal of Political 
Philosophy 2003, 11, 191. 
Walker, C & Home A (2012) 'Legislative Comment. The Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigations Measures Act 2011: one thing but not much the other.' Crim, L. R 2012, 6, 421-
438 
Walker C & Rehman J (2011) 'Prevent Responses to Jihadi Extremism' in Ramraj Vet al 
(editors) Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy. Second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Walker C (2011) Terrorism and the Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Walker C (201 Ob) 'Conscripting the public in terrorism policing: towards safer communities or a 
police state?' Crim. L. R. 2010, 6, 441-456. 
Walker C (2009) Blackstone's Guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation. Second Edition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
Walker C (2009b) 'Neighbour terrorism and the all risks policing of terrorism.' Journal of 
National Security Law and Policy 2009, 3: 121. 
Walker C (2008) 'Know thine enemy as thyself: Discerning friend from foe under anti -
terrorism laws.' 32. Melbourne Law Review 275. 
Walker C (2008b) 'The Pursuit of Terrorism with Intelligence', in Moran J & Phythian M (2008) 
(editors) Intelligence, Security and PoliCing Post - 9/11. The UK's response to the 'War on 
Terror'. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 
Walker C (2008c) "Keeping Control of Terrorists without Losing Control of Constitutional ism." 
Stanford Law Review, 2008,59: 1395-8 
Walker C (2006) 'Intelligence and Anti terrorism legislation in the UK.' Crime, Law & Social 
Change,44: 387 
Walker C (2006b) "Clamping Down on Terrorism in the UK." Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 4 (2006), 1137-1151 
Walker, C. P. (2005), CLR "Terrorist Offences: Terrorism Act 2006 Section II (I). Belonging to 
Proscribed Organization". 
Walker C (2004) "Terrorism & Criminal Justice: Past, Present & Future". Crim. L.R 2004 May, 
311-327 
298 
Walker C (2002) Blackstone's Guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Walker C (2000) 'Briefing on the Terrorism Act 2000', Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol. 
12:2 at 1-36. 
Walker, R. B. J. (2003) "War, Terror, Judgment" 11th September 2001: War. Terror and 
Judgment ". Walker, R. B. J. & Gokay, B. (editors). London. Frank Cass. 
Walklate S & My then G (2006) "Criminlogy & Terrorism which Thesis? Risk Society or 
Govermentality?" 46BRlTJ 379. May 2006 
Ward I (2008) 'God, terror and law' Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 2008,28(4),783-796 
Wardlaw G (1982) Political Terrorism: Theory. Tactics and Countermeasure. Cambridge: CUP 
Warren C (1988) Gender Issues in Field Research. London: Sage Publications. 
Washington Post (2011) 'Egypt's top Muslim leader responds to suicide bombing.' Washington 
Post January 2, 2011. accessed at: http://on 
faith. washingtonpost.com/on/faith/guestvoices/20 1110 I legypts _top _musl im Jeader _responds _to 
_suicide_bombing.html. 
Weiss B.G (2002) (editor) Studies in Islamic Legal Theory Publisher: Brill, Boston 
Weller M (2009) 'Settling self-determination conflicts: recent developments.' EJJL 2009. 20(1). 
111-165 
Wells H G (1925) The outline of History: Being a Plain History Life and Mankind. London: 
CasselI 
WheatJey S (2007) 'Democracy, Minorities and International Law', EHRLR. 2007. 2. 206-209 
Whitlock C (2005) 'Police retrace CIA's expensive Italian job', Sydney Morning Herald, 27 June 
2005. 
White J.R (2003) Terrorism 2002 Update. 4th edition. Thomson Wadsworth. 
Wiles E (2007) "Headscarves, Human Rights, and Harmonious Multicultural Society: 
Implications of the French Ban For Interpretations of Equality." 41 LSR 699-736 
Wilkinson P (1984) "State-Sponsored International Terrorism: The Problems of Response", The 
World Today, July 1984, 292-8; 
299 
Wilkinson P. (2003) "Implications of the attacks of 9111 for the future of terrorism", in Buckley 
M. & Fawn R (editors) (2003) Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11. Afghanistan and beyond. 
New York: Routledge Publication 
Williams R (2008) 'Civil and religious law in England: a religious perspective' Eec L J 2008. 
10(3) 262-282 
Williamson D (1986) "Terrorism - What Should We Do" in Terrorism. The Reference Shelf . 
Anzovin S. (editor) Vo1.58, No.3. (New York: H.W.Wilson) 
Wintour P (2011) "David Cameron tells Muslim Britain: stop tolerating extremists." The 
Guardian 5 Feb 2011. 
Wolf J (1989) Antiterrorist Initiatives. (New York's Plenum Press. 
Wolfendale J (2007) " Terrorism, Security and the Threat of Counter-Terrorism," in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 2007, 30: 75-92. 
Wong-Wylie G. (2007) 'Barriers and Facilitators of Reflective Practice in Counsellor Education: 
Critical Incidents from Doctoral Graduates.' Canadian Journal of Counselling 2007, 41 (2): 59 
Wright J. W (1984) "Terrorism: A Mode of Warfare" Military Review. Oct. 1984.35-45. 
Viallancourt P.M (1986) When Marxists Do Research New York: Greenwood Press 
Yahya H (2002) Islam Denounces Terrorism Amal Press: Bristol 
Yorke J. (2004) "Europe's Judicial Inquiry in Extradition Cases: Closing the Door on the Death 
Penalty". E.L.Rev. 2004,29(4) 546-556. 
Zawati H.M (2001) Is lihad a Just War? War. Peace and Human Rights under Islamic and 
Public International Law. Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY 
Zutshi, C. (2005) "Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies and Prospects for 
Resolution of the Conflict." Pacific Affairs. Vol 78, Issue 1: 148. 
300 
List of Cases 
A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] HL Reports 56 
A. X & Y v Secretary of State for the Home Office [2002] EWCA Civ. 1502 
Attorney General's Re! (No. 3 of 1993) [1993] N.1. 50 
Austin v United Kingdom (39692/09); (2012) 55 EHRR 14; [2012] Crim L.R. 544; Times, March 
26,2012 
Brogan v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 117 
Brogan and others v United Kingdom App nos. 11209, 11234, 11266/84, 11386/85, Ser A 145-8 
(1988) 
cc v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2011] EWHC 3316 (Admin). 
Colon v The Netherlands App No. 49458/06 (2012) 55 EHRR SE5 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Raissi [2008] EWCA Civ. 1237 
Cullen v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster [2003] UKHL 39 
Exparte Lynch (1984) 28 June QBD 
Gillan & Quinton v United Kingdom (2010) 50 EHRR 45; App no. 4158/05, 12 January 2010 
HM Advocate v Von 1979 S.L.T (Notes) 62 HCJ 
Libya v United Kingdom; Libya v United States, 1992 ICJ Rep 3, 114 (Orders of April 14) 
Liversidge & Anderson [1942] A.C. 206 
Lord Alton of Liverpool and others (In the Matter of the People's Mojahadeen Organisation of 
Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department PCI02/2006, 30 November 2007 
Mc Veigh and others v United Kingdom (1981) 5 EHRR 71 
Nicaragua v USA ICJ Rep. 1986, 14 
Norwoodv United Kingdom Application No: 23\3\/03, November 16,2004 
O'Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] AC 286 
301 
